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Abstract 
This thesis examines how United States federal courts can review the 
President's exercise of the war powers to detain American citizens, or non-
citizens having similar rights, as unlawful combatants. It argues that the 
separation of powers doctrine, based on Lockean principles, permits probing 
judicial review of such an executive detention, where the President exercises 
the war powers in a way that effectively adjudicates individual rights or 
impacts upon domestic affairs. 
The constitutional controversy over unlawful combatant detentions is 
fundamentally a separation of powers problem. Existing functionalist and 
formalist theories about the separation doctrine, as well as dichotomous 
debates about individual rights versus national security, fail to reconcile 
judicial deference to executive decisions in sorne war powers cases with closer 
scrutiny in others. This thesis therefore proposes a new separation of powers 
theory that explains the existing war powers jurisprudence, while establishing 
princip les upon which courts can vigorously review future executive war 
powers decisions that interfere with individual rights or impact upon domestic 
matters, such as with the detention of a citizen as an alleged unlawful 
combatant. 
The thesis first sets out a separation of powers theory based on the 
political thought of John Locke, placing upon each branch a fiduciary dut y to 
make decisions only in ways best calculated to serve the public good. The 
"deliberative processes" approach to the separation doctrine, growing out of 
this fiduciary dut y, functionally distributes constitutional power among the 
branches depending upon which one is most institutionally suited to resolve 
the matter at hand. Judicial application of the political question doctrine in 
past war powers cases demonstrates such a Lockean deliberative processes 
analysis, in the ways that courts have questioned judicial competency to 
scrutinize the executive's strategic military decisions. Cases dealing 
specifically with unlawful combatant detentions, in tum, show that judicial 
competence to review executive military decisions increases when the 
President functionally adjudicates individual rights of the citizen, a 
deliberative process for which the courts are more institutionally competent. 
Accordingly, this thesis concludes that courts can review executive unlawful 
combatant detentions under adjudicative standards of legality, procedural 
faimess, and reasonableness. 
Résumé 
La présente étude porte sur la manière dont les juridictions des Etats-
Unis peuvent contrôler l'exercice par le Président des pouvoirs de guerre dont 
il dispose pour mettre et maintenir en détention des ressortissants américains 
ou des étrangers ayant des droits similaires et définis comme des combattants 
illégitimes. L'auteur montre que le principe de séparation des pouvoirs inspiré 
par Locke permet le contrôle judiciaire de ces détentions administratives, dès 
lors que le Président exerce les pouvoirs de guerre dont il dispose d'une 
manière qui, d'un point de vue fonctionnel, revient à une décision quasi 
judiciaire portant sur des droits individuels ou ayant une incidence sur des 
questions internes. 
La controverse constitutionaliste que soulèvent les détentions de 
combattants illégitimes se pose fondamentalement en termes de séparation des 
pouvoirs. Les théories fonctionnalistes et formalistes, comme la dichotomie 
débattue entre droits individuels et sécurité nationale, n'expliquent pas 
pourquoi certaines décisions font montre d'une déférence à l'égard des 
décisions de l'exécutif pendant que d'autres les soumettent à un contrôle plus 
serré. L'auteur propose donc une nouvelle théorie de la séparation des 
pouvoirs qui permet à la fois d'expliquer la jurisprudence rendue sur la 
question des pouvoirs de guerre et d'établir des principes sur lesquels les 
tribunaux pourront se fonder pour passer rigoureusement au crible les futures 
décisions prises par l'exécutif dans le cadre des pouvoirs de guerre, et qui 
méconnaîtraient des droits individuels ou interviendraient dans des affaires 
internes, comme c'est le cas avec la mise et le maintien en détention de 
personnes présumées combattants illégitimes. 
La première partie de la thèse propose une théorie de la séparation des 
pouvoirs inspirée de la pensée politique de Locke, imposant que les décisions 
prises par chaque branche du pouvoir le soient sous des formes les plus à 
même de servir le bien commun. De cette obligation de loyauté (jiduciary 
duty) peut se déduire une nouvelle approche de la doctrine de séparation des 
pouvoirs en tennes de « processus délibératifs» : le pouvoir constitutionnel est 
fonctionnellement réparti entre les diverses branches en fonction de leur 
aptitude institutionnelle à résoudre au mieux la question en cause. 
L'application judiciaire de la doctrine de la question politique dans les affaires 
qui ont eu trait aux pouvoirs de guerre démontre cette analyse lockéenne des 
processus délibératifs: les juridictions ont douté de l'existence de leur 
compétence à contrôler les décisions militaires stratégiques de l'exécutif. Les 
affaires ayant eu à connaître spécifiquement des détentions de combattants 
illégitimes montrent en revanche que l'étendue de la compétence en matière de 
contrôle des actes du gouvernement en matière militaire augmente lorsque le 
Président prend des décisions équivalent fonctionnellement à des décisions 
judiciaires individuelles sur des droits de l'homme, un processus délibératif 
dans lequel les tribunaux ont davantage de compétence institutionnelle. Dès 
lors, l'auteur conclut que les tribunaux peuvent exercer un contrôle des actes 
de l'exécutif en matière de détention de combattants illégitimes, à l'aune des 
principes juridictionnels de légalité, du procès équitable et du raisonnable. 
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Preface 
The attacks against the United States on September Il, 2001 need no 
recounting, nor do the main events in the so-called "war against terrorism." 
This was a new kind of unconventional conflict. Ignited by devastating 
terrorist attacks against civilians and domestic infrastructure, planned and 
carried out by radical religious extremists, this "war" was one in which the 
United States had no traditional state enemy. Even with the more 
conventional military actions in Afghanistan, the United States nevertheless 
had to take into account that the al-Qaeda organization, ostensibly under the 
leadership of Osama bin Laden, was a complex, international, and sub-state 
entity. While it could field tenacious field combatants, as in Afghanistan, it 
also had cooperation from radical Islamic groups around the world, as weIl as 
a global network of operatives living in many western countries and trained to 
commit terrorist actions. Sorne of these potential terrorists were even citizens 
of the countries they intended to target. The threat from al-Qaeda or other 
terrorist groups was thus considerable, not only on account of the potential 
loss of life, but because of its unconventional nature, its invisibility, its 
existence across and within national borders, and its focus upon civilian 
targets. Terrorist violence on this large of a scale and operational 
sophistication challenged long-accepted notions of warfare and criminal 
activity, as the September 2001 attacks at once appeared as heinous, irrational 
crimes and cold, calculated acts ofwar. 
This ambiguity complicated (if not confused) American policy choices 
following the 2001 attack, leading to military action in Afghanistan, passage 
of the Patriot Act, l and on one level even the invasion of Iraq, supposedly to 
prevent its acquisition ofweapons ofmass destruction that might later faH into 
terrorist hands. Other nations also responded to the perceived terrorist threat. 
1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required ta Intercept 
and Obstruet Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Aet 012001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001). 
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There was broad international support, with military and logistical assistance, 
in Afghanistan. Many countries passed new and controversial anti-terrorism 
laws. While the international community largely protested, not without good 
grounds, the United Kingdom and sorne minor U.S. allies also joined in the 
invasion of Iraq. Sorne commentators have drawn attention to the social, 
economic, and political causes behind Islamic terrorism and its targeting of 
American, and more generally Western, interests. Others have criticized 
American anti-terrorism measures as gross over-reactions, in light of the 
doubtful legality of the Iraq war, the shocking abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, 
and the prolonged executive detentions of alleged unlawful combatants both 
within the United States and at Guantanamo Bay (an American controlled 
naval base in Cuba). While these concerns should not be underestimated, 
terrorism nonetheless posed a serious threat to innocent civilians in the United 
States or elsewhere. Bombings of Bali in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and London 
in 2005 aIl proved, with great loss of life, the continuing existence of 
terrorism's threat. What aIl of the above indicates, however, is that terrorism-
from any political source, not just radical Islamic fundamentalism - presents 
challenges to legal order by increasing the already inherent tension between 
individual rights and public security. A national response to terrorism is 
therefore not just about countering or eliminating that unconventional threat, 
but about protecting lives alongside a commitment to the mIe oflaw. 
This thesis focuses on one narrow legal aspect of the "war against 
terrorism" and its relationship with the mIe of law. It examines the U.S. 
President's authority under his war powers to detain citizens, or non-citizens 
having similar rights, as "unlawful combatants" for having violated the mIes 
of war, and the authority of the courts to review the lawfulness of such 
detentions. The President ordered two citizens and one non-citizen to be so 
held within the United States, and their petitions, as of August 2005, resulted 
in a favorable Supreme Court decision having significant implications for the 
mIe of law and the constitutional separation ofpowers. The June 2004 mling 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld2 affirmed that a citizen alleged to be an unlawful 
2 542 U.S. 507; 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
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combatant had a right to due process, reviewable in the courts. Subsequent 
habeas corpus petitions from citizens, or non-citizens having similar 
substantive rights, would therefore invite potentially probing judicial review of 
an executive detention decision. The Hamdi case consequently had 
implications for another six-hundred or more non-citizens held indefinitely 
and incommunicado as unlawful combatants in Guantanamo Bay, and subject 
upon presidential order to trial by military commission. Sorne federal courts 
had denied jurisdiction over the Guantanamo Bay prisoners, due to their 
detention in Cuba rather than the United States. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court decision in Rasul v. Bush,3 a companion case to Hamdi, allowed federal 
courts to hear their petitions for habeas corpus. The actual extent of any due 
process rights of the non-citizen detainees in Guantanamo remained unsettled 
as of August 2005. However, in light of Hamdi, they too might be entitled to 
due process, making the executive's detention orders potentially subject to 
considerable judicial scrutiny. 
What does this thesis hope to achieve? While much has already been 
written about the unlawful combatant detentions and military commissions, 
this thesis analyzes them in the broader context of the Constitution's 
separation of powers. Such detentions and commissions prove constitutionally 
problematic for the separation of powers doctrine because of the unique nature 
of the alleged unlawful combatancy as both a criminal and martial status, 
simultaneously invoking the judiciary's role in protecting rights and the 
executive's responsibility for maintaining national security. Unlawful 
combatant detentions raise the question as to whether they are legitimate 
exercises of the war powers or executive encroachments upon judicial power. 
At stake is no less than the constitutional equilibrium between the branches in 
times of emergency, and with it disruption of the Constitution's structural 
protections for protecting rights against arbitrary assumptions of executive 
power. While the President had detained only two citizens, and a non-citizen 
on American soil, as unlawful combatants, the proverbial slope was a 
potentially very steep and slippery one indeed. The Supreme Court 
3 542 V.S. 466; 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
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acknowledged these concems in Hamdi, with its due process analysis. 
However, this thesis goes beyond a doctrinal study of the judicial review of 
unlawful combatant detentions to examine the fundamental separation of 
powers assumptions upon which it rests. It suggests a new separation of 
powers theory, premised upon the deliberative processes that the branches use 
when making decisions. This theory explains the deferential approach of 
courts in most war powers cases, while justifying strong judicial review under 
Hamdi, when the President uses those powers to infringe individual rights or 
impact upon domestic affairs. 
The thesis' structure reflects its approach to understanding the judicial 
review of unlawful combatant detentions. Part l immediately launches into 
constructing a general theory of separation of powers, arising from an 
examination of the Lockean political theory that underlies the United States 
Constitution. Part II then explains how federal war powers jurisprudence 
reflects constitutional assumptions consistent with this new theory. Parts l and 
II together, therefore, present a theoretical model that explains the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hamdi, and offers to future courts a basis for the principled 
review of the war powers. Part III analyzes the legal status of unlawful 
combatants, the contextual limitations of Ex parte Quirin4 as the main 
precedent for su ch detentions, and the ways in which courts have approached 
the habeas corpus review of these cases. In the end, the thesis proposes that its 
deliberative proeesses theory of separation of powers permits the substantive 
judieial review of unlawful eombatant detentions, based upon standards of 
legality, procedural faimess, and reasonableness. The President does indeed 
have a eonstitutional responsibility to proteet the public against the 
unconventional threat of terrorism. Courts, however, remain the guardians of 
the rule oflaw, even in face ofnew dangers, and must ensure that liberty does 
not succumb to that same executive swom to defend it. 
4317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
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Part 1: The Separation of Powers 
Introduction 
In fighting the so-called "war against terrorism," the President's 
designation and detention of American citizens as unlawful combatants, under 
his war powers and without the benefit of trial in the civil courts, raised 
important issues about the separation ofpowers. In the 2004 case of Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, l the Supreme Court upheld the existence of such an executive 
detention power, but made clear that courts could review the detentions of 
citizens for due process compliance, upon petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
However, the Court's assertion of judicial review in Hamdi not only left 
umesolved many questions about the precise scope of such review, but 
seemingly conflicted with a war powers jurisprudence that mandated 
considerable deference to executive exercises of the war powers. The Court's 
decision in Rasul v. Bush,2 by allowing non-citizen alleged unlawful 
combatants held offshore in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, only further brought into doubt a rational framework for war 
powers review. 
The extent of the President' s war powers has long been an issue in 
American constitutional law. Designated both as Commander-in-Chief and 
Chief Executive by the Constitution, the President's military authority 
nevertheless is subject to Congress' own constitutional power to declare war. 
There exists tension, and often ambiguity, between congressional and 
presidential authority to make military decisions. While courts have a 
constitutional dut y to reVlew legislative and executive acts for compliance 
with the Constitution, they have usually remained hesitant to inteIject 
1 542 V.S. 507; 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
2 542 U.S. 466; 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
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themselves into the politically charged atmosphere and uncertainties of war-
making. Courts accordingly have found that Congress can broadly delegate 
decision-making authority to the President in matters ofwar, national security, 
and foreign affairs. Such decisions become constitutionally problematic, 
however, when they infringe individual rights and have an impact upon 
domestic rather than purely foreign affairs. In such circumstances, the 
President's exercise of the war powers threatens to upset the separation of 
powers, weakening the Constitution's structural protections for individual 
rights. 
Reconciliation of apparent doctrinal conflicts between Hamdi, Rasu!, and 
other war powers cases requires reevaluation of the underlying constitutional 
assumptions upon which those decisions might rest. The executive's detention 
of unlawful combatants, and the judicial review of them, accordingly becomes 
a fundamental problem about the separation of powers. Explanation of both 
the wide judicial deference to sorne executive exercises of the war powers 
(such as strategic military command), and the greater scrutiny of others (like 
unlawful combatant detentions) merits a new separation of powers theory. 
Part 1 proposes just such a theory, focusing upon the deliberative processes 
which the government branches use in making decisions. Using this theory, 
Parts II and III bring into line the seemingly contradictory results between 
Hamdi, Rasul, and past war powers cases. The starting point for this 
deliberative processes theory is, simply enough, perhaps the most basic 
premise of Anglo-American constitutional thought: John Locke's notion that 
all government authority is exercisable only for the public good. 
2 
Chapter 1: Executive Power and Public Trust 
Political Authority for the Public Good 
"Sa lus populi suprema lex.,,3 This princip le, given by Locke in his 
Second Treatise on Government, underlies the exercise of political authority 
by the executive branch and indeed by govemment as a whole. Locke not 
only proposed this princip le as a moral imperative for govemment, but further 
suggested a constitutional paradigm where exercise of executive and 
legislative power should be structurally divided better to achieve the public 
good and to prevent an institutional centralization of authority that might lead 
to tyranny. Modem separation of powers between executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches is, interpreted in light of this Lockean paradigm, a similar 
structural means to ensure that govemment acts only for the public good. The 
separation doctrine prevents arbitrary exercise of power by channe1ing it 
through separate branches, each having unique institutional attributes and 
deliberative capabilities that promote rational decision-making by govemment 
actors. Substantive determination of just what the public good requires in any 
particular instance, then, results from an empirical, "inter-branch" reasoning 
process. Executive discretion, its legal limitations, and protection of 
individual rights through political as well as judicial processes all combine to 
achieve respect for the Lockean paradigm; that is, a structural model that 
under all circumstances (at least ideally) serves the animating princip le of the 
public good. 
Locke began his examination of govemment structures with the 
legislative power, the representational nature of which built upon his idea that 
3 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government (1689), § 158. 
3 
popular consent is the fountain of legitimacy for aIl government authority.4 
However, this analysis of Locke's paradigm begins with the executive power 
for three reasons. First, the danger that unchecked executive power presents to 
the public good highlights the special trust that accompanies an government 
power, and the necessity of diffusing power among the branches in order to 
enforce the fiduciary obligations that they aIl necessarily have. Thus, 
executive power is a fitting topic with which to begin an examination of the 
purposes of and restrictions upon political power in general. Second, the 
unitary nature of the executive branch deprives it of the majoritarian 
justification that might mask or excuse oppressive actions by a representative 
legislature. Having a lesser representative mandate than the legislature, the 
executive runs greater risk of misjudging the public good, while its unitary 
nature can promote decisiveness and efficiency at the expense of balancing 
various societal interests. Third, the threat that arbitrary executive power 
poses to individual rights and the rule of law has historicaIly been a focus of 
Anglo-American political theory. Locke's Second Treatise itself, written 
during the age of the Glorious Revolution, displays concern about executive 
power and its precarious relationship with the public good. Protection for 
rights and maintenance of the rule of law remain fundamental to American, 
British, as weIl as other legal systems. Such concerns reach their height in 
matters of war, national security, and foreign affairs, when their exigencies 
require that the public rely upon strong executive power, and public-safety 
imperatives threaten to trump individual rights. It is at this point - where 
executive power becomes strongest and most necessary - that one can best 
begin to understand the fiduciary obligations that bothjustify and limit it. 
Lockean Prerogative 
Locke explains that executive authority, which he caUs "prerogative," is 
"nothing, but a Power in the hands of the Prince to provide for the publick 
4 Peter Josephson, The Great Art of Government: Locke 's Use of Consent (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 2002) at 215. 
4 
good."S This executive discretion is necessary, as "the Law-making Power is 
not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the 
dispatch requisite to Execution: and because also it is impossible to foresee, 
and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concem 
the publick. ... ,,6 Exercisable by the executive in the absence of law, the 
prerogative is defined not only by the substantive requirement that it serve the 
public good, but by the presence of political exigency where a legislature is 
unable or unwilling to act. Perhaps when extraordinary circumstances exist, 
such as when foreign invasion or attack might be imminent, it might ev en 
dictate that the executive act contrary to positive law where there is no time for 
the legislature to change it.7 Accordingly, Locke's prerogative power is an 
independently standing, non-statutory executive discretion to act (but not make 
law) for the public good. 
Prerogative power has a dual relationship to the public good. "[W]here 
the Legislative and Executive Power are in distinct hands,,,g the public good 
justifies executive discretion - even wide and far-reaching discretion, if 
necessary - at the same time that it directs the ends and limits of the 
prerogative. In the absence of conflicting law, the public good therefore 
legitimates as well as constrains the prerogative. Significantly, however, the 
5 Locke, Second Treatise, § 158. 
6 Ibid., § 160. 
7 Ruth W. Grant, John Locke 's Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) at 84-
85; Locke emphasizes that discretionary executive power complements, rather than obstructs, 
the law, stating "[flor Prerogative is nothing but the Power of doing publick good without a 
Rule." Ibid., § 166 [emphasis original]. However, he also finds that the prerogative might 
dictate action against the "direct Letter of the Law," ibid., § 164, when the public good 
demands. See also ibid., § 159-60. Clearly, su ch executive usurpation should be exceptional, 
with the paradoxical purpose ofviolating the law in order to save it. The absolute imperative, 
but dangerous, nature of such illegal executive action is perhaps best illustrated by President 
Lincoln's unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, without Congress' prior approval, 
in the face of Southern secession. Responding to criticisms of his early habeas suspensions 
without congressional approval, Lincoln asked: "Are aU the laws but one to go unexecuted, 
and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?" Presidential Address to 
Congress in Special Session (4 July 1861). For an analysis of a "liberal response" to 
presidential power during national emergencies, in which such power is not permanently and 
dangerously normalized by the law, but is instead exercised in open contravention of the 
Constitution and the laws, see Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism" 
(1989) 98 Yale L. J. 1384. 
8 Locke, Second Treatise, § 159. 
5 
public good is more than a standard against which to judge the acceptability of 
prerogative actions; the public good is itself definitional of the prerogative. 
That is, the executive does not possess a general discretion to act as it wills 
where the law is silent, maybe or maybe not intending to advance the public 
good, or even violate it altogether. Rather, executive actions taken without 
due regard for and intention to serve the public good would not be prerogative 
ones at all under Locke's definition. Such actions, essentially demonstrating 
bad faith by the executive, would instead be illegitimate and arbitrary 
impositions of power, threatening political liberty and degenerating into 
tyranny; they would not be prerogative power at all, under Locke's conception 
of it. Abuse of power might, of course, advance the selfish ends and personal 
ambitions of the executive officer. Such abuse is the antithesis of the 
prerogative, in that it is action umeasonable for purposes of achieving the 
public good.9 
Because Locke bases government upon consent, thereby suggesting 
popular sovereignty, it is only in the calculated interests of the public that 
government can lawfully act; hence the requirement that the executive's 
prerogative decisions be reasonable ones towards achieving those ends. In the 
Lockean scheme, as described by Ruth Grant, "[m]en consent to govemment 
for certain reasons, to fulfill particular purposes. Political action must be 
reasonably related as means to those ends or it ceases to be political and is 
instead despotic."IO Grant's understanding of the term "political action" 
reflects a Lockean perspective of prerogative, and government power in 
general, in that it contrasts with despotic or arbitrary power that is divorced 
from the substantive purpose of serving the public good. Lockean prerogative, 
as an executive power bound up with and limited by the public good, cuts the 
ground out from under divine right or other absolutist theories of executive-
centered government, legitimizing authority not upon an executive's personal 
right to govem but upon his political trust. This trust places upon the 
9 Grant, supra note 7 at 72-73, 141-42. Grant also distinguishes arbitrary from absolute 
authority, the latter, as he sees it, being an ultimate sovereign authority having power over life 
and death. 
10 Ibid. at 82. 
6 
executive, or any other govemment actor, a fiduciary obligation to act 
reasonably in pursuit of public ends. 11 As John Dunn writes, "any political 
society which derives its legitimacy formally from a set of rights of its 
sovereign which are not derivatives of the wills of his subjects violates the 
logical preconditions for a legitimate political society.,,12 A legitimate 
political society, which arises from popular consent, fixes among the 
normative goals of political association not just community survival, but the 
realization of certain fundamentaI values, such as personaI liberty, that 
substantively enrich the conception of the public goOd. 13 The executive's, or 
other govemment actor's, resulting fiduciary obligation is reasonably to 
exercise power so as to promo te both society's security along with its 
substantive values. Locke's conceptualization of legitimate political authority 
in this way fixes a trust relationship between the executive and the people 
upon the consensual delegation of authority by the latter to the former. The 
prerogative consequently arises from the executive's fiduciary obligation, and 
so must be a principled and reasonable exercise of discretion. The public good 
in this way remains the benchmark for simultaneously assessing the legitimacy 
of executive actions and defining them as Lockean prerogative. 
11 Ibid. at 187-88. 
12 John DUlUl, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of 
the 'Two Treatises of Government , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) at 124. 
13 Thus, Locke, Second Treatise, § 134, daims: "The great end of Mens entering into Society, 
being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety, and the great instrument and 
means of that being the Laws establish' d in that Society; the first and fundamental positive 
Law of aIl Commonwealths, is the establishing of the Legislative Power; as the first and 
fundamental natural Law, which is to govem even the Legislative it self, is the preservation of 
the Society, and (as far as will consist with the publick good) of every person in it."; Although 
Dunn, ibid. at 123-24, writes that the Lockean community's goals focus upon man's 
relationship with God and the "accomplishment of religious duty," the substantive moral 
purposes of society certainly could be other than promotion of religion. Without a substantive 
moral framework to guide individual and even collective moral judgment, then, as Dunn 
states, ibid. at 266, rational human action would faH back upon the "confusing abstractness of 
the utilitarian calculus." Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) suggests that the 
duties of even a religiously based society are compatible with individual moral choice, within 
certain parameters. What is more important is that different moral frameworks for society still 
mandate substantive ends to both individual actions and a government authority wielded for 
the public good. These frameworks therefore posit an ethic of individual or communitarian 
fulfillment going beyond Hobbesian order and security, and mere preservation of the polity. 
Indeed, sorne substantive political ethic ofliberty or freedom itself "is to be valued a 'fence' to 
preservation." Grant, supra note 7 at 90-91; See also Richard H. Cox, Locke on War and 
Peace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) at 107. 
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The Lockean princip le of prerogative lies beneath the concept of 
executive power in both the American and British political systems, their 
republican and monarchical differences notwithstanding. As for the Crown, 
Blackstone defined its prerogative as something that "must be in it's [sic.] 
nature singular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied to those rights and 
capacities which the king enjoys alone .... ,,14 Nevertheless, Blackstone made 
clear that those unique powers exist not for the good of the monarch himself, 
but for use on the public's behalf. The prerogative, he added, is also limitable 
by statute,15 suggesting it to be subject to Parliament's judgment as to what the 
public good requires. Dicey, in finding the prerogative to be the residuum of 
the Crown's historically inherent authority, also acknowledged its 
subordination to the representative Parliament and its moral accountability to 
the public as a whole. 16 This relationship to legally sovereign Parliament and 
politically sovereign public, as well as to independent courts that could define 
the prerogative's boundaries, accordingly places the prerogative under the mIe 
of law. Dicey's description of the mIe of law rests upon a Lockean idea that 
executive discretion is a fiduciary power for the public good, accountable to 
the legislature, courts, and general public. 17 
As Louis Fisher points out, many scholars see the United States 
Constitution as breaking from Britain's monarchical model of executive 
prerogative, particularly by giving the Senate power to ratify treaties and 
placing in Congress the power to declare war. On this latter point, Fisher 
particularly disagrees with the argument that the Constitution followed British 
example, which might encourage independent presidential initiative in war-
making. 18 Fisher's point, as weIl as original intent arguments, nevertheless 
14 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First 
Edition of 1765-1769, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) at 231-32. 
15 Ibid. at 244-45. 
16 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction ta the Law of the Constitution, 4th ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1893) at 351-52, 355-56. 
17 See Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 149-52. 
18 Compare Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 2d rev. ed. (Lawrence, Kan.: University 
Press of Kansas, 2004) at 15 with John C. Yoo, "The Continuation ofPolitics by Other Means: 
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contrasts with two centuries of the Constitution's development. Presidents 
from Washington onward and supporters of a strong executive have gradually 
expanded presidential authority over many matters which might be considered 
"war-making" in its broadest sense. 19 American constitutional practice, going 
back to the beginnings of the Republic, rests upon a Lockean presumption of 
executive prerogative to act for the public good, even where the President's 
specifie powers in sorne instances differ from those of the Crown, as with the 
ratification oftreaties or the dec1aration war. 
Alexander Hamilton suggested early on that the vesting of "executive 
Power" in the President was a "general grant" of executive authority beyond 
those powers enumerated.20 Sorne framers, notably Jefferson, would have 
strongly disagreed based upon strict constructions of the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, Hamilton's Lockean view had its proponents and has served as 
the basis upon which subsequent Presidents (inc1uding Jefferson, notably in 
regard to the Louisiana Purchase and the naval campaign against the Barbary 
pirates), as weIl as other lawyers and politicians, would justify executive 
The Original Understanding of War Powers," (1996) 84 Cal. L. Rev. 167; See also Charles J. 
Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rostow, and Michael Tigar, "What the Constitution Means 
by Executive Power" (1988) 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 165 at 193 where Rostow comments that 
"[t]he fact that the Presidency was intended to be a strong independent office, and that he had 
a vaguely defined prerogative power carried over from the British Constitution, is 
undeniable." Erwin Chemerinsky, "Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a 
Framework for Judicial Review" (1983) 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 863 at 870-878, outlines four basic 
models for executive power under the Constitution. These models, representing points on a 
continuum, 1) permit the President to act only with clear statutory or constitutional 
authorization, 2) grant broad inherent authority unimpeded by Congress or the courts, 3) 
recognize an "interstitial" inherent power under which the President can act independently 
only insofar as he does not usurp legislative or judicial powers, and 4) give an inherent power 
to the President to act where there is no c1ear statutory or constitutional authority preventing 
him from doing so. Chemerinsky, however, finds the first mode! "too inflexible to be a 
workable standard of review of Presidential actions," ibid. at 883, while the second model of 
broad inherent power lacks sufficient accountability to be acceptable in a constitutional 
democracy, ibid. at 885-86. Instead, the appropriate model is either the third or fourth one, the 
difference between them being that courts or Congress, respectively, have primary 
responsibility for checking the President, ibid. at 887-88. Chemerinsky prefers the third 
model, where courts must review presidential actions for infringement of legislative and 
judicial powers, ibid. at 890-91. 
19 Fisher, ibid. at 16, indeed recognizes but criticizes the historical incidents of expanding 
executive power as contrary to the intention of the framers. 
20 Alexander Hamilton, Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. by C. Hamilton, vol. 76 (1851) at 
80-81, quoted in Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: 
Foundation Press, 1988) at 210. 
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exercises of discretion. While the presidencies of Jackson and Lincoln 
occasioned, in different ways, significant expansions of executive power based 
upon claims of necessity and the public good, Theodore Roosevelt went 
furthest by articulating his "stewardship theory:" 
I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the 
nation could not be done by the President unless he cou Id find sorne 
specifie authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his 
right but his dut Y to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded 
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. 
Under this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be done 
many things not previously done by the President and the heads of the 
departments. 1 did not usurp power. In other words, I acted for the 
public welfare, I acted for the common well being of all our people, 
whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by 
direct constitutional or legislative prohibition .... 21 
Roosevelt acknowledged the public good as both the legitimizing and limiting 
force behind executive power. Accordingly, as Locke suggested with the 
prerogative, the President could act for the public good when exigencies 
demanded, except where the Constitution's express provisions or the laws 
passed by Congress prevented him from doing so. 
Chief Justice (and former President) Taft judicially recognized 
something near to Roosevelt's stewardship theory in the 1926 Supreme Court 
case of Myers v. United States,22 finding that the President could indeed 
exercise unenumerated powers that flowed from Article II's general grant of 
executive power, as long as not forbidden by the Constitution or statute. He 
wrote, "[t]he executive power was given in general terms strengthened by 
specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited 
by direct expressions where limitation was needed .... " 23 Taft did not go 
21 Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. by Wayne Andrews 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) at 197-98. Roosevelt, ibid. at 198, mentioned 
Jackson and Lincoln as examples, while contrasting his view of the presidency to that of his 
successor, Taft. 
22 272 o.S. 52 (1926). 
23 Ibid. at 118 (citing Hamilton, 7 J. C. Hamilton's Works of Hamilton at 80-81). See also In 
re Neagle, 135 V.S. 1 (1890) (finding that the President can take measures in the absence of 
statutory authorization in order to fulfill a general obligation to en force the laws and 
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quite as far as the stewardship theory might perhaps permit, however. 
Presidential authority was only "a grant of the power to execute the laws," and 
the Constitution's division of executive, legislative, and judicial power meant 
that the branches should be kept separate where not expressly blended.24 Still, 
the Chief Justice offered in passing dictum that there were occasions when 
executive officers might act in a "quasi-judicial character.,,25 Taft's opinion in 
Myers certainly embraced the Hamiltonian view, but resisted full acceptance 
of Roosevelt's stewardship theory in so far as it might suggest that the 
executive could stray, without limitation, into areas constitutionally reserved 
for the legislative and judicial branches. The Myers decision did not answer 
just how far the President's power might ex tend in any particular case, but 
nevertheless generally premised it upon the Lockean prerogative. 
The New Deal and the nse of the post World War II "imperial 
presidency" have only further expanded presidential power. Constitutional 
practice, then - regardless of what sorne critics might prefer - characterizes 
presidential power as neither limited to express textual grants, strictly 
construed, nor restricted to the "mere execution" of statutory laws, in which 
narrow executive discretion has no quasi-Iegislative or quasi-judicial aspects,z6 
Constitution), compared with R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte 
Northumbria Police Authority [1988] 1 AU ER 556 (C.A.) (Crown may take law enforcement 
measures under the prerogative for the defense of the realm, where not prohibited by statute). 
24 272 U.S. at 116-17. 
25 Ibid. at 135. 
26 For criticism of theories of executive power that give inherent law-making authority to the 
President, see Henry P. Monaghan, "The Protective Power of the Presidency" (1993) 93 
Colum. L. Rev. 1. Monaghan, however, does support a "protective" power by which the 
President can act, without statutory authorization, to protect the personnel, property, and 
instrumentalities of the United States. However, Monaghan admits, ibid. at 69, that 
"presidential use of the protective power can perhaps be shown to be 'legislative' in nature. 
But . . . any boundary between impermissible law-making and permissible public 
administration is not analytical, but conventional. Limited and protective presidential conduct 
would not ordinarily be understood to be presidential law-making, whatever the analytical 
resemblance." Monaghan thus seems to pin his criticisms upon a formalistic categorization of 
executive and legislative acts by downplaying any functional resemblance they might have. 
The ide a of a presidential protective power also does not undermine the Lockean notion that 
prerogative authority is contextually dependent upon the necessity of action. It is the 
identification of just such a necessity, and the question of proportionate response, that raises 
questions about the scope, but not the existence, of both presidential and Crown prerogative. 
Steven Calabresi, "The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants" (1994) 88 Northwestem U. L. Rev. 
1377 at 1392, rejects the notion as "preposterous" that presidential power resembles anything 
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The President's discretionary power, like that of the Crown, is a Lockean 
prerogative in practice as well as theory. 
However, Locke's idea of prerogative presents a problem of 
constitutional design. That is, "to understand how the executive may be 
constitutionally and legally constrained, and yet also retain the latitude to act 
outside or against the law for the public goOd.,,27 Because the prerogative is 
by definition exercisable only for the public good, and must combine 
"activism" with "discretion and self-restraint,,,28 it is subject to a "Fiduciary 
Trust ... for the safety of the People .... ,,29 This trust, as already suggested 
above, legitimizes and constrains executive authority based upon the permitted 
ends of the public good and the reasonableness of the means to achieve it. The 
empowering and limiting aspects of the public good thus create a "dialectical 
problem," as Dunn puts it, which is "critical to Locke's enterprise.,,30 A 
fiduciary trust is different from a contractarian interpretation of executive 
like the Royal prerogative. However, he believes that Article II, section 1 of the Constitution 
nevertheless grants a general executive power to the President, subject to the provisions in 
section 2 that "aIl help to define, limit, and give content to the otherwise vast grant of power. . 
. ," ibid. at 1397. Calabre si, however, does not undertake a closer examination of the nature of 
executive discretion within the American and British systems, and how they are conceptually 
similar in Lockean terrns. Prerogative power is not an incident only of monarchical 
government, but represents a discretionary power, however defined and limited, that 
inherently exists in executive office. In any case, the denial of an extra-statutory law-making 
power in the hand of the executive does not discount the existence of prerogative discretion. 
Indeed, the British Crown itself possesses no prerogative law-making authority within the 
realm. The Civil War and the Glorious Revolution settled that question in Parliament's favor 
long before the American Revolution. The Crown today still possesses no inherent authority 
to make law, despite continuing to possess considerable prerogative powers. In the American 
colonies, though, the Crown might have had sorne concurrent law-making authority along with 
the imperial Parliament. Such Royal authority would, however, have been an incident to what 
might essentially be considered a prerogative over foreign affairs. Any comparison between a 
domestic law-making power in the President and whatever prerogative powers exercised by 
the King over America as a foreign possession is thus misplaced. Again, prerogative must be 
understood in Lockean terrns as the core discretion of the executive, which remains 
conceptually the same whatever the forrn of the executive branch or the limits imposed upon 
the scope and exercise of that discretion. 
27 Josephson, supra note 4 at 233. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Locke, Second Treatise, § 156. Locke writes this in the specific context of the executive's 
duty regularly to convene the legislature or take action in their absence, indicating both the 
executive's subservience to law and obligation to act for the public welfare where the law is 
silent. 
30 Dunn, supra note 12 at 150. 
12 
authority, which would establish an agreement between the executive and the 
people. Such agreement would imply that the executive possessed certain 
rights to the exercise of power, circumscribed though they might be through 
the contractual obligation. 31 The idea of trust, presenting a dialectical problem 
about the legitimization and limitation of government authority, makes it 
difficult to define an exclusive sphere of executive power both existing vis-à-
vis the legislative and judicial branches, and permitting absolute discretion 
without regard for the public good. 
Of course, in attempting to address this dialectical problem, the framers 
of the American Constitution departed from the Crown's historically 
delineated prerogative powers and sought greater control over executive 
discretion. They placed, to project backward the phraseology of Myers, 
specific emphasis and direct limitations on executive power, where needed.32 
Rather than binding the executive with more precise definitions of how or 
when the Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief could make international 
agreements or order military operations, for example, the Constitution gave 
Congress a participatory role in those decisions through the treaty and declare 
war clauses. The President can only make treaties with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, and commands the armed forces subject to Congress' power to 
declare war. Differences between presidential and Crown powers, and even 
between legislative and judicial powers in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, however, demonstrate rather than reject Lockean theory as a 
common foundation of the two systems. 
The U.S. Constitution's congressional checks on presidential power 
highlight important substantive, as weIl as structural, aspects of Lockean 
31 Even though Locke famously advocated the notion of a social contract, that contract has 
trust qualities. Rather than conflicting, however, the concepts of contract and trust are not 
incompatible. Ross Harrison, Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion 's Masterpiece: An Examination 
of Seventeenth-CentUly Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
at 212, suggests, for example, that the political trust arises from a "double contractual 
operation," in which individuals fictionally contract to form a political society, then 
subsequently create a government as a "corporate entity" empowered to act on its behalf. See 
Grant, supra note 7 at 104. 
32 272 U.S. at 118. 
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prerogative. First, executive discretion by nature cannot be clearly defined, 
and thus structural mechanisms are necessary to determine the substantive 
public good and, consequently, the allowable scope of such discretion. 
Second, prerogative power, as a trust, does not include rights, as such, 
belonging to the executive and serving its own purposes alone. Rather, the 
trust places upon the executive a fiduciary obligation in the use of its 
discretion. Prerogative power therefore has a substantive aspect insofar as it 
promotes the public good. However, the trust has strong structural elements, 
as the executive can exercise prerogative only where the legislature is unable 
or unwilling to act. The different ways in which the American and British 
constitutions provide for the institutional determination of the public good and 
the exercise of the prerogative are only variations for how a constitutional 
system can manage the relationship between the substantive and structural 
aspects of the executive's public trust. These differences do not present 
theoretical conflicts as much as they only show variations in how to solve the 
same dialectical problem presented by Lockean prerogative. In both the 
United States and the United Kingdom, then, the problem of defining and 
limiting the scope of executive discretion is based upon a Lockean paradigm 
that requires elucidation of separation ofpowers principles. 
The Federative Power 
Additional to prerogative discretion in domestic affairs, the executive 
also possesses what Locke terms the federative power. These two classes of 
power are generally combined in the hands of the executive,33 and the 
discretionary nature of the federative power makes it in kind similar to the 
prerogative that the executive exercises in domestic matters. This similarity 
between these powers me ans that, as in British law, a broader usage of 
"prerogative" might commonly refer to federative power along with the 
prerogative in Locke's narrower domestic sense. However, though similar in 
33 Congress' share in the treaty and war-making powers, for example, demonstrates an 
exception to an executive monopoly over the federative power, as enjoyed by the Crown. 
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nature, the federative power has a distinct focus from domestic prerogative in 
terms of their applications. 34 While Locke's domestic executive power is 
inwardly directed towards members of the public, in that it concerns the 
domestic enforcement of positive laws or use of discretion for the public 
good,35 the federative power externally acts upon those individuals, groups, or 
states outside of the political society.36 The subjects upon which the executive 
exercises its prerogative and federative power therefore differ. The federative 
power comprises the making of, "War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and 
aIl the Transactions, with aIl Persons and Communities without the 
Commonwealth. . . ,,,37 actions usually associated with the Crown's 
prerogative, and sorne of which the President partly shares with Congress. In 
any case, the federative power, unlike the domestic prerogative, engages the 
public as "one Body in the State of Nature. ,,38 While political factions might 
exist within a political society, on the international scene the society engages 
others as an aggregate force. This unit y intensifies and unifies the demands of 
the public good, while recognizing the common dangers posed to it by outside 
threats. 39 
Although the federative power responds to external threats, there exists a 
risk that the executive might misdirect the federative power inward against 
domestic society itself, manipulating concerns over foreign affairs, war, or 
national security issues in order to increase its domestic prerogative or abuse 
its trust. "Therefore, war making is a public good where the optimal 
assignment of power for the most effective delivery also leads to a great risk 
that it will be produced for private ends.,,40 In spite of this risk, international 
34 Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 147-48. 
35 Ibid., § 147. 
36 Ibid., § 145. 
37 Ibid., § 146. 
38 Ibid., § 145. 
39 Cox, supra note 13 at 122-23. 
40 John Oldham McGinnis, "The Spontaneous Order ofWar Powers" (1997) 47 Case West. L. 
Rev. 1317 at 1322. 
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relations between nations or groups exist in a dynamic and unpredictable state 
of nature requiring flexible, energetic action. Federative power, therefore, "is 
much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive Laws, than 
the Executive [domestic prerogative]; and so must necessarily be left to the 
Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the 
publick goOd.,,41 In defending the proposed presidency during the state 
ratification debates on the American Constitution, Alexander Hamilton 
similarly pointed to the need for executive leadership, especially in war: 
Of aU the cares or concems of govemment, the direction of war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of 
power by a single hand. The direction ofwar implies the direction of the 
cornmon strength; and the power of directing and ernploying the 
common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the 
executive authority.42 
Hamilton's justification for a presidential war power, however, upheld a 
general proposition about the necessity of the federative power, a proposition 
which Blackstone had earlier proffered in describing the British Crown's war 
prerogative.43 Though foreign affairs rnight often present more uncertainties 
or urgency than domestic matters, Locke's federative power and domestic 
prerogative are part of a unified "prerogative" in a broader sense that both 
represent an executive discretion to act for the public good where the law is 
silent or inadequate. As with the domestic prerogative, the public good thus 
justifies and lirnits the exercise of federative power. However, it does so in a 
more pronounced way since the federative power responds to common threats 
and presents greater risks of domestic abuse. Notwithstanding their 
differences in focus and degrees, as one writer puts it, the "executive-
federative power" comprises "in truth a single power viewed from different 
perspectives,,,44 Iegitirnized and limited by the executive's trust obligations. 
41 Locke, Second Treatise, § 147; Cox, supra note 13 at 127. 
42 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist (1788) No. 74. 
43 Blackstone, supra note 14 at 249-50. 
44 Cox, supra note 13 at 126-27. 
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There are three aspects of federative power that c1early distinguish it 
from the domestic prerogative, yet similarly place them both within a Lockean 
constitutional paradigm. First, federative power addresses foreign affairs and 
external threats that generally present a greater risk to the public as a collective 
who le. Both the uncertainties of external affairs and their potentially greater 
threat to the society justify greater latitude of executive discretion than is the 
case with the domestic prerogative. However, the end for which the executive 
exercises federative power remains the public good. Second, the executive 
can and often must access vast national resources whether military, economic, 
or otherwise, when employing the federative power. Broad executive 
discretion to direct those resources is appropriate in order to respond to outside 
threats to the public good. However, the danger is that the executive might 
redirect formidable govemment power inward against the very public it is 
supposed to serve. The public good, for the same reasons that it legitimizes 
the federative power, limits its exercise to external threats. Finally, under the 
Lockean paradigm, the executive acts for the public good within a structural 
model that divides power between govemment branches. Constitutional 
structures limit the exercise of prerogative in the broad sense, in the ways that 
they diffuse govemment power to determine the public good, as well as to 
permit or restrain executive discretion. Structuralism weakens with the 
executive's use offederative power, however, as it operates on an international 
plane that resembles a state of nature between states or even non-state entities. 
In this state of nature, the executive is free to act externally to the political 
society in ways that would be unacceptable in regard to domestic matters 
within it. The context in which the executive exercises federative powers will 
also make it more difficult to determine just what the public good requires, and 
what measures will reasonably achieve it. When exercising the federative 
power, the executive will encounter fewer legal restrictions and will have 
greater freedom of judgment. However, constitutional structures that limit the 
executive's discretion should again strengthen if it attempts to redirect the 
federative power inward. 
The tense but close relationship between domestic prerogative and 
federative powers becomes clearer from the Supreme Court's decisions in 
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.45 and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer,46 which broached the respective foreign and domestic powers of the 
President. The first case, from 1936, dealt with the President's powers under 
statute to forbid arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay in the face of a continuing 
military conflict between them. Violation of such a presidential proclamation, 
pursuant to the statute, was a criminal offense. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 
which had violated the executive prohibition, claimed that the statute was void 
as an unconstitutional delegation of Congress' authority to the President, 
giving hirn an unfettered discretion to trigger the statute and determine the 
extent of its operation in particular cases. Consequently, appellees claimed, 
Congress had impermissibly abdicated its legislative responsibilities to the 
executive branch. The Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the decision of the 
Appeals Court. The majority's reasoning rested upon a differentiation 
between government powers in respect of dornestic and foreign matters. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland suggested that governmental acts in 
relating to foreign powers, such as the making of treaties and rnaking of war, 
did not derive from affirmative grants in the Constitution, but necessarily 
vested in the federal government as concomitants of national sovereignty.47 
Furthermore, the President was the representative of the nation in foreign 
affairs. The President, Sutherland suggested, possessed by virtue of his office 
an independent power to act in foreign affairs that combined with any other 
statutory powers delegated by Congress.48 The executive power at issue, 
however, was not one of law-making. Only Congress could make or undo 
law, but it could delegate to the President the discretion as to when and in what 
circumstances to bring the statute into force or haIt its operation.49 This 
executive authority, combined with long precedent of political practice, meant 
that broad congressional delegations over foreign affairs were constitutional. 
45 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
46 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
47 299 U.S. at 318. 
48 Ibid. at 319-20. 
49 Ibid. at 332. 
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While supporting a strong and independent executive role in foreign 
affairs, Curtiss-Wright was clearly a case of legislative delegation. It did not 
clarify just what the extent of any inherent federative power rnight be, and did 
not suggest that any such power would be exclusive and immune from 
congressional limitation. The Court's decision, despite favoring executive 
discretion in foreign affairs, was also limited in two other important ways. 
First, the Court did not speculate on the possibility that the President might in 
sorne way act so as to infringe upon the rights of the citizen either in the 
absence of or against statute, thereby using Lockean "federative" power to 
have an inward effect on the political society. Indeed, in recitation of the 
many statutory precedents that evidenced an accepted constitutional practice 
of broad delegation in foreign affairs, the impression is that sorne form of 
legislative cooperation or authorization might indeed be necessary for the 
President to use federative power in a way adversely affecting individual 
rights. Second, the Court's clear distinction between the govemment's foreign 
and domestic powers erected geographic as weIl as subject matter barriers to 
the President's "federative" powers, whether arising inherently through the 
Constitution or by delegation through statute. The implication of Justice 
Sutherland's reasoning was that the scope of presidential discretion would be 
narrower when he acted within American borders, as weIl as in matters 
otherwise having dom es tic effect, or usually decided by the legislative and 
judicial branches. 
This second point was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in 
Youngstown, which complemented Curtiss-Wright in that it eXplained sorne 
limitations upon the executive's use of federative power. In April 1952, 
President Truman ordered govemment seizure of most of the nation's steel 
rnills, intending to avert a workers' strike that might disrupt arms production 
for the war in Korea. Lacking any direct or irnplied statutory authority to 
make the order, Truman claimed that the Constitution granted him general 
power to act in the national interest, by virtue of the Article II provisions 
vesting in him the executive power, ordering hirn to take care that the laws be 
faithfuIly executed, and designating him Commander-in-Chief. Writing a 
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short opinion for the majority, Justice Black rejected the President's seizure 
order as an unconstitutional attempt at law-making. In granting executive 
power to the President and requiring him to execute the laws, the Constitution 
limited the presidential role in making laws to recommendation and veto of 
legislation. Rather than executing congressional policy with the ordered 
seizure, the President was himself making and executing his own policies, 
thereby intruding upon the province of Congress. Within this legislative 
province, and outside that of the executive, was the power to take private 
property for public use. 50 Justice Black's short opinion did not examine in 
detail the separation of powers, nor question the legislative nature of 
appropriation; so far the case might stand for c1ear boundaries between the 
legislative and executive actions. However, in further rejecting any 
presidential authority to order the seizure in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief, Justice Black flashed sorne deeper insight into the Constitution's 
restrictions upon the President's "federative" power, as Locke would have 
c1assified it. In responding to the President's assertions of broad powers of 
military command, Justice Black wrote: "Even though 'theater of war' be an 
expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system 
hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power 
as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes 
from stopping production.,,51 The President could not seize private property 
not just because it was an act of law-making, Justice Black seems to have 
suggested, but because the President had crossed a hne from "federative" into 
domestic affairs.52 The Court's opinion, however, did not de1ve into the extent 
of presidential powers within a theater of war and whether actions there that 
might otherwise be impennissible law-making on the home-front might be 
acceptable exercises of the President's "federative" power. 
It fell to Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, to set out the 
separation of powers proposition for which the Youngstown case is best 
50 343 U.S. at 587-88. 
51 Ibid. at 587. 
52 See also ibid. at 631-32, per Douglas J., concurring. 
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known. Justice Jackson struck upon the functional nature of branch powers, 
recognizing that they were context-dependent and fluctuated as a result oftheir 
interdependence.53 The result of this observation was his tri-partite, and now 
well-known, analysis of executive power. With considerable explanation, he 
posited first that when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congres s, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes an 
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. Justice 
Jackson cited Curtiss-Wright for this proposition, while also recognizing that 
the earlier case suggested possible inherent presidential authority in foreign 
affairs when Congress had not acted. Second, when the President acts in 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely 
upon his own independent powers. Consequently, there was a "zone of 
twilighf' in which President and Congress might have concurrent authority or 
the constitutional distribution of power was uncertain. Last, Justice Jackson 
stated that when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress, his power would be at its "lowest ebb." In such a 
case, the President could only rely upon whatever constitutional powers he had 
minus those possessed by Congress over the matter. 54 "Presidential claim to a 
power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, 
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system. ,,55 Justice Jackson thereby attempted to give the President's 
enumerated powers a pragmatic "scope and elasticity" free from rigid, 
"doctrinaire textualism.,,56 Rejecting the notion that the Constitution girdled 
the President with any powers as broad as that of the Crown prerogative, 
Justice Jackson nevertheless recognized that the President enjoyed broad 
inherent discretion to act in matters of foreign affairs and military commando 
Despite disclaiming any presidential prerogative similar to that of the Crown, 
Justice Jackson's sketch of executive discretion still reflected the prerogative 
of Locke. Jackson's view of prerogative discretion in foreign affairs, 
53 Ibid. at 635. 
54 Ibid. at 635-38. 
55 Ibid. at 638. 
56 Ibid. at 640. 
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matching that of Locke's federative power, thus prompted him to reject 
President Truman's seizure order as unconstitutional executive law-making. 
The Justice found it alarming that "a President whose conduct of foreign 
affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly 
enlarge his mastery over the internaI affairs of the country by his own 
commitment of the Nation's armed forces to sorne foreign venture.,,57 Justice 
Jackson's analysis of executive power, defined by its structural relationship to 
Congress, fundamentally rested upon considerations as to whether the 
President had acted with domestic effect and in a way adverse to private rights, 
or had externally directed his power to matters of foreign affairs. Jackson's 
model is a Lockean one, and constructs a paradigm for federative power in 
trust. 
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown illustrate the aspects of Lockean 
federative power, which, when compared with the narrower domestic 
prerogative, show that discretion is conceptually similar in both cases, but 
distinguishable upon the basis of an '''umpirage' between the individuals 
within the society, and ... the proper organization and direction of the force of 
the political society with respect to threats which emanate from withOUt.,,58 
Federative power, unlike domestic prerogative, necessarily directs itself 
against entities and persons which are external to the political society. 
Particularly in regard to war, federative power in this sense projects abroad the 
unified sovereignty of the politicai society. Although application of the 
federative power can operate directly upon external parties, such power 
potentially poses a frightening threat to the public if misdirected by a corrupt 
or unwise magistrate. 59 Inward direction of the federative power by itself risks 
breaching the executive's fiduciary obligation, due to the risk that it can pose 
57 Ibid. at 642. 
58 Cox, supra note 13 at 107, 124-25. 
59 See ibid. at 129, for the suggestion that the external operation of the federative power 
typically will not occasion internaI constitutional crises. While the public might therefore give 
extraordinary deference ta executive judgment in foreign affairs and war, however, the 
executive's inward re-direction of the federative power would then abrogate the grounds for 
such deference as that power would more likely impinge upon the security of the community 
and the rights of the individual. 
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to the public good. The dialectical problem that the public good poses for 
federative power - that is, how its exercise might promote security from 
extemal dangers without threatening liberties within the society - raises 
structural questions resting upon separation of powers princip les. 60 Such 
princip les must allow the legislature and courts to defer to the executive in 
federative matters where they are not as institutionally weU-suited for 
decision, yet to assert themselves in domestic affairs where the executive risks 
abusing its discretion. 
60 Ibid. at 113-14; McGinnis, supra note 40 at 1323. 
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Chapter II: Legislative Power and Politicization of Fiduciary Obligation 
Executive Accountability to the Legislature 
Locke's structural scheme for controlling executive discretion focuses 
upon the legislature, with its authority grounded in its representative capacity. 
Discussing specifically the executive's arbitrary refusaI to convene the 
legislature, Locke outlines the connections between the executive's abuse of 
its discretion, its moral accountability to the public, and the necessity of 
preserving the legislature as a structural check. Where the executive fails to 
convene the legislature, a prerogative power exercised in trust, the public has 
an appeal to Heaven and possesses moral justification in rebelling.61 By 
grossly abusing its discretion and violating its fiduciary obligation to act for 
the public good, the executive absolves political society from allegiance to it.62 
The important question for Locke then becomes not whether the executive can 
do wrong, which it clearly has done in such a case, but rather who is to judge it 
and hold it accountable under its fiduciary obligation. For Locke, that ultimate 
judge is the people,63 who have consented to fonn political society and 
establish a magistracy to act on their behalf. Moreover, executive 
accountability for its breach of trust rests upon an epistemological assumption 
that the people themselves can ascertain their own interests. The executive's 
fiduciary obligation to act reasonably for the public good therefore precludes 
arbitrary and self-serving actions, because they dissolve the moral bonds that 
hold together political society. A serious breach of trust by the executive can 
61 Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 155, 167-68. 
62 Ibid., § 15l. 
63 Harrison, supra note 31 at 215-16. 
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be an act of violence against the people, inviting their resistance and 
potentially leading to a state of war between govemors and governed.64 
Rebellion, however, is a necessarily extreme recourse against persistent 
and severe executive abuses; it ruptures political society and discounts as 
ineffective constitutional means of correcting such abuses. To prevent or 
remedy abuses of discretion that fall short of tyranny, Locke institutionally 
counterbalances the executive with a representative legislature wielding 
supreme law-making power.65 The legislature, rather than the people directly, 
can hold the executive accountable under its fiduciary obligation to act for the 
public good. Individuals must no longer exercise their own judgments about 
whether to endure executive abuses or retum to a state of nature through 
rebellion. Instead, Locke's structural model provides institutionalized means 
for the public accountability of the executive. The resulting constitutional 
paradigm permits "sophisticated institutional representation of the will of the 
people," which not only diffuses government power generally, but channels 
public resistance to enforce the executive's fiduciary obligation.66 
Consequently, "[l]egal avenues for redress against tyrannical abuses give 
effect to the right of resistance without destabilizing the government.,,67 
64 See ibid.; Dunn, supra note 12 at 178-79; Thomas Jefferson put forth such a Lockean 
argument in the American Declaration of Independence in 1776: "We hold these truths to be 
self-evident: That aH men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, 
to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the govemed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, 
laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them 
shaH seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that 
governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and 
accordingly aH experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils 
are sufferable than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. 
But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces 
a design to reduce them un der absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off 
such govemment, and to pro vide new guards for their future security." 
65 See Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 20-21, 89, where he exp1ains that one purpose of civil 
society is to provide for means of appeal when those in authority attempt to do injury to the 
public or corrupt the laws to that effect. 
66 Dunn, supra note 12 at 182, and 181-84. 
67 Grant, supra note 7 at 163, also suggesting that "Locke justifies extraie gal resistance only as 
a last resort." As examples oflegallines of appeal, Grant writes that "[i]mpeachment, judicial 
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Locke's discussion of the legislature demonstrates how it can hold the 
executive politically accountable, and impose legallimitations upon executive 
discretion that are themselves eventually enforceable by the courts. 
Taking the Glorious Revolution and its constitutional settlement as his 
example, Locke gives an outline for what would become the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom, thereby giving a strong 
legislative check against executive misconduct.68 "[T]he Legislative is the 
Supream Power" he writes, and "all other Powers in any Members or parts of 
the Society, [are] derived from and subordinate to it.,,69 Taken as an 
expression of the public good, legislative action can limit executive discretion 
under both the domestic prerogative and federative power.70 This legislative 
power does not conflict with the broader concept of prerogative as an 
executive discretion exercisable for the public good, but is instead intrinsic to 
it; by definition, prerogative exists in the absence of, and not in opposition to, 
controlling law. The executive might participate directly in the legislative 
process by consenting to bills, but any duly enacted statute binds it where that 
statute applies. Consequently, it is conceptualIy impossible that "the People 
have incroach 'd upon the Prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be 
d fi d b . . L ,,71 e me y pOSItIve aws. There can be no such encroachment, as 
prerogative broadly termed is not defined independently of the law and the 
executive possesses no free-standing right to govem. AlI executive discretion 
is inherently bound up with statutory, or even common-law, limitations in that 
it only exists within legal boundaries. 
review, a constitutional amendment procedure, and trial by jury could aIl be seen in this light." 
See further ibid. at 202-03. 
68 "The theorist of the Revolution is Locke; and it was his conscious effort to justify the 
innovations of 1688." Harold J. Laski, Palitical Thaught in England: Lacke ta Bentham 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 23. 
69 Locke, Second Treatise, § 150. 
70 Ibid., § 153. 
71 Ibid., § 163. See generally ibid., § § 162-66, discussing that the scope of prerogative 
expands and contracts, depending on whether a particular executive tends to use its discretion 
for or against the public good. 
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Locke's legislature may statutorily limit or abrogate executive discretion 
where it deems it to be in the public good to do so. It could, of course, also 
choose to delegate discretionary authority to the executive, but in any case can 
direct how the executive should exercise such discretion. Furthennore, 
constitutional requirements, conventions, and common law might 
predetennine the scope of executive discretion over any particular matter. The 
Glorious Revolution, for example, resulted in Parliament reserving to itself 
sorne of the fonner Royal military prerogatives. This statutory reservation, in 
the 1688 Bill of Rights,n has ever since remained a constitutional restriction 
on the Crown, and possesses such importance in Anglo-American political 
thought that the United States Constitution textually incorporates much of it. 
The 1688 Bill of Rights dec1ares that "the raising or keeping a standing army 
within the kingdom in time ofpeace, unless it be with consent ofParliament, is 
against law.,,73 Parliament further possesses the power of the purse, as the Bill 
of Rights establishes "[t]hat levying money for or to the use of the Crown by 
pretence of prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in 
other manner than the same is or shaH be granted, is illegal.,,74 These 
parliamentary reservations responded to the claims of Stuart monarchs that 
they, by prerogative, could raise an anny and fund it by levying taxes without 
Parliament's consent. The Crown retains a prerogative power to declare war 
and command anned forces in the field (being "federative" matters), but only 
with whatever forces Parliament sees fit to raise and finance by law. 
The United States Constitution expands upon the 1688 Bill of Rights by 
reserving to Congress even further power over the military. Moreover, while 
the 1688 Bill of Rights was a parliamentary statute, albeit a constitutionally 
fundamental one, the United States Constitution purports to be the voice of the 
popular sovereign itself. The Constitution is accordingly supreme over 
ordinary legislation and thereby binds executive and legislative branches alike, 
72 An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject. and settling the Succession of the 
Crown. 1688 (Eng.) 1 Will. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. 2 [hereinafter 1688 Bill afRights]. 
73 Ibid., s. 6. 
74 Ibid., s. 4. 
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unless changed under special arnendrnent procedures.75 Congress can 
authorize an arrny for up to two years, rnaintain a navy, rnake regulations for 
the arrned forces, call the states' rnilitias into national service and oversee their 
organization. 76 AU rnoney bills must arise in the Rouse of Representatives,77 
as they do in the Rouse of Cornrnons, so that only Congress rnay raise revenue 
to "provide for the cornrnon Defence.,,78 Sirnilar to the Crown, the President 
rernains Cornrnander-in-Chief79 only over whatever forces Congress chooses 
to put at his disposaI. In sirnilar ways, the war powers of the Crown and the 
President rernain dependent upon legislative willingness to provide rnilitary 
resources. Parliarnent and Congress can thus preernpt or end any executive 
rnilitary action that they deern hannful to the public good, by refusing to fund 
or otherwise rnaintain the anned forces. The legislature can thus politically 
influence as well as legally bind the executive, thereby establishing the 
contours of the executive's trust and holding the executive accountable under 
its fiduciary obligation. 
75 U.S. Const. arts. V (amendment process) and VI (supremacy clause). 
76 Congress has power "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that 
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make 
Rules for the Govemment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling 
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for goveming such Part of 
them as may be empIoyed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States 
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." Ibid., art. 1, § 8; Although Commander-
in-Chief of the federai armed forces, the President has no independent constitutional authority 
to command state militias. Astate militia only cornes under the President's command at the 
invitation of the state's Govemor, or as "federalized" pursuant to act of Congress. See infra 
note 79; Currently, the organization of state National Guard units and the conditions under 
which the executive branch can call them into federal service are govemed by U.S. Code, titles 
10 and 32. 
77 "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate 
may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills." U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7. 
78 "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; 
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Ibid., § 8. 
79 "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, 
and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States." Ibid., art. II, § 2. 
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The United States Constitution, however, restricts executive discretion in 
military matters in one important way that departs from British practice, but 
upholds the same principle as any other restrictions upon Lockean prerogative. 
While the Crown can declare war at its own discretion, in the United States 
only Congress can do so. Wary of executive military adventurism abroad and 
tyranny at home, the framers of the Constitution lodged the war declaring 
power III legislative hands,80 thereby diffusing government power, 
encouraging political debate and broader consensus, and making govemment 
war policy more publicly accountable. The constitutional reservation of the 
war-declaring power to Congress seeks to avoid ill-considered or wrongly 
motivated executive military action that would constitute a breach of trust.8! 
Congress, then, has constitutional authority to judge the executive's fiduciary 
obligations in war-making, ev en though the executive generally enjoys broad 
discretion over "federative" matters. In actual political practice, the discretion 
of the President as Commander-in-Chief to initiate hostilities, only afterwards 
seeking legislative acquiescence, is much greater than the Constitution's 
declare war clause would suggest. Nevertheless, the constitutional 
requirement that only Congress can declare war, in addition to raising military 
forces, ensures a vital and complex political process between the executive and 
legislative branches when deciding whether to commit the nation to war.82 
The President must court and maintain legislative approval for his military 
80 Congress has power "To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and ReprisaI, and make 
Rules conceming Captures on Land and Water." Ibid., art. 1, § 8. 
81 Fear of entangling alliances and principles of federalism also led the framers to strip the 
President of a treaty-making prerogative like that of the Crown, requiring instead that he make 
treaties only with the advice and consent of the Senate, for which a two-thirds majority of 
those Senators present is required. Ibid., art. II, § 2. 
82 Of course, questions remain as to whether limited or unconventional military conflict 
qualifies as "war" for constitutional purposes, and what kind of congressional actions are 
constitutionally sufficient to authorize presidential military actions under the declare war 
clause. The so-called "war against terrorism," and Congress' Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (18 Sept. 2001) 
[hereinafter Authorization for Use of Military Force, Military Force Authorization, or Joint 
Resolution] in response to the attacks of Il September 2001, present such problems of 
constitutional interpretation and raise questions about the separation of powers within the 
context of national security. For discussion of the "war against terrorism" and the Military 
Force Authorization, see 230, below. 
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actions. This Lockean structural model poiitically and legally constrains 
presidential discretion in military, just as in other, matters. 
Inter-branch dialogue over war policy, as found in the United States, 
exists to a degree in the British system, as weIl. Although the Crown, pursuant 
to the prerogative, requires no prior legislative approval to take the United 
Kingdom to war, political concems nonetheless mandate sorne executive and 
legislative cooperation. Pirst, the Crown exercises its prerogative only through 
the advice of ministers sitting in Parliament. The Prime Minister, according to 
who se advice the Crown would declare war, himself remains politically 
accountable to the House of Commons. The Prime Minister must maintain the 
confidence of a Commons majority for the Crown's military actions. The 
Govemment's military decisions will not only face criticism by the opposition, 
but might potentially alienate the Prime Minister' s support within his own 
party, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq illustrated to Mr. Blair. The Prime 
Minister's loss of confidence in the Commons, the actual threat of which 
depends upon the size of the majority, would result in the faH of the 
Govemment. Second, while the Crown can take military action without prior 
legislative approval, the sovereign power of Parliament looms latently in the 
background. As best exemplified by the 1688 Bill of Rights, Parliament could 
pass sorne form of permanent statutory restriction upon the Crown's war 
prerogative either in response to exceptional executive breaches of its trust, or 
as part of general constitutional reforms intending to reduce the scope of 
executive discretionary power. Thus, ev en though the Prime Minister loosely 
controls the House of Commons through the leverage of party discipline (and 
through the Parliament Acts can therefore push for the enactment of 
legislation without the Lords' consent, in sorne cases),83 the Crown's war 
prerogative remains situated within a Lockean structural mode!. Exercise of 
the prerogative is politically, and potentially even legally, restrained by a 
sovereign Parliament that remains the judge ofwhether the executive complies 
with its fiduciary obligation. 
83 See Brigid Hadfield, "Judicial Review and the Prerogative Powers" in The Nature of the 
Crown: A Legal and Po/itical Analysis, ed. Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 199 at 205. 
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Legislative Accauntability ta the Public 
The legislature's authority to check executive abuses of trust rests upon 
its representative role for the public. Its representative character, along with 
Locke's principle that all governrnent power must be exercised in trust for the 
public good, puts the legislature under a fiduciary obligation of its own. 
Although Locke did not expound upon an electoral system, he nonetheless 
alluded to public choice in the legislature's composition:84 
If the Legislative, or any part of it be made up of Representatives chosen 
for that time [of assembly] by the People, which afterwards return into 
the ordinary state of Subjects, and have no share in the Legislature but 
upon a new choice, this power of chusing must also be exercised by the 
People, either at certain appointed Seasons, or else when they are 
summon' d to it. ... 85 
Being in sorne way chosen by the people, individual legislators maintain links 
to various societal interests that are more directly accountable than those of the 
executive. While sorne writers have emphasized the people's right ofrebellion 
84 It is important to remember that while Locke's legislature may theoretically represent the 
public as a whole, it must not necessarily be popularly elected. Indeed, this corresponds with 
the theory of virtual representation under which members of Parliament legislated on behalf of 
both the disfranchised populace at home and peoples living throughout the Empire. Locke's 
legislature is fundamentally a republican, not a democratic, one. Historical restrictions on the 
voting of those without sufficient wealth, women, racial minorities, and other groups illustrate 
the gaps that have existed between the make-up of the voting electorate and the legislature's 
responsibility to act on behalf of the public as a whole. Indeed, property qualifications echoed 
Locke's own idea that one of the primary aims of government and the social contract was to 
protect property rights, justifying greater political participation for propertied individuals. 
Accordingly, the legislature is morally bound to act not only for the good of qualified electors, 
but also for those non-voting individuals for whom the legislature likewise exercises power in 
trust. Legislators must weigh the good of their local constituencies and favored political 
factions with that of the polity as a whole. The disjunction between a legislator's 
responsibility to particular interest groups and the greater public good therefore belies 
democratic tensions between the needs of the community and the many multiple sub-
communities having various and conflicting interests. Although Locke would have assumed 
that the legislature was electorally accountable only to a small proportion of the population, 
and certainly not to a univers al electorate, the legislature nevertheless had a fiduciary 
obligation to act for the good of the general public. See J. W. Gough, John Locke 's Political 
Philosophy, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) at 123. 
85 Locke, Second Treatise, § 154. 
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against executive tyranny,86 this recourse is an extreme one under Locke's 
structural model. The fiduciary obligation of the legislature itself requires it to 
hold the executive to a coexisting obligation. Only where the structural model 
fails, through the legislature's breach of this trust, would the people be able to 
engage their right to rebellion. Neverthe1ess, Locke's suggestion of periodic 
elections engages another structural back-up within his constitutional 
paradigm. That is, through e1ections, the people can oust those legislators 
failing their fiduciary obligation as understood by the general public (or, more 
accurately, as understood by the voting public). Elections allow the public to 
"tum the rascals out," and replace them with legislators more closely attuned 
to public sentiment. It is only where the legislature seems persistently corrupt, 
and the electoral system is inadequate for correction of the problem, that 
institutionalized means for resistance give way to the right to rebellion. 
In Locke's day, the Act of Settlement, 1701 87 asserted Parliament's 
power, as a representative body, to fulfill its trust by holding the executive 
accountable. The Act followed upon the Glorious Revolution, which rendered 
kingship dependent upon the people's consent expressed through the sovereign 
Parliament. 88 While far from democratic or representative by contemporary 
standards, the Rouse of Commons of Locke's era was nevertheless an elected 
assembly, ev en though chosen by relatively few propertied elites. 89 Of course, 
after the Great Reform Bill of 183290 enlarged the franchise, the modem 
Commons has grown stronger in its democratic legitimacy. Responsible 
govemment also means that ministers depend directly upon support of a 
Commons majority, and are regularly called to account by the Rouse. The 
Rouse of Lords, though remaining an une1ected chamber, is uItimately 
86 See for example Gough, supra note 84 at 45-47, 123. 
87 Act of Settlement, 1701 (Eng.), 12 & 13 Wm. III, c. 2. 
SS Laski, supra note 68 at 34. 
89 See Gough, supra note 84 at 128-29. 
90 Representation of the People Act, 1832 (U.K.), 2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 45 [hereinafter Great 
Reform Bill]. 
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subordinate to the Commons under the Parliament Acts.91 In the United 
States, in comparison, James Madison extolled the representative nature of the 
House of Representatives,92 while the Sixteenth Amendmenë3 made Senators 
electorally responsible to the people of the states rather than to their 
legislatures. The presence of sorne kind of electoral process, in any case, 
legitimizes legislative power to check the executive, while it also checks 
legislative abuse of trust by holding individual legislators publicly 
accountable. 94 Incorrigible legislative breaches of trust, however, might give 
the people a right to rebel against the legislature, just as they can do against the 
executive.95 ln any case, the legislature must keep its own fiduciary 
obligation, for which it is accountable to the public through regular elections. 
This obligation includes checking executive abuses ofpower. 
Locke emphasizes the connection between the legislature's electoral 
accountability, its independent trust, and its structural role in checking the 
executive by strongly condemning any executive interference with its election. 
Such executive misbehavior might necessÏtate that the people take the extreme 
course of dissolving the political society and erecting a new one in its place 
through revolution.96 Other executive attempts to thwart the elected 
legislature through corruption, or even simple defiance, violates the 
executive's trust, threatens arbitrary ruIe, and undercuts the foundations of 
civil government. Thus, Locke writes: 
91 Parliament Act, 1911 (U.K.), 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 35; Parliament Act, 1949 (U.K.), 12, 13, & 
14 Geo. VI, c. 103; See also House of Lords Act 1999 (U.K.), 1999, c. 34. 
92 See James Madison, The Federalist Nos. 52 and 53. 
93 U.S. Const. amend. XVI. 
94 See Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 21, 89. 
95 Ibid., § 222; Steven M. Dworitz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the 
American Revolution (Durham, N.e.: Duke University Press, 1990) at 92, illustrates the point, 
writing that the "theoretical question of the American Revolution was, fundamentally, a 
Lockean question: 'the extent of the legislative power'" (refering to Locke, ibid., ch. Il). 
96 Locke, ibid., §§ 212,216. 
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For the People having reserved to themselves the Choice of their 
Representatives, as the Fence to their Properties, could do it for no other 
end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely 
act and advise, as the necessity of the Commonwealth, and the publick 
Good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to 
. 97 
reqmre. 
Executive domination, corruption, or defiance of the legislature would 
accordingly subvert the public good and destroy the structural model that are 
both central to his constitutional paradigm. For the same reasons that the 
executive cannot obstruct legislative independence, the legislature must guard 
its institutional autonomy, observe constitutional boundaries to its own 
authority, and fulfill a fiduciary obligation to assess whether the executive, 
too, has acted for the public good. Accordingly, the legislature must "govern 
by promulgated establish'd Laws ... designedfor no other end ultimately but 
the good of the People . .. [and] neither must nor can transfer the Power of 
making Laws to any Body else, or place it any where but where the People 
have.',98 The legislature cannot exercise electorally legitimized power 
arbitrarily, abdicate it by complacency, or delegate it away wholesale to the 
executive without violating its public trust. 
Executive power is accordingly subject to legislative oversight, though 
federative matters usually warrant greater legislative deference to executive 
discretion than do ones falling under domestic prerogative. The legislature's 
failure to hold the executive accountable to its fiduciary obligation, however, 
would be a breach of the legislature's own trust. The executive is therefore 
politically accountable to the legislature and the public, while the legislature, 
too, must answer to the public through elections. Where constitutional, 
statutory, or perhaps common-Iaw restrictions limit executive prerogative 
broadly speaking, boundaries to executive discretion might also be legally 
cognizable ones in the courts. The courts' role in enforcing legal limitations 
upon executive discretion leads yet again to another public trust, giving the 
judiciary an important place in the Lockean constitutional paradigm. 
97 Ibid., § 222. 
9S Ibid., § 142. 
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Chapter III: Judicial Power and Legalization of Fiduciary Obligation 
The Courts within Locke 's Structural Model 
Locke's structural model, being a "proto-doctrine" of separation of 
powers, counterpoises the executive and legislative branches, each having a 
trust to act for the public good. This structural dualism promotes a 
constitutional paradigm in which government power is institutionally diffused 
to prevent its over-centralization, and through which both branches can uphold 
their fiduciary obligations.99 Notably absent from Locke's Second Treatise, 
however, is any developed discussion of the judiciary. Locke writes 
somewhat vaguely of "appeals" against wrongs and "judges" settling conflicts, 
but only in the general sense of the need for political institutions to order 
public affairs. lOo Beyond this, Locke does not propose a judicial power, as 
understood in modem constitutional practice, taking an independent and equal 
place with that of the executive and legislative. IOI Nevertheless, Locke, 
articulating his structural model, hints towards a role for courts: "Those who 
are united into one Body, and have a common establish'd Law and Judicature 
to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and punish 
99 Locke's structural model facilitates the realization of the public good in positive and 
negative ways. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. The positive, rational decision-
making aspect of this model is often overshadowed by its negative, defensive purpose of 
protecting liberty from arbitrary government. Laski, supra note 68 at 44-45, for example, 
writes of Locke' s limitation of power through the external dictates of popular sovereignty and 
the internaI division of government into branches; Gough, supra note 84 at 108-09. 
100 Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 20-21, 89. 
101 Gough, supra note 84 at 108; In the British system, one might note that, while they are 
functionally independent, the courts historically originated as forums for the Crown's Royal 
justice, while under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty they nevertheless remain bound 
by and subject ta legislative will. To further confuse matters, despite the Royal connection of 
the courts, the House of Lords acts both as an upper legislative chamber and a court of final 
appeal, while the Lord Chancellor is at once a Member of Parliament and a Crown minister. 
Thus, the British judicial "branch" is an amalgam of executive and legislative authority, much 
as Locke might have envisioned. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (O.K.), 2005, c. 4, 
however, wou Id replace the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords with a Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom. The Act, as of auturnn 2005, has not yet come into force. 
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Offenders, are in Civil Society one with another.,,102 This statement possibly 
recognizes, and certainly does not reject, an independent judicial power. 
Under Locke's model of executive-Iegislative dualism, courts might still 
have an important place in governance, even if subordinate in the sense that 
they would be unable to strike down legislative or executive actions. 103 
ludicial process offers safeguards for individual liberties against arbitrary 
govemment interference. Indeed, Locke states quite clearly that the 
legislature, though supreme, nevertheless must govern through "indifferent and 
upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by those Laws .... ,,104 With 
this terse reference to courts, Locke invokes natural justice princip les that 
underlie the rule of law, and which require judges to be impartial and no-one 
to suffer deprivation of liberty except according to the law. Locke's 
proposition, if taken as establishing a necessary relationship between 
legislative power and a legal system, might even be extrapolated as a kernel 
for the ideas of Lon Fuller.105 Expanding on the concept of natural justice, 
Fuller identifies eight desiderata necessary to a true legal system, and which 
comprise an "internaI morality" of the law. 106 If these requirements are 
substantially lacking, th en the political system is not truly one based upon law. 
In that case, what passes as law ceases to be a purposeful enterprise, and 
instead becomes a tool for the imposition of the governing power's arbitrary 
will. Fuller's purpose for the law is admittedly rather modest, if not morally 
102 Locke, Second Treatise, § 87. 
103 Gough, supra note 84 at 108-09, suggests thatjudicial power in Locke's model would faH 
under the executive power. This position would be consistent with the historical status of the 
courts in the British constitution as instruments of Royal justice. However, the Royal 
foundations of the courts would not account for the appeHate role of the judicial committee of 
the House of Lords, the upper legislative chamber. See also, ibid. at 125-26. 
104 Locke, Second Treatise, § 131. 
105 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 
1969). 
106 Ibid. at 39. FuHer's desiderata are 1) a failure to make any mies at aH, 2) failure to 
publicize them, 3) abuse of retroactive Iegislative, 4) failure to make mIes understandabIe, 5) 
enactrnent of contradictory mies, 6) requiring conduct beyond the powers of the parties 
obliged to obey, 7) introducing frequent changes making orientation of the subject impossible, 
and 8) failure to ensure a congruence between the mies and their actual administration. 
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neutral, being that of "subjecting human conduct to the guidance and control 
of general rules.,,107 However, Fuller's argument that law is a purposeful 
enterprise fits with the Lockean position that all government power is 
exercisable only in trust for the public good, thus requiring impartial, 
predictable, and reasonable application of the laws. Although Locke does not 
overtly discuss courts, there is nothing in his dualistic structural model 
incompatible with an established judiciary, capable of restraining the exercise 
ofboth executive and legislative power through the fair application of standing 
laws and discretionary decisions. As M. J. C. Vile suggests, Locke ev en 
seems to consider "the main function of the State as essentially judicial . . . 
:,108 binding executive and legislative power together with the systematic 
application of the laws. 
Locke's political theory on the whole is at once descriptive and 
justificatory of the legislative supremacy that Parliament won over the Crown, 
as well as prescriptive of a constitutional order premised not upon preserving 
the inherent rights of govemors, but upholding their fiduciary obligations to 
the public. lo9 Despite any pretense that the Glorious Revolution had 
established a stable and enduring political order, the turbulence and instability 
of the seventeenth century might have wamed Locke that constitutional affairs 
likely would not remain static over time. 110 Locke's own notion of popular 
consent as the basis of political society necessarily offered a possibility of 
change, so long as the basic princip les of his constitutional paradigm 
remained. Accordingly, the Lockean paradigm can thus accommodate the 
historical maturation of the judiciary as independent from and equal to the 
executive and legislature, and having its own public trust. AlI three branches 
sit within a tri-partite structural model that still further diffuses govemment 
107 Ibid. at 146. 
108 M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1967) at 59. 
109 Locke's thinking exhibits a eombination of historie al empirieism with an intelleetual 
rationalism. 
110 Gough, supra note 84 at 115. 
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power and promotes the public good. At the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the Act of Seulement, 1701 statutorily enshrined the principle of 
judicial independence (by me ans of guaranteeing life tenure for judges), which 
Coke had sorne time before championed against the King's persona! 
interference with the operation of the laws. 111 The United States Constitution 
later c1early ensconced the judiciary within the Lockean structural model. 
Thinkers like Montesquieu, Whig and natural law ideas, and the assertion of 
popular sovereignty foIlowing the American Revolution aIl buoyed an 
independent judicial power with a unique fiduciary obligation to apply the law, 
and check legislative and especially executive breaches of trust. 
Montesquieu and Separation of Powers 
In the Revolutionary era, broadly ranging from the late colonial period to 
the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, American political theory elevated 
the judiciary to an independent third branch capable of legaIly enforcing the 
limitations of fundamental law against the govemment. Among the many 
philosophical influences upon American thinkers of the period, Locke was 
perhaps the preeminent. 112 His theories of natural rights, the social contract, 
and a nascent separation of powers potently combined with radical Whig 
polemics and the common-Iaw tradition to fortify revolutionary rhetoric about 
fundamentalliberties and the threat of tyranny.ll3 Colonists and the founders 
III See for example Prohibitions dei Roy (1607), 12 Co. Rep. 63 and Case of Proclamations 
(1611), 12 Co. Rep. 74; For a brief overview of the growth of judicial independence in 
England, see Lord Justice Brooke, "Judicial Independence - Its History in England and 
Wales," in Fragile Bastion: Judicial Independence in the Nineties and Beyond, ed. Helen 
Cunningham (Sydney: Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 2000) 89. 
112 Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995) at 251; Although one cannot go so far as to say 
Locke's ideas caused the outbreak of the Revolution, which had varied and complex causes, 
they nevertheless framed the debate, provided American revolutionaries with rhetorical 
ammunition, offered theoretical concepts with which to understand the background and 
developments in American political society, and subsequently contributed to constitution-
making. See Dworitz, supra note 95 at 70. 
ll3 For a brief description of the whiggery that arose in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries in opposition ta Britain's perceived constitutional corruptions, see 
William B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine 
from its Origins to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (New Orleans: Tulane 
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of the republic also generously drew, in addition to Locke, from the ideas of 
other political philosophers, probably the most influential of which was 
M . 114 ontesqUleu. Notwithstanding the importance of the Revolution to the 
development of the separation of powers doctrine, the colonial grievances 
motivating it require no explanation here. 1l5 It suffices to say that the imperial 
crises arising in the 1760s began a nation-building process leading to the 
Constitution of 1787, which erected a federal government of limited powers 
delegated by the popular sovereign. What is important for subsequent judicial 
development is that American constÏtutionalism embodied an idealized Whig 
vision of government, based upon a tri-partite Lockean structural model of 
executive, legislative, and judicial power. The political philosophies of Locke 
and Montesquieu, a long tradition of common-Iaw rights, and the emergence 
University, 1965) at 82-83 [hereinafter Meaning]. For Whig thought in the American 
colonies, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, enlarged 
ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1992) at 27-31 and Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of 
the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, N.e.: University of North Carolina Press for 
the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, 
1998), ch. 1 [hereinafter American Republic]; Laski refers to Locke as "the first Whig." Laski, 
supra note 68 at 40. But see Josephson, supra note 4 at 211-12, who frnds that Locke's ideas 
broke with the Whigs' tradition-bound exhortations about the "ancient constitution," going 
further than simply justifying the constitutional settlement of 1689 in order to propose a more 
radical arrangement of popular government. Even if one assumes Locke to have been a 
visionary rather than simply an apologist, which is likely a correct conclusion, much in the 
Second Treatise nevertheless reflects constitutional ideas and Whig ideology of the 
seventeenth century. 
114 Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1985) at 59-60, 66-67; Wood, American 
Republic, ibid. at 7-8. Plato and other classical thinkers, along with the cities of Athens and 
Rome particularly, provided illustrious examples of republican government based upon virtue. 
As J. G. A. Pocock has shown in The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought 
and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, new ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003), 
classical republicanism would return as a potent political force in Renaissance Italy, with great 
subsequent influence throughout Western Europe. In England, Harrington's Oceana, More's 
Utopia, and the great political upheavals of the seventeenth century would carry on this 
republican tradition. Other sources of natural rights theories included Pufendorf and Grotius, 
while Hobbes pessimistically countered with his theory of the sovereign Leviathan. With 
Montesquieu being the greatest of them, Enlightenment writers such as Hume and Rousseau 
would challenge classical notions of republican virtue, and inspire Madison's reliance upon 
enlightened self-interest and his fear of self-serving factions. 
115 Changing attitudes towards authority and republican ideals spread throughout the Western 
world during the Enlightenment, and found particularly fertile ground in the American 
colonies. For an examination of the long-term, deeper socio-economic factors contributing to 
the outbreak of the American Revolution, see generally Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of 
the American Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1991) chs. 6-10 [hereinafter Radicalism]. See 
also Edward Countryman, The American Revolution, rev. ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2003) at 35-49, for a review of the imperial political crises in the decades leading up to the 
outbreak of violence in 1775. 
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of popular sovereignty aU combined in American politics to create a new 
constitutional role for the courts. This role rests upon the ide a that the courts, 
exercising power in public trust, have a fiduciary obligation to maintain the 
ruIe of law. In this way, Locke's executive-Iegislative dualism evolved into 
the modem doctrine of separation of powers, having an independent judicial 
branch. 116 Still, the new structural arrangement remains Lockean in principle. 
It preserves the political dynamic between the executive and legislative 
branches, but legalizes their fiduciary obligations through the judicial 
enforcement of statutory and constitutionallimitations upon their power. 
Among the greatest influences on the development of judicial power was 
Montesquieu, who "made Locke's separation of powers the keystone of his 
own more splendid arch.,,1l7 As Montesquieu wrote: 
[T]here is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for 
the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive 
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor. 118 
Like Locke, Montesquieu did not formulate a strict separation of powers, in 
which each branch would be wholly insulated from the others. Rather, 
Montesquieu's prescription for separation was flexible as the branches 
checked and balanced one another through overlapping powers. 
Montesquieu's structural model was itse1f Lockean, in that it diffused 
authority to prevent its accumulation and arbitrary exercise by any one 
116 Indeed, the American notion of judicial review was incompatible with a rigidly formalistic 
notion of separation of powers, but instead "depended upon the acceptance of the idea of 
checks and balances as essential barriers to the improper exercise of power." Vile, supra note 
108 at 157-58. Thus, the American separation doctrine is a flexible one, inspired by checks 
and balances, thereby allowing courts to judge the constitutionality of legislative and 
executive actions. 
117 McDonald, supra note 114 at 80; Laski, supra note 68 at 49, observes that "American 
republicans regarded selected doctrines of Montesquieu's as being virtually on par with Roly 
Writ." 
118 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws: A Compendium of the First English Edition, 
ed. by David Wallace Carrithers (Berkeley, Calif.: University of Califomia Press, 1977) bk. 
XI, ch. 6, para. 5. 
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institution, while allowing the branches to have input into each other's 
decision-making, as they were suited to do so, and so hold one another to their 
fiduciary obligations. 11 9 Just as Locke's model reflects the 1689 constitutional 
settlement, Montesquieu's inspiration was the early eighteenth-century British 
constitution, in which Crown, Lords, and Commons were institutionally 
separated but balanced through limite d, mutual participation in each others' 
functions. 
Although the British constitution, III theory, exhibited Locke's 
legislative-executive dualism, Montesquieu took notice of the significant 
institutional role that the Royal courts had assumed in practice. Drawing upon 
English exampIe, he probably did not imagine the judicial nullification of 
Iaws, but if so, Iikely would have dismissed it as an unenforceable action. 120 
He wouId, however, have noticed the independence of English judges since 
the Act of Settlement, 1701, the role of the courts in developing the common 
law, and their use of statutory interpretation in a way protective of individual 
Iiberties. The constitutional position of English courts underscored that his 
classification of government power into three departments was not a rigidIy 
formalistic one, but one accommodating considerable inter-branch dynamics. 
To interpret Montesquieu formalistically, as guaranteeing autonomous 
institution al spheres strictly separated through judicial review, risks projecting 
formalistic American constitutional ideas backward in time. 121 Montesquieu 
119 Vile, supra note 108 at 90-91. 
120 "Of the three powers above-rnentioned the judiciary is in sorne rneasure next to nothing. 
There rernain therefore only two .... " Montesquieu, supra note 118 at para. 32. But see 
Gwyn, Meaning, supra note 113 at 103, 111, who finds that Montesquieu considered the 
judicial power to be "the rnost frightening governrnental function," as it allows the 1egis1ative 
or executive to determine individual liberties, even as it is incapable of "participating in 
balancing the constitution." 
121 McDonald, supra note 114 at 81-82, seerns to read Montesquieu as erecting a separation of 
powers theory "nearly reconcilable with the English idea of checks and balances" which 
"provided for separation of personnel, rather than for division of function .... " However, as a 
general proposition, legislative and executive functions coincided with the institutions of 
Parliarnent and the Crown. Montesquieu was weIl enough acquainted with the workings of 
the British constitution to realize Parliarnent and Crown did in fact share in exercising sorne 
powers. As McDonald points out, ibid. at 80, Montesquieu was farniliar with Bolingbroke, 
and so had understanding of both English constitutional theory and practice. The better 
reading of Montesquieu is that he proposed a general, but not absolute, proposition about the 
functional separation of powers that rnight allow for sorne, but not excessive, rnixing of 
powers. See Gwyn, Meaning, supra note 113 at 106-13. 
41 
functionally analyzed the British constitution by associating the executive, 
legislative, and judicial power with the Crown, Parliament, and courts. 
Importantly, however, Montesquieu developed his functional view of the 
constitution at a time of its transition. Parliament and the Crown's ministers 
had not yet became intertwined through the princip le of responsible 
government, and the courts had relatively recently emerged independent from 
Royal control. Nevertheless, the institutional division of government did not 
preclude overlapping borders of authority. Montesquieu' s separation of power 
theory, as with Locke's structuralism, contributes to a constitutional paradigm 
in which government power is diffused and the branches hold one another to 
their fiduciary obligations. In doing this, the separation of powers emphasizes 
a separation of institutions with interlocking trusts, and recognizes that the 
branches exercise sorne concurrent authority in checking one another. 
Montesquieu's recognition of the importance of judicial power later 
resonated with constitutional ideas of many American colonists, who realized 
the significant implications that his theory had when combined with 
Locke's.l22 A tri-partite structural model better averted risks of concentrations 
of govemment power, in that an independent judiciary had its own fiduciary 
obligation to hold the executive, as well as the legislature, to account for 
breaches of trust. Courts in this way assumed a constitutional role in checking 
abusive executive and legislative actions by enforcing, through an adjudicative 
process, legal limitations to the other branches' powers. Even though 
Montesquieu admitted the judiciary to be the weakest of the three branches, 123 
Americans would nonetheless find in him and Locke the constitutional 
framework in which to reassess and emphasize familiar common-Iaw ideas 
about the importance of adjudication within political society. 
122 As McDonald, ibid. at 84, notes, Montesquieu buttressed the ide as of separation of powers 
naturally taking shape in America in the decades prior to 1787, so that "he transformed the 
familiar into a respectable body of doctrine."; Wood, American Republic, supra note 113 at 
151-52. 
123 Montesquieu, supra note 118 at para. 4; Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 78, 
similarly found the judiciary to be the "least dangerous" branch, with power of neither sword 
nor purse. 
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Judicial Power and Common Law 
While Locke and Montesquieu erected a structural model to promo te the 
public good, the common-Iaw tradition buttressed judicial power in America. 
It is perhaps not too much to say that the common-Iaw system influenced 
Locke, whose own ideas in turn became enmeshed with common-Iaw 
constitutional principles. The link between Lockean political theory and the 
common law becomes clearer in Blackstone's Commentaries, influential in 
both Britain and the American colonies. Blackstone drew upon Locke, not just 
for the structural notion of legislature and executive checking one another, but 
for a political society and le gal system based upon natural law and consent. 124 
Blackstone's work, however, c1early showed the tensions between the supreme 
power of the sovereign Parliament and its dut y to act for the public good by 
complying with natural law. To resolve this tension, Blackstone essentially 
denied it by equating positive and fundamental law: the former was a 
reflection ofthe latter, in the same way as were common-Iaw doctrines. In this 
sense, the Commentaries represented a juristic transition between natural law 
theories and emerging positivism.1 25 
In any case, Blackstone presented a rationalized approach to legal 
thinking that still maintained strong links with the common-Iaw tradition, 
based upon custom and first principles. 126 The Lockean idea of using 
structural mechanisms to realize the public good fit in weIl with Blackstone's 
"balanced constitution," which protected liberties and transposed natural law 
into the positive. In Blackstone's description of the constitution, limitations 
upon authority resulted from the institutional division of social estates, those 
being the Crown, Lords, and Commons, into a bi-cameraI legislature and the 
executive. No one estate or institution politically dominated the other, but the 
124 Blackstone, supra note 14 at 119-23, 149-51,259-60. 
125 For strong criticism of Blackstone's constitutional ideas, see Laski, supra note 68 at 117-
22. 
126 Wood, American Republic, supra note 113 at 10; Vile, supra note 108 at 104-05. 
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combined authority of the King-in-Parliament was supreme. However, 
already by the middle of the eighteenth century, many Whigs saw the growth 
of responsible government, the party system, and political cronyism as 
undermining the idealized, balanced constitution about which Blackstone 
wrote. The balance of social forces, and the institutional separation of 
legislative and executive power, would be mostly fiction at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. 
Blackstone's influence in the American colonies - where he was widely 
read and educated generations of common lawyers, judges, and politicians -
contributed to complaints and paranoia of sorne colonists about the ancient 
constitution's corruption. In the second half of the eighteenth century, 
differences between the constitution of Blackstone and that which had 
continued to evolve with political practice became apparent with increasing 
disagreement between colonists and Parliament over imperial govemance. 
Blackstone himself c1early favored legislative supremacy III the 
Commentaries. However, his promotion of natural law and a Lockean 
structural model meant to li mit government power were, ironicaUy, the bridge 
by which American constitutional thought could easily cross from a position 
of legislative supremacy to government limited by transcendent princip les. 
American arguments were more than rhetorical, however; they not only 
justified popular revolution against perceived tyranny, but suggested a 
"reformed" or "restored" constitution with legally enforceable restrictions 
upon executive and legislative power. The old common law, through this 
whiggish lens, took on special meaning in America, where "protesting 
colonials fused the constitutional rights of Englishmen with the natural rights 
of man, thereby merging the views of su ch legal luminaries and former chief 
justices of England as Coke, Hobart, and HoIt, and the natural law views of 
Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Locke.,,127 The fusion of common law with 
127 Huyler, supra note 112 at 221; Blackstone maintained continuity with the corumon law by 
asserting natural rights through traditional English liberties, and fusing custom with both 
rationalism and Lockean empiricism. See Michael P. Zuckert, Launching Liberalism: On 
Lockean Political Philosophy (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2002) at 238-40, 
256-57,259,262-63, and Blackstone, supra note 14 at 38-43,47-52,77-80. 
44 
political theory elevated judicial power to the place Montesquieu had assigned 
for it in his tri-partite structural model for the separation ofpowers. 
Sorne of Blackstone's own language in the Commentaries mirrored that 
of Chief Justice Coke, whose 1610 judgment in Dr. Bonham 's Case128 is one 
of the earliest suggestions that courts could legally enforce fundamental norms 
against ev en Parliament, when adjudicating the rights of the subject. In that 
case, Coke asserted that "when an Act of Parliament is against common right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will 
controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.,,129 Coke's daim, although an 
important part of the seventeenth century's constitutional struggles, never 
became established constitutional doctrine in Great Britain. It was rather the 
Americans who elaborated upon common-Iaw ideas to justifY such judicial 
power. l3O In other judgments,131 Coke also found that courts could enforce 
limitations upon the Crown, while later cases such as Entick v. Carrington l32 
denied the Crown any authority to infringe the liberty of the subject outside of 
what the law allowed. While the supremacy of Parliament was an undeniable 
political fact in the middle of the eighteenth century, courts had already 
championed restraints upon authority, especially that of the Crown. In 
America, renewed attention to the common law and the courts' adjudicative 
power assisted the judiciary in taking its place within the structural model 
articulated by Locke, and further developed by Montesquieu, Blackstone, and 
American Whigs. 
Popular Sovereignty 
128 (1610), 8 Co. Rep. 114a. 
129 Ibid. at 118; See Blackstone, supra note 14 at 41,54, and 91, for remarks about the primacy 
ofnatural over positive law, but also 89 and 91, asserting the supremacy ofParliament. 
130 See Adam Tornkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 103-04. 
131 See supra note Ill. 
132 (1765), 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P.). 
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Lockean theory and the common-law tradition combined with one of the 
most radical political innovations coming out of the American Revolution -
popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty justified an independent judiciary 
having its own fiduciary obligation to check abuses of executive and 
legislative power, through adjudication of individu al rights claims. In the 
United States and Britain, ide as of popular versus legislative sovereignty 
represented a fault line determining the relative place of the judiciary within 
each country's constitutional structure. The American colonists who rebelled 
in 1776 did so not only against the King, but as much against a Parliament that 
claimed sovereign authority to legislate for the colonies in their internaI 
matters. The Revolution rejected parliamentary supremacy as leading to 
legislative tyranny, and emphasized the public good as a limitation upon 
legislative as weIl as executive power. 133 After achieving independence, 
Americans continued to grapple with the institutional forms and political 
implications of republican government, and the new relationship between 
governors and governed. By the time of the constitutional convention in 1787, 
however, American political thinkers had begun to articulate ideas about the 
sovereignty of the people. This new conception of sovereignty re:flected 
Locke's argument about the cons en suai nature of political society. It also 
meant that govemment's public trust had legal as well as moral dimensions, in 
that government authority arose from a limited delegation. Popular 
sovereignty thereby developed out of Anglo-American Whig polemics, which 
placed govemment in a hostile opposition to the public it served, and obsessed 
about govemment's penchant for corruption, tyranny, and encroachment upon 
natural liberties. 134 Whigs had, of course, advocated a return to the ancient, 
balanced constitution, in which the legislative and executive (and the social 
forces they represented) balanced one another to restrain govemment power 
and so protect liberties. In this regard, ideas about popular sovereignty 
grounded Locke's constitutional paradigm, in which people consented to the 
formation of a govemment that exercised power in trust for the public good, 
133 Wood, American Republic, supra note 113 at 53-54,344-54. 
134 McDonald, supra note 114 at 76-78. 
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subject to structural mechanisms that divided such power and upheld the 
branches' fiduciary obligations. 
In America, however, where older social distinctions based upon estates 
were at best weak and political participation was for the time relatively open, 
whiggish structural ideas centered upon elected assemblies responsible to local 
constituencies. Many Americans kept faith after the Revolution that the 
establishment of a legislature chosen through regular local elections, animated 
by republican virtue, and paired with a weak executive, would avoid the 
arbitrary and heavy-handed manner of government that they had attributed to 
Parliament and King. Early experimentation in state governments, however, 
unfortunately demonstrated that a majority in a republican legislature, 
unchecked by the executive or courts, could act just as arbitrarily and unwisely 
as Parliament or King supposedly had. 135 By 1787, many Americans 
increasingly understood that no one branch of government, inc1uding a 
republican legislature, could be entrusted with supreme authority.136 From this 
experimentation came the notion that in a republic, then, only the people 
themselves could be the ultimate source of government authority. The people 
were sovereign, delegating limited power to government institutions, the 
members of which could never entirely be trusted. This new conception of 
sovereignty easily fell into place within Lockean theory, in which government 
originated by consent and exercised power only in trust for the public good. 
Gordon Wood, tracing the rise of popular sovereignty and its effects upon the 
separation ofpowers, summarizes these developments: 
The assumption behind this remarkable elaboration and diffusion of the 
idea of separation of powers was that all governmental power, whether in 
the hands of govemors, judges, senators, or representatives, was 
135 Wood, American Republic, supra note 113 at 63-65, 404-13; Concentration of power even 
in legislative, rather than executive, hands would also violate Locke's rejection of an 
"Absolute Dominion." Josephson, supra note 4 at 218-19, citing Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 
174,201. 
136 Thus, to understand the significance ofpopular sovereignty, "[t]he missing link here is the 
people, that is, the people as distinct from their representatives." Peter L. Strauss, 
"Symposium: Bowsher v. Synar: Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers 
Questions - A Foolish Inconsistency?" (1987) 72 Comell L. Rev. 488 at 695. 
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essentiaIly indistinguishable .... Only the great changes taking place in 
these years in the Americans' understanding of representation and the 
people's relationship to the government - aIl culminations of a century 
and a half of experience in the New World brought to a head by the 
anomalies inherent in the constitution-making experiments and summed 
up in the new meaning given to the idea of the sovereignty of the people 
d h · . ·bl 137 - ma e t lS assumptlOn pOSS1 e. 
AlI govemment power therefore arose from popular sovereignty. The 
separation of powers, as a Lockean structural model, diffused that popularly 
delegated power through the executive, legislative, and judicial branches and 
required them to hold one another to their fiduciary obligations. 
Relocating sovereignty in the people provided a theoretical resolution to 
the problem of a federal union between the states, as weIl as to the rejection of 
legislative sovereignty. There would not be a divided sovereignty between 
states and central govemment, imperium in imperio, but a unified sovereignty 
residing in the people as a whole. The people, then, had only divided legal 
exercise of that sovereignty among state and national govemments, as weIl as 
between several branches. 138 Popular sovereignty dispensed with unlimited 
legislative power, at the same time that it eradicated the old mixed constitution 
based upon social classes, an idea that had never fit comfortably with more 
leveled social realities in the New World. Instead, befitting the Age of 
Enlightenment, popular sovereignty founded the separation of powers not 
upon the institutionalization of a feudal class system, but of rational goveming 
processes combined empiricaIly to realize the public good. In this way, 
"modem conceptions of public power replaced older archaic ideas of personal 
monarchical government.,,139 The new theory of sovereignty associated the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as institutions defined by their 
qualities and personnel, with different means of decision-making, rather than 
with the characteristics and interests of old social orders. 140 Popular 
137 Wood, American Republic, supra note 113 at 453. 
138 Popular sovereignty thus supported the new ide a offederalisffi. See Wood, ibid. at 446-49, 
545-46, and McDonald, supra note 114 at 277-82. 
139 Wood, Radicalism, supra note 115 at 187. 
140 Wood, American Republic, supra note 113 at 151-52,383-85,445-49,603-04. 
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sovereignty buttressed Lockean structuralism and bound government more 
closely to the people by justifying legalIy, as well as politicalIy, binding 
fiduciary obligations enforceable in the courts. 
Judicial Review 
Popular sovereignty was significant in allowing the judiciary to take its 
place within a Lockean tri-partite structural model, and so lead to the modem 
doctrine of separation ofpowers. 141 Exercising its power as a direct delegation 
from the people, the judiciary acts in trust for the public goOd. 142 As part of its 
own fiduciary obligation, the judicial branch holds the executive and 
legislative to theirs by checking abuses of power and enforcing legal 
limitations. Unlike the Congress and President, of course, federal judges are 
not elected but appointed by the executive and confirmed by the Senate. An 
appointed judiciary nonetheless enjoys democratic institutional legitimacy as 
its power is delegated to it by the popular sovereign. Moreover, its appointed 
nature increases its independence by allowing judges to resist political 
pressures that would otherwise threaten it through electoral polIs. Such 
electoral independence better places the judiciary to check majoritarian 
excesses in Congress, as well as unreasonable or opportunistic, but politically 
popular, actions of the President. 143 The judicial role is not to represent the 
political interests of a majority of the electorate, in any case, but to fulfill its 
trust impartially by adjudicating disputes and maintaining the rule of law. 
Accordingly, the separation of powers, based on popular sovereignty, implies 
141 "The department of government which benefited most from this new, enlarged definition of 
separation ofpowers was thejudiciary." Ibid. at 453-54, and 159-61; Strauss, supra note 136 
at 696, asserts that popular sovereignty means "ipso facto" judicial review. 
142 Wood, ibid. at 461-62; "Popular consent now became the exclusive justification for the 
exercise of authority by aIl parts of the government - not just the houses of representatives but 
senates, govemors, and even judges. As sovereign expressions of the popular will, these new 
republican governments acquired an autonomous public power that their monarchical 
predecessors had never possessed or even claimed." Wood, Radicalism, supra note 115 at 187. 
143 Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Pro cess (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988) at 62-64 [hereinafter Constitutional Dialogues]. 
49 
that the judiciary, as an independent branch, possesses inherent power to 
review executive or legislative actions that violate their fiduciary obligations. 
Separation of powers principles mean that the Constitution requires 
judicial review, even though its text does not expressly provide. The 
theoretical basis for judicial review is also not weakened by the fact that the 
nature of such a power remained unsettled for sorne years after the 
Constitution's ratification and is still debated even in present times. 144 Even in 
the midst of the ratification debates, Hamilton could articulate a coherent 
the ory of judicial review, as derived from and exercised in trust for the public. 
Courts, within the separation of powers, thereby enforce the trusts he Id by the 
other branches. He explained that "[t]here is no position which depends on 
clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the 
tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.,,145 Rejecting 
legislative supremacy, Hamilton proposed that "[i]t is far more rational to 
suppose that the courts were designed to be an intennediate body between the 
people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter 
within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is 
the proper and peculiar province of the courtS.,,146 His reasoning would apply 
ev en more so to judicial review of executive power, lacking as it does 
144 Mc Donald writes, supra note 114 at 254: "A second fundamental principle on which the 
de1egates were in agreement was that, despite the shakiness of the precedents for the doctrine, 
the courts would by the very nature of their function have the power to strike down legislative 
acts if they were in violation of the Constitution." Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of 
Judicial Review: Its Legal and Historical Basis and Other Essays (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter 
Smith, 1963) at 10 [hereinafter Judicial Review J, similarly expresses the opinion that, in the 
absence of a specific clause, "the power rests upon certain general principles thought by the 
framers to have been embodied in the Constitution." Rather than judicial review arising from 
the written Constitution itself, however, both the review power and Constitution were 
"offshoots from a common stock, namely the idea of certain fundamental principles 
underlying and controlling government." Ibid. at 27. McDonald, ibid. at 258-59, nevertheless 
goes on to characterize the judicial branch, in the form finally embodied in the Constitution, as 
"at the mercy of the Congress." The vulnerable position of the judiciary, along with the 
mixing of legislative and executive functions (illustrated by Senate concurrence in treaties, for 
example), constitutes in McDonald's opinion an abandonment of Monstesquieu's separation 
of powers. Again, however, McDonald's assessment results from an overly formaIistic 
interpretation of Montesquieu. On the other hand, McDonald's criticism highlights the more 
functional notion of separation of powers, and checks and balances, incorporated into the 
Constitution. 
145 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78. 
146 Ibid. 
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majoritarian justification, law-making authority, and presenting a greater threat 
of tyranny. Hamilton's argument suggests how judicial review inherently 
exists under the separation of powers, premised as it is upon popular 
sovereignty and Lockean structuralism. 
While, as Fisher claims, "[t]he framers did not have a clear or fully 
developed theory of judicial review,,,147 they certainly understood it as an 
incipient concept arising from the separation of powers, ev en before its 
doctrinal establishment in federal jurisprudence. 148 After 1787, the theoretical 
notion of judicial review quickly became a widely accepted, if still 
controversial, constitutional doctrine. 149 In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall 
judicially established the review power in Marbury v. Madison,150 setting forth 
the premises upon which it rested: 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future 
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall mûst conduce to 
their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has 
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; 
nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The princip les, 
therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, 
from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are 
designed to be permanent. 151 
In upholding the Constitution as a fundamental law superior to aIl others, 
which the judiciary was bûund to enforce, Marshall implicitly drew upon a 
147 Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues, supra note 143 at 48. 
148 Gwyn, Meaning, supra note 113 at 126-27. 
149 See Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues, supra note 143 at 49-54; Not only had Coke 
suggested such a power, severai state and early federai cases implied it based not just upon 
written constitutionai provisions, but aiso unwritten fIfst principles. See especially 
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas 304 (C.C.D. Penn. 1795) and Calder v. Bull, 3 
Dallas 386 (1798). 
150 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). However, as Corwin, Judicial Review, supra note 144 at 50-
51, points out, the Supreme Court had actually reviewed but upheid the constitutionality of a 
congressional tax Iaw in United States v. Hylton, 3 Dallas 171 (1796). Also, the federal circuit 
court for the district of Pennsylvania in Hayburn 's Case, 2 Dallas 409 (C.C.D. Penn. 1792), 
had earlier refused to apply a federai Iaw that it found unconstitutionai for violating the 
separation ofpowers. 
151 5 U.S. at 176. 
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conglomeration of authorities. Building upon ideas from Locke, the common 
law, and popular sovereignty, Marshall asserted the judiciary's constitutional 
role as an independent branch capable of checking abusive power by the other 
twO. 152 Whereas executive-Iegislative structural dualism politicizes fiduciary 
obligations, the tri-partite separation of powers doctrine legalizes them. By 
checking the other branches and respecting its own trust, the judiciary thereby 
preserves the separation of powers and delineates the constitutional authority 
of each branch. 
Modem separation of powers doctrine thus exhibits three points defining 
the judicial role in the United States and other countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, which are also fundamentally premised upon Lockean theory. First, 
although Locke described an executive-Iegislative dualistic structure, the 
judiciary has historically matured into an independent third branch of 
govemment. The judicial branch furthers the purposes of Locke's structural 
model, as it diffuses power and is an additional institutional check upon the 
other branches. Second, as an independent branch, the judiciary exercises its 
power of adjudication in trust for the people, giving rise to its own fiduciary 
dut y to act for the public good. Courts must assert their own institutional 
competency to adjudicate particularized disputes and check abuses by the 
legislature and executive, thereby legalizing their trusts based upon popular 
sovereignty. Third, courts, because of their trust, have an inherent, 
constitutionally free-standing power of judicial review. Courts must exercise 
this review so as to confront or defer to the other branches as appropriate in 
the circumstances. Methods of confrontation and types of remedy upon 
review vary, as with the invalidation of primary legislation that violates 
constitutional restrictions, lssuance of non-binding dec1arations of 
incompatibility with rights guarantees, or the quashing of executive actions 
that are unlawful. Nevertheless, while methods of confrontation and degrees 
of deference to the political branches depend upon the constitutional system, 
152 See, for example, Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule 
of Law (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1996) at 33-43,54-58. As Hobson, ibid. 
at 58-64, further points out, Marshall's ruling in Marbury was therefore the culmination, not 
the innovation, of a judicial review power to uphold fundamental law against government 
encroachment. 
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courts cannot abdicate their dut y to consider whether legislative or executive 
actions violate their fiduciary obligations. Such failure by the courts, in tum, 
would be in violation of their own trust. 
The above three points reflect the interrelated structural, procedural, and 
substantive elements of the separation of powers doctrine, where the judiciary 
and the others branches each has its own fiduciary duty. ConsequentIy, 
separation of powers, and the judicial role within it, relies upon interactive 
deliberative processes between branches. As part of this inter-branch 
deliberation, the branches fulfiU their public trusts positively through 
reasonable decision-making and negatively by checking the abuses of each 
other. Positive and negative institutional roles differ in the cooperative or 
confrontational aspects of their exercise, yet they remain conceptuaUy unified 
in that they reflect ongoing and shifting inter-branch dialogue. The separation 
of powers doctrine, resting upon Lockean structuralism, allows the branches 
positively to contribute to a reasonable decision-making process and 
negatively to check actions by coordinate branches. 153 This structuralism 
differs from a rigidly formalistic division of branch powers where the 
definition of branch authority is exhaustive and immunized in aU cases from 
the other branches. Courts, for their part, must assert themselves to decide 
matters appropriately resolved through a case-by-case, adjudicatory process. 
At the same time, courts must give deference to the political branches in 
matters as they become unsuitable for adjudication. Where they are suitable, 
however, courts must review both executive and legislative actions against 
153 The "positive" and "negative" institutional roles are similar to those described by Vile, 
supra note 108 at 18. He associates the negative aspect of separation of powers with the pure, 
formalistic view of the doctrine, which prevents one branch from interfering with the allocated 
powers of another. The institutional and functional division is therefore a negative brake upon 
the abuse or concentration of power because it prevents the courts or political branches from 
infringing upon the powers of the others. Vile's ide a of positive checks, on the other hand, 
relates to a functional separation of powers by emphasizing checks and balances, through each 
branch participating in (and consequently having sorne direct control over) the functional 
powers associated with the other branches. Under a functional approach, however, it might be 
that a particular branch constitutionally lacks the legal power to "interfere" with another 
branch, or is instead constitutionally obligated to "defer" and so refrain from acting even 
where legal power exists, depending upon a myriad ofpolitical and legal considerations. Su ch 
a negative check, then, is not necessarily from a lack of constitutional authority, but might 
represent a branch's decision or duty to refrain from acting where certain decisions are best 
made elsewhere. 
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constitutional requirements and statutory law, look that proper procedures are 
followed, and hold executive decisions to standards of reasonableness, aIl to 
ensure that power is not misused in violation of the public goOd. 154 
154 The separation doctrine therefore both enables and disables government power, as 
demonstrated by several objectives such as those listed in Rebecca L. Brown, "Separated 
Powers and Ordered Liberty" (1991) 139 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1513 at 1533, n. 81 (citing Gwyn, 
Meaning, supra note 113 at 127-28. See infra note 155). 
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Chapter IV: Formalist and Functionalist Separation of Powers Theories 
Formalist Separation of Powers Theory 
The Lockean, tri-partite model of separation of powers between 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches structurally serves the public good 
by diluting political authority and facilitating reasonable decision-making, 
thereby preventing accumulation of power in any one branch and checking its 
arbitrary exercise. 155 The separation doctrine, however, masks important 
questions about just how to define the boundaries of each branch's authority, 
and delimit their interaction both to allow them to check one another while 
preserving their independence from undue interference or dominance by the 
others. The attempts by courts and scholars to address these issues generally 
faU under two schools ofthought, those offonnalism and functionalism. 156 
Fonnalism proposes, seemingly simply enough, that the Constitution 
strictly allocates executive power to the President, legislative power to 
Congress, and judicial power to the judiciary, with each branch confined to its 
own autonomous sphere and prohibited from intruding into another. 157 The 
only mixing and exceptions to these divisions are specifie textual departures in 
the Constitution, such as the President's legislative role through the veto or the 
Senate's participation in the executive conduct of foreign affairs through its 
consent to treaties. Other than these limited instances, the branches otherwise 
155 Gwyn, Meaning, supra note 113 at 127-28, sets out a list of the nonnative goals of the 
separation of powers doctrine. These are: "1) to create greater govemmental efficiency; 2) to 
assure that statutory law is made in the common interest; 3) to assure that the law is 
impartiaIly administered and that aIl administrators are under the law; 4) to aIlow the people's 
representatives to caIl executive officiais to account for the abuse of power; and 5) to establish 
a balance of governmental powers." 
156 For reviews of formalism and functionalism, see Cass Sunstein, "Constitutionalism After 
the New Deal" (1987) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421 and Brown, supra note 154 at 1522-31. 
157 For a description of such "pure doctrine," see Vile, supra note 108 at 13,291. 
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cannot exercise any power ascribed to another branch, e.g. the Congress 
cannot retain control over the President's execution of the law except through 
the process of further statutory enactment. 158 Fonnalism not only protects 
each branch from intrusion, but aiso prevents the willing surrender of 
constitutional responsibilities, as perhaps possible with excessive 
congressional delegations of rule-making authority to administrative 
tribunals. 159 Fonnalists therefore stress the separation of powers as mainly a 
structural prophylactic to the tyrannical accumulation of power. Because such 
concentration can occur slowly and unnoticed, and the larger structural 
implications of institutional mixing are vague, these concems require the 
judiciary to define and enforce strict constitutional boundaries between the 
branches' powers. 160 
Fonnalist theory has provoked much criticism as being politically 
unworkable, inefficient and even obstructive to democratic processes, as well 
158 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
159 F onnalism, therefore, presents potential difficulties with Justice Jackson' s concurring 
opinion in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 et seq., where he characterized presidential power to 
be at its height, when exercised pursuant to congressional authorization. Under fonnalism, the 
President might nonetheless be unable to act because to do so would be an impennissible 
delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch. See Paul R. Verkuil, "The 
American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and Separated Powers: Separation of Powers, the 
Rule of Law and the Idea ofIndependence" (1989) 30 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 301 at 318-19. 
160 Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995) at 114 (incorporating arguments previously made in Martin H. Redish and 
Elizabeth J. Cisar, '''If Angels Were to Govem': The Need for Pragmatic Forrnalism in 
Separation of Powers Theory" (1991) 41 Duke L.J. 449.); Resting upon a strict textual 
construction, fonnalism accordingly fits with originalism, which favors a constitutional 
interpretation based upon the intent of the framers. Among the Court's separation of powers 
decisions, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), is perhaps 
the most illustrative (and to critics, perhaps infamous) example of the fonnalist approach. In 
Chadha, the Supreme Court struck down the oft-used "legislative veto" as a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine. The Court reasoned that Congress' statutory reservation of 
power to overtum an executive administrative decision infringed upon the President's 
exclusive constitutional responsibility to execute the law. Accordingly, any congressional 
change to an administrative decision must be made by bill passing both houses and being 
presented to the President for signature or veto. Dean Alfange, Jr., "The Supreme Court and 
the Separation of Powers: A Welcome Retum to Nonnalcy?" (1990) 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
668 at 727, writes that "[i]n Chadha, the Court attained sorne sort of pinnacle of simplistic 
reasoning, and its opinion has been subjected to severe and well-warranted criticism." See 
also Justice Scalia's dissenting opinions in Morrison v. Oison, 487 U.S. 654, 697 et seq. 
(1988) and Mistretfa v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 et seq. (1989). 
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as unable to describe actual constitutional practice. 161 F ormalism is 
particularly troubling in respect of the authority of administrative organs, 
which vary in their control by the executive branch, and often exercise 
combined executive, legislative, and judicial functions in their implementation 
f . 1~ o statutory reglmes. Furthermore, originalist arguments for formalism 
overlook or discount the significant historical transformation of the 
presidential role in American politicallife. 163 Finally, formalism's focus upon 
strict institutional boundaries overshadows the normative concems of the 
separation of powers doctrine. The doctrine not only structurally prevents 
tyrarmy by avoiding concentrations of govemment power, but just as 
importantly serves the public good by promoting reasonable decision-making 
through inter-branch cooperation and checking abuses through inter-branch 
conflict. 164 Strict formalism, therefore, cannot theoretically accommodate the 
nation's vast administrative apparatus that has grown since the New Deal, an 
161 See generally Paul Gewirtz, "The American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and 
Separated Powers: Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking" (1989) 30 Wm. and Mary L. 
Rev. 343; Richard A. Champagne, Jr., "The Separation ofPowers, Institutional Responsibility, 
and the Prob1em of Representation" (1992) 75 Marquette L. Rev. 839 at 857; It is questionable 
whether the formalist's strict separation of powers has ever been a workable basis of 
government. "The doctrine of the separation of powers, standing alone as a the ory of 
govemment, has . . . uniformly failed to provide an adequate basis for an effective, stable 
political system. It has therefore been combined with other politica1 ideas, the theory of rnixed 
govemment, the idea of balance, the concept of checks and balances, to form the complex 
constitutional theories that provided the basis of modem Western political systems." Vile, 
supra note 108 at 2; Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to 
Comparative Politics" in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the 
Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) 3 at 18, asserts that "[i]t is 
impossible to have political structures in relation to one another in a common process without 
rnultifunctionalism ... ," a position agreeable with that of Vile, ibid. at 319. 
162 See Sunstein, supra note 156 at 493-99; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the 
Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001) at 3; Vile, ibid. at 318-19. 
163 Alfange, supra note 160 at 721; Sunstein, ibid. at 499; Martin Flaherty, "The Most 
Dangerous Branch" (1996) 105 Yale L.J. 1725 at 1816-19. Indeed, while formalists might 
find intemperate functionalism dangerous, formalism's blindness to constitutional realities of 
presidential dominance poses just as great a risk. As Flaherty comments, ibid. at 1821, 
"[w]here the [constitutional] commitrnent is balance, even the most glaring survey indicates 
that the executive branch long ago supplanted its legislative counterpart as the most powerful 
- and therefore most dangerous - in the sense that the Founders meant." 
164 Brown, supra note 154 at 1525; Donald E. Elliott, "Why our Separation of Powers 
Jurisprudence is so Abysma1" (1989) 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 506 at 527. 
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apparatus without which the federal govemment could not govem efficiently, 
if at al1. 165 
Fonnalism, moreover, suffers from two theoretical problems. First, 
many govemment actions defy easy classification as distinctly executive, 
legislative, or judicial. 166 Definitional problems become only more acute in 
the context of the operation of administrative agencies. Aside from 
administrative structures, however, the Constitution itself illustrates the 
tenninological difficulties inherent in fonnalist argument. For example, the 
Constitution designates the Vice-President, an executive officer, as the 
President of the Senate, a legislative position having a vote in the event of a tie 
in the upper chamber. The dual character of the Vice-Presidency, therefore, 
offers a little noted but clear example of direct executive participation in the 
legislative process. While the Constitution created the Vice-Presidency in the 
same clause that it established the Presidency, it sets out the Vice-President's 
legislative role in Article I, section 3 alongside the powers of Congress. Thus, 
the Vice-President's tie-breaking vote in the Senate is, fonnally, an executive 
exercise of what is functionally legislative power. The Constitution presents 
another anomaly in fonnalist theory in the case of presidential impeachment. 
Under Article I, section 3 the Senate can legislatively try the President for 
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.,,167 The upper 
legislative chamber thereby functionally adjudicates personal conduct and the 
legal rights of office-holding, and can render judgment that removes the 
President from office. 168 With impeachment, Congress therefore acts in a 
165 For discussion of the New Deal's impact upon American law, see generally Sunstein, supra 
note 156 ; Bruce Ackerman, We the People (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1991), has characterized the New Deal as a "constitutional moment," when 
normative attitudes about the role of govemment changed so substantially as effectively to 
"amend" the Constitution through interpretive means. 
166 Thomas O. Sargentich, "Symposium: Bowsher v. Synar: The Contemporary Debate About 
Legislative-Executive Separation ofPowers" (1987) 72 Comell L. Rev. 430 at 456. 
167 U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. 
168 Ibid., art. l § 3; Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988) at 159, points out the examples of the Vice-
President's senatorial role and the impeachment process, observing that, at least according to 
European ideas, "[t]he resulting political system resembles a hopeless ... mélange of the 
separation ofpowers and the mixed govemment models." 
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judicial manner despite the Constitution's general prohibition against bills of 
attainder. 169 Further complicating the characterization of the impeachment 
process, the Chief Justice presides over the Senate trial,170 raising the question 
as to whether a judicial officer thereby exercises a legislative or judicial 
function. 171 
The formalist argument presumably would reconcile these constitutional 
provisions by asserting that these anomalies of institutional mixing are limited 
exceptions to the separation doctrine, considered by the framers as the only 
such exceptions needed to maintain checks and balances between the 
branches. ln Beyond express textual departures from institutional division, the 
branches may not constitutionally exercise powers belonging to another 
branch. In this sense, formalist theory reveals its connection to both strict 
constructionism and originalism. It is also at odds both with established 
jurisprudence, particularly regarding individual rights and much administrative 
law, resting upon broad textual interpretation and historically changing 
expectations regarding both limitations upon and responsibilities of 
government power. 173 Formalist theory, in attempting to accommodate these 
169 V.S. Const. art. I, § 3 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., § 9; As Verkuil points out, supra note 159 at 308-310, impeachment "enshrines the 
ide a of separation of functions, a concept that administrative agencies borrow when they 
combine aspects of the prosecutorial and judicial functions within the executive branch." 
However, Verkuil does not resolve the definitional problems in separation of powers the ory, 
and remains vulnerable to a formalist retort based upon strict textualism. Although asserting 
that a substantive notion of the rule of law applies to the separation of powers, he does not 
make an argument as to why the administrative mixing of functions is otherwise 
constitutionally perrnissible. Notwithstanding, his rule of law argument is prescient, and his 
example of impeachment rightly suggests a constitutional commitrnent to mixing deliberative 
processes. 
172 See Bowsher, 478 V.S. at 721-27 (per Burger C.J.), and Jusice Scalia's dissents in 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-99 and Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416-22. 
173 Chief Justice Marshall' s warnings about strict constructionism in the context of federalism 
are perhaps just as relevant to an overly formalistic approach to separation of powers: 
"Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that the powers expressly granted to the 
government of the union, are to be contracted, by construction, into the narrowest possible 
compass, and that the original powers of the state are retained, if any possible construction 
will retain them, may, by a course of well-digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, 
founded on these premises, explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a 
magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1 at 185 (1824). 
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challenges, requires that courts struggle to classify aIl government action 
under its strict typology of executive, legislative, and judicial power. As such, 
it cannot coherently reconcile its strict constructionist and originalist 
foundations with adherence to precedent and political realities, which 
demonstrate considerable mixing of powers between the branches. Thus, 
formalism's textualism has descriptive shortcomings that fail to explain many 
actual exercises of government authority, and it consequently neglects deeper 
normative questions about how decision-making is reasonably related to 
values or policy goals that serve the public goOd. 174 
Second, while formalism suffers from an inability clearly to delineate 
government actions, as it purports to do, it also has long-term structural 
implications difficult to predict. Formalism claims that breach of strict 
separation ofbranch powers might seem innocuous or benevolent in the short-
term, but that disregard for its prophylactic purpose could lead to graduaI, 
unnoticeable accumulations of power that could threaten liberty in the future. 
However, formalism itself presents constitutional dangers in that the 
misclassification of a government power, and consequently its allocation to the 
wrong branch, could allow that branch to undermine the other ones under its 
formaI, but functionally mismatched, authority and risk making bad decisions 
on matters for which it is not institutionally suited. Government actions 
themselves, it can be argued, are not inherently executive, legislative, or 
judicial, nor do they become so solely on account of their exercise by a 
particular branch or their definition by the courts. 175 Formalistic 
misclassification cou Id mean that one branch could inappropriately exercise 
power free from the necessary oversight by a coordinate branch institutionally 
suited to decide the matter. 
Pragmatic Formalism 
174 Sargentich, supra note 166 at 459. 
175 See Alfange, supra note 160 at 729, writing that "[i]t is absurd to say that everything done 
by the legislature is automatically legislative, and that everything done by the executive is 
automatically executive" (criticizing Chadha, 462 V.S 919). 
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A variant of fonnalism - pragmatic fonnalism - recognizes that there are 
limited instances where one branch might exercise powers associated with 
another branch, outside of the Constitution's express exceptions, where such 
exercise is necessarily attendant upon or incidental to the branch's own 
constitutional duties. Martin Redish has advocated pragmatism as an attempt 
to avoid the unworkable strictures of strict fonnalism, in regard to the realities 
of the administrative state, by admitting that sorne mixing of functions 
advances the underlying nonnative goals of the separation doctrine. 176 
Pragmatism, however, maintains the basic fonnalist premise that the 
separation doctrine remains textually bound by the Constitution's division of 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and discemible boundaries are 
required to maintain the prophylactic barrier to the dangerous accumulation of 
power. Pragmatism thus continues to reject functionalist approaches that 
doubt the conceptual possibility or workable applicability of c1ear definitions 
of branch powers, outside the context of their exercise. l77 
In sorne cases, pragmatism nonetheless resembles a restrained 
functionalism, pennitting greater mixture of institutional power for efficiency 
and policy reasons. The case of Mistretta v. United States illustrates Redish's 
pragmatic approach, but with distinctly functionalist overtones. l78 The case 
considered the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,179 
which created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent 
commission located within the judicial branch. The Commission, consisting 
of sitting federal judges and lay persons appointed by the President and 
approved by the Senate, had responsibility for promulgating sentencing 
176 Such goals inc1ude democratic accountability, diversification offunctions, and the checking 
of power. Redish, supra note 160 at 6; See also supra note 155, for Gwyn's list of goals. 
177 Redish, ibid. at 6-7, 100, 107. 
178 488 U.S. 361 (1989), discussed in ibid. at 155-58. Thus, the Court "resolved the 
constitutional issue on the basis of a flexible, functional standard." Alfange, supra note 160 at 
759. 
179 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. and 28 U.S.c. §§ 
991-998 (1982 ed., Supp. IV). 
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guidelines for federal crimes and monitoring their implementation by the 
courts. The Supreme Court rejected an argument that the Act violated the 
separation of powers as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 
The Court found that, while Congress has delegated considerable rule-making 
discretion to the Commission, it had provided sufficient guidelines to control 
the exercise of such discretion. Furthermore, rejecting a "hermetic division 
among the branches,,,180 the Court found that the location of rule-making 
authority in the Commission did not allow the judiciary to usurp legislative 
power, did not undermine judicial independence, and concemed matters 
appropriate to the central mission of the judiciary. As Dean Alfange writes, 
from a functionalist perspective: 
[I]nasmuch as sentencing is inherently a judicial responsibility, it is not 
improper for Congress, exercising its authority under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, to delegate rulemaking authority to the judicial branch 
with regard to this function even though rules establishing sentencing 
guide1ines are considerably more substantive in nature than the 
procedural rules that the judiciary has generally been delegated authority 
to make. 181 
However, taken as an example of pragmatism, Mistretta represents an 
approach more constrained than what functionalist theory might otherwise 
allow. In assessing whether the delegation was incidental to the judicial 
function or gave a broader policy-making authority to the judiciary, the 
majority in Mistretta did not functionally balance efficiency or majoritarian 
concems against manifest threats to individual rights or excessive 
readjustments in inter-branch relations. Instead, the delegation was 
permissible because it was related and incidental to judicial power broadly 
conceived, and therefore remained conceptually premised upon the formalist 
division ofbranch powers. 182 Mistretta therefore represented a case where the 
functionalist and pragmatic formalist approaches led to the same result. 
180 488 U.S. at 381. 
181 Alfange, supra note 160 at 756. 
182 Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion starting at 488 U.S. at 413 et seq., put forward a 
strictly formalistic approach, characterizing rule-making by the Commission as pure law-
making, rather than an ancillary judicial function. As such, he found the Sentencing Refarm 
Act to be unconstitutional, as Congress cou Id not delegate away law-making power under any 
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Redish's argument, at first glance, would seem to recommend itself as a 
principled, yet common-sense, approach to formulating a workable separation 
of powers jurisprudence straddling the line between formalism and 
functionalism. Redish is persuaSIve in suggesting that, for instance, the 
executive branch can act legislatively as long as rule-making is necessarily 
related to and limited by the execution of a sufficiently constraining statute. 
With the idea of incidental power, at the heart of his pragmatic approach, he 
hints at a deeper understanding of government authority, in which exercise of 
"mixed" powers is more than just flexible, convenient, or efficient delegations 
and assumptions of otherwise separated branch powers. That is, a branch's 
"incidental" exercise of other powers undercuts the very notion of distinct and 
autonomous spheres of authority, instead suggesting a more generalized 
decision-making process, in which power is wielded in any particular matter 
by that branch (or branches) most suited to do so based upon its institutional 
attributes. Redish, however, does not delve deeper into the theoretical nature 
of incidental power, and pragmatic formalism ultimately suffers, if less so, 
from the same definitional problems as strict formalism. Under both 
pragmatic and strict formalism, the question remains as to just what powers 
are executive, legislative, or judicial. If, for example, the executive makes 
rules incidental to the implementation of a statutory regime, it is at least 
sometimes unclear as to whether such rule-making is then an exercise of 
legislative or executive power. This is the theoretical weakness of formalist 
the ory, which similarly infects its pragmatic version. Classification of actions 
remains important in deciding whether they are incidental or not to branch 
circumstances. In support of his position, Scalia, ibid. at 419-20, quoted Locke for the 
proposition that the legislature could not transfer away its authority. Scalia's lirnited quotation 
of Locke, without the full context of Locke's theoretical scheme, fell into the formalistic trap 
of defining all rule-making as exclusively legislative power, and consequently failed to 
appreciate how the formulation of sentencing guidelines could legitimately display a 
functional mixing of branch powers. The Court, in contrast, recognized functional 
ambiguities, suggesting, ibid. at 391, n. 17, per Blackmun J.: "Indeed, had Congress decided 
to confer responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch, we 
might face the constitutional questions whether Congress unconstitutionally had assigned 
judicial responsibilities to the Executive or unconstitutionally had united the power to 
prosecute and the power to sentence within one Branch." Justice Scalia no doubt would have 
found such delegation to the executive branch to be equally a violation of the separation of 
powers, but the Court's statement nevertheless makes the point about the resistance of many 
governrnent actions to clear, formalistic definitions and divisions among the branches. 
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power, and in detennining whether they are a pennissible exercise by that 
branch or an improper intrusion upon another branch's sphere of authority. 
Certainly, pragmatic fonnalism goes further than the strict theory in explaining 
and accommodating the administrative state. In the end, however, the 
pragmatic model escapes neither the definitional difficulties of the strict 
variant nor the long-tenn dangers of misclassifying, and so constitutionally 
isolating, powers within an inappropriate branch. 183 Furthennore, by allowing 
the incidental exercise of powers usually belonging to another branch, 
pragmatism still requires a contextual detennination of why and to what 
degree such exercise is constitutionally pennissible. For strict fonnalists, 
therefore, pragmatism would seem to involve the same unacceptable ad hoc 
detennination that infonns their criticisms of functionalism, while for 
functionalists it cannot sufficiently escape fonnalist constraints. 
Functionalist Separation of Powers Theory 
Contrasting with fonnalism, the functionalist theory counters that the 
Constitution does not erect strict barriers isolating the three branches from one 
another, but allows their mixing to promo te checks and balances, as well as 
government efficiency. Functionalism stresses nonnative goals, so that 
"[s]eparation of powers is not an end in itself; it is a means to the larger ends 
of preserving liberty and maintaining efficiency.,,184 Counter-emphasis on 
checks and balances arises from suspicion of rigid categorizations of power, 
which might impede government's responsiveness to political needs and 
impede efficiency, adaptability, and democratic majoritarianism served by 
183 Redish, supra note 160 at 101-02, 136, admits difficulty in defining and allocating 
functions as executive, legislative, or judicial, but believes that the Supreme Court can 
overcome it just as it attempts to do when defining many other constitutional terms, such as 
the meaning of speech. However, Redish ultimately cannot escape the problem that the Court 
might wrongly allocate powers among the branches, disguising them under the fiction of 
formalistic definitions. Indeed, his pragmatic approach to formalism seems to recognize 
without fully resolving that, for example, functional legislative power incidentally exercised 
by the President should be considered by the courts as formally executive power. See ibid. at 
117-18. 
184 Alfange, supra note 160 at 712, and 755 
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congressional delegations of powers. 185 Not surprisingly, then, functionalism 
is at odds with originalism and strict interpretation of constitutional text. 186 
Furthermore, emphasis upon checks and balances necessarily discourages any 
separation theory that wouid constitutionally insulate departmentai spheres of 
authority, within which a branch might act without any checks and which the 
other branches might oppose only with difficulty. Functionalism is more 
descriptive of constitutional practice than is formalism, and so quite 
compatible with the administrative state and complex political 
accommodations within and among the branches. Thus, under a functional 
jurisprudence, courts would not automatically strike down any and every 
attempt by one branch to exercise powers associated with another. Instead, 
courts would evaluate the functional characteristics and implications of the 
power exercised in assessing whether or not the branch action violated the 
separation doctrine. In doing this, courts would be open to more than 
incidental exercises of other powers, as conceded by pragmatic formalism. 
Such evaluation would consider factors as how far executive power is enabled 
by statutory language or related to statutory purpose, whether one branch's 
actions threaten to undermine the independence or equality of another, 
intrudes upon the "core" functions of another branch, or unduly threatens 
individual rights and lacks appropriate practical safeguards. 187 
Functionalism accordingly emphasizes the normative goals of the 
separation doctrine, rather than its formaI division of government power 
between three branches. Consequently, critics of functionalism charge that it 
actually undermines separation of powers by permitting ad hoc judicial 
decision-making that subjects principle to policy interests and efficiency, and 
destroys the structural prophylaxis against accretions of power. According to 
this view, functionalism not only violates the Constitution's plain language 
institutionally dividing the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial 
power, but collapses the separation of powers into a substantive, case-by-case 
185 Brown, supra note 154 at 1527-29. 
186 Sunstein, supra note 156 at 495-96; Flaherty, supra note 163 at 1812-l3. 
187 Brown, supra note 154 at 1527-29, 1564. 
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evaluation as to whether the particular action is expedient, excessively 
disruptive of the other branches, or violates constitutional rights like due 
process. 188 Admittedly, sorne balancing of decision-making form versus 
normative concerns is indeed inherent in the functional approach. 
Furthermore, intemperate preference for efficiency, or simple equation of the 
separation doctrine with a due process analysis, would effectively be no 
principled standard at aIl, and would threaten the Constitution's structural 
mechanisms for protecting rights and serving the public good. Extreme 
functionalism would effectively provide no guiding principles, and permit a 
free delegation of authority and use of discretion that would result in the same 
possible problems as strict formalism. That is, the executive might, through 
congressional abdication oflegislative responsibility and political oversight, as 
weIl as the judiciary's overly broad deference to executive decisions, exercise 
potentially arbitrary discretion. Extreme functionalism could therefore result 
in the executive's concentration of unchecked decision-making authority, just 
as would happen under a strict formalist approach where functionally 
legislative or judicial powers Were wrongly categorized as belonging to the 
executive branch. 
Despite their theoretical differences, both formalism and functionalism 
share two important analytical premises. The first and non-troubling is that 
any separation of powers model has the normative purpose of preserving 
political liberty through the division of power among the branches. This 
purpose indeed fits with Locke's constitutional paradigm, where a structural 
model allows government power better to serve the public good and holds 
each branch to its own trust. However, the problem is just what separation of 
powers theory best realizes these normative goals, while being representative 
of actual political practice and assumptions. 189 The second shared, and more 
problematic, premise between the two theories is that government actions can 
be typologically labeled as executive, legislative, or judicial and, like 
corporeal things, can be compartmentalized in or at times traded between the 
188 Redish, supra note 160 at 125. 
189 Fallon, supra note 162 at 24. 
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branches. Questions of how to distinguish between executive, legislative, and 
judicial powers, and just what constitutionally systemic significance such 
distinctions have, are at the center of both formalistic and functionalist 
1 . 190 separation of powers ana ySlS. Both theories fail to recognize that 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers are analytical constructs for legally 
and politically managing governmental power, and accordingly defy clear, 
conclusive definitions. 191 Even though functionalists point to definitional 
problems in criticizing formalism, their own counter-emphasis upon checks 
and balances 
contains underlying, if suppressed, premises of institutional formalism. 
After all, it makes sense to say that X 'checks' and 'balances' Y only if 
X and Y are in some basic sense independent of one another. . .. In the 
end, to avoid challenges to the formalistic underpinnings of separation 
theory by emphasizing a checks and balances framework can go only a 
certain distance toward averting the pitfalls of abstract institutional 
definitions. 192 
Both functionalism and formalism remain premised upon the identification 
and allocation of specific powers to the branches, which powers are in some 
sense separate in their natures. Functionalism and formalism, then, are in fact 
theoretically aligned in assuming that there exist specific, identifiable 
government powers, inherently executive, legislative, or judicial, and which 
either can or cannot be allocated respectively between the branches. 
190 Champagne, supra note 161 at 844-45; For discussion of the points of simi1arity between 
formalist and functionalist arguments, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Re1ationships 
between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases" (1988) 22 Harvard J. 
L. & Pub. Pol. 21. 
191 Vile, supra note 108 at 16-17,237. 
192 Sargentich, supra note 166 at 460. 
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Chapter V: Deliberative Decision-Making: An Alternative Separation of 
Powers Theory 
A Deliberative Pro cesses Approach 
Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are a functional typology of 
the deliberative processes by which govemment institutions, whether 
independent branches or inferior administrative bodies, seek to make 
reasonable decisions for the public good and so fulfill their fiduciary 
obligations within the Lockean constitutional paradigm. The separation of 
powers doctrine itself grows out of the connections between the various ways 
by which institutions can deliberate about their decisions, with questions about 
which govemment branches (due to their unique institutional characteristics) 
are the most competent to deliberate according to those processes. Further, the 
separation doctrine rests upon the notion that sorne particular kinds of 
decisions, under certain circumstances, are best resolved, and the public good 
thereby best attained, by certain deliberative processes and the branches most 
institutionally suited to use them. Consequently, the typology of a power as 
executive, legislative, or judicial grows, ultimately, not out of exclusive 
groupings of specifie government actions allocated between the branches, but 
out of the processes through which government bodies arrive at their 
decisions. Responsibility for certain govemment actions therefore usually 
rests with the branch or branches institutionally best suited to resolve a matter-
at-hand, based upon a branch's structure and competence in using the 
appropriate deliberative processes. 193 
The formalist, accordingly, might agree with this idea of the separation 
of powers, arguing for example that the doctrine mandates that rule-making 
193 For an overview of the relationship between a branch's structure and its deliberative 
competency, see 85, below. 
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should only be done by the legislature, a democratically elected body that can 
debate and politically compromise among various societal interests. However, 
government actions often defy clear definition as being executive, legislative, 
or judicial, and can exhibit mixed characteristics of each. What the formalist 
has difficulty with is in determining with certainty just what actions are 
conclusively rule-making, for example, and therefore exclusively within the 
authority of the legislature. As seen in Mistretta,194 for instance, the 
establishment of sentencing guidelines might show both rule-making and 
adjudicative qualities. Such definitional ambiguity only indicates that aH 
government actions in their most fundamental sense are part of a general 
decision-making power for the public good, where the branches have 
interlocking trusts. The separation of powers doctrine, then, cannot rest upon 
clear, exclusive lists of actions, with each assigned solely to one branch. 
Rather, the doctrine rests upon Lockean grounds, separating out the 
deliberative processes by which the branches can make the decisions entrusted 
to them and check the actions of the others. 195 This approach therefore denies 
clear distinctions between executive, legislative, and j udicial powers. 
194 488 V.S. 361 (1989). 
195 Redish, supra note 160 at 117, appears to recognize the importance of deliberative 
processes to the separation of powers, before then retreating back into a pragmatic fonnalist 
analysis: 
"With relatively narrow, historically base exceptions, 'legislative' power includes not only the 
authority to prornulgate generalized standards and requirernents of citizen behavior or to 
dispense benefits, for the purpose of achieving, maintaining, or avoiding particular social 
poliey results. So broadly phrased, of course, such a standard could conceivably be ernployed 
to describe the functions perfonned by the judicial and executive branches, as well. However, 
the difference is the structural 'baggage' that the exercise of the judicial and executive powers 
are required to carry - baggage which does not affix itself to the exercise of the legislative 
power. The judicial branch rnay establish su ch rules of behavior only in the context of the 
perfonnance of the 'traditional' judicial function of the adjudication of live cases or 
controversies. " 
For Congress, such "structural baggage" includes the necessity to show political commitment 
when legislating, thereby retaining democratic accountability for delegated authority. Such a 
princip le guides courts in detennining whether executive or judicial exercises of delegated 
authority are legislative in nature. While Redish recognizes the functional mixing of branch 
powers, he nevertheless still relies upon fonnalistic der mitions and allocations of branch 
powers. Still, his pragmatic approach nevertheless does allow more flexibility than strict 
fonnalism, as Congress might pass a statute that evidences its political commitrnent and 
rnaintains democratic accountability, while still permissibly delegating sorne rule-making 
authority to the executive as incidental to statutory implernentation. See ibid. at 136-37, 142-
43, 156-57. 
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For example, the making of statute law is best left to Congress because it 
is institutionally suited for allowing debate among law-makers, politically 
reconciling different constituency interests, and ensuring the democratic 
legitimacy of the law generally. Sorne administrative rule-making, however, 
like environmental regulation or military govemance, might be better left to 
the executive's discretion, as it can draw upon subject-matter expertise and 
more efficiently make regulatory or strategic policy choices. In the latter sort 
of cases, the separation of powers doctrine permits the executive to exercise 
considerable rule-making discretion as authorized by Congress. That 
discretion, however, remains subject to judicial review in order to ensure that 
the executive acts only within its delegated powers, as weIl as according to 
standards of due process and reasonableness in its rule determinations. In such 
cases, branch powers to decide certain issues, based on their deliberative 
competencies, can overlap. The separation doctrine is therefore Lockean, in 
that it promotes the public good by encouraging reasonable decision-making 
and allowing the branches to hold one another to their fiduciary obligations, 
based upon which branch or branches together can best decide certain matters 
using executive, legislative, or judicial processes. 
A Lockean, process-oriented approach to separation of powers becomes 
clearer in the context of British administrative law, where parliamentary 
sovereignty and responsible govemment resist formalistic divisions between 
the branches and rest upon mixing of powers. 196 Eric Barendt, for example, 
citing Ivor Jennings, thus observes the following: 
For instance, the differences between judicial and administrative 
decisions are in his [Ivor Jennings'] view not really ones of substance, 
but are only formaI or procedural. It is better that sorne decisions are 
taken by persons or bodies which observe formaI legal procedures -
impartial tribunals considering a case in public and on the evidence -
rather than by administrators who are concemed ta execute policies 
which they have developed. But we cannot say that sorne decisions are 
inherently judicial rather than administrative. 197 
196 Eric Barendt, "Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government" [1995] Pub. L. 599 at 
615. 
197 Ibid. at 603, and 604-05,616. 
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Barendt's understanding of government power therefore rejects fonnalistic 
characterizations. Nevertheless, it does not preclude a functional analysis of 
government action in detennining whether certain similar kinds of decisions 
are better handled by, for example, the judicial or executive branch. Barendt 
continues: 
[I]t is perfectly coherent to claim, for instance, that decisions on personal 
rights and liberties are inherently suitable for judicial resolution, and so 
must be made by a court, while the distribution of other goods and 
benefits may be regarded as a matter for administrative decision .... 
[E]ven within the context of an unwritten, or codified, constitution, 
courts are able to draw a clear line between administrative and judicial 
functions. 198 
British courts have relied upon su ch process-oriented, functional analysis, 
outside of the guiding presence of a written constitution, in developing judicial 
review doctrines that restrain Crown discretion. Courts will therefore review 
the executive's decisions according to standards of legality, procedural 
propriety, and reasonableness, when it acts in a way that is functionally 
legislative or judicial. 
Despite the functional mixing of powers attendant upon parliamentary 
sovereignty and responsible government, "an approach to the study of British 
government that rules out all reference to the 'separation of powers' is an 
inadequate one.,,199 Rather, British jurisprudence reflects a flexible notion of 
separation of powers, not premised upon the clear definition and allocation of 
certain powers between the branches. The separation doctrine in British 
experience has a strong historical component, based on long-established 
institutions and their functions. Thus, having no written constitution on which 
to base fonnalist theory, courts instead must remain focused upon the 
nonnative goals of separation of powers principles, upon which British 
198 Functional differentiation also, of course, allows recognition of legislative processes. Ibid. 
at 605. 
199 Vile, supra note 108 at 8. 
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government, like that of the United States, is based.2oo Such goals, behind the 
Lockean constitutional paradigm, are the promotion of the public good 
through reasonable decision-making, the diffusion of government power 
among the branches, and their mutual checks upon one another. The 
deliberative processes approach to the separation of powers allows the 
different branches to exercise authority based upon considerations about which 
one of them is most institutionally suited to decide certain matters. The 
branches might also have overlapping, concurrent authority, which not only 
accommodates the definitional ambiguity of sorne actions but also encourages 
the branches to check the others and hold them to their fiduciary obligations. 
ludicial review, for instance, recognizes that the executive might functionally 
legislate or adjudicate, but maintains the separation of powers by preventing 
unfettered, arbitrary executive discretion. Review ensures that the executive 
branch acts in trust for the public good, by making such decisions according to 
legislative or adjudicative standards more likely to lead to a reasonable 
decision in the matter at hand. 201 
200 Barendt, supra note 196 at 606-07. 
201 See ibid. at 608-09; One approach to judicial review that tries to account for the problems 
inherent in both formalism and functionalism is one of great judicial restraint. Jesse H. 
Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Pro cess: A Functional Reconsideration of 
the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980), has suggested that 
separation of powers issues, as weIl as those of federalism, are always non-justiciable political 
questions, to be resolved between Congress and the President, or the national government and 
the states. The Court shou1d instead preserve its political capital in focusing on individual 
rights. See also John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), advocating judicial abstention as long as 
political processes are open to equal participation. Flaherty, supra note 163 at 1828-1834, 
suggests that courts should passively examine separation of powers disputes, deferring to the 
political process and intervening only in those instances, as he describes at ibid. at 1828, 
"confined either to violations of c1ear tex tuai provisions relating to the apex of the three 
branches or to c1ear breaches of underlying separation of powers principles themselves." 
Flaherty loosely draws upon judicial "passive virtues," IITst formulated by Alexander Bickel, 
The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), see 107, below, and advocates judicial restraint on controversial issues 
through reliance upon the standing, ripeness, and political question doctrines. In so far as such 
a deferential approach would support, for example, considerable congressional delegation of 
authority to the President unless it violates an express constitutional provision or the most 
basic purposes of the separation of powers, it has much in common with functionalism. 
However, it wou Id aIlow far less judicial review of government action than is generally the 
case under functionalism, and risks rendering the separation of powers doctrine meaningless 
as a legally enforceable, rather than politically idealistic, principle. For a criticism of 
Choper's abstention argument, see Redish, supra note 160 at 16-21. 
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Under a process-oriented approach, then, the key issue is not necessarily 
the subject matter of a decision per se or the branch taking it, but the way in 
which decisions are made and remain accountable to the other branches. It is 
not impossible, for example, for the executive functionally to adjudicate a 
matter, even though the judiciary is in most circumstances institutionally better 
suited for that kind of deliberation. Institutions sometimes make decisions by 
blending deliberative processes, which shade into one another. A branch's 
exercise of "quasi" powers, partially resembling those often associated with a 
different branch, explains the difficulties in reaching neat, forrnalistic 
definitions of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Alex Tuckness 
makes this point in the context of Locke's dualistic model of executive and 
legislative power, placing judicial power as a midpoint and composite variant 
between them.202 Tuckness writes, "[i]n place of a three-part distinction along 
legislative, executive, and judicial functions, it is better to think of a 
continuum between the pure legislative and the pure executive case.,,203 
According to Tuckness, judicial power rests along this continuum, as courts 
essentially make law through developing new common-Iaw doctrines or 
interpreting the meaning of statute, or executing the law through its application 
and enforcement. 204 While radical forrnalism, based as it is upon c1ear 
definitions of branch powers and hard positivist jurisprudence, asserts that 
courts only apply and do not make law, such a position also conflicts with the 
cornrnon-Iaw tradition of fashioning rules through case precedent. 
Furtherrnore, the executive and legislature must each interpret existing law in 
the course of acting, a function usually reserved for adjudicatory deterrnination 
in the courtS.205 Tuckness' observation about judicial power can be applied to 
the executive and legislative, as weIl; branch powers shade into one another, 
making it difficult to define with certainty and exc1usivity the spheres of 
branch authority. 
202 Alex Tuckness, Locke and the Legislative Point of View: Toleration, Contested Principles, 
and the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) at 118-19. 
203 Ibid. at 127. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid.; Dunn, supra note 12 at 148. 
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Tuckness' understanding of executive-legislative dualism, based on 
functional concepts of rule-enforcement and rule-making, illustrates the 
significance of deliberative processes. However, it remains difficult to 
dichotomize even executive and legislative powers in practice. Indeed, 
Tuckness admits that "[t]he pure cases of legislative or executive action are 
rare if they exist at all. ,,206 What executive and legislative, as well as judicial, 
processes have in common, though, is that they fit within a Lockean structural 
model. The judiciary does not figure in the Two Treatises, not because 
adjudication is unimportant, but because Locke, like Tuckness, subsumes it 
under executive-legislative structural dualism. In any case, what Tuckness' 
explanation illustrates is the importance of structurally employing deliberative 
processes through the branches, without imposing strict formalistic definitions 
of their powers. Tuckness touches upon the centrality of deliberative 
processes to the separation of powers doctrine, and the relationship between 
deliberative processes and the branches as institutions: "Since a Lockean 
theory does not assume a simple one-to-one correspondence between functions 
and institutions, courts can, as institutions, perform both legislative and 
executive functions at different times. Insofar as they approximate one or the 
other, the institutional roles of that ideal type will apply to judges.,,207 
Likewise, for example, insofar as the executive might perform adjudicative 
functions (such as through administrative agencies), it must honor the 
deliberative standards of the judge, such as impartiality and procedural 
faimess. Thus, the separation doctrine does not rest upon strict formalistic 
divisions of powers. Rather, it differentiates between and utilizes the different 
deliberative processes by which each branch fulfills its own fiduciary 
obligation, upholds those of the others, and is in tum checked by them should 
it act improperly. 
Tuckness argues that govemment powers resist clear definition and 
deliberative processes themselves often blur, with judicial power being a 
206 Tuckness, ibid. at 127. 
207 Ibid. at 128. 
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species of the executive and legislative. Tuckness' position leads, perhaps 
unintentionally on his part, to an inverse perspective on government power, 
being the idea that executive and legislative decisions are themselves ones of 
judgment. 208 From this perspective, all government power is generally judicial 
in nature. Such a view reflects older notions of law and government, obscured 
by the rise of positivism and emphasis upon legislative power in Great Britain 
and the United States during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Previous to these jurisprudential developments, the conceptual distinction 
between statute, common law, and the executive discretion used in their 
enforcement was, at best, weak. As Vile writes: 
The connection between modem theories of law and sovereignty and the 
emergence of the concepts of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions of government is very close. The ide a of an autonomous 
'legislative power' is dependent upon the emergence of the idea that law 
could be made by hum an agency, that there was a real power to make 
law, to legislate. In the early medieval period this idea ofmaking law by 
human agency was subordinated to the view that law was a fixed 
unchanging pattern of divinely-inspired custom, which could be applied 
and interpreted by man, but not changed by him. In so far as men were 
concerned with 'legislation' they were in fact declaring the law, 
clarifying what the law really was, not creating it. Legislation was in 
fact part of the judicial procedure. . .. There could, therefore, be only 
one 'function' of government - the judicial function; all acts of 
government were in sorne way justified as aspects of the application and 
interpretation of the law.209 
Under this view, aIl government decision-making resembles adjudication in 
that legitimate authority is exercisable only to realize transcendent ideals of 
justice. Importantly, this focus upon adjudication suggests that the executive 
and legislative branches differ not in their functions so much as in their unique 
compositions as institutional forums for doing justice. Thus, for exarnple, not 
only is the King the fount of justice, but Parliament is also a high court. The 
208 William B. Gwyn, "The Indeterminancy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal 
Courts" (1989) 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 474 at 476,494-502, explains historically, for example, 
how criminal prosecutions straddle the executive and judicial functions; Philip B. Kurland, 
"The Rise and Fall of the 'Doctrine' of Separation ofPowers" (1986) 85 Mich. L. Rev. 592 at 
603. 
209 Vile, supra note 108 at 24, citing C. H. McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament and Its 
Supremacy (New Haven, 1910) at 109-10. 
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ambiguity of judicial power appears in British constitutional structure, where 
courts historically emanated from the Crown, the highest court of appeal is the 
Bouse of Lords, and the Chancellor is not only head of the judiciary but sits in 
Parliament and is a Crown minister?1O Although institutional mixing to this 
degree is missing in republican government under the United States 
Constitution, the judicial nature of government power rernains inherent within 
it. The judicial nature echoes in the selection of judges, involving presidential 
appointment and the approval of the Senate. It also appears more starkly in 
the executive branch's functional adjudication of sorne administrative matters, 
and in the idea that both the President and Congress to sorne degree must 
interpret their constitutional and legal obligations for thernselves, often in 
ways that impact upon individual legal rightS.211 Whether laying down a 
general rule, interpreting it in deciding disputes under specific facts, or 
enforcing it, all government institutions assert themselves in sorne sense as a 
judge acting for the public good. 
Whether exercised by executive, legislative, or judicial institutions, all 
lawful authority is conceptually similar in Lockean terms in that it must serve 
the public good. Branch powers differ not in purposes, but in the ways each 
branch can deliberate in making decisions. Because all branches have a 
fiduciary dut Y to act for the public good, Lockean structuralism depends upon 
them to cooperate with as well as check one other, using different deliberative 
processes as they are best able, and thereby increasing reasonableness and 
reducing arbitrariness in decisions. Executive, legislative, and judicial 
processes remain associated, but not exc1usively linked, with their respective 
branches, because each branch is particularly suite d, due to its institutional 
attributes, to deliberate and make decisions according to the particular 
processes normally associated with them. 212 Deliberative processes 
210 But see supra note 1 ° 1, for a description of pending constitutional refonns to the judiciary 
in the United Kingdom. 
211 For example Chevron US.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), mandates in certain circumstances that courts defer to an agency's reasonable 
construction of its own powers under an enabling act. 
212 Vile, supra note 108 at 290, 317, 326, 329, finds four functions that account for the 
processes of the three branches, and support the Lockean notion of govemment's genera1 
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nonetheless often shade into one another, so that at times a branch appears to 
be de1iberating in ways not characteristic of it, but functionally associated with 
another branch. For example, the detennination of criminal culpability is best 
determined through the adjudicative process, and so usually left to courts. In 
cases of military justice, however, the executive is also well-suited to make 
such determinations, in many circumstances, due to their impact upon military 
discipline and operations. The separation of powers recognizes these 
overlapping competencies and the functionally mixed nature of such decision-
making. The executive's functional adjudication of culpability, and any 
subsequent deprivation of personal liberty, would constitutionally require that 
it follow certain procedures indicative of the judicial process, lest the resulting 
decision be arbitrary, unreasonable, and so not conducive to the public good. 
Courts-martial, then, well illustrate the mixing of deliberative processes and 
their institutional relationship to the branches, which under the separation of 
powers can lead to the executive acting in a functionally judicial manner. 
Were civilian courts to decide cases of military law, it might also be argued 
that they, in tum, would to a degree act in a functionally executive way by 
enforcing military discipline and might dispense with certain adjudicative 
procedures afforded to civilians. 
The separation of powers doctrine, based upon a structural model that 
ensures the interplay of deliberative processes among the branches, therefore 
accounts for what Victoria Nourse has tenned "constitutive aspects ofpolitical 
power." That is, the United States Constitution (like others such as those of 
the United Kingdom or Canada, for example) "is a means of both limiting and 
creating political power.,,213 The legitimizing, or positive, aspect of separation 
of powers utilizes multiple deliberative processes, both between and within the 
branches, in government's effort to make reasonable decisions that serve the 
decision-making power for the public good. These are rule-rnaking, a discretionary function 
(corresponding to the prerogative), rule-application, and rule interpretation. Similarly, 
Almond, supra note 161 at 17, explains that "the three authoritative governmental functions, 
rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication, are the old functions of 'separation of 
powers,' except that an effort has been made to free them of their structural overtones .... " 
[emphasis original]. 
213 Victoria Nourse, "The Vertical Separation ofPowers" (1999) 49 Duke L.J. 749 at 758. 
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public good. This positive aspect complements the negative diffusion and 
checking of govemment power as a prophylactic to its accumulation and 
arbitrary exercise.214 The constitutionallegitimization and limitation of power 
correspond to the positive and negative roles that branches occupy when 
fulfilling their fiduciary duties. The formalist versus functionalist debate 
reflects, respectively, the negative and positive roles in terms of their counter-
emphasis upon either a strict division between or sharing of branch powers. 
However, the public good and the reasonableness it requires in govemment 
exercises of power are equally constraining and justificatory factors in 
decision-making, leading to the constitution's constitutive aspects of which 
Nourse writes.215 A Lockean sense of efficiency therefore requires a balance 
between overly rigid or porous institutional arrangements, whereby a branch 
might come to make inappropriate and unaccountable decisions beyond its 
deliberative competence. Alfange wams against over-emphasis, for example, 
upon c1ear distinctions between branch powers: 
The separation of powers princip le was seen by the framers as an 
important mechanism for the preservation of liberty and the achievement 
of goveming efficiency. Insofar as it excuses the legislature from 
administering the laws, it promotes efficiency; and insofar as it prevents 
any branch of the govemment from amassing a monopoly of authority, it 
protects liberty. But it is not an end in itself. Indeed, strict adherence to 
the doctrine can be a barrier to the attainrnent of the ends for which it 
was embraced. To the extent that it renders cooperation between the 
branches difficult, it can hinder efficient govemment functioning; and to 
214 See Verkuil, supra note 159 at 303-04; Sargentich, supra note 166 at 452, notes that 
separation of powers and the mIe of law share negative and positive aspects, but characterizes 
them in terms of liberal and democratic commitments: "Liberalism's stress on the restraint or 
control of government may conflict, to a certain degree, with democratic theory's emphasis on 
the affirmative aims of public life: to realize public values and to achieve greater coherence 
with the popular will." Sargentich thus understands the branches' positive and negative roles 
in the separation doctrine as based upon the conflicting normative goals. Under the Lockean 
paradigm, the goals of the separation of powers reduce further, however, into just the 
reasonable decision-making for the public good. A branch's positive and negative roles 
represent the ways in which it employs those deliberative powers vis-à-vis the others, while 
the tensions that Sargentich identifies go to the structural prablems present in erecting a 
govemment serving the public good. Nevertheless, the difference between positive and 
negative roles as conceptualized here and by Sargentich is one of analytical perspective only. 
In the end, under either view, the positive role is related to a branch's active pursuit of the 
public good, while the negative raIe checks the activities of the other branches in order to 
prevent abuses of power. 
215 See Barendt, supra note 196 at 602,607. 
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the extent that it precludes the development of checks and balances, it 
may endanger liberty.216 
Insofar as a de1iberative processes approach promotes inter-branch dynamics, 
where one branch might sometimes appropriately make the kinds of decisions 
usually associated with another, subject to oversight, it promotes a Lockean 
structural model that seeks both to enable and limit exercises of govemment 
power for the sake of the public good. 
Understanding the place of deliberative processes, then, attempts to 
reconcile the tensions between the limiting and legitimizing aspects of power, 
as emphasized by formalism and functionalism. It does so by going beyond 
this theoretical dichotomy,217 so that neither particular kinds of decisions nor 
the deliberative processes used to reach them are linked exc1usively and 
synonymously with particular branches. Such an understanding of the 
separation of powers doctrine, based upon decision-making processes within 
govemment administration, goes beyond what Thomas Sargentich has called 
the "rule oflaw ideal." This ideal, related to the definitional endeavors ofboth 
formalist and functionalist theories, seeks predictably to regulate political 
behavior and conflicts of interest through c1ear doctrinal rules about the 
institutional division and exercise of govemment power. 218 Attention to 
deliberative processes necessarily centers upon the rule of law, as well, but 
attempts to go beyond its narrower implementation within formalist and 
functionalist theory. Rather than attempting either formulaic or ad hoc 
distributions of govemment powers based upon unworkable definitions, 
attention to deliberative processes looks to the normative goals attached to 
both the rule of law and separation of powers principles. This approach 
focuses on govemment's rational pursuit of the public good, linking it not only 
216 Alfange, supra note 160 at 760; For the efficiency concerns of the American constitution al 
framers, see Louis Fisher, 'The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers" (1971) 5 J. Amer. Stud. 
113 and Gwyn, Meaning, supra note 113 at 34-35. 
217 See Vile, supra note 108 at 36. 
218 See Sargentich, supra note 166 at 449-54, 459-60; Verkuil, supra note 159 at 304-05, 
emphasizes the natural occurrence of government conflicts of interest. But see Redish, supra 
note 160 at 128-30, criticizing Verkuil and his approach for over-valuing efficiency and 
collapsing separation of powers analysis into a due process evaluation. 
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to democratic responsiveness through administrative flexibility, but to a 
Lockean structural model that empowers and limits government by holding the 
branches to their fiduciary obligations.219 As Sargentich recognizes, the goals 
of rational decision-making and democratic accountability - in his terms the 
public purposes and democratic pro cesses ideals - can be "contrasting, while 
partially complementary, visions.,,220 Accordingly, a deliberative processes 
theory encompasses an idea of checks and balances, where "different branches 
of govemment use their complementary resources to identify and solve social 
problems."221 A deliberative processes approach to the separation ofpowers is 
thus juxtaposed with formalistic, and less so functionalist, notions of the rule 
of law, both preoccupied with defining and allocating branch powers as 
discreet objects. The deliberative pro cesses approach relates to the rule of law 
in a richer, substantive sense, by balancing the positive and negative roles of 
the branches in both acting and limiting one another on behalf of the public 
good, but without confining them to doctrinally defined and rigid spheres of 
power. The ways in which the branches can and do make decisions - leading 
to which branches make what decisions and how - maintains both a separation 
and a balance, and importantly recognizes the Lockean structural model as a 
means to respect, not itself embody, the rule oflaw and the public good. 
Institutional Reasoning 
The deliberative aspects of the separation of powers doctrine grow out of 
the Lockean political trust that each branch has to act reasonably for the public 
good. However, the theoretical construction of the separation doctrine is 
intertwined with the historical development of government institutions in both 
the United Kingdom and the United States. The early English prototype of the 
doctrine was the mixed constitution of the feudal estates of Crown, Lords, and 
219 See Sargentich, ibid. at 464-67. 
220 Ibid. at 486. 
221 Ibid. at 478. 
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Commons, represented in the Monarchy and the houses of Parliament.222 
Partly because the mixed constitution institutionalized the interests of old 
feudal estates, the judiciary remained a subordinate branch. Popular 
sovereignty, at the foundations ofmodem democratic constitutionalism, rejects 
however the idea that govemment represents any other interests than those of 
the public. As such, the modem separation doctrine is "deeply opposed to the 
ideas of the balanced constitution, in which important elements were 
independent of popular power, and able to check the representatives of that 
power.,,223 No longer representative of competing estates, the executive and 
legislative branches differ now only in their constitutional composition and the 
ways in which they act for the popular sovereign that they represent. That is, 
their institutional competencies, based upon their composition, permit them to 
employ sorne deliberative processes better than others in coming to reasonable 
decisions for the public goOd.224 Although the separation of powers originated 
in the balance of the estates, it still represents a structural model that regulates 
power through its division and utilization of decision-making processes. 
Moreover, the separation doctrine now comprehends the judiciary as an 
independent branch, intended to resolve certain matters through the 
deliberative process of adjudication.225 The executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches, therefore, have become institutional means for the public 
empirically to assess its own good, both at the corporate and individuallevels, 
222 The idea of a mixed or balanced government between the many, the few, and the one has 
long roots in western political thought, going back to Plato's Laws and Aristotle's Polities. 
Gwyn, Meaning, supra note 113 at 24. 
223 Vile, supra note 108 at 137. 
224 See ibid. at 33, Brown, supra note 154 at 1533, n. 82, and Gwyn, Meaning, supra note 113 
at 26-27. 
225 Redish, supra note 160 at 103, explains the difference between the old idea of mixed 
government and a modem idea separation of powers: "Mixed government was designed to 
prevent absolutism - the arbitrary use of power - by avoiding the concentration of aU state 
power in one body. Separation of powers has the same function, but operates on different 
assumptions. Two major changes are required to transform mixed government into a 
government based on separation of powers. First, particular departments must be restricted to 
certain functions. Second, an independent judiciary must be established." Of course, Redish's 
idea of restricting functions to respective branches is fundamentaUy a formalistic one. A 
process-oriented approach would instead suggest that particular departments are primarily 
responsible for, but not necessarily restricted to, certain functions; Vile, ibid. at 14-17. 
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in response to political experience. 226 The empirical nature of the separation 
doctrine structurally separates the branches not just to prevent tyranny through 
the diffusion of power, but to manage the institutional advantages and 
disadvantages of the branches so that they can positively contribute to 
bl d .. k' 227 reasona e eCISlOn-ma mg. 
The separation of powers ensures an inter-branch dialogue that depends 
upon cooperation and conflict among the branches, each having its own 
perspective on what the public good requires and each suited to make that 
determination through particular deliberative processes. The separation 
doctrine does not protect branch interests for their own sake, nor require 
formalistic definitions of executive, legislative, or judicial powers that are then 
allocated between the branches. Rather, the relationship between the 
branches' fiduciary obligations, institutional composition, and deliberative 
capabilities points towards a unit y between the public good, constitutional 
structure, and a substantive rule of law premised upon reasonable decision-
making.228 
By ensuring that the three branches each have some manner of input into 
government decision-making, either positively or negative1y through different 
deliberative processes, the separation doctrine diversifies the analytical 
perspectives which the branches use in acting for the public good. The 
226 For Locke's epistemology of emplflClsm, see his An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690); Lutz, supra note 168 at 165, remarks: "When reading The Federalist 
and other writings from the founding era, one cannot but be struck by the appearance of three 
widely held assumptions: that there is order in the universe; that we can know that order 
through observation and reason; and that we can use that natural order in constructing our 
political institutions." The Constitution accordingly blends empiricism with rationalism and 
tradition, as noted by Lutz, ibid. at 166: "Blackstone's legal language, Locke's political 
terminology, and the scientific terms found in Montesquieu and Hume aIl informed American 
political discourse and helped shape the contents of the Constitution." 
227 Lockean empiricism and structural mechanisms for deliberating are therefore related, 
rational enterprises. Political society as a corporate entity, like individuals, must act based 
upon perceived experience. AIso, freedom of individual action requires freedom from 
un justifiable coercion or subordination to another's will. Liberty and reason are therefore also 
related, so that government does not just promulgate rules for public order, but makes 
reasonable decisions that promote individual freedom as a constituent part of the public good. 
See Grant, supra note 7 at 12-15,49-50,80, 195. 
228 See Brown, supra note 154 at 1518-20, and Sargentich, supra note 166 at 450, 453. 
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separation of powers in this way "measures government against the ideal of 
reasoned political deliberation,,229 and promotes the rule of law in that no 
single institution or magistrate can exercise absolute and arbitrary power. The 
doctrine also ties officiaIs more c10sely to the popular will, and equally 
subjects aIl members of civil society to fair laws.230 Inter-branch dialogue, 
based upon deliberative processes, not only dissuades magistrates from self-
serving or otherwise arbitrary action, but also remedies unconscious biases and 
institutional predilections that might skew a branch's reasoned assessment of 
the public good. Ruth Grant points to the Lockean concem over impartiality 
and rational judgment, necessary for the branches to uphoid their public trusts: 
We are apt to be partial in our judgments through either passion, 
interest, or an unwarranted trust in the opinion of others. A single 
passion can establish a tyranny in the mind so that our thoughts are no 
longer free to consider a wide variety of things, or we may simply ignore 
rational argument and evidence in areas where we have allowed our 
passions to dominate. Interest aiso can lead men to stop their inquiries at 
the point where they have reached an opinion suitable to their interest or 
lead them to adopt the opinions of a party that suits their interest without 
ever subjecting those opinions to a reasoned examination. Custom, 
education, and the constant influence of their party also blinds whole 
societies and sects, even where men are sincere and are not influenced by 
their own interests. Party loyalty is an example of placing an 
unwarranted trust in others' opinions. But whether we subject our minds 
to the opinions of party leaders, to those of our friends, neighbors, 
parents, or nurses, or to those of men of great reputation, the effect is the 
same; our reasoning is then based on false foundations. 231 
Inter-branch dialogue addresses these concems, as the differing deliberative 
processes which the branches bring to decision-making work together 
positively to ensure reasoned results and negatively to check each other from 
abusing their trusts. Interaction between the branches accordingly prevents 
one branch from dangerously monopolizing or manipulating govemment 
decision-making, and insures that an three branches have opportunity to bring 
229 Grant, supra note 7 at 189. 
230 Ibid. at 74,77. 
231 Ibid. at 183, and generally at 188-92, for the connection between impartiality and reasoned 
decision-making. 
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their institutional expertise to bear on decisions, as appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
J. Mitchell Pickerill has observed the importance of inter-branch 
dialogue as it exists between the legislative and judicial branches, in what he 
caUs "constitutional deliberation." Such deliberation is a "collective and 
interactive phenomenon in which the [Supreme] Court and Congress both 
articulate reasons for and against legislation, and in which each institution has 
a specialty with respect to the types of reasons it brings to the table.,,232 The 
President, through his veto power, political influence, and enforcement of 
legislation, is an additional actor in this process. Each branch has a unique 
role in government according to the deliberative means by which it makes 
decisions. As part of their interaction, the branches check one another as they 
assert themselves in the dialogue. However, checks are accompanied by 
balance, which as Donald Lutz has noticed, are distinct, if c10sely related, 
ideas. Whereas checks counterpoise the branches against one another, balance 
"refers to a mechanism or mechanisms for regulating the speed at which 
something occurs. This definition resembles the one used during the 
eighteenth century by c1ockmakers, or by physicists such as Isaac Newton.,,233 
Although Lutz specifically points to terms of office, constituency 
responsibilities, and the number of office-holders that comprise the branches, 
he recognizes that all three factors interact to affect the speed at which 
Congress makes decisions. Such factors affect the way in which a branch is 
institutionally capable of employing any of the functionally executive, 
legislative, or judicial deliberative processes. 234 These same factors would 
impact decision-making by the Supreme Court and President, and affect the 
manner and appropriate degree to which every branch might deliberate using 
decision-making processes functionally associated with it or the other 
branches. Far from a necessarily formalistic approach, the separation of 
232 J. Mitchell Pickerill, Constitutional Deliberation in Congress: The Impact of Judicial 
Review in a Separated System (Durham, N.e.: Duke University Press, 2004) at 30. 
233 Lutz, supra note 168 at 162. 
234 Ibid. at 163-65. 
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powers doctrine can depend upon a functional mixing of deliberative processes 
as used by the branches, promote reasonable decision-making through their 
interaction and allow them to hold one another to their fiduciary obligations. 
Rather than having exclusive, bounded spheres of authority, each branch 
exercises power based upon its institutional advantages for utilizing certain 
deliberative processes in deciding certain matters. For these same reasons, 
branch authority can overlap in different ways and to varying degrees. 
The Deliberative Virtues afthe Branches 
A branch's "deliberative virtues" recognizes a correspondence between 
its institutional composition and the deliberative process by which it ideally 
makes decisions. Thus, a representative assembly, where members can debate 
and promote their constituency interests, is particularly suited for political 
compromise and rule-making that binds the community in shared obligations. 
This association between institutional structure and deliberative process is 
what gives rise to the functional characterization of rule-making as 
"legislative" power. However, as evidenced by executive regulation, rule-
making is not monopolized by the legislature. Nevertheless, rule-making 
presupposes that the executive should ideally follow certain processes in doing 
so rather than issue edicts, which risks arbitrary, unreasonable action where 
competing policy choices lack sufficient consideration. As Vile writes, "[t]he 
fact that a particular task of government is regulated by 'legislation' rather 
than by sorne other procedure reflects the determination that certain values 
shaH predominate in the ordering of society rather than others.,,235 These 
values apply even where the executive possesses statutory or prerogative 
discretion to make rules. The danger that the executive will accumulate 
govemment power and violate its public trust exists, not in the executive 
acting in a way functionally legislative, but in acting arbitrarily without regard 
for the standards of rule-making and free from checks by the other branches. 
This does not mean that the executive is forbidden, as in strict formalism, from 
235 Vile, supra note 108 at 317-18. 
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sometimes acting in a functionaIly legislative or judicial manner. As the 
issuance of environmental regulations and courts martial illustrate, functional 
mle-making and adjudication might in sorne circumstances be most 
appropriately left to the executive branch, subject to oversight by the other 
branches. However, the executive must nevertheless act in ways that resemble 
legislative and judicial processes, such as by foIlowing administrative 
procedures and using fair tribunals. The executive would then exercise its 
power in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial manner, combined with the 
dispatch and expertise to be hoped for in executive action. Such quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial power remains politically and legally accountable 
through the existence of statutory limitations upon and judicial review of 
exercises of discretion.236 The other branches might similarly use mixed 
deliberative processes, where certain matters faIl best within their institutional 
competence. As demonstrated by Article 1 legislative courts, such as the 
United States Tax Court, Congress can itself erect tribunals in order to dispose 
of certain matters for which it is institutionally responsible, but are better 
handled through adjudicatory processes. As Fisher notes, for example, 
"[ f]unctions therefore float from one branch to another as Congress searches 
for the most effective means of discharging its duties. What is 'legislative' at 
one stage becomes 'administrative' at another and 'judicial' stilllater.,,237 
Management of functions floating between the branches, depending upon 
their deliberative virtues, lies at the heart of judicial review. Such review is a 
means by which courts not only fulfill their own fiduciary obligations and 
uphold those of the other branches, but maintain the mIe of law and the 
separation of powers. Vile writes, "[t]he graduaI evolution of the King's 
'courts' can be seen as the movement from the position where an 
[government] business was dealt with in a judicial fashion to one involving a 
'division of labor' and 'specialization', but not a specialization concemed 
merely with 'efficiency' - rather one concemed with placing emphasis upon 
236 Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues, supra note 143 at 127-31,134. 
237 Ibid. at 129-30. 
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different values.,,238 The deliberative pro cesses, as employed by the branches, 
promote these values depending upon their institutional advantages, the 
subject matter of the decision, and the factual context. Vile continues: 
. . . [T]he history of constitutional development is the history of the 
attempt, often hesitant and vague, to articulate government in such a way 
that a particular structure plays a dominant or important, but not 
exclusive, role in the performance of a given function. . .. Although it is 
impossible to develop a thoroughgoing separation of powers ... , this 
does not mean that there is no importance in the attempt to assign the 
primary or dominant concern with the performance of a particular 
function to one agency of government rather than another. 239 
Separation of powers doctrine, then, requires government branches to utilize 
and combine the executive, legislative, and judicial deliberative processes in 
the most effective way. Because each branch has unique institutional 
advantages in the ways that it asses ses the public good and makes reasonable 
decisions in fulfillment of its trust, the deliberative and structural aspects of 
the separation doctrine coincide without them being formalistically 
synonymous?40 Each branch has primary, but not exclusive, responsibility to 
exercise a particular deliberative process over certain matters. Each branch 
must also exercise oversight of other branches where its institutional 
capabilities allow, as part of the "interactive, sequential, and alternative nature 
of lawmaking. ,,241 
238 Vile, supra note 108 at 328. 
239 Ibid. at 329. As Vile suggests, ibid. at 15, "[t]he growth of three separate branches of the 
government system in Britain reflected in part the needs of the division of labour and 
specialization, and partly the demand for different agencies, and in the representation of 
varying interests in the three separate branches. This aspect of the doctrine, although usually 
assumed by political theorists rather than explicitly developed, is clearly central to the whole 
pattern of Western constitutionalism." 
240 Deliberative and structural unity results from the demands of the public good Ïtself. Like 
Locke's view of morality, in this case a political morality, knowledge of it is not innate but is 
discoverable through practical reason based upon experience. Harrison, supra note 31 at 178-
79; Moreover, ev en though aIl branches represent one popular sovereign, the institutional 
structure of each branch is representative in its own way. Nourse, supra note 213 at 758-59, 
emphasizes the representative functions of each branch in a "vertical approach" to separation 
ofpowers, which characterizes each branch as serving different "constituencies" of the people. 
Accordingly, each branch is particularly suited to de al with certain matters based on 
evaluation of which constituencies should be heard on the matter. 
241 Pickerill, supra note 232 at 152. 
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Executive, legislative, and judicial processes are for these reasons 
associated with the ability of the respective branches to demonstrate action, 
will, or judgment in making decisions for the public goOd.242 The executive, 
as Locke made c1ear, possesses the discretion necessary to make decisions 
where the law is silent, as well as to quickly respond to sudden events.243 
Executive authority, most usually united in the hands of a single magistrate, is 
characterized by action in implementing the will of the legislature, as 
expressed in law, and in protecting the public against external threats in 
federative matters. In these areas, it can act not only with decisiveness and 
dispatch, but with expertise in the many areas of public administration. 
However, at the same time that the executive can so act for the public good, it 
might be tempted to exercise its discretion in an unreasonable manner, or tum 
its formidable federative powers inward in a way that threatens the liberty of 
members of the public. As Montesquieu wrote: 
Great is the advantage which a monarchical govemment has over a 
republic: as the state is conducted by a single person, the executive 
power is thereby enabled to act with greater expedition. But as this 
expedition might degenerate into rapidity, the laws should use sorne 
contrivance to slacken it. They ought not only to favour the nature of 
each constitution [democracy or monarchy J, but likewise to remedy the 
abuses that might result from this very nature. 244 
Thus, the virtues of executive power also reveal its weaknesses, necessitating a 
structural model that negatively checks its tendencies to abuses, as well as 
positively promotes its institutional advantages for taking action. 
242 The characterization of the executive authority as action, contrasted with legislative will 
and judicial judgment is an extrapolation from a passage in Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78: 
"It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute 
their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might well happen in 
the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as weIl happen in every adjudication upon 
any single statute. The courts must de clare the sense of the law; and if they should be 
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved 
anything, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body." 
243 Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 144, 158-61. 
244 Montesquieu, supra note 118, bk. V, ch. 10, para. 1. 
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White the executive is constitutionally suited for action, the legislative 
body projects the will of the community. As an elected representative 
assembly, the legislature expresses the needs and desires of the public, for the 
good of which the government as a whole must act. The representational 
nature of the legislature, Locke pointed out, justified its supremacy over the 
executive branch, and consequently the ability of statute to define prerogative 
and limit discretion. The legislature is a forum where representatives can 
openly deliberate public concerns, politically resolve disparate interests among 
society's many factions, and formuIate forward-Iooking, binding ruIes upon 
the society for which it acts. Legislative power nevertheless also has 
drawbacks, contrasting with action by the executive, as the legislature can 
produce a multiplicity of laws, micro-manage administrative affairs, and retard 
the political action necessary to implement the laws or respond to external 
threats. Locke drew attention to these disadvantages in support of executive 
prerogative, in regard to both domestic and federative matters.245 With his 
executive-Iegislative dualism, the respective deliberative processes 
complement one another, as do the institutional compositions. Because this 
dualistic structure is premised upon the institutions' deliberative virtues, 
however, it is compatible with a tri-partite structural model that permits 
functional overlap of branch authority. This overlap itself provides flexibility 
in how the branches fulfill their negative and positive roles in checking one 
another and asserting themselves so as positively to contribute to reasonable 
decision-making. 
Whereas executive authority rests upon action, and that of the legislature 
upon will, the judicial power is one of judgment over individual rights and 
interests, whenever they conflict with each other or with community needs. 
Courts adjudicate rights and obligations in private suits, criminal prosecutions, 
or administrative matters. In various ways, they can review executive, and 
sometimes even legislative, actions that have disproportionate impact upon 
individual rights. Courts might act in ways resembling rule-making or the 
execution of laws, through the development of legal doctrines and the 
245 See Ch. 1. 
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imposition of penalties. However, their constitutional role lies in coming to 
such decisions within the context of specifie controversies and through the 
adversarial adjudicatory process of the common-Iaw system. 246 Thus, 
"judicial independence, legal training and culture, and the justices' own 
conception of their roles make it more likely that the [Supreme Court] justices 
engage in a deeper deliberation than lawmakers in Congress [or the President] 
who are concemed with numerous other factors.,,247 Adjudication allows 
courts to restrain govemment decisions that generally violate express 
constitutional provisions or unjustifiably infringe individual liberties in 
specifie cases,248 while also giving effect to those govemment actions that 
otherwise comply with standards of procedural propriety and reasonableness. 
The institutional capacity of courts to deliberate by adjudication and within 
this structural context distinguishes it from the legislature and executive.249 
246 See Vile, supra note 108 at 318, 327, 339-40. As Vile further notes, ibid. at 328-29, 
judicial procedure is unique from that of the other branches in that, generally, "facts are 
ascertained by a special procedure, the law is announced in an authoritative way, and, of 
course, a single judge may be entrusted with both these functions when a jury is not 
considered necessary." ludicial independence is important, compared to the political 
branches, because the judge will not be swayed to favor parties to a dispute, nor prefer partisan 
considerations of expediency or poliey. 
247 Pickerill, supra note 232 at 59. Pickerill goes on to explain, ibid. at 59-60, that judicial 
review means that "amended statutes [in response to judicial interpretation or invalidation] 
may be viewed as having incorporated a deeper deliberation. Second, the 'interpretive' level 
of deliberation engaged in by Congress in congressional responses may be an improvement 
over the 'policymaking' deliberation that led to the initial passage of the law. Even if it is 
only the 'legalistic' view of the Constitution that is being incorporated, the role of the 
Constitution as a legal document is an important one. Finally, because we are a 'republic of 
reasons,' interaction, or bargaining, between Court and Congress over these statutes have 
resulted . . . in a more careful consideration and articulation of the reasons that justify the 
statutory policy and the content of the legislation." Pickerill's suggestion would be just as 
applicable to the judicial review of executive actions. 
248 See Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78. 
249 This contrasts with the view of Tuckness, supra note 202 at 128-29, that such adjudicative 
processes do not significantly distinguish the judieial power. Tuckness' foeus on law-making 
brings to light the common commitrnent of the legislative and executive branches to make 
reasoned decisions based upon constitutional principles. Yet it fails to appreciate the ways in 
which executive, legislative, and judicial processes represent distinct threats to and advantages 
for the public good, best described by the branches' positive and negative roles within the 
Lockean structural mode!. Tuckness, ibid. at 158-59, recognizes the essence of constitutional 
adjudication through two functions: "One function is to make sure that clear, principled 
pronouncements are applied in cases where they yield unpopular results. . .. A second 
function is to define the focal meanings of key abstract terms, like speech." Courts, of course, 
would perform both of these functions in the course of first and second-order decision-making. 
See 92, below. Tuckness criticizes this latter judicial function as intruding upon 
majoritarianism, and so presumably the province of the legislature. However, he fails to 
consider the judiciary's independent fiduciary duty. 
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Such adjudicatory competence for enforcing government's trust obligations, 
without need of any formalistic demarcation between branch powers, justifies 
the independence of the judiciary and its participation in inter-branch decision-
making through judicial review. 
The political branches accordingly determine the public good in a 
somewhat utilitarian manner through democratic majoritarianism, political 
compromise, and expediency. Against such political considerations, the courts 
remain a bulwark for individual rights and the rule of law. The courts' 
overriding fiduciary dut y to the public good requires that it use its adjudicative 
competence to give effect to executive or legislative decisions when possible, 
but with consideration for procedural faimess and substantive rights, such as 
those of free speech, enjoyment of property, and freedom from arbitrary 
constraint.250 The Lockean conception of the public good that animates the 
courts' judgment is not a majoritarian one, but one that unifies communitarian 
and individual interests. Courts must balance the propriety of yielding to the 
virtues of executive action or legislative will in any particular case, with the 
extent to which adjudicatory processes are necessary in order to protect rights. 
The structural and deliberative aspects of judicial power thereby complement 
executive-Iegislative dualism in permitting the functional overlap of 
deliberative processes as exercised by the several branches. The separation of 
powers doctrine uses the branches' deliberative virtues to effect not a 
formalistic identification between structure and deliberative processes, but a 
functional and flexible relationship supporting a Lockean constitutional 
paradigm. 
Judicial Review, and First and Second-Order Decision-Making 
Courts, in exercising judicial review, are part of a Lockean structural 
model for deliberating about the public good, whereby the branches must 
250 Huyler, supra note 112 at 170. 
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assess public policy against fundamental constitutional principles?51 The 
courts assess executive discretionary actions for consistency with such 
princip les, as weIl as against legal limitations, but quash actions that are 
irreconcilable. Judges, in these ways, engage in what Tuclrness caUs "second-
order" and "first-order" decision-making. Second-order decision-making 
involves assessing policy or value judgments made by the legislature, by 
interpreting statutory meaning and applying it to specifie facts. This manner 
of decision-making fiIls in gaps in the written law, not just by interpreting 
statutory language, but by evaluating whether executive discretion is 
reasonable in light of it, complying with both the law and Constitution.252 
However, second-order decision-making remains subject to formalist 
criticisms. Courts themselves might find themselves making second-order 
decisions that resemble rule-making or enforcement, such as when American 
federal district courts have enforced decisions for school desegregation.253 
This example, when considered alongside "reading in," reading down," and 
severance of constitutionaIly troubling statutory provisions, only further 
demonstrates the functional ambiguity of sorne judicial actions.254 Second-
order decision-making, moreover, is not restricted to the judiciary, but also 
characterizes executive rule-making and enforcement actions taken under 
statute. In sorne instances, courts might appropriately give deference to the 
executive's second-order decisions about what the law and Constitution 
permits.255 Such executive action, insofar as it might functionally resemble 
25\ See Charles L. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1969) at 67. 
252 Tuckness, supra note 202 at 118-19, 132, 158-59. 
253 See Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues, supra note 143 at 40-43. 
254 See for example R. v. A, [2001] 3 AlI ER 1 (H.L.) and R. v. Lambert, [2001] 3 AlI ER 577 
(H.L.) for statements by the House of Lords about how British courts should flexibly interpret 
statutory language so as to arrive at a construction compatible with the European Convention, 
infra. note 278, as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998 (V.K.), 1998, c. 42. 
255 See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218 (2001), and 
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Black, supra note 251 at 76-82, makes two points 
about sueh deferenee. Confliet between the judiciary and executive does not necessarily 
impugn the validity of the aet itself, and thereby avoids a judicial-congressional conflict, 
bringing into question the statute and the scope of legislative power. Furthermore, the degree 
of appropriate deferenee to executive action depends upon the level of the executive official 
making the decision. Thus there is the need to assess the deferenee due to the executive 
branch, as wrongly done in Korematsu v. United States, 323 V.S. 214 (1944) according to 
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rule-making and adjudication both, typifies the complex institutional dynamics 
between the branches and the place of judicial review to ensure that the 
executive does not abuse its discretion. 
Judges engage III first-order decision-making when they pronounce 
fundamental constitutional values which bind aIl levels of the govemment. 
The United States Supreme Court regularly engages in first-order decision-
making by establishing generally applicable rules of constitutional behavior 
through judicial review. Moreover, ostensibly second-order interpretive 
undertakings might so strain statutory meaning or interfere with policy 
determinations that it essentially becomes first-order decision-making, by 
substantially altering them to reflect constitutional princip les with which they 
might otherwise conflict. Tuckness comments on the first-order character of 
sorne judicial activity: 
First, much of what the Supreme Court does is define the focal meanings 
of the moral terms of the Constitution. On Lockean grounds this is a 
legislative function. Consider, for example, when the Court must decide 
what speech should receive constÎtutional protection. . .. Second, the 
Supreme Court must be considered part of the legislature because it is 
institutionally supreme; there is no higher institutional body that can 
overtum its decisions. This is part of the very definition of the 
legislative power. 256 
Tuckness finds such first-order judicial decision-making to resemble 
legislative power, fitting within a structural model of executive-Iegislative 
dualism?57 However, the judicial nature of sorne executive and legislative 
Black, based upon whether it is the President himself or a low-Ievel official, such as a military 
officer or bureaucrat, who exercises the discretion given. This question arose again in the 
cases of Hamdi and Padilla, where the govemment's factual averrnents justifying the 
President's designation of Hamdi and Padilla as unlawful combatants were certified by a 
special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. See 165, 168, below. 
256 Tuckness, supra note 202 at 132. However, while the Court's judgment might be 
immediately immune from review, Congress can rewrite a law that sometimes overtums the 
decision or remedies the constitutional defects in the statute. The executive can also revisit its 
decisions and make them within the contmes of the enabling statute, according to procedural 
requirements, or with justificatory reasons. AIso, the appointment process for federal judges is 
a long-terrn remedy for adjusting the prevailing values within the judiciary; Fisher, 
Constitutional Dialogues, supra note 143 at 38-39. 
257 Tuckness, ibid. at 118-19. 
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actions just demonstrates that aU three branches engage in first and second-
order decision-making, in which their authority often overlaps. They ways in 
which they interact and check one another depends upon their institutional 
virtues for utilizing different deliberative processes. 
Certain subject matters find best resolution through a particular 
deliberative process, meaning they will faH within the authority of one branch. 
Such a stable relationship between the kind of decision, the deliberative 
process, and institutional forum represent "core" branch functions, including, 
as an example, the power to tax, command field armies, or determine 
constitutional rights. The existence of core functions does not compel 
formalistic definitions of powers, however; each branch sometimes engages in 
first and second-order decision-making even while performing its core 
functions, thereby still blurring lines between executive, legislative, and 
judicial power. Through first and second-order decision-making the branches 
accordingly maximize their own abilities to make the most reasonable 
decisions possible, while checking the others. In this way, judicial review 
forces the executive to consider past court decisions and anticipate future 
judicial reaction to its exercises of discretion.258 In tum, a court might defer to 
the executive's interpretation of the law or fact-finding when exercising 
review over its decisions. As the legislature will also anticipate judicial 
responses to its actions, based upon constitutional principles or possible 
interpretations of statutory language, it too participates in inter-branch 
dialogue. First and second-order decision-making thus reflects an institutional 
dynamic, where the branches rely upon their deliberative virtues and utilize 
different deliberative processes in ways that promote reasonable decision-
making for the public good, diffuse govemment power, and aHow the branches 
to check one another. 
The judiciary's fiduciary dut y to act for the public good, then, justifies 
both its deference to and its review of executive and legislative actions, based 
258 For discussion of how the three branches subtly interact and influence each other's 
decision-making, see Pickerill, supra note 232 at 27-28,35-36, 131, 146-9. See also Black, 
supra note 251 at 71, in regard to judicial influence upon congressional deliberation. 
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upon considerations of deliberative processes. The unique institutional 
capabilities and deficiencies of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
aIl complement one another, in that each is a forum with different deliberative 
virtues suited to different circumstances and purposes. The three branches 
therefore have inter-related positive and negative roles in a Lockean structural 
model. Each branch promotes the public good and so fulfills its trust when 
positively acting within its institutional competency and deferring to other 
branches when they are better suited to deal with the matter. Concomitant to 
this positive role, each branch must negatively check the others by ensuring 
that do not abuse their power and that they abide by ideal deliberative 
standards when acting in other functional ways. The judiciary fulfills its 
positive role against the executive, for example, by reviewing executive 
decisions against constitutional princip les and standards such as legality, 
procedural propriety, and reasonableness. At the same time, the judiciary acts 
negatively by checking executive actions that disrespect adjudicative 
standards. In either respect, the branches aIl engage in first and second-order 
decision-making, resulting from and attempting to manage the functional 
overlap of their powers. 
As Peter Josephson writes, "we should expect that [Locke's] conclusion 
for popular government will include sorne demonstration of the way in which 
such a 'Constitution' willlead the people to express their will moderately and 
rationally. In constitutional government the voice of the people is brought into 
accord with the voice ofreason.,,259 Executive, legislative, andjudicial powers 
area accordingly functional characterizations of deliberative processes, 
respectively associated with the deliberative virtues of each branch. Through 
these processes, the branches interact in coming to reasonable decisions about 
what the public good requires under the circumstances, and in so doing 
balance policy with princip le, and communitarian with individual needs. The 
separation of powers doctrine, based upon deliberative processes, seeks not 
only to restrain government through the diffusion and checking of power, but 
259 Josephson, supra note 4 at 208, and 225. 
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direct its energies towards achieving the public goOd.260 Because the Lockean 
constitutional paradigm is a rational enterprise, the branches use deliberative 
processes in the ways best calculated to achieve the public good. The judicial 
review of executive discretion grows out of these processes, retlects the 
deliberative virtues of the courts in maintaining the rule of law and 
adjudicating individual rights, and inheres in the courts by nature of their own 
fiduciary obligations. Judicial review of the executive's discretion is therefore 
essential under the separation of powers doctrine, whenever it makes decisions 
that are functionally adjudicative. In aIl cases, courts must review executive 
exercises of discretion for legality (to ensure the primacy of the Constitution 
and the law), procedural propriety (to ensure that the executive respects rule-
making and adjudicatory standards where necessary), and reasonableness (to 
prevent arbitrary, disproportionate, or improper use of power).261 Questions 
about the application of these standards and branch conflicts are most likely to 
occur, however, when a certain decision seems to implicate the core functions 
of two or more branches. Such is the problem when the need for courts to 
adjudicate questions about individual liberty arises in the course of the 
executive's prosecution ofwar. 
260 With the need to balance these structural tensions, Lockean separation of powers therefore 
cannot be a rigid, forrnalistic doctrine, as suggested by Laski, supra note 68 at 45, without 
equating the public good and the mIe of law with doctrinal certainty and strict delineations of 
branch powers. 
261 Through these standards, individual liberty is bound up with institutional structure and the 
public good. These standards are constitutionally free-standing, principled bases for the 
judicial review of executive discretion, existing alongside any specific textual guarantees, such 
as the due process clause of the V.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment. Therefore, as Black, 
supra note 251 at 63, points out in regard to criminal procedure, the concept of "ordered 
liberty" as freedom from certain kinds of unjustified government coercion and the very notion 
of citizenship infers, for example, "immunity from arbitrary arrest, oppressive interrogation, 
unfair trial, and the like .... " 
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Part II: Political Questions, War Powers, and Judicial Review 
Introduction 
A separation of powers theory based upon deliberative decision-making 
raises the question of the competencies, and the thus the constitutional 
authority, of the three branches in regard to war-making. In the Lockean 
structural model, the making of war is the epitome of the executive's 
federative power, where it wields the greatest discretion. Nevertheless, the 
legislature retains power to check executive military actions that breach the 
executive's fiduciary responsibilities. Under the Constitution, Congress has 
the power to declare war, as weIl as to raise revenue and provide for the armed 
forces. These congressional powers often collide with the war powers of the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to deploy and command military forces. 
The result is an ambiguity in the scope of the President's discretion to engage 
in and conduct hostilities, in light of Congress' authority to commit the nation 
to war and limit military resources. The Constitution therefore implicitly 
recognizes the differing deliberative competencies of the executive and 
legislative branches in assigning them different but complementary roles in 
military decision-making. Overlap and friction between the Congress' and 
President's war-making powers, and the deliberative processes they use, allow 
for considerable poli tic al maneuvering, compromise, and sometimes conflict 
between them. 
The courts, through the poli tic al question doctrine, have recognized the 
special competencies of the Congress and President, and the institutional 
limitations of the judiciary, to make decisions about war. When faced with 
congressional and presidential decisions about the initiation and conduct of 
military operations, courts typically will invoke the political question doctrine 
to avoid review and address only a clear conflict between the political 
branches. In this way, judicial review respects and upholds political 
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resolutions about issues of war, a point where congressional and presidential 
war powers overlap. Analysis of past war powers cases reveals that the 
political question doctrine itself rests upon judicial evaluations of which 
deliberative processes are best employed in military decisions, and so reflects 
a court's separation ofpowers analysis in any given circumstances. 
The courts' normal deference to the President' s military discretion, and 
their preference that Congress limit it by political means, therefore respect the 
deliberative virtues of the legislative and executive branches, the deliberative 
processes they use, and the unsuitability of military matters to resolution by 
adjudication. However, while a deliberative processes approach to separation 
of powers explains the refusaI of federal courts to review executive military 
actions in past cases, it also accounts for the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld.262 When the President uses the war powers in a justiciable way to 
infringe individual rights or impact upon domestic matters, separation of 
powers principles require that courts increasingly exercise review. In a case 
such as Hamdi, where the President acts in a functionally judicial way under 
the war powers to designate, detain, and try a United States citizen as an 
unlawful combatant, the judiciary has a free-standing constitutional power to 
review the executive's decision-making processes and hold him to 
adjudicative standards of deliberation. 
262 542 U.S. 507; 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
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Chapter VI: War as a Political Question 
War, Foreign Affairs, and the Separation of Powers 
Edward Corwin describes the Constitution's allocation of authority over 
American foreign relations, a subject encompassing the initiation and conduct 
of war, in terms reflecting Lockean executive-Iegislative dualism. Corwin's 
position, as might be expected with structural dualism, is that the Constitution 
entrusts war and foreign affairs to concurrent congressional and presidential 
authority. Corwin argues, simply enough, that the Constitution only issues to 
Congress and the President, in light of the tension between their respective 
powers to dec1are war and command the armed forces, "an invitation to 
struggle for the privilege ofdirecting foreign policy.,,263 He further writes: 
What the Constitution does, and al! that if does, is to confer on the 
President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and 
certain other powers of the same general kind on the Senate, and still 
other su ch powers on Congress [as a whole]; but which of these organs 
shaH have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the 
American nation is left for events to resolve.264 
Although the executive branch possesses the attributes of institutional unit y, 
secrecy, dispatch, and information access that give it advantages in conducting 
foreign affairs and commanding the armed forces, Congress nevertheless 
retains influence over policy choices through its power of the purse, power to 
dec1are war, and power to raise and maintain armies.265 The Constitution 
accordingly divides power over foreign affairs, and thus war, between the 
executive and legislative branches in a manner that is politically volatile, 
263 Edward Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984, 5th rev. ed. by Randall W. 
Bland, Theodore T. Hindson, and Jack W. Peltas on (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1984) 
at 201 [hereinafter The President]. 
264 Ibid. at 201 [emphasis original]. 
265 Ibid. at 201. 
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contingent upon factual circumstances, and functionally dependent upon 
which branch is institutionally better able to decide upon a certain matter. 
H. Jefferson Powell has taken partial issue with Corwin's assessment, 
agreeing that history has demonstrated eontinuing struggle between Congress 
and the President over the conduct of foreign affairs, but disagreeing with 
Corwin that the Constitution has nothing further to say about the matter.266 
Powell admits that neither Congress nor the President seems to have exclusive 
or plenary authority over foreign affairs and that legally formalistic arguments 
do not clearly refute Corwin' s suggestion that the Constitution opens the way 
to political struggle between the legislature and executive. Nevertheless, 
Powell argues that the "best reading" of the Constitution lodges in the 
President the power to formulate and execute foreign poliey, while leaving 
such issues to political rather than judicial resolution.267 Powell's position 
does not mean that Congress does not possess considerable influence over 
such matters, only that it is "institutionally incapable of taking the leading role 
in formulating foreign policy.,,268 Powell extends this argument to war-
making, where the President, as Commander-in-Chief, possesses a concurrent 
authority with Congress to commit the nation to hostilities. He differs from 
Corwin in that he believes that the Constitution tips the balance of initiative in 
favor of the President, thereby relegating Congress to a more restrained, 
reactive role in foreign affairs. 
Executive initiative notwithstanding, Powell admits that the declare war 
clause sets sorne "outer boundary" on unilateral presidential action and 
requires congressional authorization once hostilities reach "sorne point of 
severity" in which they become a full war, as opposed to limited military 
action, in the constitutional sense.269 Powell recognizes that war is an 
266 H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign AjJairs: An Essay in 
Constitutionallnterpretation (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2002) at 4-5. 
267 Ibid. at 17,25,95-97,147-49. 
268 Ibid. at 102-04. 
269 Ibid. at 113-22. 
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exception to presidential power to forrnulate and execute foreign policy, even 
where it perrnits sorne executive use of limited force: "If the anticipated or 
actual severity, scope or duration of hostilities rises to the level of 'war' in a 
constitutional sense, congressional authorization is constitutionally necessary. 
Furtherrnore, to the extent that Congress has acted to prohibit the use of the 
arrned forces in a given conflict, area or set of circumstances, that prohibition 
. b' d' ,,270 IS m mg. The Constitution "provides for autonomous foreign-policy 
initiative in the executive as well as ensuring that Congress has the means of 
addressing wayward or antidemocratic behavior by the executive," thereby 
establishing branch interdependence.271 Powell thus disagrees with Corwin's 
complete dismissal of the Constitution as disposing of the power over foreign 
affairs in finding a "best reading" that favors presidential initiative. 
Nevertheless, their positions are consistent in so far as they both characterize 
foreign affairs and war as matters for political resolution through concurrent 
executive and legislative authority. What Powell's position offers is 
justification for judicial deference to executive actions, indeed a presumption 
in favor of executive power, over foreign affairs and war. This position 
emphasizes Curtiss-Wrighpn as authority for a broad executive discretion in 
federative matters, and potentially favors executive actions that impact upon 
individual rights and stray into domestic affairs. 
Notwithstanding judicial deference to or non-interference in the political 
struggles between the executive and legislative branches, a necessary 
implication ofboth Corwin's and Powell's positions is that there must be cases 
when executive actions under the war power indeed become justiciable. 
Otherwise, there would be no legal arbitration between of the outcome of the 
political process, potentially leading to a constitutional crisis between the 
legislative and executive branches. In such instances, therefore, courts must 
enforce the outcome of the political process and police whatever outer 
boundaries might exist to each branch's powers, based either upon 
270 Ibid. at 139. 
271 Ibid. at 139-42. 
272 299 D.S. 304 (1936). For a summary and discussion of Curtiss-Wright, see 18, above. 
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congressional acts or constitutional restrictions such as guaranteed rights. 
Otherwise, political processes could themselves be legaUy meaningless, as 
there would be no enforcement mechanism to restrain executive actions that 
violated any existing constitutional or statutory restrictions. These limitations 
must all be judicially considered under the context of war, however. As 
Corwin writes: 
War does not of itself render constitutional limitations liable to outright 
suspension by either Congress or President, but do es frequently make 
them considerably less stiff - the war emergency infiltrates them and 
renders them pliable. Earlier constitutional absolutism is replaced by 
constitutional relativity; it aU depends - a result that has been definitely 
aided in the case of substantive rights by the modem conception of due 
process of law as "reasonable law" - that is to say, what the Supreme 
Court finds to be reasonable in the circumstances,z73 
Corwin suggests that such "constitutional relativity," while not leading to 
automatic suspension of individual rights in emergency situations such as war, 
in sorne circumstances might nevertheless sometimes reduce them to the 
"vanishing point," and that judicial protection of rights might be supplanted by 
congressional delegation of quasi-judicial authority to administrative processes 
under executive contro1.274 Under Corwin's own thesis, however, the 
executive might assert such control and await congressional challenge. Either 
273 Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947) at 
80 [hereinafter Total War]. See also Corwin, The President, supra note 263 at 271. 
274 See Corwin, Total War, ibid. at 127-31(criticizing Yakus v. United States 321 U.S. 414 
(1944)), and The President, ibid. at 297. But compare Corwin, Total War, ibid. at 117-22, and 
The President, ibid. at 292-93, discussing the Quirin case, 317 D.S. 1, and arguing that the 
President possesses plenary authority as Commander-in-Chief to deal with unlawful 
combatants, inc1uding those who are United States citizens. His position in this instance 
conflicts with his idea of "constitutional re1ativity" and reflects the same misunderstanding of 
Quirin as shown by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, and the New 
York District Court in Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564. See 228, be1ow. Corwin's analysis of 
Quirin erects an absolute barrier to judicial review over an executive c1aim of authority to 
designate and detain a citizen as an unlawful combatant by advancing a formalistically 
defined, inherent executive war power immune from congressional limitation or judicial 
scrutiny. Corwin accordingly fails to consider the individual circumstances of the case, the 
predicate factual determination of whether an individual is in fact an unlawful combatant thus 
falling under executive authority, and whether the President acts with congressional 
authorization. This view is incompatible with his notion of "constitutional relativity" and 
relevant case law, discussed below, which requires congressional authorization for executive 
actions under the war power that infringe individual rights and impact upon domestic matters, 
and permits judicial review of such actions. 
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way, the judiciary would refrain from treading upon political judgment by 
interpreting rights as elastic in wartime. Of course, to what extent rights are 
malleable and courts defer to the executive is the very question to be answered 
by judicial evaluation of branch competencies to deal with the particular 
situation. However, Corwin's "vanishing point" for rights exists with the near 
or complete absence of any recognized justiciability of the controversy, due to 
the judiciary's over-deference to political branches and refusaI to enter into 
any controversy over war powers. Corwin's thesis, as weIl as Powell's, would 
suggest that the primacy of the political branches in foreign affairs and war 
becomes increasingly difficult to justify as executive actions stray from 
strategie military decisions, either to impact upon individual rights and 
domestic affairs, or violate clear statutory prohibitions that result from the 
political process. 
Consequently, executive action under the war powers does not foreclose 
judicial review where such action impacts individual rights or potentially 
conflicts with domestic law. This was the case in Hamdi,275 where the 
President ordered the detention of an American citizen as an unlawful 
combatant, thereby functionally adjudicating a citizen' s legal status and rights 
under guise of the war powers. The Supreme Court recognized such an 
executive detention power, but asserted judicial review and imposed due 
process requirements where the liberty of the citizens was at stake. Hamdi, as 
weIl as other precedents on govemment war power, reflects such 
"constitutional relativity" in so far as it is based upon the branches' 
deliberative competencies in particular circumstances. The Supreme Court's 
approach accepts Corwin's and Powell's arguments by advocating deference 
to executive discretion in strategie military matters. However, the Court 
retains authority to review those actions that impact individual rights or 
domestic affairs, or otherwise collide with statutory restrictions, when facts 
present justiciable issues. "Constitutional relativity" therefore permits 
deference, but stops short of Corwin's "vanishing point," where the executive 
could functionally adjudicate without any check by the judicial branch. The 
275 542 U.S. 507; 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
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justification for executive discretion in war and foreign affairs conversely 
provides the grounds for the judicial review of the war powers in certain cases. 
British cases have taken a similar approach to the judicial review of 
executive discretion in matters of war, and are illustrative in the American 
context due to the shared Lockean foundations of those constitutional systems. 
However, in the u.K., the courts function outside of a written constitution that 
can offer formalistic premises for or against judicial review of executive 
discretion. As such, British cases highlight the deliberative virtues and 
processes at the heart of the separation ofpowers, and demonstrate the courts' 
willingness to recognize the functionally legislative or judicial character of 
many executive decisions, whether they are exercises of statutory or 
prerogative discretion. The House of Lords made this c1ear in the G. CH Q. 
case,276 by holding that prerogative decisions were amenable to review under a 
reasonableness standard, when the particular subject matter was justiciable. 
More recently, in A and Others,277 the House of Lords found that the 
executive's statutory discretion to detain non-deportable aliens as national 
security threats was a justiciable question, despite the national security 
implications. Such discretion was incompatible under the United Kingdom's 
obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights not to 
discriminate on grounds of national origin.278 Courts in both the United States 
and United Kingdom have therefore applied similar notions of the "political 
question" to those military and national security matters they have found to be 
non-justiciable.279 As a corollary to that doctrine, however, American and 
British courts have demonstrated the willingness to review such executive 
actions as they take on functional characteristics rendering them justiciable. 
276 Counci/ of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1984] 3 AlI ER 935, 
[1985] AC 374 (H.L.) [hereinafter G.G.H.Q.]. 
277 A and Others v. Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department, [2005] 2 AC 68 (H.L.). 
278 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 
November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223, Eur. T.S. 5, art.14 [hereinafter European 
Convention on Human Rights or European Convention], as incorporated by the Human Rights 
Act 1998, supra note 254. 
279 See 126, below. 
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Justiciable matters are not only those where the legislature has statutorily 
prohibited the executive from acting, giving c1ear grounds for review based 
upon legality. They would also encompass those executive decisions taken not 
in commanding military forces in the field, but in curtailing individual rights 
of citizens or other individuals within the country as part of a larger war effort 
off the battlefie1d. In the latter case, executive discretion deserves less judicial 
deference, ev en if legal under statute, as a court's institutional competency to 
review the matter increases when the executive acts in a functionally judicial 
manner to adjudicate individual rights. The executive's deliberative virtues in 
deciding military affairs thus conflict with those of the judiciary in 
adjudicating rights, necessitating modification of the executive's decision-
making processes and legitimizing the judiciary's review power. The 
judiciary's fiduciary dut y, indeed, mandates that it gradually shift from 
deference to deepening leve1s of review, as appropriate.280 In the United 
States, the application of the political question doctrine to such questions 
masks a fundamental judicial determination of the branches' relative decision-
making competencies, and, thus, their constitutional authority under the 
separation of powers. 
The Political Question Doctrine 
American federal courts have consistently made c1ear that decisions over 
the initiation and conduct of hostilities are political questions unsuitable for 
judicial resolution, and are therefore constitutionally relegated to the political 
branches. However, c10ser examination of the political question doctrine 
shows that it does not categorically prec1ude review of the President's war 
powers, but rather requires that a court abstain from exercising review only in 
those circumstances wh en their exercise is non-justiciable and so outside of 
280 Harold Hongju Koh, "Judicial Constraints: The Courts and War Powers," [hereinafter 
"Judicial Constraints"] in Gary M. Stem and Morton H. Halperin, eds., The u.s. Constitution 
and the Power to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1994) 121 at 124. 
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the courts' deliberative competence. The political question doctrine, as 
articulated most prominently in Baker v. Carr,281 assesses the competence ofa 
court to adjudicate the merits of a case, and whether decision should be left to 
the executive and legislative branches. 
In Baker, the Supreme Court heard a daim that the State of Tennessee 
misapportioned state legislators among the population, in a way that debased 
the votes of the plaintiffs and denied them equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting the argument that legislative 
apportionment was a non-justiciable political question, thus not subject to 
judicial review, the Court set forth criteria for justiciability under the political 
question doctrine. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Brennan first stated 
that non-justiciability and the political question were functions of the 
separation ofpowers.282 He then eXplained further: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to 
the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political 
question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as 
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the 
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind dearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question. 
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, 
there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a 
political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 
"political questions," not one of "political cases." The courts cannot 
reject as "no law suit" a bona fide controversy as to whether some action 
denominated "political" exceeds constitutional authority. The cases we 
have reviewed show the necessity for discriminating inquiry into the 
281 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
282 Ibid. at 210. 
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precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the impossibility of 
resolution by any semantic cataloguing.283 
Brennan's analysis of the political question doctrine inextricably links it with a 
contextual assessment of justiciability and the resolution of separation of 
powers questions. As such, it rejects formalistic typologies of actions, which 
might insulate an executive exercises of war powers from judicial review. 
Rather, application of the political question doctrine depends upon functional 
and substantive considerations about the virtues of the branches in utilizing 
different deliberative processes to decide particular cases. 
The Baker criteria, however, have not dispelled questions about the 
political question doctrine, depending as they do upon contextual 
considerations. Academic debates about the political question doctrine lead to 
two main conclusions. First, as to the requirements of the doctrine, "no lawyer 
has ever understood exactly what it means,,,284 and second, commentators 
"assume that there is a close and necessary relationship between the legitimacy 
of judicial review and the theories that might explain the political question 
cases. ,,285 Although the Baker criteria attempt to shed sorne light on the 
confusing properties of the doctrine, by explaining under what circumstances 
the courts should refuse to decide an issue, the criteria themselves remain open 
to considerable interpretation. Baker left, if not highlighted, questions about 
just what implications the political question doctrine has for judicial review, 
the constitutional allocation of decision-making between the three branches, 
and the structural protections for individual rights. Two main theories attempt 
to discem both the meaning of the political question doctrine, and explain its 
intimate relationship to judicial review generally. These theories might be 
termed the "classical" one, set out by Herbert Wechsler, and its "prudential" 
283 Ibid. at217. 
284 Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960) at 29. Although Black made this comment two 
years before the Baker decision, subsequent confusion about the doctrine proves the 
pertinence ofhis observation. 
285 Fritz W. Scharpf, "Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis" 
(1966) 75 Yale L.J. 517 at 519. 
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alternative, captured by Alexander Bickel's analysis of the "passive virtues" of 
judicial review. 
The "classical" view builds upon Chief Justice Marshall's 
pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison that it is "emphatically the province 
and dut Y of the judicial department to say what the law is," whenever a federal 
law potentially conflicts with the Constitution.286 Because of this 
constitutional responsibility, Wechsler suggests, courts cannot avoid deciding 
a constitutional issue whenever the procedural and jurisdictional requirements 
are satisfied.287 This means that, whenever courts invoke the political question 
doctrine, they ''judge whether the Constitution has committed to another 
agency of govemment the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a 
finding that itself requires an interpretation.,,288 The criteria used to support 
deployment of the political question doctrine, such as those that Baker 
proposed a few years after the appearance of Wechsler's article, are 
themselves "standards that should govern the interpretive process 
generally.,,289 A judicial determination that an issue is a political question is, 
according to Wechsler, a decision about the relative constitutional powers of 
the branches, which "is toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain 
or intervene.,,290 This judicial dut y rests upon the character of the judicial 
function and the responsibility of the courts to dispense with aIl cases and 
controversies upon "neutral principles." These princip les rest upon "analysis 
and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved," rather 
than a court's desire to reach a certain a decision in the case before it. 291 
286 5 D.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). 
287 Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959) 73 Harvard 
L. Rev. 1 at 6. 
288 Ibid. at7-8. 
289 Ibid. at 9. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. at Il, and 15, 19. 
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Bickel, however, disagrees with Wechsler that application of the political 
question doctrine is an act of constitutional interpretation as to which branch 
has authority to decide certain matters. 292 Bickel suggests that actual practice 
of the Supreme Court shows that it invokes the politicai question doctrine as a 
unique way to avoid deciding constitutional issues at an, because of prudential 
concems about the propriety or wisdom of judicial involvement in the matter 
in question. According to Bickel's position, Wechsler's interpretation of the 
doctrine would mean that a court would actually legitimate a legislative 
measure that it had declared to be a political question, and in so doing "will 
not only tip today's political balance but may add impetus to the next 
generation's choice of one policy over another.,,293 Bickel thus criticizes 
Wechsler, relying upon Charles Black's view that the Supreme Court takes an 
"affirmative" role when validating or legitimating governmental action, in 
contrast to a "negative" declaration of unconstitutionality.294 Rather, Bickel 
argues, the political question doctrine is a means of "not doing," in that the 
Court avoids either condemning or legitimating government action?95 Bickel 
points to several "passive" techniques for such avoidance, for example 
standing requirements or ripeness, insuring that a constitutional issue cornes to 
a court only in a factually developed, sufficiently concrete form. A court 
might then be better placed to deliver a principled decision at a more 
propitious time.296 The political question doctrine itself is a passive device, 
according to Bickel, which a court can use to avoid the substantive merits of a 
constitutional daim. 
Bickel indicates several concems that shadow the Baker criteria. These 
are 1) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution, 
2) the "momentousness" of the decision, which unbalances judicial judgment, 
292 Bickel, supra 201 at 125. 
293 Ibid. at 129,131. 
294 Ibid. at 87. 
295 Ibid. at 169, 200-01. 
296 Ibid. at 205-06. 
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3) anxiety that a judgment should be ignored, 4) and the Court's own self-
doubts as to its democratic, electoral irresponsibility.297 When these concems 
exist with a case, a court should prudentially abstain from deciding the 
constitutional issue based upon the political question doctrine. Abstention in 
these instances will avoid unwise judicial interference in matters politically 
resistant to adjudication, even though they are perhaps functionally justiciable. 
Use of the doctrine thereby preserves a court's ability to issue authoritative, 
principled judgments on more appropriate occasions. Judicial application of 
the political question doctrine itself, under Bickel's view, is not a principled 
decision about the constitutional allocation of branch powers, but rather a 
refusaI to decide the issue at all, based upon innumerable, subjective variables. 
While the political question doctrine and other passive virtues are devices that 
allow a court not to do anything in a particular case, they nevertheless 
complement direct decisions, made at other times, to legitimate or condernn 
govemment actions, and so form "points on a continuum of judicial power.,,298 
Bickel' s continuum inc1udes "lesser" principled, constitutional doctrines to 
curb legislative or executive power in a particular case without disposing of 
the substantive issue. Judicial decisions that a govemment action is vague, 
implicates improperly delegated authority, or lacks due process do not actually 
forec1ose action by the political branches but only require that they conform to 
previously established rules of constitutional form or process. 
Bickel, too, is not without his critics. As Fritz Scharpf has pointed out, 
Bickel's prudential argument might apply to standing, ripeness, or other 
"procedural and jurisdictional techniques of avoidance,,,299 but does not 
explain the political question doctrine itself. While a decision on standing, for 
ex ample, does indeed only affect the case at hand and so allows a court to 
retum to the issue at a later time, Scharpf argues that the finding of a political 
question "attaches to the issue itself.,,30o Consequently, "[0 Jnce the political 
297 Ibid. at 184. 
298 Ibid. at 207. 
299 Scharpf, supra note 285 at 534-35. 
300 Ibid. at 537. 
110 
question doctrine has been applied to a particular issue, the mIes of precedent 
and of stare decisis corne into play and will prevent a judicial determination of 
this issue in future cases.,,301 This position seems to reflect Wechsler's 
formulation of the c1assical theory. However, Scharpf go es further and 
suggests that the determination that an issue is a political question permanently 
removes certain classes of governrnent action from review altogether. Such 
removal abdicates the very responsibility that courts have under the c1assical 
view to review constitutional issues as they arise.302 Scharpf's interpretation 
of the political question doctrine accordingly conflicts with Wechsler's 
assertion that a court's refusaI to adjudicate is an act of constitutional 
interpretation. Citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Hirabayashi v. United 
States303 and Korematsu v. United States,304 upholding the curfew, mass 
relocation, and internrnent of ethnic Japanese during the Second World War, 
Scharpf c1aims that the Court has often decided questions of branch power as 
contextually dependent upon extra-Iegal factors, like the exigencies ofwar. In 
doing so, it has not condoned legislative or executive action as permissible 
under a broader, unlimited constitutional discretion. Scharpf thus presupposes 
that a court cannot or should not decide certain issues despite the existence of 
discemible legal standards. In regard to Hirabayashi and Korematsu, then, the 
Court might have made wrong decisions in deferring to executive action under 
the circumstances, but it did not decide that the curfew or detentions, as a 
constitutional matter, rested permanently within the President's absolute 
discretion. 
In light of these criticisms, then, what sense do es Scharpf make of the 
political question doctrine? Scharpf's explanation is a highly functional one. 
Through it, he avoids broad pronouncements that place subject matter into 
categories of non-justiciable and justiciable questions, where the former faH 
into legislative or executive spheres of power isolated from judicial review: 
301 Ibid. at 536-38. 
302 Ibid. at 538-39. 
303 Hirabyashi v. United States, 320 V.S. 81 (1943). 
304 Koremalsu v. United States, 323 V.S. 214 (1944). 
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1 am persuaded that much, if not aIl, of the Court's political question 
practice should, like the procedural and jurisdictional techniques of 
avoidance, be explained in functional terms, as the Court 's 
acknowledgment of the limitations of the American judicial process. But 
the difficulties encountered by the broader theories should serve as a 
reminder of the pitfalls of all generalizations in this field. A satisfactory 
explanation of the political ~uestion doctrine is necessarily tied to the 
specifics of individual cases. 3 5 
Under this view, a court' s invocation of the doctrine rests upon several factors, 
which share common concems with the criteria offered by Bickel and the 
Supreme Court in Baker. These inc1ude judicial difficulties of access to 
information, the need for uniformity of decision, deference to the 
responsibilities of the political branches, normative limitations on the doctrine 
posed by considerations such as individual rights or separation of powers, and 
other additional factors that might arise in a given situation. 306 
Scharpf's functional analysis of the political question doctrine 
simultaneously departs from and corresponds with elements of both the 
c1assical and prudential theories, depending upon the level of comparison. On 
the surface, Scharpf's view might appear not to differ much from Bickel's idea 
of the passive virtues, in that Scharpf sees the political question doctrine as an 
attempt by a court to avoid deciding cases where it would be iIl-advised to do 
so for various reasons. Nevertheless, Scharpf's justification for the political 
question doctrine goes beyond, and indeed rejects, the solely prudential 
concems of Bickel. Judicial involvement in cases exhibiting Scharpf' s criteria 
would not only be unwise, but institutionally dysfunctional given that branch's 
limitations for certain kinds of decision-making. Just what characteristics of a 
case render it functionally unsuitable for adjudication, and thus a political 
question constitutionally left to legislative or executive decision-making, are 
varied and factually dependent. According to such a functional position, the 
Baker criteria are guidelines for assessing a court's competency to adjudicate 
305 Scharpf, supra note 285 at 566-67 [emphasis added]. 
306 Ibid. at 567 et seq. 
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particular cases, rather than for generally classifying subject matter as 
permanently justiciable or not. For Scharpf, the political question therefore 
depends upon a court's contextual, case-by-case analysis of its own 
institutional competency to adjudicate an issue. Scharpfs functional analysis 
rests upon deliberative considerations that similarly justify avoidance 
techniques like standing or ripeness; the criteria involved assess whether the 
case is one in which the deliberative capabilities of the judiciary are 
appropriate in making a rational decision for the public good. Nevertheless, 
despite a common basis with Bickel's passive virtues, Scharpfs assessment of 
a court's decision not to resolve a case runs deeper than discretionary 
abstention for the sake ofprudence in any one instance. For Scharpf, a court is 
not just ill-advised to decide sorne cases, but is institutionally incompetent to 
do so because they are not amenable to resolution by judicial processes. 
Judicial assessment of the branches' decision-making competencies 
would seem, then, to involve an interpretive decision about the separation of 
powers, in line with Wechsler's view. Importantly, however, Scharpfs 
functionalism would not conclusively relegate certain subject matter to another 
branch and so foreclose judicial review over it in the future. Rather, the 
determination of justiciability rests not upon subject matter alone, but upon the 
particular decision itself, the interests involved, and the factual context. 
Notwithstanding this difference between Scharpfand Wechsler, however, their 
positions still have sorne root similarities. Because the functional application 
of the political question doctrine requires that a court contextually assess its 
own institutional competency to adjudicate a particular case, it is at the same 
time determining the relative - and thus constitutional - authority for the 
branches to decide the issue in question. When Scharpf's criteria compromise 
a court's ability to adjudicate an issue, the political branches will receive 
increasingly greater judicial deference to their actions. This deference is 
appropriate because the deliberative advantages of the executive and 
legislative branches make them constitutionally better placed to decide the 
matter at hand. The application of the political question doctrine would not, 
however, prevent a court from adjudicating the same subject matter, such as 
the war power, when circumstances make an issue more conducive to judicial 
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resolution. In this way, a court's detennination of its functional capacity to 
"say what the law is" in each particular case again begins to show similarities 
to Bickel's prudential approach. Such detennination, as Scharpf himself 
suggests in taking exception to such a view, is able to "coexist with the 
premises of the classical theory of judicial review.,,307 Under Scharpf's 
version of the political question doctrine, courts must make a principled 
decision about the relative institutional capabilities of the three branches, in 
order to detennine which ones are constitutionally empowered under the 
particular circumstances to make decisions most reasonably calculated best to 
achieve the public good. Judicial deference to the political branches in one 
case, however, while thereby interpreting what the constitution requires in that 
instance, does not foreclose review of similar exercises of legislative or 
executive power in future cases, more suitable for resolution by judicial 
processes. 
Under Scharpf's analysis, a court's assessment of the propriety ofreview 
under the political question doctrine belies a separation of powers the ory, 
arising from the Lockean structural model and resting upon the branches' 
deliberative virtues.308 When finding a matter to be a political question, a 
court detennines that the deliberative considerations of the separation of 
powers doctrine places the matter outside of judicial competence, and leaves it 
307 Ibid. at 59. Scharpf qualifies his position by disclaiming that a functional understanding of 
the political question doctrine is an act of constitutional interpretation. In a lengthy footnote, 
ibid., n. 275, he explains: "It would, of course, be theoretically possible to elevate the 
functional factors which in my opinion explain the Court's political question practice to the 
dignity of constitutional imperatives. But ev en if it were clearly understood that this assertion 
would be no more than a conc1usionary label attached to considerations which focus upon the 
limitations of the American judicial process, rather than upon the constitutional grants of 
power to the political departments of the government, 1 wou Id regard such an 'escalation' as 
undesirable. . .. If the Court's judgment that a particular question under the particular 
circumstances should be regarded as 'political' is expressed in terms of constitutional 
command, this statement will almost inevitably obscure the need for a close functional 
analysis in the next case dealing with a seemingly similar question. The Court has often 
demonstrated its readiness to use the political question label uncritically in situations where 
the functional reasons for avoidance were far from compelling, and it appears to me that the 
exceptional character as weIl as the flexibility of the political question is better described and 
better maintained if it is not characterized as a constitutional rule." 
308 Separation of powers remains the basis for the political question doctrine, whether one 
takes a classical textual or prudential view of the doctrine. Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. 
Firmage, with Francis P. Butler, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in 
History and Law (Dallas: Southern Methodist Univ., 1986) at 229-30. 
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to resolution by Congress or the President. Such a finding do es not dispense 
with the fiduciary duties of the political branches. Rather, a branch's fiduciary 
dut Y becomes under the circumstances a political one not legally enforceable 
in the courts, for the very reason that the executive and legislative branches, 
and the deliberative processes functionally associated with them, can best 
detennine just what actions are in the public good. The initiation and conduct 
of hostilities present just such political questions. While the complexities of 
warfare justify leaving such decisions to the political branches, they might also 
occasionally lead the executive branch to make certain off-battlefield decisions 
- like the detention of unlawful combatants - that demonstrate a functional 
mixing of deliberative processes, and so greater overlap between branch 
authority. As the justiciability of such functionally mixed executive actions 
increase, however, the judiciary's own fiduciary obligation is to review the 
case as far as it is institutionally competent to do so. 
Varying judicial deference to the decision-making competencies of the 
political branches, based upon the judiciary's own institutional limitations 
under the circumstances, might actually mean, as Louis Henkin has dared to 
suggest, "that there may be no doctrine requiring abstention from judicial 
review of 'political questions. ",309 Rather, the political question doctrine and 
criteria like those in Baker "seem rather to be elements of the ordinary respect 
which the courts show to the substantive decisions of the political 
branches. ,,3 10 The political question, as a constitutional doctrine, therefore 
seems to be nothing more than a court's functional assessment of its, and the 
other branches', deliberative competencies in a particular case. Baker itself 
suggests this, in emphasizing the importance of justiciability: 
[D]eference rests on reason, not habit. The question in a particular case 
may not seriously implicate considerations of finality - e.g., a public 
309 Louis Henkin, "ls There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?" (1976) 85 Yale L.J. 597 at 600. 
310 Ibid. at 605. Henkin also suggests, like Bickel, that there might be situations in which it is 
prudent, for whatever reasons, for the Court not actively to intervene in the decisions taken by 
the political branches. It should do this, he argues ibid. at 617-19, not necessarily by 
abstaining from judicial review under the political question doctrine, but by withholding relief 
under equity principles. 
115 
pro gram of importance (rent control) yet not central to the emergency 
effort. Further, clearly definable criteria for decision may be available. 
In such case the political question barrier falls away .... 311 
The court's level of scrutiny will be variable and dependent upon the nature 
and circumstances of the executive decision, and the extent to which it 
functionally mixes executive, legislative, and judicial processes of decision-
making. Consequently, where executive exercises of the war power are 
justiciable, a court can go on to evaluate their legality, pro ce duraI faimess, and 
reasonableness. Judicial review of the war powers, and the application of the 
political question doctrine, requires a constitutional interpretation about the 
requirements of the separation of powers, but one contextually based upon the 
relative deliberative virtues of the branches. These deliberative considerations 
explain the great deference that D.S. courts have shown to both Congress and 
the President in many war powers cases, while justifying greater judicial 
scrutiny in cases such as Hamdi. 
311 369 U.S. at 213-14. 
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Chapter VII: Judicial Review of Presidential War Powers 
The Political Question Doctrine and the War Powers 
Federal cases dealing with the Vietnam War and subsequent military 
conflicts, taken as a who le, demonstrate judicial authority to review executive 
exercises of the war powers, based upon a deliberative processes approach to 
the separation of powers. These cases suggest that executive decisions made 
under the war powers are not automatically exempt from judicial review, by 
reason of a formalistic division of branch authority. Rather, judicial review 
flows from a court's fiduciary obligation to evaluate its own institutional 
competency, under the circumstances, to resolve the particular issue through 
adjudicatory processes. The nature of the executive decision and its functional 
mixing of deliberative pro cesses, along with its justiciability, will accordingly 
result in varying levels of judicial scrutiny. 
In the United States, the unpopularity of the Vietnam War resulted in a 
series of legal challenges to the war's constitutionality. The resulting cases 
form the main corpus of jurisprudence on the scope of presidential war 
powers, and their relationship to the powers of Congress and the courts. In 
early cases, federal courts gave an indication of the judiciary's reluctance to 
involve itself in matters relating to the government's conduct of war, 
summarily dismissing challenges to it as unreviewable political questions.3 !2 
However, in Atlee v. Laird,3!3 a three judge panel of the Eastern District Court 
in Pennsylvania retreated from a strictly formalistic application of the political 
question doctrine. The Atlee court applied the Baker criteria in a way that 
highlighted their functional aspects and the importance of justiciability. In 
312 See Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 O.S. 934 (1967) 
and Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Ciro 1967), cert. denied 387 D.S. 945 (1967). 
313 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
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Atlee, several young men challenged the military action in Vietnam, arguing 
that the conflict was not a war in the constitutional sense of the clause 
requiring a congressional declaration of war, that Congress had not declared 
war, and that the President's prosecution of the war was consequently illegal. 
Even should a formaI declaration of war not be required, plaintiffs argued, 
congressional appropriation of funds and extension of the draft were 
constitutionaIly insufficient forms of authorizing military action. The court 
made clear at the outset of its opinion that it indeed had jurisdiction over the 
subject matter. The court assumed that the political question doctrine required 
it to assess the issue's justiciability, thereby rejecting an interpretation of the 
doctrine that would deny courts the jurisdiction to consider the question in any 
capacity whatsoever.314 Two of the three judges decided, however, that the 
subject matter of the cases, under the circumstances, presented non-justiciable 
political questions unsuitable for judicial resolution. A federal court, 
according to the District Court, was incapable of making a factual 
determination whether the country was at war for purposes of Article I, section 
8, what actions short of a formaI dec1aration of war sufficiently expressed 
Congress' approval for hostilities, and whether the executive conduct of war 
was therefore legal or not.315 The court therefore exercised jurisdiction over 
the subject matter, despite its martial nature, but under the political question 
doctrine refrained from deciding the case upon its merits. 
In applying the political question doctrine, the Atlee court made clear 
that it was not a jurisdictional one that foreclosed aIl review. The political 
question doctrine, according to the District Court, "limits the exercise, not the 
existence, of federal judicial power.,,316 This doctrine, the court put forward, 
was one of judicial abstention from issues it was not suited to decide, as 
assessed under the Baker criteria. 317 These concems reach their height in the 
initiation and conduct of war, making them inappropriate subjects for 
314 Ibid. at 69l. 
315 Ibid. at 705-07. 
316 Ibid. at 701. 
317 Ibid. at 702-03; See Baker, 369 U.S. 186 at 217. 
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adjudication and 80 placing them outside of the judiciary's deliberative 
competence.318 The court recognized the functional roots of the political 
question doctrine when examining its origins. Citing Baker, the court in Atlee 
emphasized that the political question doctrine grew out of the separation of 
powers and attempted to manage the coordinate relationship of the three 
branches.319 Moreover, application of the doctrine to a case was contextual, 
with the assessment of justiciability being fact-dependent. Thus, "the political 
question doctrine does not appear to have consistent attributes, but rather, as a 
grouping of considerations, applies with differing emphasis in various phases 
of the law.,,32o The District Court hinted that a court might apply the political 
question doctrine depending upon the particular context of the case, and in 
ways potentially allowing different facets of review. One significant factor in 
applying the political question doctrine and determining the appropriate level 
of review, the District Court recognized, was "the distinction between those 
cases dealing with foreign affairs and those dealing with internaI affairs,,,321 
the same "critical distinction,,322 made by the Supreme Court in Curtiss- Wright 
and Youngstown. Although the District Court found that the authorization and 
conduct of war under the facts raised political questions unsuitable for judicial 
review, its reasoning left open the possibility for sorne scrutiny of war powers 
should an issue actually be justiciable in different circumstances. Looking 
back to Youngstown, such circumstances might be, for example, if the 
executive attempted to use the war powers to infringe individual rights, 
manage internaI affairs usually left to Congress, or act without or contrary to 
congressional authorization. 
318 The District Court also suggested that the political question doctrine required that, even in 
reviewing administrative rather than war powers decisions, federal courts should abstain from 
adjudicating any foreign policy issues involved. See 347 F. Supp. at 697-98, citing C. & S 
Air Unes v. Waterman SS Corp., 333 V.S. 103 (1948). 
319 347 F. Supp. at 699, citing Baker, 369 V.S. at 210; See also DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 
1146, 1153 (2nd Cir. 1973) [hereinafter DaCosta IIIJ. 
320 347 F. Supp. at 700. 
321 Ibid. at 701. 
322 Ibid. at 696. The court further contrasted Curtiss-Wright with Youngstown at ibid., 701-03. 
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Thus, even where the political question doctrine in princip le disallows 
judicial review of executive action, the doctrine still assumes that the political 
process might yet result in a situation where courts would have ta review, and 
so enforce or strike down, congressional limitations upon presidential power. 
Leaving certain questions, such as those present in Atlee, for political 
resolution, requires legal enforcement if such resolution is not to be 
meaningless. In such a situation, judicial enforcement of legislative 
restrictions respects the political resolution mandated by the poiiticai question 
doctrine; in assessing the legality of executive actions against congressional 
statute, courts merely enforce the will of the legislature. The courts' 
interpretation of congressionai authorization would, considering Curtiss-
Wright and Youngstown, contract or expand depending upon what actions the 
executive tried to take under the war powers. 
In a brace of cases, Berk v. Laird and Orlando v. Laird,323 decided 
shortIy before Atlee, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
existence of congressional authorization, but showed a broad interpretation of 
it. In both Berk and Orlando, Army personnel unsuccessfully sought 
injunctions to restrain the executive from deploying them to Vietnam. Like 
the plaintiffs in Atlee, those in Berk and Orlando challenged the 
constitutionality of the Vietnam War itself. In Berk, the court began its brief 
opinion by indicating the relevance of the Baker factors throughout aIl stages 
of its review. The threshold question of whether the President had conducted 
the war pursuant ta congressionai authorization possessed a "general attribute 
of justiciability" even if the political question doctrine would forec1ose judicial 
scrutiny of the me ans by which the President exercised lawful authority.324 
Reconciliation of the President's constitutionai role as Commander-in-Chief 
with Congress' power ta dec1are war, however, required that there only be 
"some mutuai participation by Congress." This was a standard easily met, 
according to the court, by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and other 
323 Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1970); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir. 
1971 ). 
324 429 F.2d at 305. 
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congressional appropriations supporting the military action III Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, and somewhat confusingly, Berk begged the question as to 
whether judicial review of the sufficiency of congressional authorization, 
where it seemed absent or unclear, did not itself present a non-justiciable 
1·· 1 . B k 325 po ltIca questlOn per a er. The Berk court paradoxically found that, 
having reviewed the possible sources of congressional authorization and 
determined them to be constitutionally sufficient, it did not need to address 
whether the political question doctrine would foreclose such review in a case 
where a court found authorization lacking. 
In Orlando, decided less than a year after Berk, the Second Circuit 
elaborated upon its reasoning in the earlier case. As the Orlando court stated, 
it had "held in the first Berk opinion that the constitutional delegation of the 
war-declaring power to the Congress contains a discoverable and manageable 
standard imposing on the Congress a dut y of mutual participation in the 
prosecution of war. Judicial scrutiny of that dut y, therefore, is not foreclosed 
by the political question doctrine.,,326 However, the court in Orlando again 
stated that courts should only look to find "sorne mutuai participation between 
the Congress and the President" and no further. 327 This position stil1left open 
the question of what congressional actions were sufficient to qualify as "sorne 
mutual participation," a standard that would have to be judicially applied on a 
case by case basis. As in Berk, the Circuit Court had no problem in finding 
that Congress' Tonkin Gulf Resolution, appropriations, and extension of the 
draft demonstrated Congress' authorization for and collaboration with the 
President's conduct of the war in Vietnam. The court, however, found that the 
means by which Congress supported the military action in Vietnam, and 
thereby satisfied the constitutional requirement of sorne participation, were 
themselves political questions which courts should not decide.328 Again, the 
325 Ibid. at 305-06. 
326 443 F.2d at 1042. 
327 Ibid. at 1043. 
328 Ibid. at 1042-43; See also DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d. 1368, 1369 (2nd CiL 1971), cert. 
denied 405 U.S. 979 (1972) [hereinafter DaCosta 1] (deciding that appropriations and 
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Second Circuit seemed to contradict itself. It reviewed whether Congress had 
in sorne way authorized presidential military action in Vietnam (finding that it 
had and describing how), and then curiously interpreted the political question 
doctrine to disallow a judicial determination of whether Congress' actions 
were indeed qualitatively sufficient to satisfy the justiciable threshold 
requirement of "sorne mutual participation." 
According to Berk and Orlando, federal courts are fully competent, in 
spite or perhaps because of the political question doctrine, to ensure that the 
President takes military actions with at least sorne mutual congressional 
participation. This standard, though thin, seeks to ensure that the President 
do es not assert himself as the sole arbiter of the public good in unilateraIly 
initiating and conducting war. Although Congress has constitutional power to 
approve or disapprove war, a fonnalistic view of the political question doctrine 
limits judicial inquiry to a detennination of whether it has said "yes," "no," or 
stipulated conditions, without second-guessing the executive actions that faIl 
within the legal parameters. Berk and Orlando did not settle, however, the 
question of just what congressional actions would satisfy the participatory 
requirement. Under the particular facts of both cases, the Second Circuit 
accepted that Congress' appropriations and conscription laws complied with 
the Constitution's war declaration clause.329 These cases indicate that federal 
courts will readily infer congressional authorization both to avoid 
constitutional confrontation between the Congress and President, and to 
accommodate those branches' institutional advantages in deciding military 
policy. It is unnecessary for Congress fonnally to declare war in order to 
authorize executive military action,330 but it can instead opt for a use-of-force 
resolution, financial appropriations, conscription, or whatever other measures 
it deems political expedient.331 Nevertheless, Berk and Orlando leave open 
conscription alone constituted sufficient authorization for military action even after repeal of 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution). 
329 See 443 F.2d at 1043. 
330 See also Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Ciro 1973); Atlee, 347 F.Supp. at 706. 
33\ See Orlando, 443 F.2d 1039 (finding congressional approval for the Vietnam War in the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, appropriation of funds to military operations, and extension of the 
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the question as how strictly they would interpret purported congressional 
authorization in a case under a Youngstown scenario, where the President 
would act under the war powers to restrict the rights of citizens or otherwise 
impact upon domestic affairs. 
Review for legality under the political question doctrine would, under a 
fonnalistic view, seem to foreclose inquiry into the procedural faimess or 
reasonableness of executive military decisions. The judgments in Berk and 
Orlando, on the surface, seem to suggest that political question doctrine rests 
upon such a fonnalistic detennination of legality, placing the President's 
authorized military decisions squarely within the power of the executive 
branch and isolating them from further judicial scrutiny. However, the need 
for courts to look for sorne congressional authorization, and the potentially 
flexible interpretation of it in light of the particular executive actions taken 
under the war powers, mean that review for legality, procedural faimess, and 
reasonableness eventually collapse into the threshold inquiry of whether and 
just how Congress has authorized or limited executive military discretion.332 
In other words, application of the political question doctrine depends upon the 
functional justiciability of the issue and substantively laden questions about 
the sufficiency of congressional authorization for the particular executive 
actions in question. Doe v. Bush/33 for example, hints at this position. In that 
case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Vietnam era precedents 
in rejecting a complaint seeking to enjoin the President from beginning war 
against Iraq in 2002. Similarly to previous cases, the plaintiffs in Doe were 
military personnel, who argued that Congress' Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Against Iraq334 was constitutionally inadequate to authorize 
offensive invasion, for which the President was making preparations. The 
Selective Service Act) and DaCosta l, 448 F.2d 1368 (me ans by which Congress and 
President wind down [rom military operations are political questions). 
332 See Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitution al Power (University 
Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1982) at 82. 
333 323 F.3d 133 (lst Cir. 2003). 
334 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 
(16 Oct. 2002). 
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court, referring to its 1971 decision in Massachusetts v. Laird,335 recognized 
that only clear conflict between the Congress and President might present an 
issue for judicial resolution. Where there was no such branch conflict, as 
when Congress had mutually participated with or silently acquiesced in the 
President's military decisions, the case was not yet ripe and courts should not 
intervene.336 
Importantly, the Doe court differed from Berk and Orlando by 
explaining that its "analysis is based on ripeness rather than the political 
question doctrine," adding. that the political question doctrine "is a famously 
murky one.,,337 The court stressed that the President had not yet initiated 
military action against Iraq. Thus, "[t]he mere fact that the October Resolution 
grants sorne discretion to the President fails to raise a sufficiently clear 
constitutional issue" that would present the court with a justiciable case or 
controversy.338 Because the First Circuit concluded that "courts are rightly 
hesitant to second-guess the fonn or means by which the coequal political 
branches choose to exercise their textually committed constitutional 
powers,,,339 lack of branch conflict meant that the case was not ripe for review 
and did not present a justiciable issue. In comparing the ripeness and political 
question doctrines in war powers cases, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
"[u]1timately, however, the classification matters less than the principle. If 
courts may ever decide whether military action contravenes congressional 
authority, they surely cannot do so unless and until the available facts make it 
possible to define the issues with clarity.,,34o Thus, under the reasoning in 
Doe, detenninations of legality, ripeness, and justiciability under the political 
question doctrine coincided in princip le, even if the lines of inquiry remained 
335 323 F.3d at 137, citing Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26,34 (lst Cir. 1971). 
336 Ibid. at l38. 
337 Ibid. at 140. 
338 Ibid. at 143. 
339 Ibid. at 144, citing Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043. 
340 Ibid. at 140. 
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doctrinally distinct. The case was not ripe because it was not yet justiciable 
(or alternatively perhaps also non-justiciable because not yet ripe), the same 
princip le under the political question doctrine that would forec1ose review in 
any case. This approach resembled a use of Bickel's "passive virtues," in that 
the court seemed to use ripeness to avoid deciding the issue at aIl. However, 
one might also read Doe to suggest that under the circumstances the court was 
constitutionally incompetent to adjudicate the case, but could do so as the 
justiciability ofthe case increased. 
The District Court for the District of Columbia's decision in Dellums v. 
Bush,341 from the first Gulf War, gives further insight into the relationship 
between the political question doctrine and a threshold inquiry of justiciability. 
Dellums addressed a suit by members of Congress seeking to enjoin the 
President from invading Iraq in 1990 without first obtaining explicit 
congressional authorization, which Congress had not given. The D.C. court 
defended the judiciary's authority to determine when a de facto state of war 
existed or was imminent for purposes of a constitutional controversy about the 
relative powers of the Congress and President. 342 It thereby departed from the 
position of the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania in Atlee, which found 
the factual issue of war to be a political question. However, as in Doe, the 
D.C. District Court found the case unripe for review in the absence of both 
imminent war and sorne congressional attempt to exercise its war-dec1aring 
power, in a negative sense, by forbidding future military action by the 
President.343 Dellums, like Doe, conflated the ripeness and political question 
doctrines by forec1osing further review not necessarily because Congress had 
shown sorne approval for the President's actions, but because Congress had 
failed actively to oppose executive military initiatives. Both Doe and Dellums 
341 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D. D.C. 1990). 
342 Ibid. at 1145-46, citing Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 614. The court in Dellums, ibid. at 1146, 
recognized "the fact that courts have historically made determinations about whether this 
country was at war for many other purposes - the construction of treaties, statutes, and even 
insurance contracts [citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (lOth Cir. 
1946)]". 
343 752 F. Supp. at 1149-52. 
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suggested that a controversy would remain unripe when Congress had not 
directly confronted the President, at least in the preparatory stages for war, 
thereby finding legislative acquiescence in silence and potentially granting the 
President political initiative for beginning a major conflict. Congress would 
consequently not so much have power to authorize or withhold approval for 
the initiation of war under the declare war clause, so much as a responsibility 
to check presidential actions before they were first taken.344 While Dellums 
certainly seemed to offer institutional initiative to the executive branch in 
committing the nation to war, it nevertheless reserved judicial power to review 
a dispute where the President potentially violated the law. Again, the court 
found itself to be incompetent to adjudicate where there was no clear dispute 
between parties. The ambiguities in determining what congressional actions 
constitute "sorne mutual participation" or impose legal limitations upon 
presidential war powers also require that courts consider the full factual 
context and substantive aspects to the case. The existence, scope, and effect of 
legislative authorization is bound up with a court' s assessment of justiciability 
and its interpretive approach, which themselves will vary according to 
circumstances. At the heart of Doe and Dellums, then, was the authority of the 
court to review the legality of executive action under the particular 
circumstances, and in light of a broad understanding of congressional 
authorization. 
The relationship between the separation of powers and the poli tic al 
question doctrine in the United States also shows through more clearly in light 
of British cases dealing with the Crown's statutory powers and prerogative for 
the defence of the realm. Without the textual analysis of a written 
constitution, courts in the United Kingdom have more openly relied upon the 
relative deliberative competences of the branches in reviewing exercises of 
executive war powers, whether made under statute or prerogative. In 
consequence, they highlight the theoretical basis behind the American political 
question and separation ofpowers doctrines. In contrast to the U.S. President, 
344 But see Koh, "Judicial Constraints," supra note 280 at 121-22, characterizing Judge 
Green's language about justiciability and potential injunctive relief against unauthorized 
presidential war-making as an "unappealable declaratory judgment." 
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the British Crown needs no approval of Parliament to declare war or otherwise 
engage in military confliet. As with American federal courts' review of 
presidential war powers, British courts have long praetieed restraint in 
examining military decisions made under the prerogative. Lord Reid evoked 
the concept of the political question in the House of Lords case of Chandler v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions, writing that "the question wh ether it is 
beneficial to use the armed forces in a particular way or prejudicial to interfere 
with that use would be a political question - a question of opinion on which 
anyone actively interested in politics ... might consider his own opinion as 
good as that of anyone else .... ,,345 Because of the policy and strategie issues 
attendant upon the use of military force, Lord Reid suggested, the question of 
war is a non-justiciable one best left to political pro cesses within and between 
the legislative and executive branches. 
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, matters of war find 
resolution within the complex political interplay between the executive and 
legislative branches. American and British courts are similarly reluctant to 
review such matters, resistant as they are to resolution by adjudicative 
processes. In Chandler, Lord Reid spoke to the reliance upon political 
determinations of military matters, and the relative deliberative competencies 
of branches in matters ofwar: 
Who then is to determine what is and what is not prejudicial to the 
safety and interest of the State? The question more frequently arises as 
to what is or is not in the public interest. 1 do not subscribe to the view 
that the Government or a Minister must always or even as a general 
rule have the last word about that. 
But here we are dealing with a very special matter ... [the disposition 
and armament of the armed forces]. Anyone is entitled, in or out of 
Parliament, to urge that policy regarding the armed forces should be 
changed; but until it is changed, on a change of Government or 
otherwise, no one is entitled to challenge it in court. 346 
345 [1964] AC 763 at 791 (H.L.). 
346 Ibid. at 790. 
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Lord Reid's statement suggested princip les of deliberative decision-making 
common to American and British separation of powers. The executive and 
legislative branches, in making war, remain under trust to act for the public 
good. Because matters of war are ill-resolved through adjudicatory processes, 
however, the legislature is often best situated to check the executive and set 
limits on its military discretion. 
Courts can enforce legal restrictions upon the executive, while the 
justification for judicial deference weakens as executive actions increase in 
justiciability. Where no such limitations exist, and the subject-matter is non-
justiciable, however, courts will dec1ine review. The Court of Queen's Bench 
followed this approach in the CND. case. 347 This case involved an 
application for a dec1aratory judgment that international law prevented the 
British Govemment from invading Iraq without U.N. Security Council 
approval. While the prohibition against the aggressive use of force might be 
customary international law and thus part of the common law, the Court 
explained, these did not bind the Crown absent their statutory enactment. In 
any case, it was for the executive, not the judiciary, to interpret the U.K. 's 
obligations under international law and the purposes of military action, 
especially III light of unpredictable world events and diplomatic 
considerations. Richards J. stated bluntly that "it is unthinkable that the 
national courts would entertain a challenge to a Govemment decision to 
dec1are war or to authorise the use of armed force against a third country. That 
is a c1assic example of a non-justiciable decision.,,348 Like the U.S. 
President's war powers, the Crown's exercise of the prerogative receives 
considerable judicial deference, when Parliament has not imposed clear 
limitations and the particular decision is non-justiciable. Questions about the 
initiation and conduct of hostilities, like those in CND., are unsuitable for 
resolution by adjudicatory processes. However, justiciability will increase and 
347 R. (on application of Campaign for Nuc/ear Disarmament) v. The Prime Minister, [2002] 
An ER (D) 245 (Q.B.) [hereinafter CN.D.]. 
348 Ibid. at para. 59 ii. 
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deference to executive decisions decrease should the executive act in a way 
that is functionally judicial and infringes individual rights. 
British jurisprudence reflects the underlying princip les of the political 
question doctrine, as it is in the United States: that is, matters of war should 
usually be left to the executive and legislative branches, the deliberative 
virtues of which make them better suited to decide matters of war. 349 In the 
absence of statutory restriction, the Crown exercises legal authority over the 
military's deployment, disposition, and use. "[T]he disposition and armament 
of the armed forces are and for centuries have been within the exclusive 
discretion of the Crown," explained Lord Reid in Chandler, declaring that "no 
one can seek a legal remedy on the ground that such discretion has been 
wronglyexercised .... ,,350 Prerogative authority, as Locke made clear, exists 
only in the absence of lawful restrictions. From a formalistic viewpoint, 
British courts must make a threshold determination of legality, to see whether 
the Crown has transgressed any law limiting the prerogative. In Attorney 
General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel,351 for example, the House of Lords held 
that the Crown could not, simply at its discretion, grant or withhold 
compensation for the expropriation of private property under the prerogative 
for the defence of the realm, where a statutory scheme for compensation 
existed. Burmah Qil Co. v. Lord Advocate,352 moreover, established that non-
statutory, common-Iaw restrictions on the prerogative might exist, such as the 
requirement that the Crown's destruction of private property in a theatre of 
war can carry with it a legal dut Y to compensate the owner. The CN.D. case 
complemented these cases by affirming that the Crown's prerogative power to 
349 The Crown's treaty-making power illustrates that prerogative does not mean lack of 
accountability, dispensation from the law, or law-making authority. The Ponsonby Rule is a 
convention requiring the Crown to lay certain treaties before Parliament prior to ratification, 
allowing time for legislative debate and input. AIso, treaties cannot change domestic law 
without act of Parliament, nor can the Crown conclude a treaty in face of a statutory 
requirement of parliamentary assent thereto. See A. W. Bradley and K. D. Ewing, 
Constitution al and Administrative Law, 13th ed. (London: Longman, 2003) at 316. 
350 [1964] AC at 790, citing China Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General, [1932] 2 KB 197 
(C.A.). 
351 [1920] AlI ER 80; [1920] AC 508 (H.L.). 
352 [1965J AC 75 (H.L.). 
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initiate and conduct hostilities is non-justiciable, where it exists and its 
exercise does not infringe individual rightS?53 Where prerogative does 
infringe rights, courts will more strongly interpret relevant law so as to limit 
Crown authority. Even where the Crown clearly acts under the prerogative, 
unwritten common-law rules might constrain executive decision-making, 
should rights be at stake and the decision is a justiciable one.354 ludicial 
review of war and national security matters in the U.K. consequently takes on 
substantive considerations, as under the American political question doctrine. 
Such review will vary in intensity depending upon the circumstances and the 
deliberative competencies of the branches. The British example, also set 
within a Lockean constitutional paradigm, thus highlights the deliberative 
processes that similarly lie beneath the American political question doctrine. 
Theoretical Ambiguities in the Political Question Doctrine 
The political question doctrine's reliance upon political checks means 
that the President's need for congressional approval and the latent power of the 
sovereign Parliament present opportunity for U.S. and u.K. courts to inteIject 
into government war-making, through the process of interpreting legal 
boundaries to executive discretion. In this way, the courts maintain the 
constitutional separation of powers by enforcing the results of the political 
process. Any executive power to begin or define the scope of conflict remains 
alterable by statute,355 and the resulting limitations are subject to review by the 
courts should they be sufficiently c1ear. Courts nonetheless possess 
considerable latitude in their interpretation of the legal boundaries to executive 
353 As Kay J. stated, [2002] Ali ER (D) 245 (Q.B.) at para. 50, "[fJoreign policy and the 
deployment of the armed forces remain non-justiciable." The court in CN.D. thus found that 
courts should not interfere with the prerogative, based upon customary international law or an 
unincorporated international treaty, where their interpretation would be unnecessary to 
determine individual rights. 
354 See, for example, the G.CHQ. case, supra note 276, and accompanying text. 
355 For further discussion, see Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 308 at 111-21. 
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military discretion, and the ostensibly formalistic process quickly leads to 
substantive examination ofthe decision itself. 
In the U.S., early federal cases demonstrate the judiciary's power of 
review over executive military decisions, based upon the interpretation of 
congressional authorization. In the 1800 case of Bas v. Tingy,356 the Supreme 
Court made c1ear that Congress could constitutionally authorize military 
hostilities short of a fully dec1ared war, as with the then naval "quasi-war" 
against revolutionary France.357 Action was "limited as to places, persons, and 
things,,,358 and only "[a]s far as congress tolerated and authorised the war on 
our part, so far may we proceed in hostile operations.,,359 Accordingly, in 
Little v. Barreme360 in 1804, the Navy's capture of a vessel sailing [rom a 
French port was unlawful, despite compliance with executive order, where 
Congress had suspended trade with France and provided for seizure of ships 
bound to a French port. Similarly, in United States v. Smith361 in 1806, a 
federal circuit court upheld the criminal indictment of an individual for 
violating the Neutrality Act by committing hostile acts against Spain, then at 
peace with the United States. In was no matter that the defendant's action 
"was begun, prepared, and set on foot with the knowledge and approbation of 
the executive department . . . ," which "cannot control the statute, nor 
dispense with its execution, and still less can . .. authorize a person to do 
what the law forbids.,,362 A court's restrictive interpretation of use-of-force 
356 4 Dallas (4 U.S.) 37 (1800). 
357 Washington J. termed the distinction as between "solemn" and "imperfect" war, 4 V.S. at 
40, whi1e Chase J. characterized it as "genera1" versus "partial" war, ibid. at 43. According to 
its own "circumspection and prudence," ibid. at 45, per Chase J., Congress could authorize 
limited war through various means short of open declaration, such as by statutorily raising an 
army, equipping a navy, and regulating hostilities and captures at sea, ibid. at 41, per 
Washington J. 
358 Ibid. at 40, per Washington J. 
359 Ibid. at 45 per Paterson J; See also Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 1,28 (1801), per 
Marshall c.J. 
360 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 170 (1804). 
361 27 Fed. Cas. 1192 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
362 Ibid. at 1229-30. 
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authorizations and readiness to find implied statutory restrictions on the 
President's military discretion, therefore, suggest that Congress has the 
preeminent constitutional role in initiating hostilities, under the declare war 
clause, and provide a foundation for strong judicial review of the legality of 
executive military decisions. Such textually based review respects the 
political nature of war-making decisions, and accords with the separation of 
powers. The interpretive approach of the early federal courts, while obviously 
much less deferential to executive power than modem decisions, nevertheless 
reflects the underlying princip les of the political question doctrine. That is, 
courts should enforce political resolutions about matters ofwar. Although the 
early decisions seem formalistic and strictly textual in reasoning, they 
proceeded from a pro-congressional view, dealt with a very limited naval 
"quasi-war" having a strong commercial aspect, and reviewed executive 
actions in light of congressional statutes that sought to place considerable 
limitations upon American military engagements. 
In contrast to the early pro-Congress cases, the post-World War II period 
has seen both the courts and Congress increasingly look to the "imperial 
Presidency,,363 for leadership in international and military affairs. Unlike the 
early federal judiciary, courts now liberally construe congressional acts to 
authorize, rather than restrict, executive conduct of hostilities. The President 
receives great judicial deference for his actions, meaning that Congress must 
give far clearer expressions of limitations for them to present legally 
enforceable standards. The pre-World War II case of Curtiss-Wright364 
recognized that Congress could broadly de1egate power to the President in 
matters of foreign affairs,365 thereby emphasizing the executive's "federative" 
power. Curtiss-Wright forwarded a position that courts have subsequently 
363 Arthur M. Schlesinger farnously coined this terrn with The Imperial Presidency (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1973). 
364 299 U.S. 304. 
365 Compare Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (denying the President power, without clear statutory 
authorization, to seize the nation's steel mills in order to avert a strike during the Korean War) 
with Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding implied legislative approval 
for Pres. Carter's suspension of claims against Iran). 
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followed in liberally construing congressional authorization for the use of 
military force. In drawing attention to a history of congressional cooperation 
with the President during the Vietnam War, the First Circuit Court of Appeal 
in Massachusetts v. Laird dec1ared that courts might entertain a challenge to 
executive war policy only "[s]hould either branch be opposed to the 
continuance of hostilities ... and present the issue in clear terms .... ,,366 
Recent courts have maintained this deference to executive military leadership. 
As said by the District Court in Drinan v. Nixon, Congress and President must 
be "c1early and resolute1y in opposition,,367 before a challenge will be ripe for 
review. This standard gives considerable deference to executive military 
action taken without express authorization, and unlike the early cases, 
broadens the allowable scope of the President's military discretion. 
Nevertheless, none ofthese cases stand for the proposition that executive 
war powers are never reviewable, either for legality or upon more substantive 
grounds. As discussed above, the political question doctrine hinges upon a 
judicial assessment of the justiciability of executive action, even while courts 
are prepared to defer to the President's exercises of the war powers. Thus, for 
example, while reserving its authority to determine just what circumstances 
constitute "war" to trigger the "dec1are war" clause, the D.C. District Court in 
Dellums found in 1990 that President Bush could unilaterally prepare for 
offensive operations against Iraq, in the absence of overt congressional 
disapprova1. 368 Pointing out the judiciary's long experience with interpreting 
treaties, statutes, and even insurance contracts touching upon acts of war, the 
D.C. court still asserted that it was not "excluded from the resolution of cases 
merely because they may touch upon foreign affairs. The court must instead 
look at 'the particular question posed' in the case.,,369 In doing so, the court 
emphasized the deference due to executive military decisions, and preferred 
reliance upon Congress to check the executive, while maintaining its own 
366 451 F .2d at 34. 
367 Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F.Supp. 854, 858 (D. Mass. 1973). 
368 752 F.Supp. 1141. 
369 Ibid. at 1146, quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
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authority to review war powers cases as they became justiciable.37o Courts 
would only intervene in face of a congressional majority opposing the 
President's c1ear commitment actually to initiate war on his own initiative, and 
would not interfere with a military build-up in preparation for eventualities or 
to strengthen a diplomatie position.37 ! The decision in Dellums, therefore, 
took notice of the particular military and diplomatie circumstances, to 
determine which branch was better suited to deal with the situation. The Court 
did not discount review of executive decisions should the situation change, or 
should the executive exercise the war powers in a different way. Later, in 
Campbell v. Clinton,372 the D.C. Court of Appeals for the same reasons 
refused to dec1are unlawful President Clinton's air strikes on Yugoslavia, 
absent Congress' direct confrontation with his policy. Finally, in Doe v. Bush, 
the First Circuit Court of Appeal found that a congressional resolution, 
authorizing the President to ensure Iraq's compliance with V.N. Security 
Council resolutions implied Congress' support for full military invasion at the 
President's discretion.373 In contrast to the restrictive constitutional and 
statutory interpretation of the early nineteenth-century cases, the prevailing 
jurisprudence now gives the President c1ear initiative over Congress in taking 
the U.S. to war. The President accordingly possesses wider discretion in 
determining what military actions are necessary for the public good and so 
also what are the boundaries of his own fiduciary duty. This wide discretion 
has limits, nonetheless, which courts will enforce should conflict occur 
between the President and Congress. However, presidential actions might 
make it politically inopportune or militarily inadvisable for Congress to 
challenge executive war policy as wrongly motivated or ill-advised, thus 
upsetting the separation of powers in favor of executive power and against 
legislative or judicial interference. 
370 Ibid. at 1149. 
371 Ibid. at 1151-52. 
372 Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Ciro 2000). 
373 Doe V. Bush, 322 F.3d 109 (lst Cir. 2003). 
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Modem judicial deference to executive military action has continued 
despite Congress' attempt to reign in presidential war-making with the War 
Powers Act of 1973.374 This Act requires the President to submit a report to 
Congress, within forty-eight hours, whenever armed forces are introduced into 
hostilities or are in a situation where involvement in hostilities is imminent.375 
Unless Congress has declared war or otherwise authorized such action within 
sixt Y days, the President must withdraw American forces. 376 In attempting to 
control judicial interpretation, the Act also declares that congressional 
authorization shaH not be inferred from any law, including appropriations, 
"unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities ... and states that it is intended to constitute 
specific authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.,,377 Despite 
this interpretive clause, in no case since the Act's passage have courts 
construed it to bind Congress' constitutional discretion in the manner of 
authorizing hostilities, or deviate from the rule that a subsequent legislative act 
will prevail over a prior, inconsistent one.378 Moreover, it is debatable 
whether the War Powers Act is even a limitation upon presidential war-making 
or is instead a sixt Y day "blank check" that would allow the President to make 
374 War Powers Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (7 Nov. 1973), codified at 50 
U.S.c. § 1541 et seq. (2000). 
375 Ibid., § 4(a)(I). 
376 Ibid., § 5(b). 
377 Ibid., § 8(a). 
378 See Powell, supra note 266 at 124-25. The Acl's own enforcement clause, § 5(c), which 
allows Congress to require withdrawai of forces by a concurrent resolution not subject to 
presidentiai veto, might likely ron afoul of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 
462 V.S. 919 (1983). That case declared such a "legislative veto" of executive action to be 
unconstitutionai under the requirement that any bill passing the House of Representative and 
Senate be presented to the President for signature or veto (U.S. Const. art. l, § 7). In the event 
of such a conflict between the Act and Chadha, should the President veto a proposaI to end or 
prevent hostilities, Congress could act only by a veto override of two-thirds majority in each 
House. This situation wou Id radically shift the decision to go to war into executive hands, 
arguably rendering the declare war clause, ibid. art. 1, § 8, almost meaningless. It wou Id also 
disarm Congress' ability to counter executive misconduct short of disbanding or not funding 
the military forces (which would still be subject to veto) or perhaps even impeaching the 
President. Fisher, Presidential War Power, supra note 18 at 270-72, however, suggests that 
the War Powers Act does not delegate any congressional authority over war to the President, 
as expressly stated by § 8(d)(2). Thus, the decision in Chadha wouid not apply to the Act, and 
Congress could hait executive military action through concurrent resolution without 
presidential signature. 
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war without any legislative authorization and render unripe any challenges to 
the legality of the war before expiration of the time period. Under CUITent case 
law, in any event, the Act seems to be of little practical use in otherwise 
limiting presidential military action. It does not solve the problem of 
excessive judicial deference in determining either just what legislative acts 
constitute authorization or what executive actions fall within its boundaries, 
and Congress must still affirmatively challenge the President even under the 
Act 's own provisions.379 The War Powers Act notwithstanding, in matters of 
war the President now maintains political initiative to determine what military 
actions are necessary and in the public good. Limitations upon these actions 
can result only from more direct legislative challenge, or from judicial review 
more attuned to functional considerations and so less deferential to executive 
discretion where the President functionally adjudicates individual rights. 
Despite the judiciary's interpretive shift in assessing which branch best 
shouid have initiative in military decisions, the justification for judiciai 
deference to executive decisions thus lessens as the President acts in ways that 
are functionally Iegisiative or judicial, and infringes individuai rights and 
impacts upon domestic matters. This jurisprudential shift reflects the 
differences between the Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown cases. The separation 
ofpowers doctrine actually requires increased judiciai review in the latter type 
of case, to respect the role of deliberative processes in reasonable decision-
making and the branches' own deliberative virtues. The constitutional risk in 
an excessively deferentialjudicial approach is that, iftaken too far and c10aked 
in a formalistic approach to the separation of powers, it might permanently 
accrete war-making power in the President and forec1ose realistic opportunity 
for any judicial review of the war powers, even in cases amenable to 
adjudication.380 Although the political question doctrine is not a jurisdictional 
379 Koh, "Judicial Constraints," supra note 280 at 125, writes that "what the Resolution does 
not specifically say is that the courts should enforce it. This statutory silence has played into 
the perverse incentives of aB three branches: the President's incentive to act, Congress's 
incentive to avoid responsibility, and the courts' incentive to defer."; Wormuth and Firmage, 
supra note 308 at 215-16 refer to the War Powers Act as a "blank check" that 
unconstitutionally delegates congressional war power. 
380 Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitution al Power: The Origins 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub1ishing Co., 1976) at 5; But see Powell, supra note 266 at 
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one, excessive, fonnalistic judicial deference to war powers decisions might in 
effect, if not in doctrine, completely disengage federal courts from any 
meaningful review absent unequivocal statutory language. Indeed, this was 
the import of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hamdi,381 which affinned its 
jurisdiction to review unlawful combatant detentions under a liberal finding of 
congressional authorization. The court then refused to review the detentions 
themselves under a fonnalistic application of the political question doctrine, 
characterizing such detentions as an absolute discretion under the war 
power. 382 Despite a worrisome deferential trend, however, federal cases 
applying the political question doctrine and interpreting congressional 
authorization remain premised upon judicial assessment of the branches' 
relative deliberative competencies, within a factual context. As matters 
become justiciable, a more restrictive judicial interpretation of congressional 
authorization and executive discretion under it become appropriate, a point 
that the Supreme Court took up in the Hamdi appeal,383 when it considered due 
process requirements for unIawful combatant detentions. Judicial review of 
legal limitations upon executive military decisions, emanating from the 
separation of powers doctrine, thus implicates substantive questions about the 
deliberative virtues of the branches and the decision-making processes they 
use. 
Just as federal courts have conflated the poIiticaI question doctrine with 
those of standing and ripeness, their detennination of when and how Congress 
has limited presidential war powers brings with it examination of Congress' 
purposes and the reasonableness of the President's decisions. In Mitchell v. 
Laird,384 in which sorne member of the Rouse of Representatives challenged 
the Iegality of the war in Vietnam, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
144-45, arguing that criticisms of presidential initiative on such grounds underestimate 
Congress' formaI powers and devalue its political judgment. 
381 316 F.3d 450 (4th CiL 2003), denied rehearing en banc 337 F.3d 335 (4th CiL 2003). 
382 See 164, below. 
383 124 S. Ct. 2633. See 171, below. 
384 488 F.2d 611. 
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Columbia Circuit evaluated the sufficiency of congressional authorization for 
the war in a way that de1ved into the merits of the case. The court found that a 
dec1aration of war was unnecessary, that Congress could choose its me ans of 
authorization, and even suggested that the President could unilaterally wage 
war without congressional authorization in certain exceptional situations, such 
as in immediate response to an armed attack.385 Notwithstanding this position, 
the court departed from Berk, Orlando and other cases386 in finding that 
congressional appropriations and draft extensions by themselves were not 
necessarily constitutionally sufficient to authorize the President's conduct of 
war. Instead, the court opined that, when faced with hostilities initiated by a 
President without c1ear authorization, "[a] Congressman wholly opposed to the 
war's commencement and continuation might vote for the military 
appropriations and for the draft measures because he was unwilling to abandon 
without support men already fighting. . .. We should not construe votes cast 
in pit y and piety as though they were votes freely given to express consent.,,387 
The court thus recognized that judicial deference to executive action, giving 
the executive the institutional initiative in taking the nation to war, could 
potentially upset the separation of powers and unduly burden Congress with a 
reactionary rather than complementary political role in war-making. The court 
also seemed willing to go beneath statutory language and forms to examine 
legislative intent, and indicated that it might in appropriate circumstances 
loosen the requirement that Congress directly confront the President over 
exercise of the war powers. 
Despite looking behind the form of legislative authorization to discem 
Congress' purpose in acting, which did not seem sufficiently supportive of the 
385 Ibid. at 613-15; See also Massachusetts, 451 F.2d at 31-32. 
386 488 F.2d at 615, citing Massachusetts, 451 F.2d. 26 and United States v. Sisson, 294 F. 
Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968). 
387 488 F.2d at 615. Compare Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 550-51 (N.D. Cal. 1970) 
(finding that the question of the sufficiency of congressional authorization was an issue of 
"plain constitutional interpretation," from which courts ought not "shy away on 'political 
question' grounds"). But see Campbell, 203 F.3d 19 (finding that, in light of Congress' 
possession of and failure to exercise its powers in challenging ongoing military action against 
Yugoslavia, congressmen seeking an injunction against such executive action had no 
standing). 
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executive's policy, the Mitchell court nevertheless did not enjoin the 
President's military operations in Vietnam. Except where the President might 
act in bad faith, or presumably also where Congress imposed c1ear limitations, 
the executive's political and military strategies for ending hostilities were 
political questions unsuitable for judicial review. Although a court might find 
Congress to imply a limitation or withhold authorization, it would still be 
hesitant to find the President's own purposes in acting as inconsistent with his 
legal obligations. The District Court refused to "substitute its judgment for 
that of the President, who has an unusually wide measure of discretion in this 
area, and who should not be judicially condemned except in a case of c1ear 
abuse amounting to bad faith.,,388 The court found that Congress and the 
President shared purposes to conc1ude the war in Southeast Asia. The 
executive remained better placed than the judiciary to judge the necessity and 
expediency of certain war measures or policies for dis engagement, subject 
only to more specifie directives for Congress. Although it refused to enjoin 
the war in Indo-China and cautioned about judicial interference in matters of 
war, however, the D.C. Court of Appeal's inquiry into legislative intent and 
executive good faith hinted at descending layers of judicial review based upon 
factual context, and revealed substantive underpinnings beneath an apparently 
formalistic review for legality. 
The substantive aspect to the political question doctrine showed through 
more c1early in the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Massachusetts 
v. Laird.389 In that case, plaintiffs were not only military personnel, but 
included the state of Massachusetts itself, of which the men were residents. 
They all sought to enjoin the military operations in Vietnam due to the absence 
of a formaI congressional dec1aration of war. In refusing the injunction, the 
Court of Appeals found that the text of the Constitution did not c1early commit 
authority to conduct undec1ared military action either to the Congress or the 
President. Rather, "the Constitution, in giving sorne essential powers to 
Congress and others to the executive, committed the matter to both branches, 
388 488 F.2d at 616. 
389 451 F.2d. 26. 
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whose joint concord precludes the judiciary from measuring a specific 
executive action against any specific clause in isolation.,,39o The Circuit 
Court's interpretive approach, which has much in common with Corwin's 
argument,391 appears to ground the political question doctrine in textual terms, 
albeit with the overlapping allocation of branch powers depending upon 
political factors, factual circumstances, and competition between Congress and 
the President. In the case before it, the court found that Congress' 
appropriations were constitutionally sufficient support of the President's 
conduct of hostilities in Southeast Asia. It refused to speculate about a 
situation in which the executive acted without any legislative approval at aU, 
and also noted that Congress possessed several powers under the Constitution 
that would allow it to restrict presidential action in a way such as to present 
standards for judicial enforcement. 392 The First Circuit seemingly appreciated 
the substantive and contextual aspects to the political question doctrine in 
deciding Massachusetts. The court stated: "In arriving at this conclusion we 
are aware that while we have addressed the problem of justiciability in the 
light of the textual commitment criterion [of Baker, 396 U.S. at 217], we have 
also addressed the merits of the constitutional issue. We think, however, that 
this is inherent when the constitutional issue is posed in terms of scope of 
authority.,,393 Assessment of justiciability under the political question doctrine 
required a court to reach the substantive merits of the case; by determining the 
branches' relative competencies to decide a particular issue, the court would 
determine their constitutional authority.394 
390 Ibid. at 33. 
391 See 99, above. 
392 451 F.2d. at 34. 
393 Ibid. at 33-34. 
394 See Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The War-Making Powers of the 
President: Constitutional and International Law Aspects, fwd. by Charles O. Galvin (Dallas: 
Southem Methodist University Press, 1982) at 93-94,97; Keynes, supra note 332 at 69, 77-78. 
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Under the above precedents, courts will not question the manner in 
which the President conducts military operations,395 nor the merits of military 
action generally /96 once they have determined such decisions to be within 
congressionally authorized and so legal bounds. This veneer of formalism 
rests upon the non-justiciability of the initiation and conduct of war - the 
issues involved in aIl of the above cases - even though the determination of 
justiciability, and thus application of the political question doctrine, itself 
reveals substantive considerations. Courts have also readily presumed 
reasonableness and good faith on the parts ofboth Congress and the President 
in leading the nation in war. While such a presumption defers to political 
decisions, it also implies that reasonableness and good faith are preconditions 
for lawful exercise of the war powers, and are potentially rebuttable. As the 
court in Atlee suggested: 
[M]odem technology has so altered global relations that it is at least 
arguable by reasonable men of good faith that our military presence in 
Vietnam is necessary to protect the security interests of the United 
States. Under these circumstances . .. a court should refrain from 
determining whether the President in making war has ~roperly do ne so 
under the power committed to him by the Constitution.3 7 
Nevertheless, judicial application of the political question doctrine 
presupposes that Congress can set limits to presidential military action, limits 
that can only be ascertained with reference to the particular facts of the case 
and in light of the political purposes of military actions. The highly strategic 
nature of the issues in the case history and lack of direct conflict between the 
political branches, however, have prevented courts from fully exploring the 
limits of the political question doctrine in a justiciable case, where the 
deliberative pro cesses involved are more complex. Accordingly, the cases 
395 DaCosta III, 471 F.2d at 1155 ("Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital 
information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield decisions, and sitting thousands of 
miles from the field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately determine whether a specifie 
military operation constitutes an 'escalation' of the war or is merely a new tactical approach 
within a continuing strategie plan."). 
396 Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 706-07. 
397 Ibid. at 706-07. 
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remain fixed in formalistic language at times, ev en though they demonstrate or 
recognize substantive qualities. J udicial review therefore requires substantive 
inquiries not only into the purposes of congressional and presidential actions, 
but also the way in which the President exercises the war powers to impact 
upon individual rights or domestic affairs. These contextual considerations all 
combine with the assessment of justiciability and the branches' relative 
deliberative competencies in leading to resolution of the separation of powers 
issue of a case. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in the third DaCosta v. Laird 
case,398 demonstrated the flaws in maintaining a formalistic appearance of the 
political question doctrine, by drawing attention to the deliberative 
competency of the courts. In that case, the appellant invited the Second 
Circuit "to extend the reach of judicial inquiry with respect to the Vietnam war 
into the domain of tactical and strategie military decision .... ,,399 The court 
found that the President's strategie reasons for mining North Vietnamese 
waters and continuing air attacks were non-justiciable political questions about 
how best to disengage from the Vietnam War. Still, the court recognized that 
"[a]s a general mie, we see no reason why Executive fact-finding must be 
totally insulated from judicial review. We have always demanded that there 
be, at the very least, sorne reasonable or rational basis for a finding of fact, 
whether made by an administrative agency, the Congress, or the Executive." 
In certain matters such as the one at issue in DaCosta III, however, a court 
institutionally was "incapable of assessing the facts," rendering the issue non-
justiciable under the political question doctrine.400 What the Second Circuit 
di d, then, was actually to review the case, make a decision upon the branches' 
deliberative competencies to decide the matter in question, and thereby resolve 
the separation of powers issue. The court went so far as openly to assert that, 
398 DaCosta III, 471 F.2d 1146. For DaCosta l, see supra notes 328 and 331. DaCosta v. 
Laird (DaCosta II), 456 F.2d 1335 (2d. Cir. 1972), affirrned without opinion in unpublished 
memorandum and order, Docket No. 72 C. 207 (E.D.N.Y., 16 Feb. 1972) (cited in 471 F.2d at 
1147, n. 4). 
399 471 F.2d at 1147. 
400 Ibid. at 1155. 
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should an executive exercise of the war powers be justiciable, courts could 
then review it substantively not only for legality but for reasonableness.401 
Justice Marshall later echoed the Second Circuit in Holtzman v. 
Schlesinger,402 when refusing to vacate that Circuit's stay of a district court 
injunction restraining the executive's military actions in Cambodia. The 
decision came just two weeks before a congressional deadline cutting off aIl 
funding for military operations in Southeast Asia. Justice Marshall wrote, 
"[w]hile we have undoubted authority to judge the legality of executive action, 
we are on treacherous ground when we attempt judgments as to its wisdom or 
necessity.,,403 He therefore refused to enjoin military action without hearing 
by the full Supreme Court, despite expressing his opinion that the President's 
conduct of military operations in Cambodia was likely unconstitutional on the 
merits.404 Marshall's opinion therefore appears to have prudential elements, 
like those argued by Bicke1.405 However, the opinion was particularly based 
upon the fact that a c1ear deadline had not yet elapsed; not only were Congress 
and President not yet in direct conflict, but Congress' own deadline arguably 
implied a time period in which it authorized the executive to continue to use 
broad military discretion in its policy of disengagement. Marshall therefore 
continued to respect the terms of the political compromise that had been 
reached, and was prepared for the Court to enforce the deadline once it had 
passed. Marshall also expressed a personal opinion that the full Court might 
substantively review the President's military decisions, even before expiry of 
the deadline, in order to assess whether they indicated presidential compliance 
with a congressionally mandated policy of disengagement. 
401 Presumably, review for reasonableness of executive decisions would suggest that courts 
could also examine the antecedent decision-making process, thus raising a standard of 
procedural fairness where the executive functionally adjudicates individual rights under the 
warpowers. 
402 414 V.S. 1304 (1973) [hereinafter Holtzman 1]. 
403 Ibid. at 1309-10. 
404 Ibid. at 1313-14. 
405 See 109, above. 
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However, plaintiffs' reapplied to vacate the stay, this time to Justice 
Douglas, who granted it and reinstated the original injunction.406 Douglas 
considered vacation of the stay, against Marshall's prior ruling, appropriate 
considering the "capital" nature of the case. The certainty of civilian or 
combatant deaths could not be equitably balanced against possible harm to 
foreign policy interests attendant upon an injunction of the Cambodian 
campaign. Referring to Youngstown, Douglas argued that the deprivation of 
life was a more substantial individu al interest than the seizure of property. He 
also made c1ear that vacation of the stay was not a decision on the merits, 
though he expressed his opinion that Cambodian action likely was 
unauthorized and unconstitutional. The govemment's subsequent application 
for another stay was then considered again by Justice Marshall, who, after 
polling his colleagues and receiving approval, issued a second stay.407 
Nevertheless, like Marshall, Douglas emphatically stressed that exercises of 
the war powers were reviewable when justiciable. Marshall's and Douglas' 
dicta upon the merits of the case illustrated how a court could apply the 
political question doctrine in a way that contextually focused upon 
justiciability and de1iberative processes, opening up review of the war powers 
to standards of legality, procedural propriety, and reasonableness, as they 
increasingly infringed individual rights or impacted upon domestic affairs.408 
As with those in the U.S, courts in the U.K. have also refused to question 
executive decisions relating to the initiation and conduct of war, upon similar 
separation of powers principles. The British cases show that two potential 
avenues nevertheless exist for the judiciary to develop a supervisory role over 
406 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316 (1973) [hereinafter Holtzman II]. 
407 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973), Douglas J. dissenting [hereinafter 
Holtzman Ill]. 
408 But see Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), which overruled the 
district court injunction. The Court of Appeals did so on grounds that the determination as to 
whether military action in Cambodia was a basic change in the Vietnam War requiring new 
congressional authorization, or was instead within the existing tactical discretion of the 
President, was a non justiciable political question. Nevertheless, the court went on to state that 
the congressional deadline constituted authorization for executive military action in Cambodia 
until expiry of the statutory date, thereby broadly interpreting the applicable law as 
authorization for a limited duration ofhostilities. 
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executive military actions. British courts, theoretically, might have to enforce 
statutory restrictions on the Crown's prerogative, or independently review its 
military decisions ad hoc if they present justiciable issues. Review under 
either approach go es beyond formalistic notions of legality to eonsider also the 
procedural propriety and reasonableness of executive decisions. The general 
approach of British law to executive war powers is one that, like American 
law, fundamentally relies upon political processes to govem their exercise. In 
China Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Attorney Generar09 Slesser L.J. stated "at no 
time has Parliament derogated from the prerogative with regard to the 
command of the forces as it was dec1ared in the time of Charles II. It has 
dec1ared the standing army illegal in time of peace without the consent of 
Parliament, but has abstained from interfering with the command by the 
Crown over a legalized army.,,410 This remark makes two observations about 
the Crown's military authority, still valid since the 1932 decision. First, the 
executive enjoys historie al prerogative discretion over military affairs, which 
would normally present non-justiciable political questions. Second, 
Parliament may limit or abolish the prerogative, and instead delegate a 
statutory discretion to the executive. 
De Keyser 's Royal Hoterll suggests the importance of statutory 
interpretation III determining the extent of the executive military 
prerogative.412 In that case, the House of Lords considered whether a hotel 
owner had a right to compensation, when the military expropriated the hotel in 
order to billet personnel during World War 1. The Crown argued that it 
possessed a prerogative power to requisition private property in defense of the 
realm, making any compensation ex gratia even though Parliament had 
enacted expropriation measures with a compensation scheme. The House of 
409 [1932] 2 KB 197 (C.A.). 
410 Ibid. at 239. 
411 [1920] An ER 80. 
412 In military as in other areas, "[ c Jases that deal directly with the royal prerogative are rare." 
Sebastian Payne, "The Royal Prerogative" in The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Politieal 
Analysis, ed. Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
77 a179. 
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Lords decided that the statute pre-empted whatever prerogative expropriation 
power formerly existed. Therefore, "if the whole ground of something which 
could be done by the prerogative is covered by the statute it is the statute that 
rules.,,413 The prerogative in such instance goes into abeyance and Crown 
actions are subject to whatever limitations the statute imposes.414 De Keyser's 
Royal Hotel indicates that a statute might restrict the prerogative not only by 
express words, but also "by necessary implication, or . . . where an Act of 
Parliament is made for the public good .... ,,415 Courts are therefore in the 
position, when interpreting a statute, to determine its extent and purpose vis-à-
vis the war prerogative. However, it is significant that in De Keyser 's Royal 
Hotel the House of Lords dealt with the seizure of private property off the 
battlefield, for which the common law has traditionally presumed a right to 
compensation. The case suggests the princip le that whenever a claimed 
prerogative action over an individual liberty interest or domestic matter 
potentially conflicts with a statutory regime, courts will favor a statutory 
construction that binds the Crown.416 Courts can then review the statutory 
action upon the established grounds for review, such as procedural propriety 
and reasonableness. This interpretive approach recognizes that Parliament will 
more strongly define the Crown's fiduciary responsibility where individual 
rights or domestic affairs are at issue. With cases of high policy not directly 
implicating individual rights, but involving more abstract policy 
determinations or having foreign effect, the prerogative would prevail in the 
absence of a statute's c1ear language or necessary implication. The British 
interpretive approach to determining whether Parliament as restricted the 
Crown prerogative in military matters is therefore somewhat similar to the 
4\3 [1920] AlI ER at 86, per Lord Dunedin. For more on compensation for the prerogative 
taking of private property during war, see Burmah Dil, [1965] AC 75. Regarding confliet 
between prerogative and legislative schemes, see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade, 
[1977] 2 AlI ER 182, 192-94 (H.L.). 
414 [1920] AlI ER at 92-93, per Lord Atkinson. See also R. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union, [1995] 2 AlI ER 244 (H.L.). 
415 [1920] AlI ER at 110, per Lord Parmoor. See a1so Province of Bombay v. Municipal 
Corporation of Bombay, [1947] AC 58 (P.c.) (a statute will bind the Crown by implication 
only if its purpose would otherwise be wholly frustrated). 
416 See [1920] AlI ER at 109,per Lord Parmoor. 
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Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown paradigm in U.S. law, premised as it is upon 
Lockean notions of domestic versus federative executive discretion. In any 
case, however, judicial review for legality is an interpretive enterprise, leading 
to consideration of many substantive considerations about the context and way 
in which the executive lawfully exercises military discretion. 
The prerogative in sorne instances, however, might also co-exist with 
and be complementary to statute. This was the situation in Chandler. 417 The 
House of Lords found that the Crown could determine under the prerogative 
that an airbase and the weapons situated there were part of the military 
disposition, with the consequence that interference with such an installation 
fell under a statute making it unlawful to enter into a prohibited place for a 
purpose prejudicial to the state's safety and interest. In this way, the House of 
Lords read the act in question so as to avoid raising any political question or 
conflict with the prerogative.418 De Keyser's Royal Hotel dealt with a statute 
granting authority to expropriate private property subject to certain procedures, 
while Chandler concemed a statute that required a predicate policy 
determination for its operation, i.e. the determination of military installations 
which should be off-limits for national security purposes. Importantly, in the 
latter case, criminalliability was not established by the prerogative, but by the 
statute, and guilt was adjudged by regular jury trial. The prerogative decision 
about the status of the airbase only detailed a location covered by the statute 
and so did not functionally adjudicate individual rights. In any event, these 
cases demonstrate that it falls to the courts to determine Parliament's intent 
with the statute and how it binds the Crown. This decision will be within the 
context of what (if any) rights are at stake and how executive action impacts 
upon them, and the domestic versus foreign exercise of executive power. It 
will also involve an assessment of justiciability, based upon which branches 
are the appropriate forums for decision-making, considering the general public 
interests involved and the facts of the case. 
417 [1964] AC 763 (H.L.). 
418 Ibid. at 791,per Lord Reid. 
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Judicial review of the sort in De Keyser's Royal Hotel and Chandler 
examines as a threshold matter whether the Crown is bound by legislation. 
Having decided that the Crown is bound and ascertained the statutory limits, a 
court can then rely upon established judicial review doctrines. These can 
de1ve into substantive aspects of the executive's decision-making processes, 
and allow searching review by a court. British courts have long reviewed 
statutory executive decisions under an ultra vires theory, ensuring that 
executive decision-making does not go beyond the parliamentary grant of 
authority. Orthodox ultra vires review upholds the sovereignty of Parliament 
not only by ensuring that the Crown does not act illegally, but by finding an 
implied legislative intent that it act reasonably,419 under fair procedures,420 and 
not in frustration of the statutory purpose.421 However, the legislative intent 
that is the formalistic basis of ultra vires review is largely a fiction. Such 
review - especially given its richly substantive aspects - more accurately 
reflects normative mIe of law considerations that subject executive action to 
fundamental principles of natural justice, and promo te fair and reasonable 
decision-making for the sake of the public good. The judicially formulated 
standards of review, developed at common law, demonstrate an inherent 
review power in the courts that flows from their fiduciary dut y under the 
separation of powers to hold the Crown to adjudicative standards in its 
deliberations. 
In contrast to statutory powers, exercise of the prerogative long remained 
unreviewable; it was by definition non-justiciable, except to the pre1iminary 
extent necessary to define its limits. In Chandler, however, Lord Devlin 
suggested possible judicial supervision over use of prerogative powers, noting 
that "[t]he courts will not review the proper exercise of discretionary power 
but they will intervene to correct excess or abuse.,,422 In the G.c.H.Q. case,423 
419 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1947] 2 AlI ER 680 
(H.L.). 
420 Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] AC 40 (H.L.). 
421 See Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] AC 997 (H.L.). 
422 [1964] AC at 810. 
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the Rouse of Lords detennined that actual justiciability of the subject matter, 
rather than the prerogative nature, of executive action was detenninative of a 
court's competence to review the particular decision in question. Fonnerly 
umeviewable prerogative decisions, such as the issuance of passports,424 the 
granting ofmercy,425 or even regulations goveming military service426 are now 
subject to review in the same manner as statutory powers. The courts' 
continuing refusaI to review non-statutory executive discretion regarding the 
initiation of hostilities or the use of the anned forces, then, rests solely upon 
the character of those decisions as political questions unsuitable for legal 
resolution. The non-justiciability of such decisions is no longer based upon 
their prerogative classification, but upon substantive considerations about the 
functional use of deliberative processes. The Rouse of Lords has pointed this 
out, beginning with G.c.H.Q.427 Courts can therefore hold the Crown to its 
fiduciary obligation when it acts under prerogative as weIl as statutory powers, 
by ensuring that it acts within its deliberative competency and respects 
adjudicative standards where appropriate. 
Consequently, while courts have categorically declared the conduct of 
hostilities and the deployment of the armed forces to be non-justiciable 
political questions, such powers cannot now automatically be excluded from 
aIl review without consideration of the circumstances surrounding their 
exercise.428 British courts retain jurisdiction to examine the exercise of a 
423 [1984] 3 AlI ER 935. 
424 See R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett, 
[1989] 1 AlI ER 655 (C.A.). 
425 R. v. Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department, ex parte Bentley, [1993] 4 AlI ER 442 
(Q.B.). 
426 R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, [1996] 1 AlI ER 257 (C.A.). 
427 See, for example, [1984] 3 Ali ER at 948, per Lord Scarman, 951, per Lord Diplock, and 
956, per Lord RoskilI. 
428 B. V. Harris labels this distinction in review as between primary and secondary 
determinations of justiciability, the former based upon set categories of executive decisions, 
i.e. prerogative issuance of passports, and the latter upon a contextual examination of 
particular decisions. A primary finding of categorical non-justiciability is potentially arbitrary 
by failing to ho Id certain kinds of decisions accountable under the rule of law, ev en when they 
might be appropriately reviewable. Under a secondary determination, otherwise unreviewable 
categories wou Id be reviewable if satisfying certain conditions of justiciability under the 
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prerogative military decision in its specifie context, and may review it upon a 
threshold finding of justiciability. The guidelines for justiciability now seem 
to be the absence of high policy factors, suitability for judicial rather than 
political resolution, and the impact of the executive decision upon individual 
rightS.429 The criteria are similar in kind to those of Baker, reflecting shared 
princip les regarding the courts' exercise of judicial power. Still, the 
possibility of such review of the prerogative suggests a far-reaching judicial 
claim to supervise executive military actions for breaches of fiduciary dut y, 
ev en when Parliament has chosen not to challenge executive actions. Judicial 
review of the prerogative offers the public another bulwark against abuses by 
an executive that can politically manipulate or dominate Parliament through 
party control. Review is also important, as there is no constitutional 
requirement, as in the United States, that the Crown must act with affirmative 
legislative approval in matters of war. Finally, prerogative review rejects 
unsustainable, formalistic classifications of executive decisions in favor of a 
functional analysis that contextually assesses the branches' relative 
deliberative competencies. As the courts have intimated, it is difficult to 
hypothesize a situation in which a challenged prerogative decision to go to war 
or command the armed forces in the field would present judicially identifiable 
standards not best left to political resolution.43o Nevertheless, after G. CH. Q., 
the legal possibility now exists that other, more justiciable exercises of the war 
prerogative are amenable to judicial review. Any executive decisions that 
stray from military policy and strategy to directly impact upon individual 
circumstances. B. V. Harris, "Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of Mercy" 
(2003) 62 Cambridge L.J. 631 at 644. 
429 Hadfield, supra note 83 at 228. See also Harris, ibid. at 634-46, who suggests five 
somewhat fuller considerations in any assessment of the justiciability of executive action. 
These are: 1) appreciation of the subject matter, 2) reservation for legislative deterrnination, 3) 
constitutional propriety, in terms of separation of powers, 4) suitability of the court's 
personnel and processing to the decision-making required, and 5) availability of objective 
criteria. Evaluation of any substantive individual right would be bound up with these 
considerations. 
430 As Bradley and Ewing further note, supra note 349 at 258: "The right to enforce 
[European] Convention rights against an exercise of prerogative power does not formally 
depend on the power in question being justiciable. But in view of the fact that many 
prerogative powers deal with issues such as defence of the realm and national security, it may 
be expected that the courts would exercise caution in response to any daim under the Human 
Rights Act." 
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rights and domestic affairs will certainly be subject to such review on 
principled grounds oflegality, procedural propriety, and reasonableness. 
The above American and British cases suggest that, the political question 
doctrine notwithstanding, courts can enforce limitations upon exercises of the 
executive's war powers whenever a particular case presents justiciable 
standards. By reviewing executive actions for legality, courts respect the 
results of the political pro cesses that justify the political question doctrine.431 
However, the concept of legality is complex one; interpretation of possible 
statutory limitations and the threshold assessment of justiciability depend upon 
substantive considerations. The substantive aspects to the political question 
doctrine create theoretical confusion about the doctrine's constitutional 
purpose. Confusion is most evident where the executive branch uses the war 
powers in functionally legislative or adjudicative ways to impact upon 
individual rights or domestic affairs. The deliberative virtues of the courts 
justify them in reviewing these kinds of executive exercises of the war powers 
against the standards of the adjudicative deliberative process, that inc1ude 
legality, procedural faimess, and reasonableness. The formalistic justifications 
for the political question doctrine, accordingly, cannot bear the weight of its 
deliberative foundations. The resulting cracks reveal that the judicial analysis 
necessary to apply the political question doctrine in a particular case leads to a 
constitutional decision about the branches' relative de1iberative competencies, 
and so the scope oftheir authority under the separation ofpowers. 
Judicial Review of Presidential War Powers: Challenges and Implications 
In the United States, judicial determination of the existence of "sorne" 
congressional participation authorizing executive war-making and application 
of the political question doctrine blur formalistic lines of legality. Under a 
formalistic approach, the political question doctrine permits courts to 
431 Keynes, supra note 332 at 77. 
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detennine that Congress has somehow approved military action,432 as the 
Constitution mandates, but thereafter requires it to abstain from scrutinizing 
Congress' chosen means of constitutional authorization and the President's 
military decisions under it. Nevertheless, judicial review for legality and 
detennination of justiciability of the matter are factually dependent; combined 
with other doctrines, such as standing or ripeness, application of the political 
question doctrine has a substantive under-layer opening opportunities for 
varying degrees of judicial review of the war powers. However, the Vietnam 
era cases and their progeny did not go beyond the judicial review of issues 
stemming from the initiation and conduct of hostilities, matters of high policy 
and strategic judgment unsuitable for adjudicatory resolution. Nor did these 
war powers cases c1arify how broadly courts might interpret congressional 
actions to qualify as "sorne mutual participation" with the President, when his 
exercises of the war powers increasingly impact upon individual rights and 
domestic affairs in a Youngstown scenario. Cases indicated, but did not settle, 
that justiciable exercises of the war powers would be subject to review under 
adjudicatory standards not just of legality, but also procedural propriety and 
reasonableness. Functionally judicial exercises of the war powers by the 
President, as with the designation, detention, or trial of unlawful combatants, 
wou Id accordingly be subject to considerable scrutiny by the courts. The war 
powers cases, taken as a whole, demonstrate that, in making a threshold 
detennination about justiciability under the political question doctrine, courts 
actually assess the relative deliberative competencies of the branches, and 
consequently their authority under the separation of powers. The assessment 
of justiciability engages the fiduciary obligations of the courts, and legitimizes 
their constitutionally free-standing authority to review executive war powers 
as appropriate. The Lockean constitutional paradigm that underlies the 
deliberative processes approach to the separation of powers only becomes 
more evident in the British context, where courts must review executive 
decisions and uphold the mIe of law outside of a written constitution. 
432 However, the President does retain constitutional authority to repel invasion, suppress 
insurrection, or otherwise respond to pressing national emergencies without need of Congress' 
support. See Holtzman J, 414 V.S. at 1311-12 and The Prize Cases, 67 V.S. 635, 668 (1862). 
Just what circumstances would present such emergency remain undefmed, and under a 
formalistic approach might themselves be non-justiciable political questions. 
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A theoretically untenable, fonnalistic application of the political question 
doctrine, in contrast, potentially leads to a three-fold constitutional problem in 
the United States, as identified by Corwin. First, the judiciary's excessive 
deference to executive war powers and political processes can effectively 
amount to its abdication of review. Such abdication requires an assumption 
that the government as a whole possesses an inherent power to wage war, with 
no constitutional distribution of decision-making authority between the 
executive and legislative branches, other than what they themselves detennine 
it to be. This would undennine the Lockean structural model of distributing 
government power among the branches, and having them hold one another to 
their fiduciary obligations. Second, the premise of a unified national war 
power would mean that the President's role as Commander-in-Chief could 
then evolve from the command of forces in the field, to the power to take 
whatever military action he sees necessary, so long as not directly challenged 
by Congress. The President would then be in much the same position as the 
British Crown with its prerogative, despite the dec1are war clause, although the 
deference given by American courts would again bring into question whether 
and how they might enforce unambiguous congressional limitations. If not, 
then the political question doctrine itself becomes meaningless, as ev en clear 
congressionallimitations are legally unenforceable. Last, under a national war 
power, Congress could delegate to the President its own legislative power to 
dec1are war and take emergency measures for the country, greatly upsetting 
checks and balances, expanding executive discretion over any matter 
connected to warfare, and thereby forec1ose any meaningful judicial review of 
presidential war measures under a legality standard. By abdicating judicial 
interference with the war powers in a fonnalistic attempt to preserve a 
presidentiai sphere of authority over war, courts can facilitate the executive 
branch in gathering vast legisiative and judicial power unto itself. The 
political question doctrine, in that way, can actually upset the separation of 
powers, just as it purports to preserve it. The great risk in a fonnalistic 
application of the political question doctrine, therefore, is that courts will 
abdicate their constitutional role and continue to set aside "principal canons of 
constitutional interpretation," as weIl as statutory ones, so as to allow the 
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executive branch to gather unto itself the entirety of the national government' s 
fonnidable war power.433 Not only could the executive branch then 
unaccountably act upon matters and with deliberative processes for which it is 
not always the most institutionally competent, but the lack of judicial 
involvement could further dissuade Congress from limiting presidential war-
making unless it is prepared to provoke a serious constitutional conflict 
between it and the President. The reticence ofboth Congress and the courts to 
restrict presidential exercises of the war power can thus become mutually 
reinforcing. The executive branch can thereby not only increase its own 
powers, but become the sole detenniner as to when, how, and where they will 
be exercised. Such concentration of power undennines the Lockean structural 
protections for the public good, where the branches hold one another to their 
trusts by cooperating in reasonable decision-making and checking abuses. 
Thus, a judicial approach to review that too readily finds congressional 
authorization for executive military actions would give the President the 
primary constitutional responsibility for taking the nation to war, relegating 
Congress to a responsive rather than initiating role. Not only might the 
President present Congress with a fait accompli that requires sorne continued 
military commitment or presents Congress with political difficulties in 
ordering disengagement,434 but any such orders or cutting of funds would then 
be subject to a presidential veto, requiring a two-thirds vote in both houses to 
override.435 This situation would effectively nullify the Constitution's declare 
war clause, as well as betray the principle that Congress is institutionally better 
able and more appropriately suited in a republic to authorize war. Moreover, 
433 Corwin, The President, supra note 263 at 296-97. 
434 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit expressed this same eoneem in Mitchell, 488 
F.2d at 615. 
435 Peter Raven-Hansen, "Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause" in The Us. 
Constitution and the Power to Go to War: Historical and Current Perspectives, ed. Gary M. 
Stem and Morton H. Halperin (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994) 29 at 34-35; 
President Nixon vetoed just sueh a eongressional eut-off of funding for the bombing of 
Cambodia in 1973. Unable to muster a two-thirds vote in eaeh house to override the veto, 
Congress instead passed a compromise measure that the President signed. That measure gave 
the President another month and a half before a deadline to hait bombing, at which time 
funding for the operation would cease. Keynes, supra note 332 at 153. See also Holtzman Il, 
414 U.S. at 1320, per Douglas J.; See supra note 378. 
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whatever the courts' lack of competency to review strategic military decisions, 
their fiduciary (and thus constitutional) dut Y to act increases as the President 
strays from battlefield judgment and exercises the war power to alter the legal 
obligations of citizens or other individuals within the country itself. Such 
matters are squarely within the deliberative competencies of the judicial 
branch, and the domestic rights concems undercut the justifications for the 
broad deference usually given in matters of war and foreign affairs. In such 
cases, application of the Baker criteria in assessing justiciability, and an 
appreciation of Youngstown's distinction between domestic and foreign 
exercises of discretion, indicates that the political question doctrine permits, if 
not requires, an evaluation of executive actions based upon the deliberative 
processes involved. This evaluation will itself be context dependent and will 
assess the branches' relative deliberative competencies and the deliberative 
processes used in any particular case. Substantive considerations are bound up 
with the determination of justiciability, and inform the adjudicative standards 
of legality, procedural propriety, and reasonableness. In imposing these 
standards upon the executive when it uses the war powers in a functionally 
judicial way, the judiciary keeps its fiduciary dut Y to uphold the rule of law 
and protect individu al rights, check the other branches, and maintain the 
separation of powers. 
The interaction between justiciability, the political question doctrine, and 
a deliberative processes approach to the separation of powers becomes 
especially evident in the context of unlawful combatant detentions, a matter 
implicating core executive and judicial functions. Executive decisions under 
the war powers to designate an individu al as an unlawful combatant and 
imprison him or her without trial in a civilian court are of a highly 
adjudicatory nature, but are ancillary to the executive disposition of hostile 
enemy forces. A detention decision, unlike those about the initiation or 
conduct of war at issue in the Vietnam era and later cases, presents an issue in 
which the powers of the Congress, President, and judiciary c1early overlap 
depending upon the public interests emphasized (e.g., rules for criminal 
liability, protection of national security, and preservation of individual rights). 
With these considerations in mind, the President's functionally judicial 
155 
designation, detention, and trial of individuals as unlawful combatants reveals 
an exceptionally high degree of justiciability. Consequently, the constitutional 
separation of powers permits the executive detention of unlawful combatants 
pursuant to congressional authorization, but nevertheless demands thorough 
and substantive judicial review. Such review ensures that the President makes 
detention decisions according to the adjudicative standards of legality, 
procedural propriety, and reasonableness. 
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Part III: Judicial Review ofUnlawful Combatant Detentions 
Introduction 
In waging the "war against terrorism," President Bush designated both 
citizens and non-citizens to be unlawful combatants, having violated the laws 
of war. While the Government held two citizens and one non-citizen in 
military brigs within the United States, it also detained hundreds of aliens at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. As authority for his actions, the 
President relied upon the Supreme Court case Ex parte Quirin,436 in which the 
Court upheld the power of President Roosevelt to try alleged Nazi saboteurs as 
unlawful combatants, even if citizens, before a military commission. Upon 
petitions for writs ofhabeas corpus, federal courts wrestled with the separation 
of powers issues presented by such detentions. Lower courts divided upon 
whether such detentions were lawful, or whether they ev en possessed 
jurisdiction to hear the Guantanamo c1aims. Finally, the Supreme Court 
deterrnined in Hamdi v. Rumsfel~37 that the President indeed had the power to 
detain citizens as unlawful combatants, but that they were entitled to due 
process under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In Rasul v. Bush,438 a 
companion case, the Court also found that courts could hear the habeas 
petitions ofnon-cÏtizens held in Guantanamo Bay. 
Nevertheless, the rulings in Hamdi and Rasul left unresolved many 
questions about the constitutional foundations for both the executive's 
detention power and the judicial review ofthem. Indeed, the Supreme Court's 
Hamdi decision in particular seemed to depart from past jurisprudence, in 
which courts refused to review exercises of the war powers as political 
436 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
437 542 U.S. 507; 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
438 542 U.S. 466; 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
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questions. Hamdi raised questions particularly in light of the Quirin holding, 
which seemed to give considerable deference to presidential unlawful 
combatant determinations. Unlawful combatant status itself fit uncomfortably 
into a dichotomous paradigm of crime and war. Detainees stood accused of 
having committing hostile, belligerent acts against the United States, which 
were in violation of the intemationallaws of war. The Govemment contended 
that unlawful combatants did not fulfill the requirements for lawful 
belligerency under the Third Geneva Convention,439 and therefore were not 
entitled to the Convention 's protections of Prisoner of War status. Instead, the 
President could detain them, as weIl as try and punish them before military 
commissions, at his discretion. Accordingly, unlawful combatant status, as 
well as the executive's treatment ofindividuals so designated, exhibited mixed 
criminal and martial aspects that did not fit easily into formalistic spheres of 
executive or judicial power. 
While sorne courts found that the President had an almost absolute 
executive discretion to detain unIawful combatants, an analysis of Quirin and 
other precedents, in light of the deliberative processes approach to the 
separation of powers, suggests otherwise. WhiIe, under Quirin, the President 
might indeed have possessed a power to detain unlawful combatants subject to 
congressional authorization as well as limitations, the Iawfulness of such 
detention depended upon predicate facts and due process requirements that 
defined the executive's jurisdiction to detain. The factual context of Quirin 
revealed the importance of a habeas review sensitive to the circumstances of 
the case, and the functional judicial aspects attendant upon an executive 
decision to designate, detain, and try an individual as an unlawful combatant. 
The Supreme Court, in its Ham di decision, thus rejected a formalistic 
approach to the separation of powers that would have categorized an unlawful 
combatant detention as an unreviewable exercise of the war powers. Instead, 
Hamdi, and the habeas cases that followed it, suggested that wh en the 
President exercised the war powers so as to adjudicate individual rights and 
impact domestic affairs, courts were constitutionally empowered to scrutinize 
439 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison ers of War, infra note 442. 
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his decisions to an increasing degree. In reviewing the lawfulness of unlawful 
combatant detentions, the Hamdi Court imposed the eommonly used due 
proeess test of Mathews v. Eldridge,440 demonstrating a conceptual unity 
between such a justiciable exercise of the war powers and other administrative 
decision-making using mixed deliberative processes. The lawfulness of 
unlawful combatant detentions therefore depended upon substantively 
enriched princip les of legality, proeedural faimess, and reasonableness, which 
courts must use to uphold the mIe of law, proteet individual rights, preserve 
the separation of powers and prevent abuses of exeeutive power. 
440 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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Chapter VIII: Unlawful Combatant Detentions and the "War Against 
Terrorism" 
Detentions at Guantanamo Bay 
Responding to the terrorist attacks of September 200 1, the following 
month the United States led a multi-national coalition to invade Afghanistan, 
target Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's operational bases located there, and 
overthrow the Taliban regime.44 ! As a result of the military operations III 
Afghanistan, the United States took captive hundreds of Taliban, as weIl as 
other al-Qaeda fighters and suspected terrorists. The American Govemment 
detained these individuals, along with other suspected terrorists subsequently 
taken into military custody, at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. As of 
August 2005, the military was still holding over five-hundred prisoners at the 
base. These individuals had uncertain status under both domestic and 
international law for two main reasons. First, President Bush designated 
captives of Guantanamo Bayas so-called "enemy combatants," falling outside 
of the Third Geneva Convention 's protections for prisoners of war. 442 He also 
441 Osama bin Laden was, and at the time of writing remains, the ostensible and self-declared 
leader of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. A Sunni fundarnentalist of Saudi nationality, bin 
Laden was a prominent leader of Mujahadeen resisting the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan during the 1980s. As the apparent leader of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, 
he c1aimed responsibility for the attacks against the United States on Il September 2001, and 
has continued to act as the main spokesman for jihad against Western powers. Bin Laden and 
al-Qaeda also had close ties with the Taliban, a Sunni Islamic ultra-fundamentalist group that 
effectively ruled most of Afghanistan from the late 1990s until an American-Ied military 
coalition ousted it from power. The refusaI of the Taliban to expel bin Laden from 
Afghanistan, and close al-Qaeda-sponsored terrorist camps located there, prompted American 
and allied military action in that country. The coalition against the Taliban included, most 
notably, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the rebellious Northern Alliance faction within 
Afghanistan itself. 
442 President Bush refused to recognize the Taliban, along with al-Qaeda fighters, as prisoners 
of war under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison ers of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III or Third Geneva 
Convention] (ratified by the United States). The President did, however, express the intention 
to treat Taliban prisoners consistently with Geneva III, without conceding their POW status. 
U.S. White House, "Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo" (7 Feb. 2002), online: 
The White House <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2002/02120020207 -13 .htrnl>. 
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issued a Military Order, subjecting foreign unlawful cornbatants to trial by 
special rnilitary cornrnissions.443 The President's actions, under the war 
powers, raised questions about the existence of an executive power to detain 
and try alleged unlawful cornbatants (foreigners as weIl as United States 
citizens) outside of the civil courts. Second, because Guantanarno Bay was on 
sovereign Cuban territory, the Govemment contended that detainees there 
were ineligible to file habeas corpus petitions in the federal district courts. 
Following the 1950 Suprerne Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager,444 
denying district court jurisdiction over non-citizens held outside of sovereign 
American territory, sorne federal courts refused to hear such habeas 
petitions.445 This rneant that the Guantanamo prisoners existed in what Lord 
Steyn, a Lord of Appeal of the British Rouse of Lords, notably criticized as a 
"legal black hole" that denied thern fundarnental due process.446 A detainee 
could challenge in the courts neither the lawfulness of the President's 
detention order, nor conditions of treatrnent, which in sorne circurnstances 
have allegedly arnounted to serious physical and psychological abuse.447 
Finally, on 28 June 2004, the Suprerne Court addressed the jurisdictional 
issue of Guantanarno Bay in Rasul v. Bush.448 The Court found that federal 
district courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions frorn 
Guantanamo detainees. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court found that 
the Eisentrager decision did not control petitions originating from 
443 o.S. White House, Military arder: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism (13 Nov. 2001), on1ine: The White House 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html>[hereinafter "Military 
Grder"]. 
444339 V.S. 763 (1950). 
445 See for example Al-Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Ciro 2003). But 
compare Gherebi V. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Ciro 2003) (f'mding court had habeas jurisdiction 
due to exclusive United States control over Guantanamo Bay). 
446 Lord Steyn, "Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole" Twenty-Seventh F. A. Mann 
Lecture, London, 25 Nov. 2003, (2004) 53 I.c.L.Q. 1. 
447 See OK. V. Bush, 344 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D. D.C. 2005) and OK. V. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 
102 (D. D.C. 2005). 
448 124 S. Ct. 2686. 
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Guantanamo Bay. Instead, the federal habeas corpus statute allowed district 
courts to exercise habeas jurisdiction based upon the location of the effective 
custodian, rather than the prisoner.449 The habeas statute applied to 
Guantanamo because the United States enjoyed complete jurisdiction and 
control over the territory; the United States essentially exercised de facto, if 
not legal, sovereignty.45o The ruling of Rasul meant that the President's 
detention of unlawful combatants at Guantanamo Bay, for purposes of the 
Constitution, had an essentially domestic impact. Although petitioners were 
foreign nationals, the geographical coverage of the habeas statute applied to 
them equally as with American citizens.451 In this way, the Supreme Court 
continued to respect the Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown paradigm, 
distinguishing between executive exercises of Lockean "federative" and 
domestic discretion. By characterizing Guantanamo Bayas de facto United 
States territory, the Court invoked the logic of Youngstown, justifying greater 
judicial scrutiny of those executive exercises of the war powers infringing 
upon individual rights. Foreign detainees at Guantanamo could therefore 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district courts, challenging 
the legality of their imprisonment. The general rule in Eisentrager that district 
courts did not have habeas jurisdiction over non-citizens held abroad, 
however, continued to stand,452 thus continuing Curtiss-Wright deference in 
"federative" matters. Rasul's jurisdictional decision did not itself examine, as 
to substantive lawfulness, the President's designation and detention of 
unlawful combatants under the war powers. Rather, the Supreme Court 
addressed those issues in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,453 decided the same 
day. Unlike Rasul, Hamdi concemed the habeas petition of an American 
449 124 S. Ct. at 2695. See also Eraden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 V.S. 
484 (1973) and 28 V.S.C. § 2241 (2000). Compare with 124 S. Ct. at 2701 et seq. (Scalia J. 
dissenting), Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) and Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707 
(7th CiL 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 34 (2004). 
450 124 S. Ct. at 2696-98. 
451 Ibid. at 2996. 
452 Tung Yin, "The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism" (2005) 13 Wm. and 
Mary Bill ofRts. J. 1035 at 1056. 
453 542 U.S. 507; 124 S. Ct. 2633. 
162 
citizen, whom the Government had captured in Afghanistan, designated as an 
unlawful combatant, and ordered detained at a military prison within the 
continental United States. In Hamdi, the Court decided that citizen detainees 
were constitutionally entitled to due process. The Hamdi decision would be 
the precedent potentially goveming subsequent hearings upon the habeas 
petitions of foreign detainees held in Guantanarno or the United States, should 
a court also find that such foreigners were constitutionally entitled to similar 
due process protections as American citizens designated as unlawful 
combatants. 
Detentions within the United States: the Prelude to Harndi 
As part of "the war against terrorism," as of August 2005 the President 
had designated and detained two American citizens, Yaser Esarn Harndi and 
José Padilla, as unlawful combatants. The President similarly designated Ali 
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a non-citizen living legally within the United States. 
The American military c1aimed to have captured Hamdi as an armed 
belligerent in Afghanistan, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested 
both Padilla and al-Marri in the United States in connection with suspected 
terrorist activities. The situation of Hamdi and Padilla differed significantly 
from that of the Guantanamo detainees. In addition to being citizens, both 
were militarily imprisoned on United States territory. Furthermore, Padilla 
and al-Marri were actually arrested within the country, pursuant to criminal 
terrorist investigations, before then being designated as unlawful combatants 
and transferred to military custody. Executive detention of these three men 
was therefore a direct domestic application of the war powers, and a functional 
adjudication of their individual rights. Unlike its position towards the 
Guantanamo detainees, the Government at no time disputed that these 
individuals, as citizens or an alien present within the country, had a right to 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Instead, the Govemment asserted that the 
detentions of Hamdi, Padilla, and al-Marri were lawful exercises of the 
executive's constitutional war powers. These cases therefore avoided the 
jurisdictional issues presented by the Guantanamo detentions. Nevertheless, 
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they raised even more troublesome controversy about the separation of 
powers. In detaining Harndi, P adill a, and al-Marri, as with the foreign 
detainees in Guantanarno, the President functionally adjudicated individual 
rights, but acted outside of normal criminal laws and judicial processes -
indeed, outside of the judicial institutions - normally applicable to citizens or 
non-citizens within the United States. These cases not only illustrated the 
mixing of deliberative processes in executive detention decisions, but involved 
the President's redirection of formidable war powers to adjudicate individual 
rights and bypass the domestic legal system. 
1. Hamdi 
Yaser Esarn Harndi was born to Saudi parents in Louisiana, where his 
father worked in the oil industry. He lived in the United States only very 
briefly as a child, however, before his family returned to the Middle East. The 
Govemment took him into custody during the military operations in 
Afghanistan. The Govemment alleged that, upon capture by Northern 
Alliance forces in faH 2001,454 Harndi was armed and with Taliban forces,455 
which the President refused to recognize as covered by the Third Geneva 
Convention 's protections for POWS.456 After the N orthern Alliance 
transferred Hamdi to American custody, military officiaIs determined that he 
was an enemy combatant, based upon undisc10sed criteria and screening 
processes. The Government transported him first to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
before transferring him to the Norfolk Naval Brig in Virginia after discovering 
that he was an American citizen.457 The Govemment subsequently held 
Harndi incommunicado without legal counsel, without charges, and without a 
454 Harndi v. Rurn.sfeld, 316 F.3d 450,460 (4th Cir. 2003), denied rehearing en banc 337 F.3d 
335 (4th Cir. 2003). 
455 Ibid. at 472. 
456 See supra note 442. 
457 Hamdi was located at the Norfolk Naval Brig from April 2002 until the time of his release 
in Sept. 2004. 316 F .3d at 460. 
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hearing of any kind. Furthermore, Hamdi underwent ongoing interrogation for 
any information he might have regarding terrorist operations. 
Hamdi was personally unable to bring a legal challenge to his 
confinement due to restrictive detention conditions. Accordingly, his father 
filed on his behalf a habeas corpus petition in federal court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia. The District court found, over Govemment objections to 
the petition, that given the conditions of Hamdi's detention his father qualified 
as a "next friend" legally competent to represent Hamdi's interests. It 
additionally appointed a federal public defender to Hamdi's case, and ordered 
the Govemment to grant counsel access to Hamdi. Although the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that Hamdi' s father was a proper next friend 
for purposes of filing a habeas petition for his son, it reversed the District 
Court order granting counsel access to Hamdi based upon deference to the 
Govemment's assertions that such access would irreparably disrupt the 
.. . 458 
ongomg mterrogatIOn process. 
The District Court subsequently undertook a probing examination of the 
Govemment's proffered evidence in support of detention, which consisted 
solely of the "Mobbs Declaration.,,459 This document, submitted by Michael 
Mobbs, a "Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense of Policy," set 
out the alleged circumstances of Hamdi' s capture and reiterated the 
Govemment position that he was affiliated with the Taliban, was a belligerent, 
and qualified as an unlawful combatant. Judge Doumar of the District Court 
recognized that, "[t]his case appears to be the first in American jurisprudence 
where an American citizen has been he Id incommunicado and subjected to an 
indefinite detention in the continental United States without charges, without 
any findings by a military tribunal, and without access to a lawyer.,,46o In 
trying to balance the deference due to the executive in national security 
458 Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 600 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting next friend status for 
public defender and third party, but recognizing it for Hamdi's father); Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 
296 F.3d 278,282-83 (4th Cil. 2002). 
459 Harndi v. Rurnsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
460 Ibid. at 528. 
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matters with individual rights, the court asserted the necessity of "meaningful 
judicial review,,461 of the detention. The court found that Fifth Amendment 
due process applied and that the assertions of the Mobbs Declaration, with 
nothing more, was insufficient justification for the executive's designation and 
detention of Hamdi as an enemy combatant.462 Accordingly, the court ordered 
the Government to deliver, for in camera inspection, further information, su ch 
as the screening criteria for enemy combatants and contact information about 
those individuals responsible for making such determinations.463 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's 
order for production, finding it undisputed that Harndi was captured in a 
foreign theater of conflict and that the Mobbs Declaration was a sufficient 
showing of the legal basis upon which the President could detain Harndi under 
the war powers.464 The court found that the separation of powers required 
great judicial deference to the President's exercise of the war powers. Broad 
deference was appropriate due to executive expertise in and political 
accountability for matters of war, while the courts lacked competence in such 
matters.465 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that the Government's proffered 
factual justifications on their face demonstrated the legality of Hamdi' s 
detention, and separation of powers concems prohibited further judicial 
inquiry testing those assertions. Thus, "[t]he factual averments in the [Mobbs] 
affidavit, if accurate, are sufficient to confirm that Harndi' s detention 
conforms with a legitimate exercise of the war powers given the executive by 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution and . . . that it is consistent with the 
Constitution and laws of Congress,,,466 referring particularly to Congress' 
Authorization for Use of Military Force following the September e1eventh 
461 Ibid. at 532. 
462 Ibid. at 534-35. 
463 Ibid. at 528-29. 
464316F.3dat459. 
465 Ibid. at 463. 
466 Ibid. at 473. 
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attacks.467 The Fourth Circuit later denied rehearing en banc,468 and Harndi 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which it granted. The 
Supreme Court's decision on the case, discussed below,469 overturned the 
Fourth Circuit and opened the door to substantive judicial review of the 
President's functionally adjudicative war powers decisions. 
2. Padilla 
Authorities originally arrested José Padilla on May 8, 2002 in Chicago 
on a material witness warrant issued by the court for the Southern District of 
New York,470 to which state he was returned and assigned public defense 
counsel. On June 9, 2002, however, the Department of Justice transferred 
Padilla to military custody pursuant to a presidential designation of the sarne 
day that he was an enemy combatant. This designation dec1ared that Padilla 
was 1) "c1osely associated with al Qaeda," 2) had "engaged in war-like acts, 
inc1uding conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism" against the 
United States, 3) possessed information useful in preventing further attacks, 
and 4) was a continuing threat to national security.471 The Govemment 
imprisoned him in the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. 
Refusing Padilla access to his counsel, the Govemment justified his arrest 
based upon alleged contacts with al-Qaeda in the Middle East and his 
participation in terrorism plots within the United States.472 
Proceeding as next friend, Padilla's counsel petitioned on his behalf for a 
writ ofhabeas corpus. The Southern District Court for New York allowed the 
467 Ibid. at 467-69; Authorizationfor Use of Military Force, supra note 82. 
468 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), denying rehearing en banc of 316 F.3d 
450 (4th Cir. 2003). 
469 See 171, below. 
470 Padilla v.Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564,571 (S.D. N.Y. 2002). 
471 Ibid. at 569, 571; U.S. White House, Presidential Order Designating Jose Padilla as an 
Enemy Combatant (9 June 2002), online: The White House <http://news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf>. 
472 233 F.Supp.2d at 572-73. 
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petition and addressed threshold issues of jurisdiction and legal authorization 
for detention. The District Court rejected Government arguments that it 
lacked habeas jurisdiction over petitioner's custodian, based upon Padilla's 
transferal from civilian custody in New York to military prison in South 
Carolina. Rather, the court interpreted the federal habeas statute to reach the 
Secretary of Defense as the ultimate, rather than immediate, custodian 
reachable by service ofprocess in the Southem District of New York. 473 The 
Court also found, as did the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, that the President 
possessed authority, under his war powers and Congress' Authorization for 
Use of Military Force, to designate and detain American citizens, even within 
the United States, as unlawful comb atants. 474 Again, as with Hamdi, the 
Government relied upon a declaration by Michael Mobbs as to the factual 
allegations supporting Padilla's unlawful combatant status.475 However, the 
District Court ordered the Government to allow Padilla to meet with legal 
counsel for purposes of pursuing his petition. Additionally, it established a 
review standard of "sorne evidence" that was extremely deferential to 
executive discretion, but at least permitted Padilla to controvert the 
Govemment's factual allegations behind the unlawful combatant 
designation.476 The District Court thereby made a weak gesture in balancing 
the relative competencies of the executive andjudicial branches in determining 
the appropriate scope of judicial review under the separation of powers. After 
the Govemment refused Padilla access to counsel under the court' s order 
(which the court affirmed upon reconsideration pursuant to Govemment 
motion),477 it filed an interlocutory appeal upon aU issues to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
473 Ibid. at 583-87. 
474 Ibid. at 569,589-90; Military Force Authorization, supra note 82. 
475 See 165, above. 
476 That is, the Government needed only to present "sorne evidence" supporting a finding that 
Padilla was an unlawful cornbatant. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08. 
477 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 
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The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling that the 
Secretary of Defense was the proper respondent within the jurisdiction of the 
court despite Padilla's physical location in South Carolina.478 It parted with 
the lower court, however, by expressly finding no inherent presidential power 
to detain enemy combatants under the war power, and characterizing such a 
daim as an assumption of legislative power be10nging to Congress alone 
under the separation of powers doctrine. Furthermore, it interpreted relevant 
statutes strictly against presidential war powers. According to the Court, the 
Military Force Authorization did not permit detention of American citizens on 
U.S. territory,479 while also finding that the plain language of the Non-
Detention Act of 1971 at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (forbidding imprisonment of a 
citizen except pursuant to congressional act) was an absolute bar to the 
detention of enemy combatants absent express congressional authorization.48o 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court with orders to 
issue a writ of habeas cOrpUS.481 The Government responded by filing a 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which granted it and set 
the case for hearing along with the Hamdi appeal. The Court, however, would 
not consider the merits of the case, finding instead that Padilla had filed his 
petition in the wrong district, given his detention in South Carolina. 
3. Al-Marri 
In addition to Harndi and P adill a, the President also designated and 
detained one non-citizen as an enemy combatant within the United States. Ali 
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Quatari graduate student in Illinois, was in the same 
position for habeas purposes as Harndi and Padilla because of his presence on 
American soil. The Government did not dispute his right to petition for a writ 
478 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 707, 710 (2d Ciro 2003). 
479 Ibid. at712. 
480 Ibid. at 718-19; The Non-Detention Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 62 Stat. 847 (1971), 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000), provides: "No citizen shaH be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 
481 352 F.3d at 699, 724. 
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of habeas corpus. Al-Marri was lawfully present in the country on a student 
visa when authorities first arrested him on a material witness warrant on 
December 12,2001 in connection with federal criminal investigations into the 
attacks of September Il, 2001. Federal prosecutors subsequently indicted him 
for, among other things, lying to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and for 
committing credit card fraud. 482 On June 23, 2003, shortly before his 
scheduled trial in the Central District Court of Illinois, President Bush 
designated him an enemy combatant.483 The Department of Defense then took 
custody of al-Marri, inteming him in the Consolidated Naval Brig at 
Charleston, South Carolina. Federal prosecutors, as a result, dismissed the 
criminal indictments against him.484 The Govemment denied al-Marri access 
to his legal counsel, who filed a habeas petition on his behalf in the Central 
District for Illinois. The District Court found itself to be the improper venue 
for al-Marri's petition, due to his physical detention in South Carolina, despite 
the Govemment's swift and purposeful removal of him from the district.485 
Thus, the Illinois District Court decided the jurisdictional issue against 
petitioner, unlike the New York District Court in the Padilla case. Upon 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District 
Court' s dismissal of the petition for improper venue.486 The Supreme Court in 
tum denied certiorari, reflecting its ruling on the jurisdictional issues in 
Padilla. 
4. The Supreme Court Appeals 
482 Al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1004-05 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
483 Ibid.; U.S. White House, Presidential Order Designating Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri as an 
Enemy Combatant (23 June 2003), online: The White Bouse <http://news.f'rndlaw.comlhdocs/ 
docs/almarri/almarri62303exord.pdf>. 
484 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-05; See "Bush Declares Student an Enemy Combatant" New York 
Times (24 June 2003), A-15. 
485 Compare 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-05 with Padilla, 233 F.Supp.2d 564 (finding that the 
Secretary of Defense was a proper habeas custodian for purposes of venue despite petitioner's 
Ïnternment in South Carolina). 
486 Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 34 (2004). 
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The Supreme Court, upon appeal, overturned the Circuit Court decisions 
in both the Padilla and Hamdi cases. In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,487 the Court 
found that the warden of the Charleston Naval Brig, and not the Secretary of 
Defense, was the proper respondent and that the District Court for Southern 
New York therefore had no jurisdiction over Padilla. The Supreme Court 
disposed of Padilla as had the Seventh Circuit in Al-Marri, for which the 
Court later refused to grant certiorari.488 The Court therefore did not decide 
upon the merits ofPadilla's habeas petition, but required him to petition in the 
district of his physical confinement. However, the Supreme Court heard 
arguments in the Hamdi case on the same day as Padilla, and released the 
judgments together. Hamdi addressed much the same substantive issues 
presented in Padilla, and provided the framework for the future judicial review 
of any unlawful combatant detentions. 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,489 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and remanded the case to the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia. A plurality of justices490 found, in an opinion 
by Justice O'Connor, that Congress had authorized detentions of enemy 
combatants with the Authorization for Use of Military Force.491 However, 
constitutional due process required a balancing of the individual's fundamental 
liberty interests and the Govemment's interests in protecting national security. 
These interests required consideration in light of the govemmental burden in 
487 542 U.S. 426; 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2721-22, 2724 (2004). 
488 See supra note 485. 
489 542 U.S. 507; 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
490 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. 
491 "The Government maintains that no explicit congressional authorization is required, 
because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the 
Constitution. We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such authority, 
however, because we agree with the Government's alternative position, that Congress has in 
fact authorized Hamdi's detention, through the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, supra note 82]." 124 S. Ct. at 2639, per 'Connor J.; A majority of justices agreed that 
Congress had authorized the President to detain citizens as unlawful combatants. Thomas J., 
while dissenting with the plurality's due process analysis, nevertheless concurred with its 
finding that Congress had authorized the detention of unlawful comhatants through the 
Military Force Authorization, making it unnecesarry to consider the question of inherent 
executive power. Ibid. at 2679. 
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affording added procedures relative to the value of those procedures in 
protecting the private interest at stake. 492 This balancing test was the same one 
for due process that the Court had articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.493 
Applying this test, the Court detennined that "a citizen-detainee seeking to 
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.,,494 
Separation ofpowers, rather than precluding judicial review, instead mandated 
that courts scrutinize executive detention decisions for compliance with due 
process. Concurring with the judgment were Justices Souter and Ginsburg, 
who agreed with the plurality's due process analysis, but found that neither the 
Military Force Authorization nor any inherent war powers of the President 
authorized detention of citizens as enemy combatants under the circumstances. 
Dissenting were Justice Thomas, who would have affinned the decision of the 
Fourth Circuit, and Justices Scalia and Stevens, who interpreted the 
Constitution as requiring the President to prosecute Hamdi in the civil courts 
either for treason or other criminal charges, or altematively persuade Congress 
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The President, according to these two 
dissenters, otherwise had no authority under the war powers to detain a citizen 
as an unlawful combatant. The Hamdi plurality, while finding that the 
President did indeed have statutory authority to designate and detain 
individuals as unlawful combatants, nevertheless did not concede to him 
absolute discretion free from judicial review. Rather, the executive acted in a 
functionally judicial manner, constitutionally requiring it to adhere to 
adjudicative standards of due process, subject to judicial review. The Hamdi 
decision provided the basis upon which detainees could ground their 
492 124 S. Ct. at 2646-49. 
493 424 U.S. 319 (1976); See generally Jesselyn A. Radack, "Y ou Say Defendant, 1 Say 
Combatant: Opportunistic Treatment of Terrorism Suspects Held in the United States and the 
Need for Due Process" (2005) 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. and Soc. Change 525 (written before but 
published after the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi, and suggesting adoption of the Mathews 
test in unlawful combatant cases). 
494 124 S. Ct. at 2648. 
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subsequent habeas petitions, and the District Courts wouid review unIawful 
combatant detentions.495 
Unlawful Combatant Detentions as a Separation of Powers Issue 
The federai courts, in reviewing the unlawfui combatant detentions, dealt 
not only with individual rights but with fundamental separation of powers 
issues. Courts had to assess the existence and scope of executive authority ta 
detain unlawful combatants, pursuant to congressionai authorization and the 
Constitution, and their own power ta review the executive's detention 
decisions. In considering these questions, all made within the context of the 
so-called "war against terrorism,,,496 the lower federal court cases divided on 
formalistic and more functional approaches to the separation of powers 
doctrine. The Supreme Court's decisions in Rasul and Hamdi, in contrast, 
remained sensitive ta the mixed deliberative processes involved in the 
determination of unlawful combatant status, as well as the relative deliberative 
virtues of the branches. Rasul highlighted the distinction between executive 
discretion in "federative" and domestic matters, while Hamdi in tum asserted 
the role of judicial review when the executive directed justiciable war powers 
inward against American citizens and ta impact upon domestic affairs. Bath 
cases, arising from habeas petitions, presumed a special constitutional role for 
the courts whenever the executive sought to deprive a citizen or resident of 
personaIIiberty and bypass the civil courts. 
Rasul complemented Hamdi, in so far as they both distinguished between 
domestic and foreign exercises of the war powers. Rasul found that the right 
495 Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision, the Government chose not to detain Hamdi 
any longer, but re1eased him in return for his agreement to renounce his American citizenship 
and immediately leave the country for Saudi Arabia. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Sett1ement 
Agreement (17 Sept. 2004), online: FindLaw <http://news.find1aw.comJhdocs/docs/ 
hamdi/91704stlagrmnt.htm1>. Padilla and al-Marri remained in custody, pursuing their habeas 
petitions in the proper districts. Severa1 alien detainees in Guantanamo wou1d subsequently 
file habeas petitions based upon the rulings in Rasul and Hamdi. See Ch. 12, below. 
496 For questions regarding the existence of war, for constitutional purposes, see supra notes 
82, 328 and 331. 
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to file a habeas corpus petition ran to foreign territory where the United States 
exercised plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ultimate sovereignty. 
Giving the Guantanamo detainees a right to get into federal court to challenge 
the legality of their detention, Rasu/ ostensibly put foreign detainees in the 
same position (for purposes of access to judicial process) as if they had been 
citizens or located in sovereign United States territory. The Rasul decision, 
however, rested upon the peculiar status of Guantanamo Bay, and, though it 
might apply to analogous territory in the future, it did not undo the basic 
jurisdictional premise of Eisentrager.497 That is, non-citizens detained in 
foreign territory, where the United States did not exercise a plenary and 
exclusive jurisdiction amounting to de facto sovereignty, still would have no 
right to petition for the habeas writ in federal courts. Rasul was an exception 
that proved the Eisentrager rule. 
Not only did Rasu/ respect Eisentrager, but it complied with the Curtiss-
Wright and Youngstown distinctions between foreign and domestic exercises 
of executive discretion. First, Rasu/ distinguished between foreign and 
domestic exercises of the war powers in that, absent Congress' statutory 
extension of district court jurisdiction, the President presumably could still 
detain non-citizen, unlawful combatants abroad with possibly absolute 
discretion. Second, in cases of citizens, sovereign United States territ ory, or 
exceptional territories such as Guantanamo Bay (where Government control 
amounted to de facto sovereignty), courts had jurisdiction to review executive 
detentions and therefore check those exercises of the war powers as essentially 
having a domestic impact. Youngstown stood for just such a war powers 
review. In settling the jurisdictional issues surrounding the Guantanamo Bay 
detentions, Rasu/ implicitly reinforced the Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown 
paradigm that would favor an executive authority to detain unlawful 
combatants, while at the same time supporting judicial review of such 
497 The Supreme Court's determination of Guantanamo Bay's status thus depended upon a 
contextual judicial assessment of the base's peculiar characteristics, for purposes of a habeas 
corpus petition. Non-citizens located at military bases abroad or other foreign areas under 
American control would therefore still faU outside of district court jurisdiction, unless that 
control was so complete as to resemble the de facto American sovereignty over Guantanamo 
Bay. 
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detentions when domestically-oriented against citizens or within United States 
territory. Rasul therefore intersected with Hamdi by promoting the distinction 
between "federative" and domestic executive power. Furthermore, it gave the 
Guantanamo detainees the same access to judicial process as Hamdi, Padilla, 
and al-Marri, and raised the possibility (though did not decide) that the 
lawfulness of their detention as unlawful combatants would be tested under the 
due process standards established in Hamdi. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi responded to conflicts between 
the 10wer federal courts in the cases ofboth Hamdi and Padilla. No court went 
so far as to deny habeas jurisdiction over a citizen detainee, but sorne so 
broadly deferred as to make a showing of legality sufficient upon the 
executive's word alone. Finding that the authority to detain unlawful 
combatants arose under the President's war powers, the Fourth Circuit and 
New York District Court in the Hamdi and Padilla cases, respectively, were 
extremely reluctant to restrict, in any degree, executive discretion. 
Misapplying the precedent of Ex parte Quirin,498 which supported executive 
authority to detain unlawful combatants, the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi and the 
New York District Court in Padilla accepted broad presidential discretion to 
designate, indefinitely detain, and possibly militarily try both citizens and non-
citizens within the United States as unlawful combatants. These courts 
exhibited an approach to judicial review stunted by broad interpretation of 
statutory authorization, excessive deference to executive war powers, and a 
formalistic conception of the separation of powers doctrine. This approach 
allowed the President effectively to determine the scope and application ofhis 
own war powers, and then insulated their exercise from meaningful judicial 
review as a non-justiciable political question. Furthermore, these lower court 
decisions failed to appreciate the Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown distinction 
between the executive's discretion in foreign versus domestic affairs. The 
courts did so by formalistically categorizing any and all exercises of the war 
powers as political questions beyond judicial competency. Rather than 
498 317 U.S. 1. See 228, below, for analysis of how the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
the Southem District Court of New York misapplied Quirin. 
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preserving the separation of powers, such deferential review instead weakened 
structural protections against inwardly-directed war powers. Moreover, the 
formalistic approach of the Fourth Circuit and New York District Court 
disregarded the importance of deliberative processes to the separation of 
powers doctrine. By c1assifying unlawful combatant detentions as political 
questions, solely on account of their inclusion in the war powers, these courts 
permitted the President to exercise functionally judicial processes and infringe 
individual rights without effective check by the courts. Such broad and 
unfettered presidential discretion threatened the separation of powers and 
undermined Lockean structural protections for the public good. 
The Supreme Court's plurality decision in Hamdi differed from the 
formalistic one taken by the Fourth Circuit below and the New York District 
Court in the Padilla case. This contextual approach to review respected the 
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown distinction between foreign and domestic 
exercises of executive discretion. The Court's reasoning was sensitive to 
deliberative pro cesses, and recognized that presidential detention of citizens as 
unlawful combatants had functionally judicial aspects that triggered the courts' 
own competency to adjudicate individual rights and so justified judicial 
review. Because of the functionally judicial nature of unlawful combatant 
detentions, the Supreme Court imposed upon the executive's decision-making 
process the due process analysis of Mathews, which derived procedural 
requirements by contextually balancing individual liberty with government 
interests, and took into account the relative values and burdens of procedural 
safeguards. The Court imposed fair hearing requirements, but left to the lower 
courts the responsibility of evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of the 
executive's detention decisions in any particular case. Thus, the President had 
constitutional power under the war powers to detain unlawful combatants, but 
could only do so subject to congressional authorization, the adjudicative 
standards of due pro cess, and judicial review - aIl dependent upon factual 
context and substantive considerations. Hamdi 's due process test, in its richer 
sense, therefore required that an executive detention decision be legal, 
procedurally fair, and reasonable. Judicial application of these standards 
belied a deliberative pro cesses approach to the separation of powers, under 
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which the decision to detain an unlawful combatant implicated overlapping 
core executive and judicial functions, respectively to prosecute war and 
adjudicate individual rights. 
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Chapter IX: Judicial and Executive Aspects of Unlawful Combatant 
Detentions 
Unlawful Combatancy as Criminal and Military Status 
Leading up to the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision in 2004, as part of 
the military response to the "war against terrorism," the President designated 
and detained under his war powers both citizens and non-citizens as "enemy 
combatants. Il This status was a synonym for so-called "unlawful 
combatants, ,,499 who fail to satisfy the Third Geneva Convention's criteria for 
lawful belligerencloo and are subj ect to trial by special military commissions 
pursuant to act of Congress. However, as shown by the federal cases dealing 
with Hamdi, Padilla, and the Guantanamo detainees, the executive branch's 
treatment of unlawful combatants raises separation of powers concerns: the 
President thereby uses a broad discretion under his war powers - whether 
inherent or statutory in origin - in a way that infringes individual rights and 
impacts upon domestic affairs. In so designating, detaining, and possibly 
trying unlawful combatants, the President therefore acts in a functionally 
judicial manner, purportedly through his military capacity. Such cases engage 
the core decision-making functions of both branches, each possessing 
deliberative virtues suited to the matter depending upon the war-making or 
adjudicative aspects emphasized. As such, unlawful combatant cases display a 
high degree of justiciability, at the same time that they faU under the 
executive's war powers. Under the deliberative processes approach to the 
separation of powers doctrine, while the President might detain unlawful 
combatants under the color of statute or possibly even inherent constitutional 
authority, the quasi-judicial nature and justiciability of su ch decisions enable 
499 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 593. 
500 Geneva III, supra note 442, art. 4(2). 
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courts to review them, and ho Id the executive to deliberative standards of 
adjudication. 
While the Supreme Court later recognized the justiciability and permit 
review of detentions in Hamdi, the lower courts first conflicted on the 
ambiguous criminal and martial status of unlawful combatancy, as it came 
before them. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in Hamdi 
illustrated the difficulties associated with characterizing unlawful combatancy 
as a strictly criminal or belligerent status. The Court of Appeals rejected 
Hamdi' s claim that his detention was unlawful because the President had 
exceeded his constitutional powers and held petitioner without due process. 
The court found that the President's discretionary authority to detain a citizen 
as an unlawful combatant, without hearing or trial, was a lawful exercise of the 
war powers pursuant to congressional authorization, and so deserved broad 
judicial deference as a matter of national security.501 Furthermore, the 
question of indefinite detention was untimely as hostilities in Afghanistan 
continued. 502 In its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit insufficiently 
addressed a crucial aspect ofpetitioner's detention, in so far as it related to the 
justifiable nature of executive interference with petitioner's liberty. That is, 
the Government held Hamdi neither as a prisoner of war under the Third 
Geneva Convention nor as a criminal under domestic laws, but as an unlawful 
combatant who had violated the laws of war, exempting him from protection 
as a POW and subjecting him to criminal punishment. 
Analysis of detention status in the circumstances reveals a tension 
between the President's dut y to protect the United States as Commander-in-
Chief, and to execute the domestic criminal laws and uphold the Constitution 
as the Chief Executive. These potentially conflicting duties engage, on the one 
hand, a broad discretion to make decisions for the national security, with a 
responsibility to prosecute alleged criminals in courts and cooperate with them 
in preserving the rule of law. The ambiguities of unlawful combatant status 
501 316 F.3d at 474. 
502 Ibid. at 476. 
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therefore suggest the overlapping institutional competencies of the executive 
and judicial branches to resolve such cases according to executive or judicial 
deliberative processes. In dealing with this tension, however, the Fourth 
Circuit refused to question the executive's factual allegations in support of 
Hamdi' s detention, or to inquire into the actual conditions of internment. In 
that way, the court gave the President almost unreviewable discretion to detain 
an individu al under onerous conditions, ignoring the punitive, as opposed to 
merely preventive, characteristics of the incarceration: 
Hamdi and the amici make much of the distinction between lawful and 
unlawful combatants, noting correctly that lawful combatants are not 
subject to punishment for their participation in a conflict. But for the 
purposes of this case, it is a distinction without a difference, since the 
option to detain until the cessation of hostilities belongs to the executive 
in either case. It is true that unlawful combatants are entitled to a 
proceeding before a military tribunal before they may be puni shed for the 
acts which render their belligerency unlawful. Quirin, 317 V.S. at 31. 
But they are also subject to mere detention in precisely the same way that 
lawful prisoners of war are. Id. The fact that Hamdi might be an 
unlawful combatant in no way means that the executive is required to 
inflict every consequence of that status on him.503 
The court went on to say that "[w]e are not here dealing with a de fendant who 
has been indicted on criminal charges in the exercise of the executive's law 
enforcement powers. We are dealing with the executive's assertion of its 
powers to detain under the war powers of Article II.,,504 The Fourth Circuit 
formalistically categorized unlawful combatant detentions as executive war 
powers, paying attention neither to the criminal aspects ofunlawful combatant 
status nor to the functionally mixed executive and judicial deliberative 
processes involved. 
Designation as an unlawful combatant, in contrast to the Fourth Circuit's 
formalistic understanding of the status, is in its nature akin to a criminal 
charge, in which the individual remains subject to detention, trial, and 
punishment at the President's personal discretion. The decision of the Circuit 
503 Ibid. at 469. 
504 Ibid. 
180 
Court wou Id mean that the executive could unilaterally designate an individual 
as an unlawful combatant, and not only detain him for the duration of a 
conflict to prevent further belligerency, but hold him at pleasure under 
punitive conditions without ever bringing the person to trial before either a 
civil court or even a military commission. The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the Fourth Circuit, showing attention to the ambiguous status of 
unlawful combatants and the deliberative processes involved in their 
designation, detention, and possible trial. The Supreme Court in Hamdi 
agreed that the President can detain and try citizens as unlawful combatants 
under the war powers, but reaffirmed the power of the courts to review such 
decisions due to their inherent justiciability, thereby accommodating the 
deliberative processes ofboth the executive andjudicial branches. 
The criminal, punitive aspects of an unlawful combatant designation 
arise under the international laws of war. While regularly used in legal 
literature, however, the term "unlawful combatant" appears nowhere in the 
relevant international instruments.505 It instead represent the implied status of 
those individuals failing to conduct warfare lawfully, as defined by the Hague 
and Third Geneva Conventions.506 The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 
incorporated the definition of lawful combatants contained in the earlier 
Hague Convention, with sorne modifications, and both treaties now represent 
customary internationallaw.507 These treaties establish four criteria identifying 
those belligerents who are lawful and protected by their respective provisions. 
Lawful combatants are 1) to be commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates, 2) to have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, 
3) to carry arms openly, and 4) to conduct their operations in accordance with 
505 Knut Dormann, "The legal situation of 'unlawful/unprivileged' combatants" (2003) 85 (no. 
849) International Review of the Red Cross 45 at 46. 
506 Ibid. at 46-47; See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with 
Annex of Regulations, 18 Oct. 1907, Annex art. 1, 36 Stat. 227, T.S. 539 (26 Jan. 1910) 
[hereinafter Hague Convention] (ratified by the United States) and Geneva III, supra note 442, 
art. 4(2). 
507 René Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 34-35; Horst Fischer, "Protection of Prisoners of War," 
ch. 7 in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, ed. Dieter Fleck (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) 321 at 325. 
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the laws and customs of war. 508 Members of national militaries are, as a 
general rule, qualified combatants under these criteria.509 Lawful combatants 
need not be part of a regular national military force, however, and can include 
civilians; militia, partisans, popular resistance movements, and other irregular 
forces are entitled to POW protection as long as they operate under the four 
criteria and in so doing represent a party to an armed conflict.510 Neither the 
Hague nor Geneva Convention explicitly discusses the status of those 
belligerents failing to meet these conditions, so-called "unlawful" combatants. 
However, the implication of this silence is that such combatants are not 
entitled to protection as prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention, 
and so are subject to punishment for their actions. 511 
Lawful combatants are entitled to POW status upon capture. The Third 
Geneva Convention guarantees, among other things, that prisoners are to be 
intemed together under specified humane conditions,512 are entitled to mail 
• • 513 d ffi' h" . 514 commUnICatIOn, an may not SU er pUnIS mg mterrogatIOn. Perhaps 
508 Hague Convention, supra note 506, Annex art. 1; Geneva Ill, supra note 442, art. 4(2); For 
further explanation of the protection due to POWs, see generally Fischer, ibid. 
509 Knut Ipsen, "Cornbatants and Non-Cornbatants," ch. 3 in The Handbook of Humanitarian 
Law in Armed Conflicts, ed. Dieter Fleck (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995) 65 at 66-67. 
510 G. 1. A. D. Draper, "The Developrnent of International Hurnanitarian Law," in Reflections 
on Law and Armed Conflicts: The Selected Works on the Laws of War by the late Professor 
Colonel G.1.A.D. Draper, OBE, eds. Michael A. Meyer and Hilaire McCoubrey (The Hague: 
Kluwer International, 1998) 69 at 73 [hereinafter Se/ected Works]; Geneva Ill, supra note 442, 
art. 4A(6), also grants POW status to civilians participating in a levée en masse, where the 
civilian population spontaneously resists invaders in situations where organization is not 
possible, and civilian resistance otherwise follows the laws of war. However, Geneva IIIonly 
protects such resistance irl territory not yet occupied by an irlvading force, after which 
unorganized civilian resistance becornes unlawful. Ipsen, ibid. at 70-72, 79-80; As for the 
relationship between cornbatants and a party to the conflict, "[t]he exact nature or quality of 
this nexus is far from certairl." G. 1. A. D. Draper, "The Status of Combatants and the 
Question of Guerilla Warfare" (1971) 45 Brit. Yearbook Int'l. L. 173 at 200 [hereirlafter 
"Status of Cornbatants"]. 
511 Dormann, supra note 505 at 46-47; As rnentioned at 185, below, this does not rnean that 
unlawful cornbatants lack al! protection under international hurnanitarian or hurnan rights law; 
Regarding unlawful combatant status under international law, see for exarnple the Privy 
Council case of Mohamed Ali and Another v. Public Prosecutor [1968] 3 Al! ER 488 (P.c.), 
discussed in R. R. Baxter, "The Privy Council on the Qualifications of Belligerents" (1969) 63 
Amer. J. Int'l. L. 290 at 294-96. 
512 Geneva Ill, supra note 442, arts. 22, 25-30. 
513 Ibid., art. 71. 
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most importantly, under the Third Geneva Convention, the capturing power 
may not punish lawful combatants for their hostile and violent acts during war, 
but only hold them for the duration of the conflict to prevent their further 
belligerency, after which the captor must promptly free and repatriate them.515 
Offenses committed by POWs are punishable only under the rules for courts 
martial that apply to members of the captor's own military forces. 516 A 
competent tribunal is to resolve any doubt as to whether a captured belligerent 
qualifies as lawful and is thus protected under the Third Geneva Convention, 
or is unlawful and so faIls outside of the treaty.517 Captives whose lawful 
status the capturing power questions are to be accorded full protection as 
POWs until the tribunal determines otherwise.518 
The protection guaranteed to POWs by the Third Geneva Convention 
contrasts markedly with that due to captured "unlawful" belligerents not 
meeting the Hague and Geneva III criteria. Unprotected status is dependent 
upon the individual's lack of compliance with these criteria; thus they may be 
"either members of the regular forces or members of resistance or guerilla 
movements who do not fulfil the conditions of status as lawful combatants. ,,519 
514 This requirement is the well-known rule that a POW is obligated to give no more 
information than his or her name, rank, date of birth, and seriai number, and may not be 
punished for failure to say more. Ibid., art. 17. 
515 Ibid., arts. 13,99,118. 
516 Ibid., arts. 82,84, 102. 
517 Ibid., art. 5. 
518 Ibid.; The President unilaterally determined that Taliban fighters and al-Qaeda associates 
did not qualilfy as POWs under the Third Geneva Convention. See supra note 442. In 
response to the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision that detainees must be afforded due process 
in confronting the factual allegations against them, the Government established the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal. The Tribunal, composed of three officers, would conduct status 
hearings for each detainee, who could make representations before the Tribunal with benefit of 
militarily assigned counsel. U.S. Department of Defense, Order Establishing Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal (7 July 2004), online: Department of Defense <http://www.defenselink.miV 
news/JuI2004/d20040707review.pdf>. Such Tribunals only considered whether the detainee 
was an unlawful combatant under the terms of the President's Military Order, supra note 443, 
instead of the Third Geneva Convention 's provisions for POWs. The Court of Appeal for the 
D.C. Circuit, however, found that absence of a Geneva III, art. 5 hearing did not preclude trial 
before military commission. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir 2005), overruling 
344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.C. 2004). 
519 Ingrid Detter, The Law of War, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 
136. 
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Unlike lawful combatants entitled to protection as POWs, unlawful 
combatants are subject to punishment by the capturing power simply on 
account of their belligerency, even without the commission of any other act 
constituting a war crime.520 In further contrast to the Third Geneva 
Convention, the precise standards of treatment to which unlawful combatants 
are subject in detention and punishment are uncertain. In times not long past, 
these individuals enjoyed no protection under the laws of war, ev en to the 
extent that capturing states were entitled summarily to execute them. 521 This 
extreme disparity in treatment ofPOWs and unlawful combatants underlies the 
significance that the latter designation traditionally had under the laws of war. 
"The princip le of distinction is of importance. If a person fulfils the 
requirements for [lawful] combatant status he is entitled to the 'rights' of a 
soldier, notably to enjoy prisoner of war status if captured; if he does not fulfil 
these requirements, he is an 'unlawful combatant' and may be shot.,,522 The 
possibility of harsh treatment places unlawful combatants, as criminals in 
wartime, on a dividing line between legal paradigms of crime and war, 
meaning that the capturing state can both punish them as criminals and deal 
with them as belligerent enemies.523 
520 "It is generally accepted that unlawful combatants may be prosecuted for their participation 
in hostilities, even if they respect all the rules of international humanitarian law. . .. If 
unlawful combatants furthermore commit serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
they may be prosecuted for war crimes." Dôrmann, supra note 505 at 70-71; "Unlawful 
combatants must not be confused with war criminals." Yoram Dinstein, "The Distinction 
Between Unlawful Combatants and War Criminals" in International Law at a Time of 
Perplexity - Essays in Honour of Shobtai Rosenne, ed. Yoram Dinstein, (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1989) 105 at 107; Ipsen, supra note 509 at 68; See also R. R. Baxter, 
"So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs" (1951) 28 Brit. 
Yearbook Int'l. L. 323 at 330-31, 339-40 [hereinafter "Unprivileged Belligerency"], for the 
proposition that while spies, guerillas, and saboteurs are unprotected under Geneva III, such 
activities are not per se war crimes. Baxter criticizes Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, for 
implying the contrary position, that actions leading to a failure to qualify for POW status 
under Geneva III are war crimes. The brutality and scale of war crimes typically differs from 
less serious violations of the laws of war, as by the failure to fight under a command structure. 
Because such individuals are unprotected, the capturing state can nonetheless punish them for 
their belligerent acts. Ibid. at 342. 
521 Detter, supra note 519 at 148. 
522 Ibid. at 145. 
523 Bruce Ackerman, "The Emergency Constitution" (2004) 113 Yale L.J. 1029, and "This is 
not War" (2004) 113 Yale L.J. 1871, suggests that the unique nature ofterrorism illustrates the 
need for a new constitutional framework that goes beyond the crime and war paradigm, and 
would give the President more specifie emergency powers to detain individuals subject to 
special safeguards. A legally defined emergency regime somewhere between peace and war, 
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Although unlawful combatants might not be subject to the protections of 
Geneva III, the notion of summary execution is now an unacceptable one even 
under the exigencies of war, and does not reconcile with modern developments 
in international humanitarian and human rights law. Thus, "it can hardly be 
maintained that unlawful combatants are not entitled to any protection 
whatsoever under international humanitarian law.,,524 For this proposition, the 
District Court in Padilla cited the United Kingdom's Manual of Military Law, 
which provides that "[n]o law authorizes [officers] to have [any disarmed 
enemy] shot without trial; and international law forbids summary execution 
absolutely.,,525 Accordingly, before a capturing state imposes punishment, 
"[i]t is uncontroverted that a person accused of hostile conduct other than as a 
member of those forces which are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war 
must be granted a trial.,,526 Indeed, the Hague Convention entitles spies, for 
example, to judicial proceedings before punishment.527 Similarly, ProtocolI 
of the Third Geneva Convention mandates sorne degree of due process rights 
for individuals not qualifying for any other kind of protected status.528 
which does not currently exist under the Constitution, would thus prevent executive resort to 
far more sweeping war powers. Mark Tushnet, "Controlling Executive Power in the War on 
Terrorism" (2005) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2673, similarly queries whether a new "constitutional 
design" or "institutional mechanism" other than the separation of powers and judicial review 
is necessary to de al with the threat of terrorism, without however formulating an alternative. 
For criticisms, see Laurence H. Tribe and Patrick O. Gudridge, "The Anti-Emergency 
Constitution" (2004) 113 Yale L.J. 1801, David Cole, "The Priority of Morality: The 
Emergency Constitution's Blindspot" (2004) 113 Yale L.J. 1753, and Curtis A. Bradley and 
Jack L. Goldsmith, "Rejoinder: The War on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement 
Requirements, and Constitutional Design" (2005) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2683 at 2694-97 
[hereinafter "Rejoinder"]; See Frederic Block, "Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: 
The Interactions between the Three Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current 
Threats to the Nation's Security" (2005) 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. and Soc. Change 459, for a review 
of statutory powers available to the executive branch for fighting terrorism and other national 
security threats. 
524 Dormann, supra note 505 at 73. 
525 u.K. War Office, Manual of Military Law (1914) at 242, cited in Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 
at 592. 
526 Baxter, "Unprivileged Belligerency," supra note 520 at 340. 
527 Hague Convention, supra note 506, Annex arts. 29-31. 
528 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 75 
[hereinafter Protocol 1 or First Protocol] (signed but not ratified by the United States). 
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Although the United States has yet to ratify Protoco/ l, despite being a 
signatory, the extension of minimum due process protections to prisoners 
falling outside of Geneva III meets minimum humanitarian requirements, to 
prevent the arbitrary and inhumane treatment of detainees. 529 Moreover, an 
unlawful combatant covered under Protoco/ l, under sorne circumstances, 
might be better protected as a civilian under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 530 
Most fundamentally, the view that unlawful combatants could be summarily 
executed without any semblance ofjudicial process "cannot be reconciled with 
modem ideas about human rights, in particular the rights to life and to a fair 
trial, even in time of war. Yet, even if such drastic treatment is prohibited and 
the resistance fighter therefore spared his life, it makes quite sorne difference 
whether he remains liable to be put on trial for his warlike activities.,,531 
While a capturing state might detain and punish an unlawful combatant as 
529 As Gary D. Solis, "Military Commissions and Terrorists," in Eugene R. Fidell and Dwight 
H. Sullivan, eds., Evolving Military Justice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002) 195 
at 197, points out, the Military Order establishing military commissions does not of itse1f 
violate Protocol 1, as it requires that unlawful combatants receive a "full and fair trial." 
Military Order, supra note 443, § 4(c)(2). As such, Solis explains, ibid., the compatibility ofa 
military commission with Protoco/ 1 (even though the United States might not formally be 
bound) will depend upon actual procedures used, which should inc1ude informing the 
defendant of reasons for detention, and conviction by an impartial court presuming the 
defendant's innocence, admitting him to proceedings, precluding self-incrimination, the 
hearing of friendly witnesses, and perrnitting of cross-examination. Such process would be 
required before subjection to punitive detention conditions. See also Ruth Wedgwood, 
"Agora: Military Commissions: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions" (2002) 96 
Amer. J. In1'l. L. 328 at 336. 
530 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civi/ian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV or Fourth Geneva 
Convention] (ratified by the United States); Because Geneva IV, art. 4(4) excepts coverage to 
nationals of the party or power in which hands they are, as weIl as to nationals of astate which 
is not a party to the Convention, it is inapplicable to Harndi and Padilla as United States 
citizens. However, it might well have applied to al-Marri as a Qatari. See generally Dormann, 
supra note 505; Ipsen, supra note 509 at 68. However, the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan, 415 F.3d 
33, interpreted Geneva 111 as not applying to al-Qaeda members. It did not address the 
possibility that Geneva III might apply based upon the nationality of the detainee, even though 
the home nation was not a party to the conflict. 
531 Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction 
to International Humanitarian Law, 3d ed. (Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 2001) at 40-41; The primary representation of due process as a basic human rights 
norm is found in the International Co venant on Civil and Po/itical Rights, 23 Mar. 1976,999 
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 14 (ratified by the United States) [hereinafter I.CCP.R.]; Unlawful 
combatants still possess basic individual rights, as humanitarian law does not necessarily 
parallel the protections of human rights law, and under the 1. C CP.R. military commissions 
might require state derogation for a lesser standard of due process. Provost, supra note 507 at 
41-42; Joan Fitzpatrick, "Agora: Military Commissions: Jurisdiction of Military Commissions 
and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism" (2002) 96 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 345 at 350-52. 
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having unprotected status under the Third Geneva Convention, it must still 
respect the prisoner's human rights. Ruman rights abuses can, if severe 
enough, themselves amount to severe breaches of international law or perhaps 
even war crimes, while wrongful denial ofPOW status alone would be a grave 
breach of the Convention.532 "Unlawful combatant" status, then, denotes 
individual behavior that violates the laws of war, is criminal, and is subject to 
. . d" Il 533 pumtIve treatment un er mternatlOna aw. 
A presidential designation under the war powers534 that an individual 
qualifies as an unlawful combatant alleges unlawful combatant status and 
violations of the international laws of war, through failure to satisfy the 
conditions of lawful belligerency in the Hague and Third Geneva 
Conventions. 535 As the Southern District Court of New York observed in 
Padilla, "when the President designated Padilla an 'enemy combatant,' he 
necessarily meant that Padilla was an unlawful combatant, acting as an 
associate of a terrorist organization whose operations do not meet the four 
criteria necessary to confer lawful combatant status on its members and 
adherents.,,536 Unlawful belligerency, however, is also a domestic offense 
under U.S. law, according to the reasoning of Quirin and its progeny, because 
of Congress' incorporation of the laws of war and its authorization of special 
military commissions through the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 537 
532 For a briefhistorical overview ofthose human rights violations constituting war crimes, see 
Howard S. Levie, "Violations of Human Rights in the Time of War as War Crimes" in War 
Crimes in International Law, ed. Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (The Hague: Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1996) at 123. 
533 Acts giving rise to unlawful combatant status are therefore, like war crimes, "a special case 
of a crime, committed in violation of the international order of the law of war, while in pursuit 
of war against a particular enemy." Noah Feldman, "Choices of Law, Choices of War" (2002) 
25 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol. 457 at 465. But see supra note 520, regarding the distinction of 
unlawful combatancy from war crimes. 
534 D.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
535 Hague Convention, supra note 506, Annex art. 1; Geneva III, supra note 442, art. 4(2). 
536 233 F. Supp. 2d at 593. 
537 See Quirin, 317 D.S. at 30; Uniform Code ofMilitaryJustice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 
107 (1950), codified as amended at 10 D.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2000) [hereinafter U. c.M.J.). See 
215, below. 
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Accordingly, as the Fourth Circuit suggested in Hamdi,538 the dual 
criminallbelligerent status of unlawful combatants means that the President 
has authority either to detain them as a preventive measure or punish them for 
their belligerent actions. What the Circuit Court failed to do, however, is draw 
attention to the President's discretion in dealing with unlawful combatants, 
and the need for judicial review to prevent abuse ofthat authority. That is, the 
President must administratively detain an unlawful combatant during the 
conflict in ways that are humane, respectful of the prisoner's basic hum an 
rights, and not punitive. Altematively, he can punitively incarcerate them only 
after they have been adjudged guilty through sorne fair process or trial, even if 
before a military commission. In any case, if the President chooses to detain 
an individual as an unlawful combatant rather than seek prosecution in a civil 
court, he must comply with fundamental due process. Indeed, the Third 
Geneva Convention itself mandates a fair status determination before 
designating someone as an unI aw fuI combatant outside of the treaty's 
protections.539 Formalistic categorizations of unlawful combatant detentions 
as non-justiciable war powers not only ignores the judicial and criminal 
aspects involved, but upsets the separation ofpowers by allowing the President 
to act without effective check by the courts, and in disregard of deliberative 
standards of adjudication. The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi, in 
contrast, restrained executive discretion by requiring that aIl unlawful 
combatant designations, detentions, and trials indeed meet adjudicative 
standards of due process, subject to judicial review. As such, the Supreme 
Court rejected a formalistic understanding of the separation of powers 
doctrine, in favor of a deliberative processes approach recognizing the 
overlapping institutional competencies of both the executive and judicial 
branches in making unlawful combatant detention decisions. 
Military Commissions 
538 316 F.3d at 469, quoted at 180, above. 
539 Geneva Ill, supra note 442, art. 5. 
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On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an order for the 
"Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism.,,54o Section 2 of the Order applies to non-citizens whom the 
President determines 1) are members of al Qaeda, 2) are international terrorists 
acting detrimentally to the United States, or 3) have harbored individuals 
falling into the first two categories. The President could order the detention of 
those persons whom he suspected to be within the scope of the order. 541 Until 
the Supreme Court decision in Hamdi, it was unclear as to whether an 
individual could be so detained without benefit of hearing or any other 
process. Furthermore, the President might criminally prosecute such 
individuals, directing that they "when tried, be tried by military commission 
for any and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is 
alleged to have committed, and may be puni shed in accordance with the 
penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or 
death.,,542 The legal basis for the Order rested upon the President's authority 
as Commander-in-Chief,543 Congress' Authorization for Use of Military Force 
and provisions of the U C.MJ. 544 However, because there was no law 
requiring trials of designees, prosecution remained within the President's 
discretion. Furthermore, the executive power to arrest and detain unlawful 
combatants did not rely upon the laying of formaI cri minai charges or actually 
convening a commission. In this way, the President claimed authority to arrest 
540 Military Order, supra note 443. 
541 Ibid., § 3. 
542 Ibid., § 4(a); Several non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay were subsequently charged 
for trial by military commissions, pursuant to the Military Order. The first military 
commission was actually convened on 24 August 2004 in the case of United States v. Salim 
Achmed Hamdan, a short time after the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi. U.S. Department 
of Defense, News Release, "First Military Commission Convened at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba" 
(24 Aug. 2004), online: Department of Defense <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/ 
nr20040824-1164.htmI>. 
543 U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2. 
544 Military Force Authorization, supra note 82; U.CM.J., art. 21 at 10 U.S.c. § 821 
(reserving to military commissions concurrent jurisdiction with courts martial) and art. 36 at § 
836 (authorizing President to establish rules of procedure for military commissions). For their 
text, see infra note 580. 
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and detain an individual indefinitely without trial or other adjudicatory 
process. 
Military commissions of the type authorized by the Military Order are 
exceptional, quasi-judicial tribunals that differ from civil courts established 
under Article III of the V.S. Constitution. As typified by the Defense 
Department's Order No. 1 establishing implementation regulations for the 
Military Order, such commissions would consist of a panel of military officers 
instead of a life-tenured judge appointed by the President and confirmed by 
Senate.545 Commissions also "derive their basic grant of authority from 
Articles 1 and II of the United States Constitution," and there proceedings are 
means by which Congress can therefore exercise its power to "define and 
punish ... offenses against the Law of Nations.,,546 Based upon the Quirin 
precedent, which the Supreme Court followed in Hamdi, Congress authorized 
commissions and simultaneously incorporated the laws of war through the 
language of the U C.UJ, which at section 821 provides: "The provisions of 
this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military 
commissions, provo st courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent 
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law 
of war may be tried by military commissions, provost court, or other military 
tribunal.,,547 Additionally, section 836 enables the President to establish rules 
of procedure for commissions.548 Sorne federal courts, inc1uding the Supreme 
Court in Hamdi, also interpreted Congress' Authorization for Use of Military 
Force to be a generai authorization for whatever measures the President found 
545 u.s. Department of Defense, Military Commission arder No. 1 (21 March 2002), § 
4(A)(3), online: Department of Defense <http://www.defenselink.mil/newslMar2002/ 
d200203210rd.pdf> [hereinafter "arder No. 1"], provides that: "Each member and altemate 
member [of the commission] shall be a commissioned officer of the United States armed 
forces ("Military Officer"), including without limitation reserve personnel on active duty, 
National Guard personnel on active duty in Federal Service, and retired personnel recalled to 
active dut y."; Jennifer Eisea, "Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying Terrorists as War 
Criminals before Military Commissions," Report for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service (11 Dec. 2001) at 16 [hereinafter "Terrorism and the Law ofWar"). 
546 V.S. Const. Art. l § 8; Jeffrey Addicott, "Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era: The 
'War on Terror'" (2002) 4 Scholar: St. Mary's L. Rev. Minority Issues 209 at 243. 
547 UCM.J., art. 21 at 10 U.S.c. § 821; See Addicott, ibid. at 243-44. 
548 UCM.J., art. 36 at 10 U.S.C. § 836. 
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necessary to take as Commander-in-Chief, which inc1uded the detention of 
unlawful combatants, in response to the terrorist attacks of September Il, 
2001. 
That the President possesses sorne authority under the war powers to 
detain individu aIs and try them by military commission is c1ear, as in the past 
the executive branch has employed commissions for such things as the 
govemance of territory under military occupation or the imposition of martial 
law in times of emergency, as well as for punishing violations of the laws of 
war.
549 However, it is unc1ear to what extent, if any, the President possesses 
inherent discretionary authority to detain and try unlawful combatants. 
Authority for commissions and detentions potentially arises sui generis from 
the Constitution, the common law of war, as weIl as from statute. It is 
therefore uncertain whether a statutory basis for commissions and the 
incorporation of international law is the sole source for their existence, or is 
merely legislative recognition of a presidential war power that arises from the 
Constitution and the nature of executive power itself. These distinctions raise 
important questions about the source and extent of executive discretion, the 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction of commissions, as weIl as the judicial 
interpretation of the potential legal sources of such power. 550 In Hamdi, the 
Govemment argued that no congressional authorization to detain was required, 
as the President possessed plenary authority to do so under Article II of the 
Constitution. However, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the 
question of inherent authority, in light of Congress' Military Force 
A uthorization. 551 
During World War II, the Supreme Court in Quirin elaborated upon the 
jurisdiction of military commissions to allow the President to detain and 
punish enemy belligerents for violating the laws ofwar. This case remains the 
549 Maj. L. K. Underhill, "Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals in the United States over 
Civilians" (1924) 12 Cal. L. Rev. 75 at 84-85; See Elsea, "Terrorism and the Law of War," 
supra note 545 at 18; See 205, below. 
550 A. Wigfall Green, "The Military Commission" (1948) 42 Amer. J. InCl. L. 832 at 834. 
55! 124 S. Ct. at 2639. 
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main precedent on the existence of executive power to detain and try unlawful 
combatants, although the Court' s later opinion in Hamdi would explore due 
process limitations upon the exercise of that power and the judicial role in 
reviewing it. Based upon Quirin and the historical use of military 
commissions, the constitutional permissibility of commissions intertwines 
with their personal and subject matter jurisdictions, and arises out of wartime 
circumstances.552 The exceptional jurisdiction of commissions distinguishes 
them from Article III courts, which have general jurisdiction over federal 
crimes and an exclusive one over civilians, but for the rare exceptions of the 
imposition of martial law and the occupation of foreign territory.553 The 
military nature of commissions and unlawful combatant detentions, having 
origins in Articles 1 and II of the Constitution, also exempts them from sorne 
procedural protections normally rnandated by the Bill of Rights in civil courts, 
such as trial by jury.554 Detentions and use ofmilitary commissions thus differ 
from regular criminal processes in that they are unique instruments of military 
power. Commissions can rnaintain civil order in areas under martial law or 
that are militarily occupied. Altematively, discretionary detentions and 
military trials can project rnilitary force against individuals off the battlefield, 
as in the case of spies, saboteurs, unlawful combatants failing to obey the laws 
of war, or perpetrators of war crimes. Military commissions might be 
constitutionally appropriate to maintain military govemment or punish 
violations of the laws of war, but their use is dangerous when they target 
civilian criminal activity for the purposes of ensuring swift and certain 
punishment, and avoiding structural checks on executive power that prevent 
arbitrary interferences with personal liberties. 555 Therefore, in their purposes 
552 Maj. Timothy C. MacDonnell, "Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief 
Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two Courts," 
(March 2002) Army Lawyer 19 at 26, classifies these three types of military commissions as 
martial law courts, military government courts, and war courts for specific violations of the 
laws of war. For detailed discussion of these three types of commissions, see generally Col. 
William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, 2d rev. and enl. ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1920) at 798-841. 
553 See 205, below. 
554 See 197-98,219, below. 
555 Fitzpatrick, "Jurisdiction of Military Commissions," supra note 531 at 345. See for 
example Ex parte Milligan 71 V.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
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and character, military commissions and detentions bridge the gap between the 
pursuit ofmilitary objectives and the enforcement ofcriminallaw. 
Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Executive Authority to Detain and 
Try 
The Military Order and Order No. 1, however, gave only a superficial 
impression of executive authority to detain unlawful combatants or otherwise 
convene military commissions. The Military Order made clear that it did not 
"limit the lawful authority of the Secretary of Defense, any military 
commander, or any other officer or agent of the United States or of any State 
to detain or try any person who is not an individual subject to this order.,,556 
This savings clause might first suggest the continued availability of 
prosecution before the civil courts for any number of federal crimes. !ts 
reference to detention and prosecutorial authority in the Defense Secretary and 
military commanders, however, implied the broader reach of military 
commissions and the detention power. Military Commission Order No. 1 was 
more explicit, stating that "[n]othing in this Order shaH affect the authority to 
constitute military commissions for a purpose not govemed by the President's 
Military Order.,,557 The Military Order was therefore neither a complete 
declaration of nor the source for the presidential authority to detain and try 
unlawful combatants for violations of the laws of war. It was instead a policy 
statement only, which by its own terms disclaimed creating any enforceable 
legal rights or expectations for those subject to it.558 
Substantively, the Military Order (and so also Order No. 1) placed an 
unenforceable restriction on the personal jurisdiction that commissions have, 
556 Military Order, supra note 443, § 7(a)(3). 
557 Order No. 1, supra note 545, § 8. 
558 Military Order, supra note 443, § 7(c) provides: "This order is not intended to and does not 
create any right, bene fit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity 
by any party, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers 
or employees, or any other person." 
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while narrowing and enlarging its subject matter jurisdiction for the offenses 
for which the President might detain and try an individual. The Order applied 
to non-citizens the President had reason to believe 1) are members of al Qaeda, 
2) participated in terrorism directed against the United States, or 3) knowingly 
harbored such individuals.559 "Thus we have an Executive Order designed to 
apply (1) just to foreigners who (2) engage in international terrorism.,,560 The 
personal jurisdiction of commissions under the Military Order, like that of any 
military commission, was c10sely related if not identical to the substantive 
offenses for which the President might detain and try an individual before it.561 
The offenses subject to military commissions under the Order, however, were 
problematic in three respects. First, the Order automatically conflated 
membership with al-Qaeda, absent any other individual action, with a violation 
of the laws of war.562 Second, the Order treated terrorism generally as 
violations of the laws of war, committed during an armed conflict, with no 
consideration of the location or circumstances of the act.563 Third, by 
including those who aid terrorism or harbor individuals subject to the Order, it 
reached persons who might not only be civilians, but who were non-
belligerents outside of any zone of conflict, and had not violated the laws of 
559 Ibid., § 2(a)(1). 
560 George P. Fletcher, "On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military 
Tribunals" (2002) 25 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol. 635 at 649. 
56\ Neal A. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, "Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals" (2002) 111 Yale L. J. 1259 at 1259. 
562 Diane F. Orentlicher and Robert K. Goldman, "The Military Tribunal Order: When Justice 
Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions," (2002) 25 Harv. J. L Pub. 
Pol. 653 at 658; American Bar Association, "American Bar Association Task Force on 
Terrorism and the Law: Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions" (March 
2002) Army Lawyer 8 at 13 [hereinafter "ABA Task Force"] (finding that "it is not c1ear that 
membership, alone, in al Qaida or harboring terrorists violates the law of war - the necessary 
predicate to the jurisdiction of a military commission under both common law and Article 21, 
UCMJ."); Jordan J. Pau st, "Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality" (2001) 
23 Mich. J. Int. L. 1 at 8, n. 16. 
563 Orentlicher and Goldman, ibid. at 654; "AB A Task Force," ibid. at 11-12 (finding strong 
support for the proposition that the September Il attacks, at least, were acts of War); Fletcher, 
supra note 560 at 651-52; Paust, ibid. at 8, n. 16, and 9, n. 17; Katyal and Tribe, supra note 
561 at 1261 (commenting that "[t]he Order's terms sweep so broadly that they reach a Basque 
separatist who kills an American citizen in Madrid, or a member of the Irish Republican Army 
who threatens the American embassy in London.") 
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war. 564 It thereby "treat[ ed] virtually any foreign national whom the President 
suspects of terrorist-related activity as an enemy belligerent, regardless of 
h h h . d S' d . d ft· ,,565 W et er t e Umte tates IS engage III arme con lCt. The Military 
Order extended presidential authority over civilians, generally equating a wide 
range of possible criminal activities with belligerent acts against the laws of 
war, and so redefined both domestic criminal and intemationallaw. This was 
a significant intrusion upon the law-making power of Congress, as weB as the 
province of the courts, and constituted an expansion ofmilitary authority at the 
expense of the civil. As such, the Order actually went beyond the jurisdiction 
of commissions and possibly exceeded the President's authority to detain or 
try individuals under the laws ofwar. 
The Military Order also limited its applicability to non-citizens. In 
Quirin, however, the Supreme Court made c1ear that military commissions 
could try citizens as unlawful combatants, if they violated the laws of war.566 
The Military Order's applicability to non-citizens was therefore not a 
restriction of the personal jurisdiction of military commissions, but was rather 
an unenforceable statement of official executive policy. Distinction based 
upon citizenship also raised two equal protections concems of disparate 
treatment based upon nationality, having no rational connection to the purpose 
of the Military Order, that being the punishment of violations of the laws of 
war. First, it would permit military trial of an alien within the United States, 
while a citizen committing the same action would receive a civil trial with full 
protections under the Bill of Rights. Second, U.S. citizens fighting abroad 
with terrorists would receive treatment more favorable than, for example, a 
Taliban Afghani fighting against the Northem Alliance or foreign troopS.567 
Such criticism notwithstanding, executive power over unlawful combatants is 
564 Orentlicher and Goldman, ibid. at 658-59; "AB A Task Force," ibid. at 13; Katyal and 
Tribe, ibid. at 1263. 
565 Orentlicher and Goldman, ibid. at 653. 
566 See also Calepaugh v. Laaney, 235 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 V.S. 1014 
(1957). 
567 Katyal and Tribe, supra note 561 at 1298. 
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potentially exempted from sorne Fifth Arnendment due process restraints, as 
applied in criminal cases, while aliens in general do not enjoy full 
constitutional protections.568 The Military Order therefore did not prevent the 
President from designating, detaining, and trying by military commission, at 
his discretion, those U.S. citizens whom he believed had violated the laws of 
war. The mere threat of military detention and trial, moreover, would 
intensely pressure a citizen prosecuted by civil authorities to plea bargain or 
cooperate in other ways, for fear of removal to military custody.569 Even 
without an instrument like the Military Order, the President possesses 
authority under the war power to designate, detain, and try both citizens and 
non-citizens as unlawful combatants. Consequently, the President, by 
redirecting the war powers against citizens or other individuals within 
Arnerican territory, could detain a person as an unlawful combatant in an 
attempt to circurnvent due process and checks by the other branches. The 
Supreme Court decision in Hamdi attempted to prevent just this, by imposing 
due process and pennitting judicial review of those exercises of the war 
powers that were contextually justiciable and so within the deliberative 
competency of the courts. 
Procedure Before Military Commissions 
Military commissions are not courts martial. The authority of both 
originates in the military powers of Articles l and II of the Constitution, rather 
than in Article III. Nevertheless, they are not the same sort of entity: 
[S]ubstantial differences exist between military commissions and courts-
martial. Although both courts have existed since the beginning of the 
United States, they have existed for different purposes, based on 
568 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
569 Indeed, after the Suprerne Court decision in Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633, the Government 
released Harndi on the condition that he surrender his V.S. citizenship and return to Saudi 
Arabia, a deal he accepted rather than face further rnilitary detention. See supra note 495. 
John Walker Lindh, a V.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan while fighting for the Taliban, also 
pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges rather than be detained as an unlawful cornbatant. 
See infra note 698. 
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different sources of constitutional authority, and with different 
jurisdictional boundaries. These differences can affect who may order a 
trial, who may be tried, what types of cases the court can hear, and the 
pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures applied in a particular case.570 
Article 21 of the U.CMJ at 10 U.S.C. § 821 underscores these functional 
differences. By reserving concurrent jurisdiction in sorne cases to both courts 
martial and military commissions, Congress implied that there are indeed other 
are as in which military commission jurisdiction goes beyond that of courts 
martial. Commission jurisdiction includes spies, saboteurs, civilians engaged 
in hostilities and others (which could inc1ude terrorists and war criminals) who 
violate the laws of war and so fall outside court martial jurisdiction over V.S. 
military personnel and prisoners of war. 571 Commissions thus "close the gap 
that might otherwise prec1ude trial ofthese categories of alleged offenders.,,572 
Congress further reserved concurrent jurisdiction, with the implication that 
courts martial and commissions have different procedural characteristics. 
While "cases arising in the land or naval forces,,573 are constitutionally exempt 
from certain requirements of the Bill of Rights,574 courts martial nevertheless 
afford considerable procedural protections to an accused that closely replicate, 
570 MacDonnell, supra note 552 at 19; Maj. Gen. Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., "Military 
Commissions" (March 2002) Army Lawyer 1; See Evan J. Wallach, "Afghanistan, Quirin, and 
Uchiyama: Does the Sauce Suit the Gander?" (Nov. 2003) Army Lawyer 18 (arguing that trial 
of POW s by military commissions, with procedures such as those in the Quirin case, violate 
intemationallaw), and also Kevin 1. Barry, "Military Commissions: Trying American Justice" 
(Nov. 2003) Army Lawyer 1 (criticizing the procedures established for military commissions 
under the President's Military arder), compared with Frederic L. Borch, "Why Military 
Commissions are the Proper Forum and Why Terrorists Will Have "Full and Fair" Trials: A 
Rebuttal to Military Commissions: Trying American Justice" (Nov. 2003) Army Lawyer 10 
(defending commission procedures). 
571 Daryl A. Mundis, "Agora: Military Commissions: The Use of Military Commissions to 
Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts" (2002) 96 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 320 at 321; See 
Henry W. Halleck, "Military Tribunals and their Jurisdiction" (1911) 5 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 958 
at 965, and Underhill, supra note 549 at 84- 90; Solis, supra note 529 at 196. 
572 Mundis, ibid. at 321. 
573 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
574 See Daigle v.Warner, 490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973) and Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 
(1976) (Constitution does not require appointed counsel in every case of summary court 
martial), as weIl as United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450 (Ct. Mil. Appeals 1992) (Constitution 
does not require military judges to be appointed for fixed terms). 
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and in sorne cases might surpass, those in a civil court.575 In contrast, the right 
to jury trial, for example, is inapplicable to military commission proceedings 
and Fifth Amendment due process rights might also be more restricted.576 
Courts martial, as well as Article III civil courts, therefore mainly differ from 
military commissions in that the latter are relatively free from the rigorous 
procedural rights applicable to the former twO.577 Unlike courts martial under 
the U C.MJ, "no such statutory procedures exist to codify due pro cess rights 
for defendants before military commissions.,,578 Constitutional due pro cess 
goveming commissions must therefore arise independently of any express 
statutory guarantees. The Supreme Court took this position, by imposing the 
Mathews test upon unlawful combatant detentions and, so by extension, trials 
by military commissions of citizens or non-citizens present in the United 
States. 
The Military Grder and Order No. 1 illustrated the procedural freedom 
characteristic of military commissions. Military commissions could be 
convened under the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief, or 
through designated executive officers. 579 However, as shown by the Military 
Order's invocation of both the constitutional power of the Commander-in-
Chief and his statutory authorization, the extent to which such commissions 
arise from or are limitable by statute, as opposed to inherent executive power, 
575 See United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244 (Ct. Mil. Appeals 1960) and United States v. 
Bell, 40 C.M.R. 807 (Army Board of Review 1969); David L. Herman, "A Dish Best not 
Served at a11: How Foreign Military War Crimes Suspects Lack Protection Under United 
States and International Law" (2002) 172 Mil. L. Rev. 40 at 71; Juan R. Torruella, "On the 
Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of Presidential 
Power" (2002) 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 648 at 713-14. 
576 See 219, below. 
577 Elsea, "Terrorism and the Law ofWar," supra note 545 at 35. 
578 Jennifer Elsea, "Trying Terrorists as War Criminals," Report for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service (29 Oct. 2001) at 4; Solis, supra note 529 at 197. 
579 Halleck, supra note 571 at 965-66; Congres s, however, may ais a specially create a military 
commission under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, just as it has authorized the President to convene 
commissions under 10 U.S.C. § 821. "ABA Task Force," supra note 562 at 8-9. 
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remains unsettled.58o Supported by both executive and legislative sources, the 
Military Order gave to the Secretary of Defense the power to appoint military 
commissions, as well as all rules and regulations to govem its operation.581 
Such executive appointment power arises from the "military function,,582 of 
the commissions, as a response to a terrorist threat against the United States.583 
Accordingly, it was not "practicable to apply in military commissions under 
this order the princip les of law and the rules of evidence generally 
recognizable in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district 
courtS."S84 Commissions therefore differ most importantly in three main ways 
from civil courts, as well as courts martial, based upon evidentiary rules, 
appellate procedures, and right to jury trial. 
580 The Military Drder, supra note 443, specifically mentions, in addition to the authority 
vested in the President as Commander-in-Chief, the Military Force Authorization, supra note 
82, and 10 U.S.c. §§ 821, 836. 
10 U.S.C. § 821 provides: "The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon 
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provo st courts, or other military tribunals 
of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of 
war may be tried by military commissions, provo st courts, or other military tribunals." 
10 U.S.c. § 836 provides: "(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of 
proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and 
other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the 
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the princip les of 
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United 
States District courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter. (b) 
AlI rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform as practicable." 
Halleck, supra note 571 at 965-966, a General and Chief of Staff during the Civil War, 
writes that military commissions "are established by the President, by virtue of his war power 
as commander-in-chief, and have jurisdiction of cases arising under the laws of war .... 
Congress has recognized the lawfulness of these tribunals, and, in a measure, regulated their 
proceedings, but it has not defined or limited their jurisdiction .... " See also Elsea, 
"Terrorism and the Law of War," supra note 545 at 18. For uncertainty over the respective 
legislative and executive power to govem military commissions, see Quirin, 317 O.S. at 29, 
47-48. 
58\ Military Order, supra note 443, § 4(b); The Secretary of Defense subsequently promulgated 
Drder No. 1, supra note 545. 
582 Military Order, ibid. The language of the Military Order designating commissions to have 
a military function would also serve to exclude its proceedings from judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), codified as amended 
at 5 U.s.c. § 550 et seq. (2000), §§ 553(a)(I), 554(a)(4) [hereinafter A.P.A.], which does not 
apply to agency action invo1ving military or foreign affairs. Torrue1la, supra note 575 at 709. 
For further discussion of the A.P.A. and its relevance to military commissions, see 265, below. 
583 Military Order, ibid., §§ 1, 4(b). 
584 Ibid., § 4(b); See also ibid., § 1(t). 
199 
First, military commissions are not subject to common rules of evidence, 
instead usually allowing evidence simply considered by the commission to be 
probative to a reasonable person.585 This considerably relaxes evidentiary 
burdens upon the prosecution, particularly in light of c1aimed inconveniences 
resulting from possible battlefield conditions. An evidentiary standard like 
that established by the Military Order and Order No. 1 could have 
unanticipated and far-reaching consequences for due process. "Almost any 
rumor or hearsay, no matter how far removed, could have sorne probative 
value and would, thus, theoretically be sufficient for admission, since the rule 
gives no standard as to how much probative value is required to convince 'a 
reasonable man,' that most elusive of legal fictions.,,586 However, Iack of 
evidentiary rules and restriction of judiciai review over commission 
proceedings could on the contrary risk due process violations due to unreliable 
factual determinations. 
Second, trial judgments of commissions are not reviewable under regular 
civil or military appellate procedures,587 instead requiring submission of the 
record directly to the President for final review and decision. In the case of the 
Military Order, the President could allow the Secretary of Defense to review 
commission findings.588 Order No. 1 required the commission record to be 
forwarded to a review panel that could order further proceedings by the 
commission or send a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. The 
Secretary of Defense then would review the record before forwarding to the 
585 Ibid., § 4(c)(3), allows the "admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the 
presiding officer of the military commission (or instead, if any other member of the 
commission so requests at the time the presiding officer renders that opinion, the opinion of 
the commission rendered at that time by a majority of the commission), have prabative value 
ta a reasanable persan" [emphasis addedJ. On the use of relaxed evidentiary mIes in past 
trials before military commissions, see Quirin, 317 V.S. at 47-48 and In re Yamashita, 327 
V.S. 1 at 19-20 (1946) (upholding trial by military commission of Japanese general accused of 
atrocities in the Philippines). 
586 Torruella, supra note 575 at 715. 
587 See also Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8. 
588 Military Order, supra note 443, § 4(c)(8). 
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President for final decision. 589 Because military commissions are not courts 
but instruments ofmilitary authority, strictly speaking "their report can only be 
a recommendation, or a statement of facts - never a finding or sentence.,,590 
Their trial determinations therefore are merely advisory to the President, who 
officially deals with (according to his personal discretion) with the individual 
cases they "investigate." This discretion is grounded in his war powers and 
represents an extraordinary application of that power towards the 
determination of an individual's interests in his personal liberty. Juan 
Torruella calls the review procedures established by the Military Order and 
Order No. l "the single most radical departure from the type of procedure 
usually present in a criminal trial," likening it to an administrative review 
process.591 Thus, commission findings are not final, but remain subject to 
personal, executive modification potentially motivated not by legal merits, but 
by political or military considerations. Properly considered, the mixed 
executive and judicial aspects of such proceedings, far from disengaging the 
courts under the separation of powers, reinforce the importance of their role in 
insuring that the executive comply with certain adjudicative standards, where 
executive action combines with quasi-judicial deliberative processes. 
Despite the Military Order's provision ousting commission proceedings 
from review in civil courts or any other tribunals,592 a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus nevertheless constitutionally remains as a mechanism for 
seeking judicial review. While courts might not have an appellate review of 
commission proceedings, through the writ of habeas corpus they can 
nevertheless ensure that the President acts according to law. With the writ, 
they can give a remedy for executive excesses of jurisdiction, notably those 
that violate separation of powers princip les and unjustifiably infringe upon 
individual rights. Grounds for habeas review in these circumstances would 
589 Order No. 1, supra note 545, § 6(H). 
590 Halleck, supra note 571 at 967; Harold Hongju Koh, "Agora: Military Commissions: The 
Case Against Military Commissions" (2002) 96 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 337 at 339 [hereinafter 
"Case Against Military Commissions"]. 
591 Torruella, supra note 575 at 722. 
592 Military Order, supra note 443, § 7(b). 
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include not only legality, but procedural propriety. Both grounds for review 
have substantive elements, particularly in the determination of jurisdictional 
facts, which lead to considerations of reasonableness. Citizens, as well as 
aliens on American soil (as contrasted with aliens abroad), are always entitled 
to seek habeas corpus review of detention. 593 Habeas review is available in 
these circumstances regardless of an ouster clause in an executive order 
authorizing military commissions. President Roosevelt's military order, 
authorizing the trial of German saboteurs in World War II, contained such an 
ouster clause, which the Supreme Court ignored in the Quirin decision.594 
Similarly, the Military Order declared that "the individual shall not be 
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or 
indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the 
individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, 
(ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.,,595 
However, any unilateral attempt by the President to foreclose habeas corpus 
review would most likely be an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, a 
drastic measure generally considered reserved to Congress under Article l, 
section 9 of the Constitution.596 ln response to these concems, White House 
Counsel publicly admitted that the Order would not foreclose habeas corpus 
review, and that under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in the 
United States by a military commission would be able to challenge the 
lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction through a habeas corpus 
proceeding in federai court.597 
593 See Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, and Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763. 
594U .S. White Rouse, Presidential Proclamation No. 2561 (2 July 1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 510 1 (7 
July 1942); U.S. White Rouse, Appointment of Military Commission (2 July 1942), 7 Fed. 
Reg. 5103 (7 July 1942). 
595 Military Order, supra note 443, § 7(b)(2). 
596 Paust, supra note 562 at 21-23; See Justice Scalia's dissent in Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660 et 
seq., taking this position. 
597 Alberto R. Gonzales, "Martial Justice, Full and Fair" The New York Times (20 Nov. 2001) 
A27; As for the ouster clause prohibiting review by foreign courts or international tribunals, it 
is "both surplusage and irrelevant. The President has as much control over those entities as 
they have over us: none." Torruella, supra note 575 at 724. See also Elsea, "Terrorism and the 
Law ofWar," supra note 545 at 33-34. 
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Third, military commissions differ from criminal trials or courts martial 
in that they are free from the Sixth Amendment right to a jury tria1.598 The 
commISSIOn members are solely responsible for making decisions and 
determining sentences. Military Commission Order No. 1, for example, 
provided that two-thirds of commission members could find a defendant guilty 
and pass sentence, except that unanimity would be required for capital 
punishment. 599 There was also sorne uncertainty as to how Fifth Amendment 
due process applied, until the Supreme Court's application of the Mathews 
balancing test in Hamdi. Even after Hamdi, the exact contours of due process 
required further elaboration by the lower courts. Moreover, military 
commissions may proceed wholly or partially in secret in the interests of 
national security.600 These procedural aspects make military commissions 
(and unlawful combatant detentions generally) formidable executive tools for 
directing the war powers, through functionally judicial processes, against an 
individual belligerent in furtherance ofmilitary objectives off the battlefield.601 
598 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-45. 
599 Military Order, supra note 443, §§ 4(c)(6)-(7); Order No. 1, supra note 545, § 6(F); 
Commissions are to consist ofbetween three and seven officers. Ibid., § 4(2). 
600 See Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, and Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial: A Military Tribunal and 
American Law (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003) at 53-56 [heremafter 
Nazi Saboteurs], for an account of the media restrictions on the Quirin trial; Order No. 1, ibid., 
§ 6(B)(3). 
601 "The commission is simply an instrumentality for the more efficient execution of the war 
powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the President as Commander-in-chief in 
war." Winthrop, supra note 552 at 831; See Wedgwood, supra note 529 at 330 (arguing that 
for these reasons, "military commissions may be the most practicable course" for trying 
terrorists). Compare with Koh, "Case Against Military Commissions," supra note 590 
(arguing that military commissions undermine the rule of law, and that Article III courts are 
the most appropria te forum for trying individuals for terrorism or war crimes). Michael J. 
Matheson, "Agora: Military Commissions: U.S. Military Commissions: One of Several 
Options" (2002) 96 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 354 (suggests that military commissions are indeed a 
valid option for trying members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban, but that the government should 
consider the possibly greater utility ofusing other less controversial forums). 
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Chapter X: The Precedent of Ex Parte Quirin 
The Importance a/Quirin 
Ex parte Quirin is the basis upon which later federal courts, in the Hamdi 
and Padilla cases, would find an executive power to detain unlawful 
combatants. Quirin shows that such detentions faU under the executive's 
power to conduct military hostilities. Nevertheless, analysis of Quirin, like the 
laws of war, highlights the mixed executive and judicial aspects of unlawful 
combatant detentions and trials by military commissions. The significance of 
Quirin to the separation of powers, therefore, is that it tried to manage the 
different deliberative processes attendant upon unlawful combatant detentions, 
as well as the branches' relative strengths in employing them. Contrary to the 
interpretation given to it by sorne later courts,602 Quirin did not draw 
formalistic hnes around the war powers, which on their face wou Id support an 
effectively absolute executive discretion to detain outside of meaningful 
judicial review. The case instead supports a presidential authority under the 
war powers to designate, detain, and try unlawful combatants, but existing 
concurrently with a power in the courts to exercise judicial review and hold 
the executive to adjudicative standards. Furthermore, a look behind the scenes 
of the Supreme Court's decision reveals troublesome irregularities in the 
Justices' disposaI of the case. These irregularities caution against an overly 
broad reading of Quirin in favor of executive power, while also suggesting 
that the Justices did not discount, in other factual circumstances, more 
intensive judicial review of the President's detention decisions. 
Historical Background 
602 See the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, 316 F.3d 450, and the Southem District 
Court of New York in Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564. 
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The use ofmilitary tribunals to try spies, saboteurs, guerillas, and the like 
has a long history in American law, peaking in intensity during the Civil War 
and Reconstruction era of the 1860s and '70S.603 One of the earliest examples 
of the use of a military commission occurred during the American Revolution, 
when General Washington ordered the trial of British Major John André on 
charges of spying for the enemy in disguise behind American lines. The 
commission convicted Major André "as a Spy from the enemy, and that 
agreeably to the law and usage ofnations ... he ought to suffer death.,,604 The 
trial of Major André is the first prominent American usage of military 
commissions to try offenses against the law of war, and, because it predates 
the Constitution, shows the long-standing relationship of commissions to the 
laws ofwar. 
With the Mexican War in the 1840s came the first widespread use of 
military commissions under the Constitution. General Winfield Scott, 
commander of American forces in Mexico, instituted martial law in those 
areas of Mexico under military occupation. In keeping order following the 
breakdown of Mexican civil authority, General Scott authorized special 
military tribunals to try three types of offenses. These were crimes ofMexican 
civilians against American troops, crimes of V.S. soldiers not covered by the 
disciplinary provisions of the Articles of War, and offenses against the law of 
war.
605 Vnlike the case of Major André, in which a commission tried a 
specific military offense, the commissions in Mexico supplanted civil 
authority altogether as an instrument of martiallaw and military occupation. 
603 For a good history of military commissions in American law, from the Revolution to the 
"war against terrorism," see Louis Fisher, "Military Tribunals: A Sorry History" (2003) 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 484; See also Winthrop, supra note 552 at 832-34; Solis, supra 
note 529 at 199-201, Green, supra note 550 at 832-33. 
604 Proceedings of a Board of General Officers Respecting Major John Andre (29 Sept. 1780), 
quoted in Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31-32, n. 9. 
605 Michael R. Belknap, "A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in 
Historical Perspective" (2002) 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 433 at 447-48 [hereinafter "Putrid 
Pedigree"]. 
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The most extensive use of executive detentions and military 
commissions was, without equal before or since, during the Civil War. 
Immediately following his assumption of office and the outbreak of the 
South's armed rebellion in 1861, President Lincoln unilaterally suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus and ordered arrests of those suspected of disloyalty to 
the Union. Although Lincoln's suspension of habeas was unconstitutional,606 
Congress ratified the President's action by authorizing his actions after the 
fact. Throughout the war, the Lincoln Administration detained thousands for a 
variety of alleged offenses or sympathy for the rebellion, tried many by 
military commissions, and on several other occasions suspended habeas corpus 
either upon the President's unilateral order, or with the prior or subsequent 
approvalofCongress. The heavy hand of Lincoln's Administration, and ofhis 
suc cess ors during the Reconstruction period, led to several cases regarding the 
constitutionallimits to executive military detentions, but which conflicted and 
did not settle the issue.607 
In 1866, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Ex parte 
Milligan,608 which remained the most important case on military detention and 
trial until Quirin. Coming after the end of the war, amidst the fallout from the 
Lincoln assassination, and when attention had tumed from fifth columns in the 
606 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9, 487), in which Chief 
Justice Taney, on circuit, ruled that the President had no independent constitutional authority 
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but that such power belonged exclusively to Congress. 
The Constitution does not expressly reserve such power to Congress. However, U.S. Const. 
art. J, § 9, in setting out the restrictions upon the powers of Congress, declares: "The privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus shan not be suspende d, unless when in cases of rebellion or 
invasion the public safety may require it." See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in 
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660 et seq., arguing that the President has no constitutional authority to 
detain and try citizens or aliens within United States territory as unlawful combatants, without 
Congress' express suspension of habeas corpus. For extended analysis of the Merryman 
decision, see Jeffrey D. Jackson, "The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the 
Arguments Surrounding Ex Parte Merryman" (2004) 34 U. Balt. L. Rev. Il. 
607 See Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1864) (holding that 
Court had no jurisdiction to hear appeals from military courts), and Ex parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. 506 (1869) (affirming that Congress could withdraw Court's jurisdiction from hearing 
appeals from military commissions operating in the occupied South); Much has been written 
about Lincoln's use of executive arrests and military commissions to suppress political 
dissention in the Northem states. The most extensive treatment of the subject to date is Mark 
E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (Oxford University 
Press, 1991) [hereinafter Fate of Liberty]. 
608 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
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North ta the occupation of the defeated South, Milligan represented a 
significant judicial pronouncement on the limitations of executive detention 
power. The Government in 1865 had accused Lambdin Milligan, a resident of 
Indiana, of participation in a pro-southem organization, whereupon a military 
commission tried, convicted, and sentenced him ta hang. Upon Milligan's 
appeal on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court declared 
that military commissions lacked jurisdiction over citizens having no 
connection with enemy forces and residing in an area with functioning civil 
courts. MilUgan thus sought ta make sure that the executive could not use 
military commissions, under its war powers, ta circumvent the law and civil 
courts. It also affirmed military detentions and commissions as unique means 
ta govem militarily where civil arder had broken down, or ta deal with 
irregular belligerents. Milligan, however, left open further inquiry about just 
what criteria defined a citizen as opposed ta a belligerent, upon which Quirin 
and Harndi would later elaborate. Despite Milligan, however, the U.S. 
military continued ta detain individuals and try them by commissions during 
the occupation of the South, as part of the Government's Reconstruction 
efforts ta restore civil arder and curb bath racial and anti-Union violence in the 
aftermath of the Civil War. Military commissions also tried the conspirators 
ta the Lincoln assassination.609 
Obviously, the circumstances motivating the exceptional executive 
intrusions upon civil liberties during the Civil War were in response ta 
extreme national crisis. The United States was engaged in a civil war for 
preservation of the Union, fighting against formidable Southem armies in the 
field and sorne considerable Confederate sympathy within the North. With 
military conquest and occupation of the South came the collapse of civil 
authority there and the challenging task of national political reunification. 
Thus, the detentions and use of military trials in the South were generally in 
accordance with the laws of war regarding military govemance of occupied 
609 See for example McCardle, 74 U.S. 506; V.S. White House, Order of the President 
Establishing a Military Commission (1 May 1865) and U.S. Attorney General's Office, 
Opinion on the Constitutional Power of the Military to Try and Execute the Assassins of the 
President (July 1865); Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (2 March 1867) (dividing the 
South into military districts and authorizing trial by military commissions). 
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enemy territory, with the anomaly that occupation was not of foreign soil, but 
rebellious American States. Furthermore, Congress statutorily authorized 
executive detentions and military commissions in the South pursuant to its 
policy of military Reconstruction.610 The Civil War and Reconstruction era 
was thus the high-water mark of military detentions and trials, the law of 
which wou Id not see any further significant development until the Supreme 
Court's decision in Quirin during the Second World War.611 
The Quirin Case 
In June of 1942, eight German saboteurs landed on American shores. 
Trained by the German Army in infiltration and sabotage techniques, the 
individuals had the mission of attacking industries and other infrastructure 
within the United States. AlI of the men had lived in the United States at sorne 
point in their lives, while one would later claim American citizenship in his 
trial before the military commission.612 After completing their training, aH 
eight went to the United States. Four men landed on a Long Island beach on 
June 13, 1942, while the others arrived on the coast near Jacksonville, Florida 
on June 16, 1942.613 Members of both parties disembarked from German 
submarines and wore articles of German military uniforms, burying them after 
610 See for example Reconstruction Act, ibid. 
6Il In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), the Supreme Court upheld a curfew 
imposed upon individuals of Japanese ancestry, while in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944), it found constitutional the executive internment of such individuals pursuant to 
congressional authorization. However, in Ex parte Endo, 323 V.S. 283 (1944), the Court 
made c1ear that upon a petition for habeas corpus il would review whether an individual 
subject to detention was, in fact, loyal and so falling outside of the executive's power to detain 
under congressional authorization. See infra note 796. 
612 The eight men were George Dasch, Ernest Burger, Heimich Heinck, Richard Quirin, 
Edward Kerling, Werner Thiel, Hermann Neubauer, and Herbert Haupt. In challenging the 
jurisdiction of the military commission, Haupt c1aimed American citizenship as his parents 
had immigrated to the Vnited States when he was five years old and then became naturalized 
while he was a minor. 317 V.S. at 20. For biographical background on the eight saboteurs, 
see Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 6-16. 
613 The Supreme Court opinion in Quirin, 317 V.S. at 21, gives the date of the Florida landing 
as "[o]n or about June 17, 1942," while Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, ibid. at 35, dates the landing as 
June 16; Burger, Heinck, Quirin, and Dasch landed on Long Island, while Kerling, Thiel, 
Neubauer, and Haupt landed in Florida. 317 V.S. at 21. 
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landing. Changing into civilian c10thing and carrying large quantities of cash, 
the men dispersed in pairs to different points in the United States. By June 27, 
however, all men were in the custody of the F.B.I. without committing any 
sabotage, a remarkably quick roundup that was as strange as most of the case's 
history. 
Shortly after one party landed on Long Island, a Coastguardsman on 
patrol spotted and confronted the men. After a bribery attempt, the party let 
the Coastguardsman depart, whereupon he reported the incident at his station. 
Although the saboteurs had disappeared by the time the Coastguard 
investigated, its personnel discovered the German uniforms along with 
explosives and other materials buried in the sand. The Coastguard informed 
the F.B.I. of these events, which soon after took up the investigation. 
Nevertheless, the Coastguard's discovery of the men did not directly lead to 
their arrest. Instead, apprehension of the saboteurs resulted from betrayal by 
one of their own. George Dasch, the leader of the group which landed on 
Long Island and the one who had tried to bribe the Coastguard patrol, called 
the F.B.I. office in New York to report the conspiracy.614 Surprisingly, the 
dut y officer recorded the caU but the F.B.I. took no action upon it. Five days 
later, on June 18, Dasch actually traveled from New York City to Washington 
D.C. and physically tumed himselfin to the F.B.I. The information that Dasch 
provided led to the quick arrests of the other saboteurs. In the publicity that 
followed, the F.B.I. promoted its capture of the saboteurs without recognizing 
the role of either the Coastguard or Dasch's surrender. It certainly did not 
reveal its embarrassing failure to act upon Dasch's initial caU to its New York 
desk. Instead, the Govemment continued to c10sely control aU information 
regarding the event and the subsequent secret military trial, and exploited the 
situation as a propaganda opportunity to show the skill of America's security 
establishment. Thus, immediately upon capture of the saboteurs, the 
Govemment's actions demonstrated concem with public image both at home 
and abroad. 
614 Dasch apparently made the caU with the knowledge and approval of his partner, Burger. 
David J. Danelski, "The Saboteurs' Case," (1996) 1 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 61 at 64. 
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After capture of the saboteurs, the Administration swiftly settled on a 
special military trial, with little internaI disagreement. Encouraged by the 
Attorney General Francis Biddle, President Roosevelt signed a 
Proclamation615 on July 2 designating the captives as unlawful combatants and 
authorizing their trial by military commission. President Roosevelt's 
Proclamation specifically addressed those enemies, whether citizens or 
otherwise, who entered United States territory to commit sabotage, other 
hostile acts, or violations of the law of war. Claiming authority under the 
Constitution and unspecified statutes, the President subjected all such 
individuals to the law of war and the jurisdiction of military tribunals. By 
generally invoking the laws of war, and being vague in his reliance upon 
statutory authority, the President avoided any overt claim to inherent power 
while at the same time maximizing his legal maneuverability as Commander-
in-Chief.616 The Proclamation went further, however, by purporting to deny 
the saboteurs all access to the civil court system.617 President Roosevelt issued 
an Order618 on the same day establishing the military commission to try the 
offenses against the law of war. The Order empowered the commission to set 
mIes for its own procedure, consistent with Congress' Articles of War 
governing military justice, but free from the procedures for courts martia1.619 
The commission could forego regular mIes of evidence in order to admit 
anything having "probative value to a reasonable man." AIso, the commission 
could convict and condemn to death upon concurrence of two-thirds of its 
members, as opposed to the unanimity required for capital sentences in courts 
615 U.S. White Rouse, Presidential Proclamation No. 2561 (2 July 1942),7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (7 
July 1942) [hereinafter "Proclamation"]. 
616 See Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 51. 
617 President Roosevelt's Proclamation, supra note 615, provided that "such persans shaH not 
he privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have 
any such remedy or proceeding sought on their hehalf, in the courts of the United States, or of 
its states, territories, and possessions, except under such regulations as the Attorney General, 
with the approval of the Secretary ofWar, may from time to time prescrihe." 
618 U.S. White Rouse, Executive Order No. 9185 (2 July 1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (7 July 
1942) [hereinafter "Order"]. 
619 Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 52. 
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martial. In a final departure from standard procedure of military justice, the 
decision of the commission was to go directly to the President for review 
rather than to the usual review panel used in courts martial. 
The Government formally charged the saboteurs with violating the laws 
of war and the provisions of the Articles of War related to communicating 
intelligence to and spying for the enemy, along with conspiracy to do the 
same.
620 With the eight men defended by appointed military counsel, the trial 
before the military commission began on July 8. The trial remained closed to 
the public and proceeded in secret. About two weeks after the start of the trial, 
defense counsel sought to challenge the commission's jurisdiction through 
petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus in direct challenge to President Roosevelt's 
Proclamation, closing defendants' access to the civil COurtS.621 The resulting 
procedural steps for the habeas petition were both hurried and confused. 
When the federal District Court for the District of Columbia immediately 
denied the defendants' petition, their counsel filed a habeas petition with the 
Supreme Court in special session. 
The Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court agreed to hear oral arguments on the habeas corpus 
petition while the petitioners perfected an exceptional application for certiorari 
to the D.C. Court of Appeals before the D.C. court had actually rendered a 
judgment. 622 On July 31, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, 
and in a short per curiam opinion also upheld the District Court's denial of 
habeas. 623 The Supreme Court upheld aIl charges against the petitioners and 
620 Articles ofWar, 81, 82 (codified at 10 U.S.c. § 1471 et seq. (1940)). 
621 Dasch, in cooperating with the governrnent, would not be a party to the habeas petition. 
Danelski, supra note 614 at 68. 
622 Petitioners applied for a writ of certiorari under 28 V.S.C. § 347(a). Vpon stipulation of 
counsel for petitioners and respondent, the record for the habeas petition in the Supreme Court 
applied to the certiorari proceedings. See 317 V.S. at 18, per curiam opinion. 
623 "Thus the Court's jurisdiction caught up with the Court just at the finish line." Danelski, 
supra note 614 at 58. 
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the authority of the military commission to try them; it specifically reserved 
"the preparation of a full opinion which necessarily will require a considerable 
period of time for its preparation .... ,,624 After the Supreme Court's issuance 
of the per curiam opinion, the commission reconvened for final arguments on 
August 1, and on August 3 it convicted all defendants and sentenced them to 
death. President Roosevelt, however, granted clemency to Dasch and 
Burger.625 The Court's formaI opinion would not come until October 29, 
1942, in which it clearly recognized the President's power to try an unlawful 
combatant, even if a U.S. citizen, by military commission. 
The Court, in issuing its formaI opinion, faced the fait accompli of its per 
curiam opinion and the resulting execution of six of the saboteurs. While this 
predicament and the politicization of the case conceivably influenced the 
Court's justifications for its decision, which deferred to the President, Quirin 
was far from a blank endorsement of an executive detention power. The Court 
had exercised its habeas jurisdiction, in spite of the ouster clause in the 
President's Proclamation. The Government indeed argued that the President, 
by virtue of his office as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, had 
power to deny habeas corpus to invading alien enemies.626 Nevertheless, the 
Court ignored the Proclamation's injunction that the petitioners "shall not be 
privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding" in the civil courts. 
Without further explanation, it instead asserted that: 
... there is certainly nothing in the Proclamation to prevent access to the 
courts for determining its applicability to the particular case. And 
neither the Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens 
forecloses consideration by the courts ofpetitioners' contentions that the 
Constitution and laws of the United States constitutionally enacted forbid 
their trial by military commission.627 
624 See 317 V.S. at 18-19, per curiam opinion. 
625 Dasch received a sentence of 30 years and Burger one of life. Danelski, supra note 614 at 
72. President Truman wou Id later commute the sentences of both and repatriate them to 
Germany. Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 175. 
626 317 V.S. at 11-13. 
627 Ibid. at 25. 
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The Court's review asserted the independent role of the judicial branch to 
check the executive and not let it determine its own jurisdiction.628 The Court 
realized the importance of habeas review, when it stated: "Constitutional 
safeguards for the protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be 
disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on sorne who are guilty.,,629 
Thus, "dut y ... rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, 
to preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty .... ,,630 
The Quirin Court, far from advocating an absolute executive discretion to 
detain under the war powers, reaffirmed its constitutional power ofreview. 
Thus, the Court in Quirin followed the Milligan decision, which had 
summed-up the judicial role in checking executive detention by declaring that 
"[i]f there was law to justify this military trial, it is not our province to 
interfere; if there was not, it is our dut y to declare the nullity of the whole 
proceedings.,,631 In other respects, Quirin distinguished Milligan upon its 
facts, but did not overrule it. Milligan, the Court explained, was a citizen 
having no association with the armed forces of the enemy and a non-
belligerent not subject to the law ofwar. Milligan had also never lived in any 
of the rebellious states, but resided in Indiana, where there was no martial law 
in force and the civil courts were open. For these reasons, a military 
commission had no jurisdiction to try Milligan. The Court accordingly 
"construe[d] the [earlier] Court's statement as to the applicability of the law of 
war to Milligan's case as having particular reference to the facts before it.,,632 
In contrast, aIl petitioners in Quirin were associated with the military forces of 
aState with which the United States was at war. The fact that the saboteurs 
628 But see Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 121-22, observing that "the message was 
1arge1y a fiction," and that the Supreme Court, "[i]nstead of functioning as an independent 
institution, ... served more as a wing of the White Rouse." 
629 317 U.S. at 25. 
630 Ibid. at 19. 
631 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119. 
632 317 U.S. at 45. 
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trained under the military and wore uniforms upon their initial landing from 
enemy submarines demonstrated their status as combatants. They were thus 
subject to the law of war, which they violated upon entering the United States 
and shedding uniform in order to commit hostile acts. It was petitioners' 
alleged military affiliation that the Quirin Court emphasized in distinguishing 
Milligan. As Attorney General Biddle advised President Roosevelt: 
"Practically ... the Milligan case is out of the way and should not plague us 
again.,,633 It is worth noting, however, that the petitioners in Quirin did not 
challenge the facts of the case, which therefore "1eaves open the important 
question of how to proceed should these 'jurisdictional' facts be disputed.,,634 
Milligan is still good Iaw, and would prohibit military detention or trial of an 
individual who could controvert the Govemment' s factual assertions regarding 
his alleged belligerency. Milligan and Quirin, taken together then, point to the 
importance of judicial review based upon procedural fairness and 
reasonableness; Govemment errors III its factual justifications are 
jurisdictional ones, denying it authority to detain or try. 
Quirin also took an expansive approach to constitutional and statutory 
authorization of executive war measures. This approach favored a broad 
executive power to detain arising from vague and brief statutory reference to 
military commissions, rather than provisions expressly authorizing military 
detention and trial. The Court explained the legislative basis of the President's 
authority to detain and try the petitioners: 
By the Articles of War, 10 U.S.c. §§ 1471-1593, Congress has 
provided rules for the govemment of the Arroy. It has provided for the 
trial and punishment, by courts martial, of violations of the Articles by 
members of the armed forces and by specified classes of persons 
associated with the Army. Arts. l, 2. But the Articles also recognize the 
"military commission" appointed by military command as an appropriate 
tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war 
not ordinarily tried by court martial. See Arts. 12, 15. Articles 38 and 
633 Francis Biddle, Memorandum for the President, 29 Oct. 1942, OF 3602, F.D.R. Papers, 
quoted in Danelski, supra note 614 at 79. 
634 Robert E. Cushman, "Ex parte Quirin et a/- The Nazi Saboteur Case" (1942) 29 Comell 
L.Q. 54 at 64. 
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46 authorize the President, with certain limitations, to prescribe the 
procedure for military commissions. Articles 81 and 82 authorize trial, 
either by court martial or military commission, of those charged with 
relieving, harboring or corresponding with the enemy and those charged 
with spying. And Article 15 declares that "the provisions of these 
articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial shall not be construed 
as depriving military commissions . . . or other military tribunals of 
concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute 
or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions ... or 
other military tribunals." Article 2 includes among those persons subject 
to military law the personnel of our own military establishment. But 
this, as Article 12 provides, does not exclude from that class "any other 
person who by the law ofwar is subject to trial by military tribunals" and 
who under Article 12 may be tried by court martial or under Article 15 
by military commission. 
Similarly the Espionage Act of 1917, which authorizes trial in the 
district courts of certain offenses that tend to interfere with the 
prosecution of war, provides that nothing contained in the act "shaH be 
deemed to limit the jurisdiction of the general courts-martial, military 
commissions, or naval courts-martial." 50 U.S.c. § 38.635 
These provisions of the Articles of War and the Espionage Act satisfied the 
Court that Congress had authorized military commissions. The Hamdi and 
Padilla courts would later foHow this broad interpretive approach to the 
U CM.J, which matched that taken to congressional authorization for military 
force under the Vietnam War cases. 
Further elaboration of the form and jurisdiction of commissions was 
unnecessary, as they applied to aIl "offenders or offenses that ... by the law of 
war may be triable by such military commissions .... ,,636 Congress thus 
"incorporated by reference . . . aH offenses which are defined as such by the 
law of war . . . ,,,637 which determined the nature and use of military 
commissions. As the Court explained, Congress had power under Article l, 
section 8, clause 10 to "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of 
Nations." The exercise of such power required neither codification of 
international law nor statutory enumeration of its offenses, but contemplated 
635 317 US. at 26-27. 
636 Articles ofWar, 15. 
637 317 U.S. at 30. 
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blanket incorporation by reference.638 Congress' authorization of military 
commissions, then, was premised upon its adoption of the "common law of 
war," defined by the Govemment prosecution as "a centuries-old body of 
largely unwritten mIes and princip les of international law which governs the 
behavior of both soldiers and civilians during time of war.,,639 This left open 
the question, for resolution in the courts, as to just what was the content of the 
internationallaw of war. Congress had thus adopted "all offenses" defined by 
"the system of common law applied by military tribunals so far as if should be 
recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. ,,640 The Court thereby 
strongly suggested that the judiciary, not the President or military authorities, 
had the final say as to the requirements of international law. Wholesale 
incorporation of the international law of war also raised the interesting 
possibility, not addressed by the Quirin Court, that such law could change over 
time, without modification by Congress. If so, such changes would 
presumably result from evolving "usages established among civilized peoples, 
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience," and 
recognized by the civil courtS.64l Moreover, Quirin begged the question, also 
left unaddressed in later cases, as to whether the law ofwar, as incorporated by 
Congress, included protective principles that actually restrained executive 
exercises of military power. The Court, however, did not speculate on larger 
issues arising from Congress' general adoption of the laws of war. Instead, it 
simply dec1ared that the international laws of war, by custom and usage642 as 
weIl as the Hague Convention,643 recognized the offense of crossing into 
638 Ibid. at 29-30. 
639 Argument of Attorney General Biddle, 317 U.S. at 13-14, citing Winthrop, supra note 552 
at 17,41,42, 773 ff. 
640 317 U.S. at 30 [emphasis added]. 
641 Hague Convention, Preamble, supra note 506, quoted at 317 D.S. at 35. The Quirin Court, 
ibid. at 29, qualified the operation of the law ofwar, stating that "[w]e may assume that there 
are acts regarded in other countries, or by sorne writers on international law, as offenses 
against the law of war which would not be triable by military tribunal here, either because they 
are not recognized by our courts as violations of the law of war or because they are of that 
c1ass of offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury." 
642 317 D.S. at 35, n. 12. 
643 317 US. at 34-35, citing Hague Convention, supra note 506. The Court also explained, 
ibid. at 34, that the War Department had incorporated the Hague definition of lawful 
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enemy territory, out of uniform, in order to commit hostile acts.644 The 
President, it decided, could lawfully punish such acts by military commission. 
Although the Court found statutory authorization for the President's 
detention and trial of unlawful combatants, it offered a vague hint about 
whether the President might possess inherent power for his actions. In dealing 
with the saboteurs, the Court concluded, President Roosevelt exercised a 
congressional conf errai of authority over unlawful combatants. However, he 
also wielded "such authority as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in 
Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally 
be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war.,,645 Just what 
might be the extent ofhis full authority remained unresolved: 
It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the 
President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create 
military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. 
For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war 
before such commissions. We are concemed only with the question 
wh ether it is within the constitutional power of the National Govemment 
to place petitioners upon trial before a military commission for the 
offenses with which they are charged.646 
Quirin accordingly addressed not inherent executive power, but the President's 
proper exercise of congressionally delegated authority. There was no need to 
consider Roosevelt' s authority standing alone, either in the midst of legislative 
silence or in the face of conflicting statute. 
In Quirin, the Supreme Court foreshadowed its Youngstown decision of a 
few years later. In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson found the 
President's authority at its maximum when proceeding from express or 
combatancy in its Rules of Land Warfare, citing those of 1914, paras. 369-77 and of 1940, 
paras. 8-9, 345-57. 
644 317 V.S. at 34-35. 
645 Ibid. at 28; Green, supra note 550 at 837, is of the opinion that "[t]he authority of the 
military commission transcends the authority contained in the Articles ofWar. ... " 
646 317 V.S. at 29. 
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implied congressional authorization, while descending into "twilight" with the 
absence of legislation or being limited only to what was constitutionally 
intrinsic in the presence of conflicting statute.647 Based upon its interpretation 
of congressional authorization in Quirin, the President was therefore acting at 
full authority under the war powers, although such authority itself could not 
oust the Court's own constitutional jurisdiction to review upon a habeas 
petition. Quirin also followed the reasoning of Curtiss- Wright, which stood 
for judicial deference to executive actions in foreign affairs pursuant to broad 
interpretation of congressional authorization. Although it failed to cite 
Curtiss-Wright, the Quirin decision resonated with the earlier case by finding 
congressional authorization for executive detentions and military commission 
trials in the course of conducting the war. The Court thus demonstrated 
sensitivity to the distinctions between domestic and foreign exercises of 
executive power, as weIl as the functionally mixed deliberative processes the 
executive used in trying petitioners as unlawful combatants. Under the 
circumstances, however, it showed a willingness to find an executive authority 
to detain. In addition to responding to the pressures of world war, the case 
came to the Supreme Court "at a time when its separation of powers 
jurisprudence, in both the foreign relations and domestic realms, was in astate 
of flUX.,,648 While Quirin was replete with language alluding to the 
Commander-in-Chiefs war powers, and spoke in terms favorable to executive 
authority, it nevertheless remained squarely premised upon a congressional 
delegation of power. Quirin explicitly refused to examine a claim of inherent 
executive authority to detain unlawful combatants, and evidenced considerable 
judicial consideration of the President' s legal bases for action. 
An Irregular Precedent 
647 343 U.S. at 635-38. 
648 G. Edward White, "Felix Frankfurter's 'Soliloquy' in Ex parte Quirin: Nazi Sabotage and 
Constitutional Conundrums" (2002) 5 Green Bag 2d 423 at 429. 
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Aside from the question of whether or not the President had legal 
authority to try the petitioners by military commission, Quirin aiso raised 
issues of procedural propriety. Proceedings against the saboteurs were swift. 
The Government apprehended the last of the saboteurs by June 27, President 
Roosevelt ordered a military commission on July 2, the trial began on July 8, 
and, except for final arguments, c10sed on July 27. Oral argument before the 
Supreme Court began on July 29, and it delivered the per curiam decision on 
July 31. Although the efforts made by defense counsel were admirable given 
these time constraints, the proceedings were extremely hurried. Along with 
considerations of time, procedure differed considerably from that of a civil 
trial, and even a regular court martial. Notably, the Government charged the 
petitioners without indictment by grand jury, and denied them trial by jury. 
Furthermore, the trial was not only secret, but the commission could admit any 
evidence having probative value to a reasonable man, rather than being 
admissible under the mIes of evidence for courts-martial or civilian trials. 
Finally, conviction and sentencing (inc1uding capital) required only a two-
thirds majority of the commission members, andjudgment went directly to the 
President rather than to a board of review like that usually used in courts 
martial. 
The Quirin Court had no difficulty in deciding that Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights to grand jury and trial by jury were inapplicable to military 
commissions. Significantly, however, the Court restricted its discussion of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to their provisions on grand jury indictment and 
trial by jury. The Supreme Court did not consider the fundamental due 
process concem of preliminary access to a judicial process, as petitioners had 
received a timely (although perhaps too quick) trial and access to counse1.649 
649 Defense counsel also did not make a procedural due process argument, preferring instead to 
assert the applicability of the procedures contained in Congress' Articles of War. See 220, 
below. Interestingly, in his draft opinion, Chief Justice Stone briefly suggested that sorne 
legal process would always be required for any punishment under the law. Justice Douglas, 
however, persuaded Stone to delete the sentence, arguing that it His susceptible to the 
interpretation that it would have been unlawful for the executive to have disposed of the 
petitioners summarily without a trial by a tribunal." Since the President's power to order 
summary execution, and thus deny fundamental due process, were not in issue, Douglas saw 
no need to raise the point in the formaI opinion. Danelski, supra note 614 at 76. 
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The Court explained that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guaranteed 
indictment and jury trial only as practiced at common law, excluding petty 
offenses and contempt for example.65o Under the common law, indictment 
and jury trial were likewise "procedures unknown to military tribunals, which 
are not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article .... ,,651 For this reason, the 
Court concluded that "the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict 
whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against 
the law of war by military commission, and that petitioners, charged with su ch 
an offense not required to be tried by jury at common law, were lawfully 
placed on trial by the Commission without ajury.,,652 So while Quirin limited 
the application of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in trials by military 
commissions, it did so only in regard to indictment and jury trial. Quirin did 
not directly address Fifth Amendment due process, nor did it have to broach 
Sixth Amendment rights to speedy trial and counsel. The Supreme Court 
would not address the due process issue until the Hamdi case, in which it 
adopted the Mathews balancing test. 
Defense counsel challenged the procedural peculiarities of the 
commission by relying upon the Articles of War, suggesting that the 
procedures for courts martial likewise applied to special military tribunals.653 
Specifically, the defense argued that the Articles established rules of 
evidence,654 required a three-fourth majority for conviction,655 mandated a 
preliminary hearing,656 and provided for appeal including submission of the 
650 317 V.S. at 39-40. 
651 Ibid. at 39 [citations omitted]; The Court also emphasized that trial ofunlawful combatants 
did not present exceptions to the V.S. Const. Amends. V, VI as "cases arising in the land or 
naval forces," as such exception was to allow courts martial for offenses that otherwise might 
be triable in the civil courts. This is because "[n]o exception is necessary to exclude from the 
operation ofthese provisions cases never deemed to be within their terms." 317 V.S. at 41,43. 
652 Ibid. at 45. 
653 See ibid. at 10-11. 
654 Articles of War, 38. 
655 Ibid., 43. 
656 Ibid., 70. 
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trial record to a board of review. 657 The trial before the military commission 
lacked in aIl of these aspects. The Government, in contrast, took the position 
that "[ w ]hatever privilege may be accorded to such enemies is accorded by 
sufferance, and may be taken away by the President,,,658 whose power over 
unlawful combatants was "absolute.,,659 The Court saw no need to determine 
whether the Articles of War, or constitutional due process and international 
law, required sorne kind of trial for detainees.660 However, it summarily 
rebuffed the defense argument with little explanation, while revealing tensions 
among the Justices. Unanimously agreeing that the Articles of War afforded 
no basis for a writ of habeas corpus, the Justices divided on the reasoning 
behind their conclusion. Sorne members believed that the Articles of War 
simply did not apply to military commissions, while others found that the 
Articles applied, but did not conflict with the commissions' procedures.661 
Although Chief Justice Stone had little difficulty accommodating the 
members of the Court on most issues in the case, he encountered trouble on 
the question of the Articles of War. Faced with stubborn disagreement over 
the application of the Articles to military commissions, the Chief Justice 
circulated two memorandums offering different justifications. "Memorandum 
A" suggested that ev en if the Articles662 required submission of the 
commission's record to a board ofreview before the President's final decision, 
the issue was not before the Court and could not be a basis for the writ. This 
argument raised doubt, however, as to whether the President's subsequent 
failure to utilize a board of review was a potential jurisdictional defect only 
657 Ibid., 46, 50~. 
658 317 V.S. at 12. 
659 Ibid.; "The position of the Attorney General was that the President could lawfully have 
ordered the prisoners shot as soon as they were arrested, that trial before the Military 
Commission was given as an act of grace and not of necessity, and that as belligerents the 
prisoners had no right of access to any court." Cushman, supra note 634 at 63. 
660 317 U.S. at 47. 
661 Ibid. at47-48. 
662 Articles ofWar, 46, 50~. 
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now apparent after execution ofpetitioners.663 "Memorandum B" asserted that 
the Articles of War simply did not apply at aU to military commissions trying 
violations of the law of war. This was not only a larger question not before the 
Court, but could support a broader executive power to militarily try citizens 
for any unspecified offense under the law of war. 664 Justice Jackson 
complicated matters by th en writing his own memorandum c1aiming that the 
civil courts had no jurisdiction to review the President' s treatment of unlawful 
combatants pursuant to the exercise of his war powers, and that the Articles of 
War did not apply. Jackson not only fragmented the Court further, but aiso 
asserted a c1aim of inherent executive authority to detain and try unlawful 
b b '1' . . 665 corn atants y ml ltary commIssIOn. Unanimous decision increasingly 
seemed unlikely. Nevertheless, a final unanimous opinion ultimately glossed 
over these internaI disagreements, which were symptomatic of the Court's 
highly unusual and belated decision-making in the case.666 Resolution of the 
problem resulted, however, from what must be one of the more unusual 
incidents in the Supreme Court's history, the "soliloquy" of Justice 
Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter's memorandum, commenting on the Court's 
quandary, belied an infectious politicization of the case and highlighted its 
context of desperate, total war. 
663 White, supra note 648 at 431; Danelski, supra note 614 at 71; In a letter to Justice 
Frankfurter, Chief Justice Stone worried that it "seems almost brutal to announce this ground 
of decision for the [Ifst time after six of the petitioners have been executed and it is too late for 
them to raise the question if in fact the articles as they construe them have been violated." 
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter, 10 Sept. 1942, Felix Frankfurter Papers, 
quoted in Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 110. 
664 White, ibid. at 431. 
665 Ibid. at 432; Danelski, supra note 614 at 76; Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 114-
16. 
666 In an unpublished interview in 1962, Justice Douglas commented: "Our experience with 
[the Saboteurs' Case 1 indicated ... to all of us that it is extremely undesirable to announce a 
decision on the merits without an opinion accompanying it. Because once the search for the 
grounds . . . is made, sometimes those grounds crumble." Transcription of interviews of 
William O. Douglas, by Walter F. Murphy, pp. 204-05, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, 
Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., quoted in Danelski, ibid. at 80. 
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Upset at the course the Court was taking in coming to a formaI decision, 
Justice Frankfurter sent around a memorandum entitled "F.F.'s Soliloquy,,,667 
taking the form of an imaginary conversation between him and the saboteurs. 
The Justice criticized the differences in reasoning regarding the applicability 
of the Articles of War, writing that he could not "find enough room in the legal 
differences between them to insert a razor blade." Responding to the 
petitioners' request for a writ of habeas corpus, Justice Frankfurter attacked 
the "damned scoundrels" as "low-down, ordinary, enemy spies" subject to 
summary execution, but instead "humanely" tried by military Commission 
upon order of the Commander-in-Chief. While the Articles of War authorized 
the President's actions, Articles 46 and 50Yz simply did not apply in the 
circumstances of the case. Justice Frankfurter, however, refused to be 
"seduced into inquiring what powers the President has or has not got, what 
limits the Congress may or may not put upon the Commander-in-Chief in time 
of war, when, as a matter of fact, the ground upon which you claim to stand -
namely, the proper construction ofthese Articles ofWar - exists only in your 
foolish fancy." It was unnecessary any further to justify a conclusion shared 
by the Justices and reachable with "intellectual self-respect," thereby avoiding 
"needless rows." Justice Frankfurter contemptuously dismissed the petitioners 
as having "done enough mischief already without leaving the seeds of a bitter 
conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress after your bodies will 
be rotting in lime." After damning the saboteurs, Frankfurter included in his 
imaginary conversation sorne of the "very best lawyers" he knew who were in 
battle "to lick the Japs and the Nazis." These fictionallawyers castigated the 
Justices for their "intemecine conflict," and advised them not to be "too 
engrossed in . . . verbalistic conflicts because the inroads on energy and 
national Ullity that such conflict inevitably produce, is a pastime we had better 
postpone until peacetime." The soliloquy was an acidic and blatant call for 
patriotic unit y at the expense of objective and reasoned legal analysis, but had 
the desired effect. Having already painted themselves into a corner with the 
premature per curiam opinion, and faced with justifying the execution of six 
667 "F.F.'s Soliloquy," October 1942, Jackson Papers, reprinted in Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, 
supra note 600 at 118-21. 
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men, the Justices fell into line. Following sorne further correspondence, 
Justice Jackson agreed not to write a separate concurrence, while the other 
justices settled on a compromise. Chief Justice Stone, in drafting the Court's 
unanimous opinion, offered the reasoning of neither his Memorandum A or B. 
He instead inserted only a paragraph concluding that Articles of War 46 and 
50Y2 did not provide grounds for habeas relief, while finding it unnecessary to 
decide in just what way Congress might restrict the President's power over 
such enemy belligerents. 
Justice Frankfurter's soliloquy, as biased and politicized as it was, was 
just one extraordinary event in a case that was rife with irregularities. Shortly 
after apprehension of the saboteurs, Frankfurter had also advised Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson that a military commission shouid be composed entirely 
of military officers. The Court had other connections with the executive 
branch, as weIl. Justice Byrnes had worked so closely within the 
Administration itself that he would leave the Court in October of 1942, before 
issuance of the formaI opinion, in order to direct the Office of Economie 
Stabilization.668 Chief Justice Stone's son, an Army major and judge 
advocate, had actually been a member of the defense counsel before the 
military commission, although Attorney General Biddle asked the Chief 
Justice not to recuse himself on that account. The only justice to disqualify 
himself from the case was Justice Murphy, on active dut y as a lieutenant 
colonel in the Army Reserves; he did so at the suggestion of Justice 
Frankfurter.669 
From the beginning, aside from the naturally unpopular cause of the Nazi 
saboteurs, the Court sought to avoid a constitutional crisis through a 
confrontation with President Roosevelt, who had declared to his Attorney 
General Francis Biddle, "1 won't give them up . .. 1 won't hand them over to 
any United States marshall armed with a writ of habeas cOrpUS.,,670 Members 
668 Fisher, ibid. at 96. 
669 Danelski, supra note 614 at 69. 
670 Francis Biddle, In Brie! Authority (1962) at 331, quoted in Danelski, ibid. at 68. 
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of the Court were aware of Roosevelt's position, as during a preliminary 
conference on the case Justice Roberts expressed fear that the President would 
execute the petitioners regardless of the Court's decision.671 The justices 
likely remained wary of a constitutional showdown during wartime, a 
sentiment Justice Frankfurter expressed in his soliloquy pleading for 
. fi 1 .. 672 unanimity III Quirin 's orma opIlllOn. The purposes behind Justice 
Frankfurter's curious memorandum seem to have motivated the Supreme 
Court as a whole. The Court "sought to achieve two potentially conflicting 
goals: swift and drastic punishment for the Nazi-sponsored saboteurs, and the 
avoidance of any public constitutional clashes that might produce open 
ideological divisions within the Court,,,673 as weIl as direct challenge to the 
President. These goals colored the Court's view of the case. While Quirin 
upholds an executive detention power, it aiso stands for sorne degree of 
judicial review over its exercise. The irregularities in the case strongly caution 
against reading Quirin more broadly than necessary, in support of an absolute 
executive discretion to designate, detain, and try an unlawful combatant by 
military commission. 
The circumstances recounted above underscore the exceptionai nature of 
the Quirin case, its deep and troubling politicization, and its inseparability 
from the context of the Second World War. Far from isolated, Quirin grew in 
the same war-poisoned atmosphere in which the Supreme Court decided 
Korematsu v. United States,674 upholding the Administration's mass 
internment of Japanese-Americans. Quirin aiso occurred in a period before 
contemporary human rights law, further developments in the law of war, and 
the due process revolution of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl 
Warren. Certainly, the fact that a formaI state of war - a total war - existed 
671 Danelski, ibid. at 69. 
672 Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs, supra note 600 at 121. 
673 White, supra note 648 at 433. 
674 Korematsu, 323 o.S. 214; For a review of major Supreme Court decisions during the war, 
see David P. Currie, "Lecture: The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second World 
War, 1941-1946" (1987) 37 Cath. UL. Rev. 1. 
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between Nazi Germany and the United States might go a long way to explain 
the Court's troubled deliberations in Quirin. Moreover, use of military 
commissions indisputably has a long history in the United States, as weIl as 
support in the international laws of war. However, the constitutionality of 
executive detentions and trial depends upon such circumstances. Military 
detentions and commissions during actual invasion or the occupation of 
foreign territory differ in kind from those domestically used against citizens 
accused of offenses against the law of war. In interpreting congressional 
authorization for such commissions and the degree, if any, to which the 
President can redirect his war powers to infringe individual rights and impact 
domestic affairs, courts must evaluate the factual context in a way which leads 
into substantive considerations. Courts accordingly have a constitutional 
responsibility not to be "more executive-minded than the executive," but to 
scrutinize carefully particular detention decisions. Because of its factual and 
procedural peculiarities, Quirin is, as Justice Frankfurter later characterized it, 
"not a happy precedent.,,675 Chief Justice Stone indeed emphasized the 
limited, fact-dependent scope of the Quirin decision: 
We have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate 
boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons 
according to the law of war. It is enough the petitioners here, upon the 
conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries, and were held in 
good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies 
who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered, 
or after entry remained in, out territory without uniform - an offense 
against the law of war. We ho/d only that those particular facts 
constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution 
authorizes to be tried by military commission.676 
675 Justice Frankfurter, Memorandum, Rosenberg v. United States, 4 June 1953, Box 655, 
Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School, quoted in Danelski, supra note 614 at 80. 
676 317 US. at 45-46 [emphasis added]; However, Quirin was not the only case of its kind to 
come out of the war. In 1956, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a belated habeas 
petition in Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429 (lOth Ciro 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 1014 
(1957). That case involved two Nazi saboteurs landing on the Maine coast, and had facts very 
similar to those in Quirin. While the Tenth Circuit denied the writ based upon Quirin, it is 
interesting to note that the military commission proceedings had less visible involvement of 
the Roosevelt Administration. The Administration also complied with the review procedures 
in the Articles of War that were sa troubling to the Supreme Court in Quirin. 
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Borrowing from Chief Justice Stone's language in distinguishing MilUgan, 
one should construe the Court's statement as to the applicability of the law of 
war to the Quirin case as having particular reference to the facts before it. 677 
Accordingly, Quirin does not support a broad executive power to detain, but 
one that is fact-dependent and subject to potentially searching judicial review. 
Quirin left it to Hamdi to address questions about the review standards 
for unlawful combatant detentions, while its own irregularities caution against 
any misapplication of it that would erode procedural protections or restrict 
judicial review on substantive grounds. Quirin affirmed an executive 
detention power, but, like Milligan before it, explored the definitional (and 
thus jurisdictional) criteria for belligerents subject to it. Other than rejecting 
rights to grand jury indictment and jury trial, the Court did not address 
procedural or substantive due process issues, partly due to the irregularities of 
the Justices' deliberations. However, because jurisdiction to detain and try 
unlawful combatants depended upon factual predicates about the state of war 
and the alleged belligerents' conduct, procedural and substantive issues lay 
beneath Quirin 's reasoning. In formalistically reading Quirin to stand for a 
detention power effectively unlimited by any meaningful judicial review, 
lower federal courts in Hamdi and Padilla misapplied Quirin. They failed to 
appreciate the larger context of the case and its somewhat awkward attempts to 
manage deliberative processes, while they also ignored the irregularities that 
wamed against it as a precedent for an overly broad detention power. In 
contrast, the Supreme Court in Hamdi picked up on the deliberative qualities 
of its earlier Quirin decision, going on to articulate a strong standard of review 
accommodating both executive and judicial processes in the designation, 
detention, and trial ofunlawful combatants. 
677 See 317 U.S. at 45. 
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Chapter XI: Hamdi, Padilla, and the Scope of Judicial Review 
The Application of Quirin 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hamdi678 and the District Court 
for the Southem District of New York in Padilla,679 it is submitted, both 
incorrectly applied Quirin to the factual circumstances of those cases and 
misread it for supporting a broad executive detention power unburdened by 
judicial review. While recognizing Quirin as supporting an executive 
detention power over unlawful combatants, the Court of Appeals and District 
Court did not grapple with the conceptual difficulties presented by the 
adjudicative aspects of such an exercise of presidential war powers. The 
courts inadequately considered the unconventional nature of the "war against 
terrorism" compared to the world war in which Quirin was decided, and what, 
if any, impact it had on triggering executive war powers. They likewise failed 
critically to examine terrorism as an ambiguous criminal and martial 
phenomenon, and to assess just how certain non-state organizations, such as 
al-Qaeda, and their members are covered by the laws of war. The courts 
instead formalistically applied Quirin as marking out an executive detention 
power resistant to meaningful judicial review and dependent upon the 
President's own determinations about whether the factual circumstances 
justified exercise of such a power. The Fourth Circuit and the New York 
District Court overlooked the factual context upon which the President's 
detention power depends, and ignored the important Curtiss-
Wright/Youngstown distinction between foreign and domestic exercises of 
executive discretion. In doing so, both courts disregarded the mixed executive 
and judicial deliberative processes involved in an unlawful combatant 
detention decision. 
678 31 6 F.3d450. 
679 233 F. Supp. 2d 564. 
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In comparison, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Padilla and the 
Supreme Court plurality in Hamdi were more sensitive to the factual context 
of Quirin and the deliberative processes that lay beneath the separation of 
powers issues it presented. Stressing differences between the status of Padilla 
and the Quirin petitioners, and finding the absence of congressional 
authorization to detain in the former case, the Second Circuit went so far as to 
declare that "[ w Je do not agree that Quirin controls.,,68o The Supreme Court 
did not go so far in Hamdi, but rather relied upon Quirin in finding that the 
President indeed had power under the circumstances, and pursuant to 
congressional authorization, to designate and detain unlawful combatants. 
Nevertheless, such power was not an absolute discretion, but was subject to 
judicial review for compliance with due process. The Supreme Court applied 
Quirin in a way that regarded the factual context, remained attentive to foreign 
and domestic exercises of the war powers, and accommodated mixed 
deliberative processes involved in a detention decision, in fashioning strong 
judicial review based upon the Mathews due process test. 681 
There are therefore three points useful for comparing how aIl of the 
above courts applied Quirin to the cases of Hamdi and Padilla, and which 
reveal how an executive detention decision involves functionaIly judicial 
deliberative processes that trigger review by the courts. These points concem 
the legal nature of "the war against terrorism,,682 and non-state belligerents, the 
locus of capture and personal status of alleged unlawful combatants, and the 
actual conditions of their detention. Examination of these issues indicates how 
the courts ignored or considered the factual dependence of the executive's 
detention power, while refusing or exerclsmg review based upon 
determination of its justiciability. This analysis shows that the Supreme Court 
properly applied Quirin in its Hamdi decision, leading to two fundamental 
conclusions about the judicial review of unlawful combatant detentions, or 
680 352 F.3d at 715. 
681 See 171, above. 
682 See supra note 496. 
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possibly any justiciable exercise of the war powers that infringes upon 
individual rights or domestic matters. 
First, justiciable factual predicates, subject to judicial review, trigger the 
President's lawful authority under the war powers to designate, detain, and try 
unlawful combatants. The contextual dependence of such authority means that 
a court's determination of legality under habeas corpus, application of the 
political question doctrine, and constitutional resolution of separation of 
powers issues aH combine. The executive's claim of jurisdiction over 
unlawful combatants invites judicial inquiry into the very facts that allegedly 
justify the detention decision itself. Because the facts that support the 
executive's legal authority to detain and justify the detention decision are the 
same, courts have a free-standing constitutional power to review the 
President's detention decisions. Second, the separation of powers doctrine, 
based upon deliberative processes, me ans that executive authority to detain 
also depends upon it respecting adjudicative ideals when it acts in a 
functionally judicial manner. Courts are therefore not limited to scrutinizing 
the factual predicates for an unlawful combatant detention, but they can also 
review the sufficiency of the executive's decision-making processes. That is, 
in addition to reviewing the facts supporting the President's decision to detain 
an individual as an unlawful combatant, courts can assess both the procedural 
due process afforded to the individual and evaluate the reasonableness of the 
executive's detention decision. 
The "War Against Terrorism, " the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda 
The President's authority under the war powers to detain an unlawful 
combatant depends upon the existence of a congressionally authorized armed 
conflict. In the absence of an authorized conflict, the President must prosecute 
saboteurs, armed infiltrators, terrorists, or other individuals committing violent 
acts against the State under regular criminal laws and judicial procedures. In 
the cases of Hamdi and Padilla, the conflicts supporting exercise of the 
detention power were that in Afghanistan and, more generally, the "war 
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against terrorism." The Fourth Circuit in Hamdi and the New York Southern 
District Court in Padilla at times seemed, however, as argued by Harndi before 
the Fourth Circuit, to "confuse [ ... ] the international armed conflict that 
allegedly authorized Hamdi's detention in the first place with an on-going 
fight against individuals whom [Govemment] Respondents refuse to recognize 
as 'belligerents' under international law.,,683 Hamdi and Padilla, in their 
petitions, emphasized the open-ended duration of the "war against terrorism" 
and the uncertain legal status of the enemy. Thus, their detention was 
potentially indefinite during an unconventional conflict that could "have no 
clear end,,,684 as Padilla submitted before the New York District Court. These 
observations drew attention to the peculiar nature of the "war against 
terrorism," and the implications for individual rights should it justifY the 
President's exercise of the war powers to detain alleged unlawful combatants 
under such circumstances. 
The Fourth Circuit and New York District Court avoided addressing the 
question of hostilities directly as "one that need not be addressed,,,685 in the 
words of the District Court, because American troops were still involved in 
combat or occupation duties in Afghanistan.686 The military measures 
necessary in conducting the hostilities were matters for the political branches, 
not the courts. Neither did the absence of a declaration of war matter, as 
Congress had approved executive military actions against terrorists pursuant to 
the Authorizationfor Use of Military Force. As the New York District Court 
stated, "a formaI declaration of war is not necessary in order for the executive 
to exercise its constitutional authority to prosecute an armed conflict .... ,,687 
When reviewing whether the President had authority to detain pursuant to the 
683 316 F .3d at 476; The Second Circuit in Padilla had no reason to address this question as to 
whether there existed a conflict triggering the war powers, as it was unnecessary given the 
court's finding that the Non-Detention Act, 18 V.S.C. § 4001(a), forbade detention of citizens 
absent express congressional authorization. See 169, above. 
684 233 F. Supp. 2d at 588. 
685 Ibid. at 590. 
686 See also Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476. 
687 233 F. Supp. 2d at 589. 
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congressional authorization, however, the courts first had to assess whether a 
military conflict actually existed to trigger the President's war powers as 
Commander-in-Chief. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit and New York District 
Court made it clear that they would defer to the President' s strategie 
assessments about the military situation, essentially allowing him to determine 
whether an authorized conflict existed to trigger his detention power. Neither 
court was willing to con si der the legal nature of the "war against terrorism," 
upon which the applicability of Quirin might depend. The Court of Appeals, 
for example, refused to reach Hamdi's arguments about the indefinite and 
ambiguous nature of the "war against terrorism," as "under the most 
circumscribed definition of conflict hostilities [in Afghanistan] have not yet 
reached their end, this argument is without merit.,,688 
Despite finding it unnecessary to look beyond the Afghan conflict as 
support for the President's detention power, the Fourth Circuit and New York 
District Court nevertheless reflected upon the "war against terrorism." The 
Fourth Circuit, in Hamdi, demonstrated the deference courts were prepared to 
give to the executive's determination that a conflict existed as a predicate to its 
exercise of the detention power: 
These interests do not carry less weight because the conflict in which 
Hamdi was captured is waged less against nation-states than against 
scattered and unpatrioted forces. We have emphasized that the 
"unconventional aspects of the present struggle do not make its stakes 
any less grave." Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 283. Nor does the nature of the 
present conflict render respect for the judgments of the political branches 
any less appropriate. We have noted that the "political branches are best 
positioned to comprehend this global war in its full context," id., and 
neither the absence of set-piece battles nor the intervals of calm between 
terrorist assaults suffice to nullify the warmaking authority entrusted to 
the executive and legislative branches.689 
The New York District Court in Padilla did suggest that "when operations 
against al Qaeda fighters end, or the operational capacity of al Qaeda is 
688 Ibid. at 476. 
689 316 F.3d at 464. 
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effectively destroyed, there may be occasion to debate the legality of 
continuing to hold prisoners based on their connection to al Qaeda. . . .,,690 
The degree of deference that both courts were willing to show to executive 
military decisions, however, would severely limit, if not foreclose, review of 
the existence or constitutional sufficiency of a conflict for detention purposes. 
The courts' held out the possibility that an open-ended, unconventional 
conflict, considerably different from the kind of dec1ared conventional war 
behind the Quirin case, could justifY the President' s detention power. The 
ambiguous character of the "war against terrorism" thus raised concems about 
how far the President could go in invoking his own war powers, and to what 
degree Quirin applied outside of conventional warfare.691 
The Supreme Court in Hamdi, in contrast to the Fourth Circuit and the 
New York District Court, recognized "that the national security underpinnings 
of the 'war on terror,' although crucially important, are broad and 
malleable.,,692 As such, Hamdi's c1aim that his detention was possibly of 
indefinite duration, given the unconventional nature of the conflict, was "not 
far-fetched.,,693 However, the Court found that Congress' Authorization for 
Use of Military Force permitted detention only for the duration of the conflict 
in Afghanistan. The Court therefore found no need to consider further the 
unconventional "war against terrorism," but asserted that was a "c1early 
established princip le of the law of war that detention may last no longer than 
active hostilities.,,694 Since the Court, like the Fourth Circuit and New York 
District Court, found that hostilities in Afghanistan were still not conc1uded, 
detention of unlawful combatants pursuant to the congressional authorization 
was lawful. However, the c1ear implications of the Court's position was that 
690 233 F. Supp. 2d at 590. 
69\ While distinguishing Quirin 's applicability to citizens or aliens within the United States, 
based upon the nature of the conflict, it remains arguable that haliens outside the United State 
surely faB within the jurisdiction of commissions" based upon the reasoning of Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. 763. Solis, supra note 529 at 201. 
692 124 S. Ct. at 2641. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Ibid. 
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the courts, while perhaps appropriately deferring to the executive's military 
judgment about a conflict, nevertheless could independently determine as a 
predicate factual matter whether a congressionally authorized conflict existed 
for purposes of triggering the President's detention power. 695 
Judicial consideration of whether a military conflict exists for purposes 
of triggering the President's detention power encounters several conceptual 
difficulties in regard to the "war against terrorism." American and 
international law has long dealt with terrorism as a special criminal, rather 
than martial, phenomenon. Terrorism, though notoriously resistant to uniform 
definition, generally encompasses 1) the use or threat of violence against 
civilian targets, 2) motivated by political, religious, or other ideological 
beliefs, 3) to coerce or influence govemment policies. This core definition, in 
varying forms, lies at the center of domestic criminal, anti-terrorism legislation 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, for example.696 
Several international conventions and Security Council resolutions similarly 
define terrorism, and characterize it as international criminal behavior 
punishable by aIl nations.697 Interestingly, the United States Govemment 
chose to prosecute sorne individuals - such as the infamous "American 
Taliban" John Walker Lindh and alleged September eleventh bomber Zacarias 
695 Justice Scalia Uoined by Stevens J.) and Justice Thomas both dissented from the Court's 
decision, using fonnalistic reasoning to come to radically different, but logically consistent, 
conclusions. Justice Scalia, ibid. at 2660 et seq., found that where a citizen allegedly wages 
war against the United States, the executive must criminally prosecute him in the courts for 
treason or other offenses. The executive branch could otherwise hold the individual without 
criminal charge only if Congress had suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Justice Thomas, 
ibid. at 2674 et seq., on the other hand, asserted that the President could detain unlawful 
combatants under his war powers, and courts lacked the "expertise and capacity to second-
guess that decision." The federal government's war powers could not be "balanced away" 
under the Mathews test. Ibid. at 2674. Both approaches similarly depended upon fonnahstic 
classifications of unlawful combatant detentions as either uniquely criminal or martial in 
nature, leaving such detention decisions for resolution exclusively by either the judicial or 
executive branches. Except for textually explicit constitutional exceptions, such with the 
legislative suspension of habeas corpus, no branch could infringe upon the others' demarcated 
spheres of authority. The dissenting views of Justices Scalia and Thomas, despite their 
opposite conclusions, similarly rested upon a highly fonnalistic approach to the separation of 
powers doctrine, which denied the functional mixing of deliberative processes. 
696 See David Jenkins, "In Support of Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act: A Comparison of 
Canadian, British, and American Anti-Terrorism Law" (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 419 at 433-40. 
697 Ibid. at 427-29. 
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Moussaoui- under criminal terrorism laws, rather than treat them as unlawful 
combatants under the laws ofwar.698 In many domestic and intemationallegal 
regimes, then, terrorism is an unusual species of crime, and its peculiar 
characteristics fit uneasily into the traditional, dualistic paradigms of crime 
versus war. As such, the "war against terrorism" raises questions about the 
extent of executive authority under the war powers to de al with terrorists as 
unlawful combatants, and the relative deliberative virtues of the executive and 
judicial branches in making such detention decisions. 
Shifting terrorism from a criminal to war paradigm could have far-
reaching impact upon future legal, political, and strategic responses to 
terrorism,699 as weIl as the separation of powers. The prosecutions of Lindh 
and Moussaoui, when compared with the detention of Hamdi and Padilla, for 
example, illustrate how executive detention of unlawful combatants blurs the 
functional lines between executive and judicial de1iberative processes. The 
ambiguous nature of terrorism within the crime/war paradigms raises concems 
about wh ether it is best dealt with through either regular criminal procedure in 
Article III courts or under the executive's war powers. The uncertain place of 
terrorism between crime and war also opens greater possibilities that the 
executive branch can infringe individual rights and impact upon domestic 
affairs, by using its war powers to adjudicate and punish individu al criminal 
behavior. Formalistic adherence to the crime/war dichotomy ignores the 
contextual complexities of terrorism as both criminal activity and an 
unconventional method of armed conflict. Consequently, a formalistic 
approach ignores functional mixing of deliberative processes involved in an 
unlawful combatant detention decision: processes that require the executive to 
698 See United States v. Lindh, PIe a Agreement (15 July 2002), online at: FindLaw 
<http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf> and United States v. 
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct. 1670 (2005); Another citizen, 
Lyman Faris, was also criminally prosecuted for terrorism offenses. United States v. Faris, 
Plea Agreement (June 2003), online at: FindLaw <http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/faris/ 
usfaris603plea. pdf>. 
699 "If the war on terrorism is not ta be conceived of as an international arrned conflict, it is 
one of startling breadth, innumerable 'combatants,' and indefinite duration." Fitzpatrick, 
"Jurisdiction of Military Commissions," supra note 531 at 347, and 346-48. 
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adhere to adjudicative standards of decision-making and so permit judicial 
review under the separation of powers doctrine. 
Terrorism, therefore, is not just a criminal phenomenon, but is a "highly 
irregular technique of armed conflict" often organized and waged within and 
against a civilian population at large, thus distinguishing it from regular 
crimes.700 These tactics are in pursuit of political goals by attempting to affect 
government behavior, seen for example in the influence of the March Il, 2004 
Madrid train bombing upon the subsequent Spanish general election. In this 
way, terrorists' political goals resemble those traditionally pursued by nation-
states through international diplomacy or armed conflict. As demonstrated by 
al-Qaeda's orchestration of the September eleventh attacks, terrorists might 
also possess capabilities to operate on an international level and cause 
catastrophic loss of life. AI-Qaeda's, or other groups', capacity to cause harm 
and wage violent campaign for political ends challenge the nation-state 
monopoly on large-scale violence. Terrorism might at times resemble in 
purposes, execution, and scale those hostile acts previously attributable only to 
nation-states or well-organized internaI resistance movements. Indeed, sorne 
terrorist resources might ev en be greater than those possessed by weak or 
"failed" states, typified by the strong connection between al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Thus, the question as to whether criminal acts 
of terrorism can also constitute acts of war intersects with the legal status of 
non-state entities, such as al-Qaeda, in international law and their capacity to 
wage war for the purposes of triggering the President's detention authority 
d h · 701 un er 18 war powers. 
700 W. Michael Reisman, "International Legal Responses to Terrorism" (1999) 22 Hous. J. Int'l 
L. 3 at 11-12; Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a 
Democratie Society (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998) at 8-9. 
701 Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, "Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism" (2005) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047 at 2066-71 [hereinafter "Congressional 
Authorization"], however, argue that the "war against terrorism" does strongly exhibit 
characteristics of a more traditional war. "Where, as here, both political branches have treated 
a conflict as a 'war', and that characterization is plausible, there is no basis for the courts to 
second-guess that deterrnination based on some metaphysical conception of the true meaning 
of war." Even accepting that courts should not engage in such second-guessing, the character 
of the conflict and its participants nevertheless becomes relevant to deterrnining such legal 
questions as the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention, the criteria for lawful 
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The Bush Administration's association of al-Qaeda with the Taliban, and 
the consequent refusaI to apply the Third Geneva Convention to belligerents 
captured fighting for either group, resulted from just such an ambiguity about 
the nature of terrorism. The international status of the Taliban as the 
govemment of Afghanistan and its relationship with al-Qaeda was far from 
clear. Only three states, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
had recognized the Taliban as the legitimate govemment of Afghanistan as of 
August 2001.702 The peculiar isolation of the Taliban in the world community 
and the highly unstable, nearly anarchie, political situation in Afghanistan 
prior to September Il, 2001 raised the question as to whether that country 
might not be a "failed" state, against which certain mies, such as those of the 
Third Geneva Convention, might not fully apply. As a failed state, the Taliban 
might have been under international law no more than a tenuous alliance of 
warlords and religious leaders, de facto controlling most of Afghanistan only 
by virtue of force. Without a legitimate claim to sovereign authority, nearly 
no international recognition, little administrative or bureaucratie apparatus, or 
even a uniformed, organized military force distinct from independent factional 
or tribal militias, the Taliban might have arguably constituted only a sub-state 
entity acting as the de facto govemment of Afghanistan. 
The close relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda complicated the 
difficulty in making legal distinctions between sub-state, criminal enterprise 
and state war-making. Individual loyalties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda often 
over-Iapped and interplayed with conflicts between tribal warlords, while al-
Qaeda exerted considerable political influence over the Taliban.703 The two 
combatancy, and the scope ofpresidential authority to detain unlawful combatants pursuant to 
congressional authorization. 
702 "Afghanistan's Taliban Rules" CNN (9 August 2001), online at: CNN 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/centrall08/09/taliban.profile/>. 
703 As Bradley and Goldsmith, "Congressional Authorization," supra note 701 at 2049, 
mention, loyalties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, or other terrorist causes, transcend national 
identification. Not only have citizens of the United States, Canada, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and other Westem nations fought on the ground in Afghanistan on behalf of the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda, but citizens have conspired from within their own countries to commit 
terrorist acts against them. "The traditional concept of 'enemy alien' is inapplicable in this 
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entities were in many respects intertwined, confusing the international legal 
status of both. Under dichotomous crime/war paradigms, a determination that 
the Taliban was a sub-state entity might indeed exempt its fighters from 
Geneva Convention protections from criminal prosecution. The implications 
of the Taliban's Geneva exception, however, are uncertain in terms of the 
President's constitutional authority to deal with them. The non-state character 
of Taliban fighters could mean that the President's full war powers would not 
apply in the event of their capture, requiring punishment through sorne sort of 
civilian prosecution. Alternatively, like the Bush Administration claimed, the 
non-state status of the Taliban and its association with al-Qaeda might mean 
that that the President could treat them as unlawful combatants under his war 
powers. The opposing position would be that the Third Geneva Convention 
applied to the Taliban's fighters due to its status as the de facto govemment of 
Afghanistan. Consequently, international law would require POW treatment 
of its belligerents captured in conventional battle, inc1uding possibly those 
members of al-Qaeda fighting on its behalf. The uncertainty of the 
international status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda therefore raised doubts about 
whether the President, under the Constitution and the laws ofwar, could detain 
their fighters as unlawful combatants, must hold them as POWs under the 
Third Geneva Convention, or might prosecute them before civilian courtS.704 
The difficulties in characterizing the Taliban and al-Qaeda under 
international law led the Fourth Circuit and the New York District Court to 
defer to the President' s decisions regarding the legal status of those entities. 
Neverthe1ess, while such foreign affairs decisions might faH outside of the 
normal competency of the courts, judicial deference to the executive in such 
matters has implications for the constitution al separation of powers and the 
rule of law, which the courts have a Lockean fiduciary obligation to maintain. 
In allowing the President to treat Taliban or al-Qaeda fighters as unlawful 
combatants, with unchecked discretion and outside of his deliberative 
conflict; in ste ad ofbeing affiliated with particular states at war with the United States, terrorist 
enemies are predominantly citizens and residents offriendly states or ev en the United States." 
704 See Aldrich, George H., "The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal 
Combatants" (2002) 96 Amer. J. Int'l. L. 891 at 893-96. 
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competency, the courts enable him to determine the applicability and scope of 
his own war powers to the possible detriment of the public good. The 
Supreme Court confronted this problem in Ham di when considering the 
personal status of individuals subject to detention as unlawful combatants.705 
Not only does the "war against terrorism" offer the prospect of an open-ended, 
ill-defined conflict, but executive discretion to determine combatant status 
threatens to dissolve any legal certainties about just who is the enemy. Such 
discretion allows the President to infringe upon the rights of individuals who 
might not actually qualify as unlawful combatants under the laws of war. It 
further enables the President to direct the war powers domestically inward to 
circurnvent civilian courts in dealing with individuals alleged to present an 
unconventional security threat, through their association with organizations 
such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Such unbounded executive discretion to deal 
with individuals under the war powers and by-pass federal courts was the very 
issue in Milligan, as weIl as the World War II case of Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku. 706 Decided shortly after Quirin, the Supreme Court found in 
Duncan that judicial consideration of the actual state of hostilities was 
necessary to determine whether the executive branch had lawfully imposed 
martiallaw in Hawaii. Accordingly, while courts should normally defer to the 
executive's foreign affairs and military judgments, the absence of any judicial 
consideration of the nature and intensity of a conflict, and the international 
status of its belligerents, allows the President potentially to abuse his war 
powers and violate the separation of powers. He could do so by improperly 
detaining alleged unlawful combatants, using his war powers under 
circumstances that might not constitutionally trigger them, and acting in a 
functionally judicial manner without deliberating according to adjudicative 
standards. 707 
705 See 248, below. 
706 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
707 As the Supreme Court stated in Hamdi: "Moreover, as critical as the Government's interest 
may be in detaining those who actually pose an irnrnediate threat to the national security of the 
United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an 
unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and 
abuse of others who do not present that sort ofthreat." 124 S. Ct. at 2647. 
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Moreover, President Bush's Military Order708 subjecting all members of 
al-Qaeda to military trial as unlawful combatants, along with his denial that 
the Taliban's fighters were entitled to protection under the Third Geneva 
Convention, assigned group culpability based upon his own evaluations of 
those entities' international status. The Geneva Convention allows for no such 
collective determination, but expressly requires cases of its applicability to be 
resolved individually in regard to its four criteria for lawful belligerency.709 
Under the laws of war, it is doubtful that an individual can qualify as an 
unlawful belligerent based merely upon association, rather than his actual 
commission of unprivileged belligerent acts. While one might argue that 
"[v]irtually no Taliban, al Qaeda, or other terrorist satisfies the very precise 
Geneva Convention requirements for prisoner of war status,,,710 such 
determination must nevertheless depend upon the individual's personal 
engagement in or preparation for belligerent acts, and not be predicated upon a 
blanket executive judgment about the characteristics of the belligerent entities 
and their actions. Otherwise, the President could claim authority under the 
war powers to deal with individuals sympathetic to a particular group, such as 
al-Qaeda, even though such individuals might never have actively participated 
in violent acts of belligerency.711 As with an unfettered discretion to 
708 Military Order, supra note 443. 
709 See 183, 188, above; Jennifer Eisea, Treatment of 'Battlefield Detainees' in the War on 
Terrorism (New York: Novinka, 2003) at 39-41; But see Draper, "The Status ofCombatants," 
supra note 510 at 197, who writes that "[ w ]here, however, the majority of the members of the 
group, for any reason whatever, fail to meet the conditions [of Geneva IIIJ, or any of them, at 
any time, then the members of the group, all of them, fail to obtain combatant status. An 
individual belonging to a group of that kind will, upon capture, be denied a prisoner or 
combatant status, whatever his individual behaviour may have been. AU the members of such 
a group are then exposed to the legal consequences of illegal combatancy." However, no 
courts hearing the cases of Harndi or Padilla sufficiently considered this question. 
710 Salis, supra note 529 at 198. 
711 The Government has admitted the potentially limitless scope of an executive power to 
determine individual combatant status or group culpability free from judicial review: 
"[C]ounsel for the respondents argued that the Executive has the authority to detain the 
foUowing individuals until the conclusion of the war on terrorism: '[a] little old lady in 
Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in 
Afghanistan, but [what] really is a front to fmance al-Qaeda activities,' ... a pers on who 
teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda member, ... and a joumalist who knows the location 
of Osama bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source .... " In re Guantanamo 
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determine individual combatant status, executive assignment of group 
culpability threatens the separation of powers. If courts overly defer to such 
executive decisions, the President rather than the courts would then determine 
the extent and applicability ofhis own war powers, resolve pertinent questions 
of international law, and adjudicate individual rights without judicial review. 
In the case of citizens or individuals present on V.S. territory, it would also 
bridge the divide between the President's foreign exercise of the war powers, 
and the domestic execution and adjudication of the laws. AlI of these issues 
faU within the judiciary's deliberative competence, justifying careful judicial 
review of them notwithstanding appropriately measured deference to the 
executive branch's expertise in foreign affairs and war. 
The ambiguous character of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, along with their 
violent deeds, prompted the Bush Administration to designate and detain 
citizens as unlawful combatants as part of the "war against terrorism," a 
conflict very much unlike the declared, conventional, total war that was the 
backdrop for Quirin. No courts in the Hamdi or Padilla cases, when following 
Quirin, questioned either the unconventional nature of the conflict or the status 
of the Taliban or al-Qaeda under the internationallaws of war. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision left open the possibility that, in a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, a detainee could raise such questions as issues of 
fact, upon which the President's detention authority would be legally 
predicated. AdditionaUy, the nature of the conflict and the status of the actors 
could be substantive considerations III balancing individual versus 
Govemment interests under the Mathews test, thus determining the procedural 
requirements that the executive must follow when functionally adjudicating an 
individual's combatant status. 
Locus of Capture and Personal Status 
Detainee Cases, 255 F. Supp. 2d 443 at 475 (D. D.C. 2005) [citations omitted). See 275, 
below. 
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In his habeas petition, Hamdi did not challenge the fact of his capture in 
a zone of combat, but did dispute allegations of his belligerency. While the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia focused upon whether Hamdi 
was actually armed and what his actions had been, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals only considered his capture in a combat zone. The Fourth Circuit 
decided only the issue of law712 as to whether the President could exercise the 
detention power in such an area, without independently inquiring as to whether 
Hamdi' s actual conduct supported his status as an unlawful combatant. Thus, 
according to the Fourth Circuit, the President's lawful authority to detain 
unlawful combatants was effectively predicated upon the individual's locus of 
capture; detention of an individual, captured in a combat zone, would depend 
upon the President's own factual assertions. The Fourth Circuit thus overruled 
the District Court, which had insisted upon an independent judicial inquiry as 
to whether Hamdi had actually violated the laws ofwar. The Court of Appeals 
had earlier directed the District Court that "if Harndi is indeed an 'enemy 
combatant' ... , the government's detention of him is a lawful one,,,713 only 
later to base the status determination upon the executive's unquestionable 
factual findings. Executive jurisdiction to detain unlawful combatants 
essentially depended not upon the personal status of the individual, then, but 
upon the location of the individual's locus of capture. Foreign captures, 
according to the view of the Fourth Circuit, deserved Curtiss-Wright deference 
as "federative" matters, appropriately resolved through executive deliberative 
processes. 
The Fourth Circuit was also unwilling to scrutinize the executive's 
criteria for determining unlawful combatancy. The court's omission on this 
point meant that the President could not only establish the predicate facts for 
his detention power, but could change the legal criteria defining its scope, as 
weIl. The Fourth Circuit accordingly deferred to the "determination by the 
executive that the citizen was aIlied with enemy forces,,,714 without further 
712 "[W]e conclude that Hamdi's petition fails as a matter oflaw." 316 F.3d at 469. 
713 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 279. 
714 316 F.3d at 465. 
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analysis as to whether such individual behavior, even if true, amounted to a 
violation of the laws of war. Although Hamdi allegedly bore arms openly in 
the field, and did not surreptitiously cross American or allied lines in order to 
commit hostile acts, the Government nevertheless designated him as an 
unlawful combatant based simply upon his alleged affiliation with the Taliban. 
Hamdi' s designation as an unlawful combatant did not rest upon specific 
allegations of individual offenses under the laws of war, based upon the Third 
Geneva Convention 's criteria, as had been the case with the petitioners in 
Quirin. Instead, Hamdi's designation rested upon the Bush Administration's 
categorical determination that all individuals associated with the Taliban were 
unlawful combatants without protection under the Convention. Because of the 
locus of Hamdi's capture, the Fourth Circuit left his unlawful combatant status 
solely to executive discretion. According to the Appeals Court, courts should 
look only at whether the Government' s factual assertions, accepted as true on 
their face, would support the executive's detention decision according to its 
own established criteria. 715 This was a more formalistic view of the separation 
of powers, despite habeas review, as it heavily circumscribed judicial 
oversight of executive actions under the war powers and discounted 
overlapping branch authority over a detention decision. The Court of Appeals 
refused to recognize its institutional competency to determine facts and 
consistently to interpret the legal criteria of unlawful combatant status, while 
ignoring the functionally judicial aspects of such an executive detention 
decision. 
The Fourth Circuit formalistically interpreted Quirin as support for a 
broad executive authority to detain unlawful combatants, subject only to very 
deferential review for legality upon a petition for habeas corpus. Importantly, 
however, the court disregarded the importance of personal status and the 
particular facts in the prior decision. The earlier case dealt specifically with 
the internment and military trial of a U.S. citizen, Haupt, as well as others, 
715 "By refusing to inquire meaningfully into the facts underlying and legitimating the 
government's deprivation of Hamdi's constitutionally guaranteed liberty, the Fourth Circuit 
had effectively demoted its powerful conception of the rights at stake to the status of mere 
precatory language." Jonathan Masur, "A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and 
Military Deference" (2005) 56 Hastings L.J. 441 at 468. 
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who were unlawful combatants because they had entered the country and shed 
uniform to commit sabotage. The detainees' affiliation with the enemy and 
their hostile intent were undisputed, but their personal status was a point that 
the Quirin majority belabored in its full opinion. In Quirin, as in the District 
Court's decision in Hamdi, the actual conduct of the detainees was 
determinative of whether they were unlawful combatants under the laws of 
war. Because Quirin was concemed with the domestic arrest and military trial 
of belligerents on U.S. soil, the locus of capture would have been an 
insufficient basis for judicial deference to the executive's factual assertions. 
Instead, Quirin required judicial inquiry into the detainees' status. Defense 
counsel in Quirin had relied upon Milligan 's holding that the military could 
not try a citizen by military commission where the civil courts were open and 
functioning. However, the Supreme Court had distinguished the Civil War 
case by pointing out that the civilian, non-belligerent status of Milligan 
contrasted with the military affiliations of the Quirin petitioners, and their 
violations of the laws of war. Thus, while Quirin affirmed the domestic reach 
of the President's detention power, it premised his jurisdiction upon the facts 
supporting unlawful combatant status. Consequently, in reviewing the 
executive's legal authority to detain an unlawful combatant, courts would have 
to make an independent inquiry into the facts behind the executive's status 
determination. Because, under Quirin, jurisdictional facts coincided with 
those of personal status, courts could not properly refuse upon a habeas 
petition to review the executive's factual allegations about an individual 
captured in a foreign zone of combat. To do so, as the Fourth Circuit did, 
would abdicate the judiciary's constitutional responsibility to maintain the 
separation of powers by ensuring that the executive does not act unlawfully 
and outside of its decision-making competence. 
In Hamdi the Fourth Circuit went beyond Quirin, insofar as it suggested 
that the President might enjoy greater discretion to detain suspected unlawful 
combatants if captured abroad rather than at home. The Fourth Circuit noted 
the difference between the case it was deciding and the type represented by 
Quirin and Padilla, which concemed "the designation as an enemy combatant 
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of an American citizen captured on American soil .... ,,716 The Fourth Circuit 
refused to speculate on how its approach might impact a domestic unlawful 
combatant case, stating that it applied Quirin to "the specific context before us 
- that of the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation 
undertaken in a foreign country .... ,,717 Thus, the Fourth Circuit made a 
conscious effort not to address the ongoing Padilla case in the Southern 
District of New York, dec1aring that "[t]o compare this battlefield capture to 
the domestic arrest in Padilla v. Bush is to compare apples and oranges.,,718 
The Fourth Circuit thereby suggested that domestic captures of unlawful 
combatants might require less j udicial deference to executive status 
detenninations than would battlefield captures like Hamdi. The court 
seemingly interpreted Quirin in light of the Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown 
paradigm, giving the President a greater discretion to detain in "federative" 
matters while narrowing that discretion as it impacted more heavily upon 
domestic affairs or citizens' rights. 
Unlike Hamdi, the Government captured P adill a, not on a foreign 
battlefield, but within the United States. The District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, applying Quirin, recognized that the President 
possessed constitutional and statutory authority to detain citizens as unlawful 
combatants, even if captured on American soil. The District Court found, 
similarly to the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, that the executive detennination of 
Padilla's status deserved a high degree of judicial deference. The District 
Court, however, cautioned that, because the Quirin petitioners stipulated the 
facts, it "offers no guidance regarding the standard to be applied in making the 
threshold detennination that a habeas corpus petitioner is an unlawful 
combatant.,,719 In trying to balance its dut y to review executive detention 
decisions with appropriate deference the President's military judgment, the 
716 Ibid. at 465. 
717 Ibid. 
718 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Ciro 2003), per Wilkinson, J., denying 
rehearing en banc of 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). 
719 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607. 
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court held that it would detennine only whether there was "sorne evidence" in 
support of the Government' s unlawful combatant designation.720 This 
standard was a highly deferential one that would accept the Government's 
factual assertions about Padilla to be true, but unlike the Fourth Circuit's 
approach would give petitioner a limited opportunity to introduce additional 
facts. Because it interpreted Congress' Military Force Authorization to pennit 
detentions of citizens anywhere, the court found that the domestic locus of 
capture was not a consideration in reviewing the President's legal authority to 
detain an unlawful combatant.72! The District Court complied with Quirin in 
so far as it recognized the importance of individual status over the locus of 
capture. The court also noticed that the Govemment had accorded the Quirin 
petitioners a hearing on their unlawful combatant status before a military 
commission, a procedural benefit not enjoyed by Padilla. However, its "sorne 
evidence" standard of review remained highly deferential to the executive's 
assessment of the factual predicates supporting its own established criteria for 
unlawful combatancy, raising the same separation of powers problems as did 
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hamdi. 
Despite its attention to personal status, the District Court still failed to 
address the important dissimilarities between the status of Padilla and the 
Quirin petitioners. Padilla's alleged plot to detonate a "dirty bomb" would 
violate the laws of war, but for the fact that he had no affiliation with enemy 
anned forces that would seem to qualify him as an unlawful combatant under 
the laws of war. This lack of affiliation called into question his belligerent, 
rather than civilian, status, and so did not clearly subject him to treatment 
under the President's military authority as opposed to regular criminal process. 
The Supreme Court in Quirin, in contrast, had distinguished Milligan from the 
case before it, because of the military associations of Haupt and the others.722 
Although the District Court stated that "Padilla, like the [Quirin] saboteurs, is 
alleged to be in active association with an enemy whom the United States is at 
720 Ibid. at 608. 
721 Ibid. at 606-07. 
722 See 317 U.S. at 45. 
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war,,,723 Padilla disputed the truth of this allegation. The "sorne evidence" 
standard set by the District Court, however, would have restricted the 
petitioner from effectively contraverting the Government's factual assertions. 
The court left unanswered just what kind of enemy contacts Quirin required in 
order to avoid Milligan 's holding. Like the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi, the 
District Court in Padilla accordingly refrained from making a closer 
examination of the "war against terrorism," the legal status of al-Qaeda and its 
sympathizers, and the actual circumstances of Padilla's alleged belligerency. 
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Ramdi and the New York District Court's 
decision in Padilla together stood for a broad executive power to designate, 
detain, and try individuals as unlawful combatants without any meaningful 
judicial review into whether they had actually violated the laws ofwar.724 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the District Court, did 
not reach the issues of Padilla's locus of capture and personal status. Rather, 
by interpreting Congress' Military Force Authorization as insufficient to 
abrogate the explicit requirement in 18 V.S.c. § 4001(a) that the executive not 
detain a citizen "except pursuant to an Act of Congress," the Second Circuit 
found an absolute statutory bar to the military detention of citizens. Because 
the President possessed no inherent constitutional authority to detain unlawful 
combatants under the war powers, the detention of Padilla or other citizens 
was unlawful. The Court of Appeals accordingly ordered the District Court to 
issue a writ ofhabeas corpus, freeing Padilla from military custody. 
The Supreme Court did not reach the merits ofPadilla's petition due to a 
finding that the New York District Court lackedjurisdiction over his detention 
in South Carolina. However, it addressed them indirectly in its Hamdi 
decision. In Hamdi, the Court's plurality interpreted the Military Force 
Authorization, permitting the President's use of "necessary and appropriate 
723 233 F. Supp. 2d at 594. 
724 For analysis of the deferential approaches that the Fourth Circuit and New York District 
Court took towards executive unlawful combatant designations, see for example Jordan J. 
Paust, "Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights ofPersons Detained Without Trial" 
(2003) 44 Harv. In1'l L.J. 503 at 525 et seq. and Steven R. Swanson, "Enemy Combatants and 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus" (2003) 35 Ariz. St. L.J. 939 at 982 et seq. 
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force," to allow detentions of unlawful combatants as a power necessarily 
incidental to the conduct of war. The Force Authorization therefore satisfied 
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). Citing Quirin, it agreed that there was no constitutional 
bar to such detention of a citizen.725 However, the Court recognized that, as to 
the designation of "enemy combatant", "[there] is sorne debate as to the proper 
scope of this term, and the Government has never provided any court with the 
full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.,,726 The Court made 
clear that detention was authorized only for "individuals falling into the 
limited category we are considering.,,727 That restricted category, according to 
the Court, was that proposed by the Government under the circumstances, 
being an individual '''part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States 
or coalition partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in armed conflict 
against the United States. ",728 The Court, however, did not need directly to 
address the question of the applicability of the Geneva III criteria, as it did not 
rule on the merits of the case. 
To a majority of justices, the individual's personal status as a belligerent, 
and not his locus of capture, was nevertheless the crucial issue in determining 
the executive's lawful authority to detain. The Court overruled the Fourth 
Circuit's decision that Hamdi's capture in a foreign combat zone required 
broad deference to the executive's status determination, without any 
independent judicial review of the facts. The Court explained, per Justice 
O'Connor, that Quirin "postdated and clarifies" the decision in Milligan,729 
making it clear that the President could detain a citizen who aided the enemy 
only if the individual met certain criteria under the laws of war. In a footnote, 
the Supreme Court cautioned that an individual's affiliation with an enemy, or 
725 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41, per O'Connor J.; It was on this point of statutory interpretation that 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg disagreed in their concurring opinion, fmding that the Military 
Force Authorization did not override the prohibition on detention found in 18 V.S.C. § 
4001(a), the same position taken by the Second Circuit in Padilla. Ibid. at 2653-54. 
726 Ibid. 
727 Ibid. at 2640. 
728 Ibid. at 2639. 
729 Ibid. at 2642-43. 
248 
capture upon a battlefield, was not necessarily sufficient to allow his detention 
as an unlawful combatant. Accordingly, "[t]he legal category of 'enemy 
combatant,'" the Government's euphemism for an unlawful combatant, "has 
not been elaborated upon in great detail. The permissible bounds of the 
category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented 
to them.,,730 By this statement, the Court suggested that the judicial branch, 
not the executive, had to determine the legal criteria of unlawful combatancy, 
against which the executive's factual determinations would be reviewed. 
While remaining sensitive to the executive's military judgment, Justice 
O'Connor explained, courts could still scrutinize the factual allegations 
supporting an unlawful combatant detention: 
[A ]rguments that military officers ought not to have to wage war under 
the threat of litigation lose much of their steam when factual disputes at 
enemy-combatant hearings are limited to the alleged combatant's acts. 
This focus meddles little, if at all, in the strategy or conduct of war, 
inquiring only into the appropriateness of continuing to detain an 
individual claimed to have taken up arms against the United States. 
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments 
of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a 
war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it 
does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise 
their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing 
and resolving claims like those presented here.731 
Thus, while the contours of judicial review of unlawful combatant detentions 
might be different from those in civilian criminal cases, "the threats to military 
operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty 
as to trump a citizen's core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government's 
case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.,,732 A court's factual inquiry 
into an individual's belligerent conduct therefore coincided with the 
jurisdictional question of whether the President had constitutional authority to 
detain unlawful combatants under the war powers, an authority subject to 
730 Ibid. at 2642, n. 1. 
73\ Ibid. at 2649-50. 
732 Ibid. at 2650. 
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judicial review under the separation of powers doctrine because it implicated 
mixed executive and judicial deliberati ve processes. 
Because the legal authority of the President to detain depended upon the 
personal status of the individual, the Supreme Court found it inappropriate to 
defer to executive fact-finding under the "sorne evidence" standard suggested 
by the Government in Hamdi and accepted by the Second Circuit in Padilla. 
The Court noted that the "sorne evidence" standard was for the review of an 
administrative record deve10ped after adversarial hearing, and was not itself a 
standard of factual proof.733 Where a citizen detainee disputed the executive's 
factual allegations about his belligerency, due process required procedural 
mechanisms for the status determination. The due process consequently 
required was, pursuant to the Mathews test, a balance between individual 
liberty interests and the Government's interest in protecting national 
security.734 Fifth Amendment due process therefore mandated that the 
executive must give notification and fair hearing, including access to counsel, 
to a citizen detainee regarding the factual basis for his detention. 735 An 
individual, pursuant to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, must 
consequently have an opportunity for meaningful judicial review of the 
executive's detention decision.736 Due process under the Mathews test thus 
733 Ibid. at 2651. 
734 Ibid. at 2644-46, citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 319; But see Masur, supra note 715 at 472, 
criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi, and its allowance of a rebuttable factual 
presumption in favor of the Govement, as leading to a position "nearly identical" to the one 
established by the "sorne evidence" standard of the New York District Court in Padilla. 
However, the Supreme Court's specific reliance upon the Fifth Amendment due process 
clause in fashioning procedures for status determinations, and its clear statement that any 
factul presumption is indeed rebuttable, is an inherently more robust standard for executive 
decision-making. Not only must the Govemment, upon rebuttal, proffer supporting evidence 
for its factual claims, but the Fifth Amendment opens up a window for judicial scrutiny into 
the executive's actual decision-making processes. Indeed, Masur himself goes on to suggest 
that administrative law provides better controlling principles in reviewing unlawful combatant 
detentions. However, the Hamdi Court's invocation of the Mathews balancing test, a 
comerstone of administrative law, invites just such an administrative-based review of 
justiciable exercises of the war powers. See 265, below. 
735 Ibid. at 2648; Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred with the plurality's opinion, though 
admitting it to be unnecessary given their view that 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) barred detentions of 
citizens as unlawful combatants, notwithstanding Congress' Authorization for Military Force. 
Ibid. at 2660. 
736 Ibid. at 2650. 
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depended upon judicial evaluation of fact-specific, contextual considerations, 
and required the executive to adhere to adjudicative standards when 
functionally adjudicating individual rights.737 Where the executive failed to 
accord sufficient due process before a neutral decision-maker, the Court 
added, a court upon habeas review must compensate for the procedural 
deficiencies by independently scrutinizing the factual predicates to the 
President's detention decision.738 
In applying Quirin, the Hamdi Court supported an executive authority to 
detain unlawful combatants, pursuant to congressional authorization. 
However, it required judiciaUy reviewable, procedural protections to prevent 
the executive from determining the extent of its own detention authority under 
the war powers. In so far as it also found congressional authorization for 
detentions, the Court recognized a combined role for the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches in lawfully detaining citizens as unlawful combatants. 
Each brought to bear its own deliberative virtues in the decision to detain an 
unlawful combatant. As the Court stated, "[ w ]hatever power the United States 
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or 
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envi si ons a 
role for aU three branches when individual liberties are at stake.,,739 The 
Supreme Court condemned the Government's claims to a broad discretion to 
detain in no uncertain terms: 
Indeed, the position that the courts must forego any examination of the 
individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader 
737 "At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these 
core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon 
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Rearsay, for example, 
may need to be aecepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in sueh 
a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of 
the Govemment's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair 
opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible 
evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to 
the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he fans outside the 
criteria." Ibid. at 2649. 
738 Ibid. at 2651. 
739 Ibid. at 2650. 
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detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of 
separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power 
into a single branch of govemment. We have long made clear that astate 
of war is not a blank: check for the President when it cornes to the rights 
of the Nation's citizens [citing Youngstown] . ... Thus, while we do not 
question that our due process assessment must pay keen attention to the 
particular burdens faced by the Executive in the context of military 
action, it would tum our system of checks and balances on its head to 
suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to 
the factual basis for his detention by his govemment, simply because the 
Executive opposes making available such a challenge.74o 
As this passage shows, the Hamdi Court was keenly sensitive to the contextual 
aspects of Quirin and the mixed deliberative processes that underlay its 
approach to the separation of powers issues involved in unlawful combatant 
detentions.741 The Court's exercise of review and imposition of the Mathews 
test sought to reconcile the complementary executive and judicial 
competencies in unlawful combatant cases. It did so by permitting the 
executive to detain, pursuant to congressional authorization, but subject to 
judicial review and the deliberative standards of adjudication. 
Treatment of Detainees 
Not only did their unlawful combatant status bridge a div ide between 
criminal and martial conduct, but the detention conditions of Hamdi and 
Padilla, like those of al-Marri and the Guantanamo detainees, smacked of 
criminal punishment. This punitive aspect highlighted the functionally judicial 
nature of unlawful combatant detentions, and emphasized the need for 
procedural protections and judicial oversight to prevent executive abuses of 
740 Ibid. 
741 The reasoning of the majority, however, contrasted with the dissenting opinions of Justices 
Scalia and Thomas. See supra note 695. Because Justice Scalia found that the President had 
no constitutional power to detain citizens as unlawful combatants, there were no factual 
predicates for the courts to review. Justice Thomas took the opposite approach, suggesting 
that courts had no authority to review the President's detention decisions, to determine 
whether an individual is, in fact, an unlawful combatant. The President's factual findings are 
conclusive ifmade in good faith, Justice Thomas submitted, "even ifhe is mistaken." Ibid. at 
2681 [emphasis original]. 
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the war powers. The conditions of confinement for the detainees neither met 
the standards for POWs under the Third Geneva Convention, nor 
administratively served the sole purpose of preventing their rejoinder with an 
enemy. That the President, under the war powers, can detain a citizen to 
prevent his retum to an enemy is c1ear. In the World War II case of In re 
Territa, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the President, 
under the war powers, may constitutionally detain a citizen as a prisoner of 
war, when captured while serving in the enemy military.742 Territo, an 
American citizen taken by D.S. forces while he served with the Italian army, 
was intemed in a prisoner of war camp along with his fellow, captured 
soldiers. The Appeals Court held that, although a citizen may file a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of such detention, federal courts 
will not look beyond the alleged facts of battlefield capture.743 The court in 
Territo further explained that intemment of POWs is necessary to the 
executive's prosecution ofwar in order to prevent captives from rejoining the 
enemy.744 As a result, the detention of a citizen as a POW is for militarily 
administrative rather than punitive purposes, is not a badge of criminality, and 
is limited to the duration of hostilities, at the end of which the capturing power 
must repatriate its prisoners. POW detention, therefore, does not meet the two 
primary objectives of criminal punishment, those being retribution for and 
deterrence of unlawful activities.745 Under Territa, the President can 
administratively hold citizens at ms discretion to prevent their retum to battle 
while hostilities last, but such intemment cannot be of a punitive nature. 
Accordingly, the procedural protections due to a POW are possibly lower than 
those owed to an alleged unlawful combatant. Should the President seek to 
742 In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946); "The option to detain those captured in a zone 
of armed combat for the duration of hostilities belongs indisputably to the Commander in 
Chief." Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 341, per Wilkinson J., denying rehearing en banc 316 F.3d 450. 
743 156 F.2d at 145-46. 
744 Ibid. at 145. 
745 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 591, citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 
(1997); "In this respect, 'captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,' but rather 
'a simple war measure. ", Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465, quoting Winthrop, supra note 552 at 788. 
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punish a citizen captured while fighting for the enemy, he must first comply 
with due process in functionally adjudicating the individual's guilt. 
Neither the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hamdi nor the New York 
District Court in Padilla considered the actual punitive conditions that the 
prisoners endured during their detention. Both courts also emphasized the 
belligerent rather than criminal aspects of unlawful combatant status, ignoring 
its uneasy place between the dichotomous paradigrns of crime and war. The 
courts took the absence of formaI criminal charges to mean that petitioners 
were subjected only to administrative internrnent. Both courts intentionally 
overlooked the true facts of detention and naively trusted that the executive 
branch would not impose punitive conditions upon detainees who had not been 
formally prosecuted and convicted. The Fourth Circuit, for example, found 
that "Hamdi has not been charged with any crime. He is being held as an 
enemy combatant pursuant to the well-established laws and customs of 
war.,,746 The court overlooked the criminal nature of unlawful combatant 
status, while suggesting that a criminal prosecution would be highly 
inconvenient to the Governrnent while conducting war. 747 The New York 
District Court in Padilla noted the difference between lawful and unlawful 
combatants,748 while nevertheless stating that "[ n]o criminal charges have been 
filed against Padilla.,,749 The District Court stated that "[a]1though unlawful 
combatants, unlike prisoners of war, may be tried and punished by military 
tribunals, there is no basis to impose a requirement that they be punished. 
Rather, their detention for the duration of hostilities is supportable ... on that 
same ground that the detention of prisoners of war is supportable: to prevent 
them from rejoining the enemy.,,750 The Southem District Court of New York, 
746 316 F.3d at 475. 
747 Ibid. at 465-66. The Court of Appeals did not consider the possibility that the Government 
might avoid such inconveniences by simply holding captives under administrative conditions 
similar to those ofPOWs. 
748 233 F. Supp. 2d at 592-93. 
749 Ibid. at 572. 
750 316 F. Supp. 2d at 593. 
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like the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, established a theoretical 
distinction without a difference between POW and unlawful combatant status. 
Both were subject to detention at the President's discretion, and the 
administrative nature of their internment dispensed with any due process 
requirements. In addition, the two courts refused to look at the actual 
treatment of Hamdi and Padilla, to assess whether their detentions were in fact 
administrative or punitive in nature. 
The Court of Appeals in Hamdi and the District Court in Padilla thereby 
allowed the executive branch to hold an individu al as an unlawful combatant 
with the same scope of discretion as a POW, but possibly under punitive 
conditions without criminal prosecution. Both courts arrived at their 
conclusions based upon an interpretation of a passage in Quirin, stating that 
"[u]lawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention (like 
lawful combatants as prisoners of war) , but in addition they are subject to trial 
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency 
unlawful.,,751 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had repeated this 
language in Colepaugh v. Looney/52 the other World War II unlawful 
combatant case. The courts in Hamdi and Padilla took this phrase to mean 
that the Government had a choice simply to detain or altematively prosecute 
unlawful combatants, at its discretion. The facts of both Quirin and 
Colepaugh, however, do not suggest an interpretation of this passage that 
would permit the Government to detain unlawful combatants under punitive 
conditions, without first prosecuting them. In both cases, the Government 
promptly prosecuted, before military commissions, the individuals involved 
upon their arrest and designation as unlawful combatants.753 Neither case 
presented a scenario in which the Government claimed authority to hold 
unlawful combatants under punitive conditions without first affording them 
sorne due process. Instead, the facts at issue in Quirin and Colepaugh, along 
751 317 U.S. at 31 [emphasis added], quoted in Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 469 and Padilla, 233 F. 
Supp. 2d at 595. 
752 235 F.2d at 432. 
753 Fisher, Presidential War Power, supra note 18 at 205. 
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with Terrifa's distinction between administrative and punitive internment, 
suggest the correct interpretation of the above passage from Quirin. That is, 
the Government can capture and detain unlawful combatants for the 
administrative purpose of prevent their rejoining an enemy, as it does with 
POWs. However, the Government must prosecute unlawful combatants if its 
purpose is to punish them in any way for their unlawful belligerent acts. The 
Fourth Circuit and New York District Court in Hamdi and Padilla incorrectly 
applied Quirin in this regard, overlooking the actual conditions and purposes 
of detention. They refused to recognize that the actual detention conditions of 
the petitioners in those cases (as opposed to the executive branch's formaI 
characterization of the conditions), did not resemble administrative internment, 
but instead served the Government's punitive purposes of retribution for and 
deterrence of terrorism. Such detention purposes were the hallmarks of 
criminal punishment, as the District Court remarked in Padilla,754 over which 
courts could exercise review to ensure that the executive had accorded the 
individual in question due process oflaw. 
The detention conditions that Harndi and Padilla, as well as al-Marri and 
the Guantanamo detainees, endured indicated more than a Govemment 
administrative interest in preventing their rejoining enemies of the United 
States. Al-Marri, for example, was already in custody and scheduled for trial 
in a federal district court shortly after the date on which the President 
designated him an unlawful combatant and placed him under military arrest.755 
Padilla, too, was under arrest on a material witness warrant and facing criminal 
investigation when the President declared him to be an unlawful combatant, 
authorizing his immediate transfer to military custody.756 The civilian arrests 
of al-Marri and Padilla significantly lessened the necessity of their military 
confinement in order to prevent consorting with an enemy, and suggested that 
the Govemment had ulterior purposes for their detention as unlawful 
combatants. Locked in solitary confinement in military prisons rather than 
754 233 F. Supp. 2d at 591; See supra note 745 and accompanying text. 
755 See 167, above. 
756 See 169, above. 
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administrative internment facilities,757 Hamdi, Padilla, and al-Marri had no 
outside contact, while subject to intense interrogation for whatever information 
they might possesses regarding terrorist activities. Government sources 
publicized the justifications for the military detention of al-Marri, suggesting 
that the detention of aIl three citizens was in fact punitive rather than 
administrative in purpose. An unnamed senior F .B.I. official commented to 
the New York Times that the decision to declare al-Marri an unlawful 
combatant and remove him from civil court jurisdiction "held clear 
implications for other terrorism suspects. 'If 1 were in their shoes, l' d take a 
message from this,' the official said.,,758 Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Alice Fisher similarly suggested that al-Marri's transfer to military custody as 
an unlawful combatant was the best way to deter future terrorist attacks.759 
Notwithstanding the absence of formaI criminal charges, the actual conditions 
of confinement and such Government sources indicated that the executive 
detained al-Marri and the other detainees for the punitive purposes of 
deterrence and retribution. 
Before the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision, only the Eastern Virginia 
District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals gave any consideration 
to Hamdi and PadiIla's detention conditions. In finding the allegations in the 
Mobbs Declaration as insufficient to justify Harndi's detention, the Virginia 
District Court noted that the Declaration neither mentioned the unlawful nature 
of Harndi's belligerency (which the Government subsequently did in the 
757 Geneva II!, supra note 442, arts. 22, 97, which forbid holding POWs in penitentiaries, still 
might give guidance as to acceptable conditions ofpurely administrative detention ofunlawful 
combatants. 
758 "Enemy Combatant Decision Marks Change, OfficiaIs Say" New York Times (25 June 
2003) A14; The New York Times, ibid., also reported Government officiaIs as indicating that 
"[b]y declaring Mr. Marri an enemy combatant, the administration also sends a message to 
other terrorist suspects now in the criminal system - sorne charged secretly - about what could 
happen ifthey do not cooperate with investigators .... " 
759 "Enemy of the State: Bush Administration Designates Qatar Man Enemy Combatant" 
(A.P.) (23 June 2003), online: A.B.c. News <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/worldJ 
enemy _ combatant030623 .html>. 
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hearing) nor justified detention for purposes of intelligence gathering (as the 
Government also later argued).760 Furthennore, the District Court observed: 
There is nothing to indicate why he is treated differently than an the 
other captured Taliban. There is no reason given for Hamdi to be in 
solitary confinement, incommunicado for over four months and being 
held for sorne eight-to-ten months without any charges of any kind. This 
is clearly an umeasonable length of time to be held in order to bring 
criminal charges [footnote omitted]. So obviously criminal charges are 
not contemplated.761 
The District Court's cornments drew attention to the punitive conditions of 
Hamdi's detention, and noticed the absence of any criminal process. The 
Second Circuit in Padilla, moreover, held that 18 U.S.c. § 4001(a) barred the 
President's detention of citizens as unlawful combatants,162 regardless of the 
administrative or punitive nature of the intemment. Although finding, in 
contrast, that Congress' Authorization for Use of Military Force was explicit 
authorization for Hamdi's detention, the Supreme Court did not discuss his 
detention conditions. Instead, the Court took a broader view that an of the 
executive's decisions to designate, detain, or possibly try individuals as 
unlawful combatants must comply with due process under the Mathews test.763 
Such executive decisions remained subject to vigorous judicial review. The 
Mathews balancing test, however, left open the possibility that administrative 
versus punitive conditions of detention would be detenninative factors in 
weighing individual liberty interests against Government interests in national 
security. 
760 243 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
761 Ibid. at 533. 
762 See 169, above. 
763 "[C]ommitment for any pm-pose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires 
due process protection." 124 S. Ct. at 2646-47 [emphasis original], quoting Jones v. United 
States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983). 
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Unlawful combatants, by their very character, commit both criminal and 
martial acts,764 invoking executive and judicial decision-making competencies. 
Accordingly, a presidential designation of an individual as an unlawful 
combatant under the laws of war, both in its substantive status determination 
and the punitive aspects possibly attendant upon detention, is in essence a 
criminal allegation as much as it is a wartime measure. Unlawful combatant 
detentions involve executive adjudication of an individual right to personal 
liberty as weIl as executive judgment ofmilitary necessity, representing mixed 
deliberative processes over which the courts can exercise review to ensure that 
the executive complies with due process. However, the ambivalence of the 
Fourth Circuit and New York District Court about whether to treat unlawful 
combatants under a crime or war paradigm benefited the Governrnent by 
effectively allowing the executive branch to determine the extent of its own 
authority to detain?65 Such executive discretion would unbalance the 
separation of powers and permit the President to use the war powers 
functionally to adjudicate individual liberties and impact domestic affairs, 
without procedural protections and adequate judicial check.766 
The above contextual analysis of the legal status of the "war against 
terrorism" and non-state belligerents, the locus of capture and personal status 
of alleged unlawful combatants, and the conditions of their detention leads to 
764 Feldman, supra note 533 at 458-61, identifies four general elements in distinguishing 
between the commission of a crime and the waging of war. These comprise the identity of the 
actor, the jurisdictional provenance of the act, the intentions of the actor, and the scale of the 
act. As with terrorism, unlawful beUigerency, and treason, "[t]he hard cases on the border of 
the crime/war distinction show the importance of aU four criteria .... " Ibid. at 461. 
765 As Fletcher, supra note 560 at 639, somewhat cynically but accurately comments, "[w]hen 
it suits its purposes, the administration justifies its actions as the pursuit of justice; if the 
justice argument fails, the move is to think in the language ofwar and collective self-defense." 
766 Katyal and Tribe, supra note 561 at 1265-66, emphasize the danger attendant upon a 
presidential claim unilaterally to qualify and punish terrorism as unlawful belligerency. 
"[T]he [Military] Grder installs the executive branch as lawgiver as weil as law-enforcer, law-
interpreter, and law applier, asserting for the executive branch the prerogative to revise the 
jurisdictional design of the system of criminal justice and leaving to the executive the 
specification, by substantive rules promulgated as it goes along, of what might constitute 
'terrorism' or a 'terrorist group' and a ho st of other specifics left largely to the imagination. 
This 'blending of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in one person or even in one 
branch of the government is ordinarily regarded as the very acme of absolutism'" (quoting 
Reid v. Caver!, 354 U.S. l, Il (1957) (civilian wives ofmilitary personnel could not be tried 
by courts martial)). 
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two conclusions about the judicial review of unlawful combatant detentions. 
First, the jurisdictional facts predicate to triggering the President's authority to 
detain unlawful combatants under the war powers are also the same ones at 
issue in an individual's status determination. Because the executive power to 
detain is contextually dependent upon the circumstances, the courts' separation 
of powers analysis requires inquiry into the substantive merits of a particular 
case. Second, an unlawful combatant detention decision involves mixed 
executive and judicial deliberative processes. Upon a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, therefore, courts have an independent constitutional authority, 
under the separation of powers doctrine, not only to scrutinize the facts 
justifying detention, but to ensure that the executive complies with 
adjudicative standards of decision-making. Consequently, whenever the 
President exercises the war powers in a justiciable way to infringe individual 
rights or impact domestic matters, the standards of legality, procedural 
faimess, and substantive reasonableness must guide the courts in resolving the 
separation of powers issues involved. The Mathews test, adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Hamdi, incorporates these standards in marking the 
judicially reviewable constitutional boundaries to the President's exercise of 
the war powers. 
260 
Chapter XII: Post Hamdi: Towards Substantive Review of the War 
Powers 
The Mathews Test, Due Pro cess, and Un lawfu 1 Combatant Status 
Determinations 
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court applied Quirin in a way that made 
executive authority to detain unlawful combatants, under the war powers, 
dependent upon contextual considerations. Thus, the Court made it c1ear that 
judicial review of the legality of an executive detention decision required 
attention to the particular facts of the case and the adjudicative nature of that 
decision. Whatever institutional expertise the executive branch might have in 
matters of war, it did not prec1ude the courts from examining either executive 
fact-findings or decision-making processes for purposes of determining the 
lawfulness of an unlawful combatant detention. Pursuant to habeas corpus 
review, courts had an independent constitutional responsibility to ensure that 
the executive did not abuse its power, and so violate the separation of powers, 
by acting beyond its de1iberative competency and arbitrarily infringing 
individual rights. As the Hamdi plurality noticed, "[e]ven in cases in which 
the detention of enemy combatants is Iegally authorized, there remains the 
question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his 
enemy-combatant status.,,767 The executive's jurisdiction to detain 
accordingly had a procedural element to it, which courts must consider upon 
habeas review. Hamdi 's imposition of the Mathews test meant that a court 
wouId aIso have to consider substantive issues involved, in determining 
constitutionally required standards of due process and whether the executive 
had complied with them. 
767 124 S. Ct. at 2643. 
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The Ham di Court recognized that unlawful combatant detentions 
implicated the highest of concems on behalf of both parties: the personal 
liberty of the citizen and the Government's responsibility for national security. 
A court's due process analysis, pursuant to its habeas review, depended upon a 
preliminary balancing of these interests. Rejecting the Fourth Circuit's 
deferential posture to the executive's security claims, the Supreme Court 
asserted the courts' institutional responsibility and competency to scrutinize 
the relative weight of the Government's risk assessments vis-à-vis the 
individual's interest in freedom from arbitrary detention. Notwithstanding that 
Hamdi was a war powers case, the Court invoked a basic test of administrative 
law, used for evaluating the due process required whenever an executive 
agency adjudicated the legal rights of individuals: 
Both of these pOSItIons [national security versus personal liberty] 
highlight legitimate concems. And both emphasize the tension that often 
exists between the autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in 
order to pursue effectively a particular goal and the process that a citizen 
contends he is due before he is deprived of a constitutional right. The 
ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing 
interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure 
that a citizen is not "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law," is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge . .. 
768 
This balancing test meant that courts ought not always require the strict 
procedures of criminallaw or exercise de nova review, but neither should they 
too broadly defer to executive exercises of discretion. A court should rather 
weigh the competing claims of the individual and Government, in the context 
of factual circumstances and with sensitivity to the functional deliberations 
involved. Hamdi 's implication was c1ear: where the executive sought to 
deprive an individual of his personal liberty under the war powers, a court's 
habeas review of the lawfulness of detention would extend to the 
constitutional sufficiency of the decision-making process, taking into account 
substantive considerations about the facts and interests of the parties.769 
768 Ibid. at 2646 [citations omitted]. 
769 See Zadvydas v. United States, 533 V.S. 678 (2001) (Due process clause recommended an 
interpretation of federallaw that prevented the indefinite detention of a non-removable alien). 
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Hamdi therefore rejected a formalistic separation doctrine that would, as 
Justices Scalia and Thomas argued oppositely in dissent, grant to the President 
either no or absolute discretion to detain unlawful combatants under the war 
powers. Instead, the Court showed sensitivity to the mixed deliberative 
processes involved in such detention decisions. Potentially, any justiciable 
exercise of the war powers was now subject to judicial review under the same 
princip les as any other exercise of executive discretion, and the executive 
would be constitutionally required to adhere to adjudicate ideals when 
deliberating in a functionally judicial way. The Court's invocation of 
Mathews demonstrated its willingness to subject justiciable exercises of the 
war powers to broader princip les of judicial review. Tellingly, the Mathews 
case itself resides at the core of modem administrative jurisprudence. In 
Mathews, decided in 1976, the Court considered whether the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment required that a recipient of Social Security 
disability benefits receive an evidentiary hearing before their termination. The 
Court ruled that it did not. Nevertheless, the Govemment did not possess an 
absolute discretion in administering federal benefits schemes. Prior to 
Ma th ews , the Court had ruled in Goldberg v. Kelly770 that the Govemment 
must indeed afford an evidentiary hearing, approximating a judicial trial, 
before terminating an individual' s welfare benefits, which amounted to a 
constitutional property interest. Mathews, however, distinguished Goldberg 
on the facts. Determination of an individual' s statutory entitlement to welfare 
depended upon an evaluation of personal circumstances more subjective than 
the medical questions at issue in physical disability cases. Thus, a prior 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary for the administrative evaluation of 
disability, where the individual had ample opportunity to contribute to the 
medical record. Subsequent to termination of disability benefits, an individual 
could then seek an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge. 
Furthermore, the Mathews Court argued, termination of disability benefits did 
not disqualify an individual from other need-based programs, such as welfare, 
770 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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and so would not subject him to the same hardship threatened in the Goldberg 
case. 
In arriving at its decision in Mathews, the Supreme Court considered the 
case in a broad context, and avoided any strict due process requirements that 
would uniformly apply in all cases of administrative decision-making. The 
Court affirmed that the Constitution guaranteed, as a '''principle basic to our 
society, '" a '''right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous 10ss 
of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a 
criminal conviction .... ' The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. ",771 Nevertheless, the contours of that right were not rigid or 
judicially determinable in the abstracto Rather, '" [d]ue process,' 'unlike some 
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances. ",772 Instead, , .. [d]ue process is flexible and caUs for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. ",773 The 
Mathews Court then set out the constitutional test for determining just what 
process would be due under any particular set of circumstances. The test itself 
was laden with substantive determinations of the interests involved and the 
factual context surrounding them: 
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the 
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.774 
771 424 U.S. at 333, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) 
(Frankurter J., concurring) and Armstrong V. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
772 Ibid. at 334, quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
773 Ibid., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 D.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
774 Ibid. at 334-35, citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-71. 
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The strict due process required in Goldberg therefore did not forec1ose the less 
stringent process afforded the individual in Mathews. The compatibility of the 
cases was not because of the respective procedures used, but because they 
derived from a common analytical framework for applying Fifth Amendment 
due process. 
The Mathews test is accordingly a comerstone of administrative law, 
allowing courts to control facially lawful executive decisions otherwise made 
without constitutionally sufficient due process. Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act,775 for example, which puts the judicial review of 
administrative actions upon a statutory footing, due process review under 
Mathews coexists with substantive heads ofreview. Under section 706 ofthat 
Act, executive administrative actions are unlawful if they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of agency discretion. 776 Executive actions are also 
unlawful if they contravene constitutional rights, do not observe proper 
procedures, or are unsupported by substantial evidence.777 Nevertheless, the 
A.P.A. is limited in its applicability. It specifically does not inc1ude courts, 
military commissions, or wartime military authority in the field as "agencies" 
within the ambit of the Act,778 and its procedural requirements for agency 
adjudications do not apply to "the conduct of military or foreign affairs 
functions.,,779 Notwithstanding such limitations, administrative review under 
the A.P.A. reflects an interrelationship between procedural due process and 
reasonable decision-making, under the Lockean constÏtutional paradigm, that 
is constitutionally intrinsic.780 Judicial review for procedural faimess is 
775 A.P.A., 5 V.S.C. § 551 et seq. 
776 Ibid., § 706(2)(A). 
777 Ibid., § 706(2)(B), (D)-(E). 
778 Ibid., § 701(b)(1)(F)-(G). 
779 Ibid., § 554(a)(4). 
780 Masur, supra note 715 at 482, notes that judicial review of agency decisions and executive 
military activities raise similar questions about how to adjudicate issues within the specialist 
knowledge of experts, how to treat broad congressional delegations of authority, and how to 
keep the executive within legal boundaries. Thus, review of unlawful combatant detentions, 
like administrative law, requires judicial scrutiny into executive fact-findings, a distinction 
between notions of general executive authority to act and specific constraints upon it, and 
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necessary to prevent agencies either from acting ultra vires or impermissibly 
infringing individual rights based on unreasonable decisions about the relative 
weight of interests and the factual circumstances. AIso, somewhat 
tautologically, judicial review of substantive matters in tum ensures that 
procedural rights are meaningful. Without judicial inquiry into competing 
substantive interests of the individual concemed and the Govemment, the 
Govemment could essentially determine on its own the process to be given to 
an alleged unlawful combatant. Likewise, without judicial inquiry into the 
executive's decisions, the executive could take unreasonable or arbitrary 
actions either without or otherwise wholly divorced from those very 
procedures constitutionally required to prevent them. Acting in a functionally 
judicial way, without adhering to adjudicative ideals and free from check by 
the courts, the executive could therefore avoid Lockean structural protections 
for the public good. It could instead act unreasonably and in violation of its 
fiduciary obligation. 
In invoking its Mathews test, the Hamdi Court opened the door to 
substantive judicial inquiry into the President's unlawful combatant detention 
decisions, combining questions of jurisdiction, procedure, and reasonableness 
under its separation of powers analysis. Habeas corpus review of the 
lawfulness of an unlawful combatant detention requires judicial scrutiny of the 
executive's findings of predicate jurisdictional facts, as well as of the 
sufficiency of the due process afforded to the individual, determined through 
the balancing of the substantive interests at stake. Because the predicate facts 
also coincide with the unlawful belligerent acts that the individual had 
recognition that rationality review derives from "more fundamental reqUlsltes of liberal 
legality." In commenting upon the importance of "substantial evidence" review to 
administrative law, by which courts assess the weight and import of evidence justifying 
agency adjudicative decisions, Masur, ibid. at 493, touches upon the constitutional basis for 
such review. "In congruence with hard look review, the 'substantial evidence' standard stems 
from a court's duty to ensure that adjudicating agencies abide by the ground rules oftheir own 
proceedings, thus vindicating and enforcing the rule of law. . .. By consequence, 
Congressional repeal of the Administrative Procedure Act could not eliminate substantial 
evidence scrutiny as a judicial dictate any more than it could terminate hard look review. The 
princip les underlying substantial evidence are thus general to aIl expert executive branch 
bodies: absent some ulterior motivation, they should be applied with equal force to ostensibly 
'military' cases as they are to administrative ones." See also Cass R. Sunstein, 
"Administrative Law Goes to War" (2005) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2663. 
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allegedly committed, a court's review of the executive's jurisdiction to detain 
will also go to the merits of any particular case. In scrutinizing the executive' s 
decision-making under the Mathews test, a court can therefore assess the 
reasonableness of the executive's factual findings and determination as to the 
balance between the needs of national security ad individual rights. While 
reasonableness is therefore analytically distinguishable from legality and 
procedural faimess as a standard of judicial review, an three standards are 
intrinsically related, constituent parts of the executive's power to detain 
unlawful combatants under the separation of powers doctrine. 
In balancing the competing individual and Govemment interests in 
Harndi, the Supreme Court faced polar extremes. While a citizen had a 
fundamental right to be free from involuntary confinement, the Constitution 
also reposed the "core strategie matters ofwarmaking ... in the hands ofthose 
who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them.,,781 
Executive detention of unlawful combatants implicated both of these interests. 
A detention decision also involved functionally mixed deliberative processes, 
as the executive branch adjudicated the right to personalliberty under guise of 
the war powers. The Court emphasized, however, that the "starting point for 
the Mathews v Eldridge analysis is unaltered by the allegations surrounding 
the particular detainee or the organizations with which he is alleged to have 
associated.,,782 The citizen retained a fundamental right to be free from 
govemment confinement, notwithstanding the martial nature of the allegations. 
Accordingly, the "sorne evidence" standard argued by the Govemment ran an 
unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivation of that right, where a detainee 
had been previously afforded no meaningful process.783 Still, the Court did 
not discount the importance of the Govemment's position, and so rejected the 
probing, essentially de nova review of the District Court as too burdensome on 
the Govemment. Instead, the Supreme Court applied the Mathews test in an 
781 124 S. Ct. at 2647. 
782 Ibid. 
783 Ibid. at 2651. 
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attempt to reach an even balance between the competing interests at stake in 
an unlawful combatant case. 
The Court used Mathews to fashion for alleged unlawful combatants a 
basic right to a hearing, but one far removed from a regular criminal trial and 
sti11lacking in many details. The Court found that "a citizen-detainee seeking 
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of 
the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
Govemment's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.,,784 Hamdi, 
as a detainee, also "unquestionably" had a right to counsel.785 "At the same 
time," the plurality continued, "the exigencies of the circumstances may 
demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings 
may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive 
at a time of ongoing military conflict.,,786 Thus, the admission of hearsay 
evidence might be constitutionally permissible, while a "burden-shifting 
scheme" could permit the Government's factual assertions a favorable 
presumption so long as the detainee had fair opportunity to rebut.787 In 
applying Mathews, the Supreme Court thus rejected Govemment suggestions 
that the courts had a "heavily circumscribed role" and that they "must forego 
any examination of the individual case and focus exclusive1y on the legality of 
the broader detention scheme .... ,,788 Instead, the Court came to its own 
conclusions that the Government's substantive concems were not so weighty 
as to override the individual's liberty interests. In fashioning its due process 
requirements, it also independentIy determined that those procedures would 
not have "the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the 
Government forecasts.,,789 Rather, "[t]his focus meddles littIe, if at aIl, in the 
784 Ibid. at 2648. 
785 Ibid. at 2652. 
786 Ibid. at 2649. 
787 Ibid. 
788 Ibid. at 2650. 
789 Ibid. at 2649. 
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strategy or conduct of war ... ," indicating that courts would not be straying 
beyond their deliberative competency.790 Indeed, only Congress' suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus could constitutionally override an alleged 
unlawful combatant's entitlement to due process/91 and so, by extension, 
effectively preclude the courts from making substantive inquiries into the 
President's unlawful combatant detention decisions. 
Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court balanced the parties' substantive 
interests in its due process analysis, it did not resolve Hamdi's habeas petition 
on the merits. It instead remanded the case for further proceedings consistent 
with its mandated procedures. Since Hamdi afterwards struck a deal with the 
Government, whereby he surrendered his citizenship in retum for release and 
retum to Saudi Arabia,792 it feU to the lower courts to flesh out Hamdi 's 
reasoning in the other unlawful combatant cases that wou Id come before them. 
In the months following the Hamdi de ci sion, Padilla's case once again came 
up before a federal District Court, which granted the petition. Pursuant to the 
Supreme Court' s Rasul decision, Guantanamo Bay detainees filed habeas 
petitions chaUenging the lawfulness of their detentions and the constitutional 
sufficiency of the Government's newly instituted Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals. Conflicting decisions in these cases demonstrated considerable 
disagreement about just how deeply courts should delve into substantive 
matters, in light of Hamdi and the Mathews balancing test, when reviewing the 
lawfulness ofunlawful combatant detentions. As of August 2005 - the time of 
writing - it seemed certain that these cases would eventuaUy come before the 
Supreme Court for clarification of the procedural and substantive issues left 
unanswered by Hamdi. 
While the law therefore remains unsettled, these later cases reaffirmed 
the basic premise behind the Hamdi decision, despite the differences in their 
reasoning and conclusions. That is, the judicial power to review unlawful 
790 Ibid. 
791 Ibid. at 2650-51. 
792 See supra note 495. 
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combatant detentions results from a separation of powers doctrine based upon 
deliberative processes. The Supreme Court's application of the Mathews test 
recognized the functionally judicial aspect of unlawful combatant detentions, 
requiring judicial review along with the need for sorne judicial deference to the 
executive's particular expertise in matters of national security. Certainly, 
subsequent cases disagreed not just on the details of Hamdi 's mandated 
procedures, but on the constitutional rights, if any, possessed by non-citizen 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay. Disagreements notwithstanding, the post-
Hamdi cases differed not in their analytical frameworks, as much as in how 
they reconciled the overlapping institutional competencies of the executive 
and judicial branches in determining unlawful combatant status. Hamdi and 
its conflicting progeny thus maintained a conceptual unit y between the basic 
princip les oflegality, procedural faimess, and reasonable decision-making. As 
suggested by their resolution through habeas corpus proceedings, these three 
standards combine in determining the executive's power, under the separation 
of powers doctrine, to detain unlawful combatants.793 The post-Hamdi cases 
indicate how courts might now review unlawful combatant detentions, or 
indeed any justiciable exercises of the war powers, based upon interrelated 
princip les of legality, procedural faimess, and reasonableness. 
Legality of Unlawful Combatant Detentions: Substantive Considerations 
The Supreme Court in Hamdi interpreted Congress' Authorization for 
Use of Military Force as authorizing the President's detention of unlawful 
combatants. Subsequent cases in the lower courts necessarily followed the 
Supreme Court's finding, but nevertheless differed in how broadly that 
authorization extended. For example, in hearing Padilla's habeas petition, the 
District of South Carolina imputed considerable limitations upon the 
Congress' Authorization for Use of Military Force, very narrowly interpreting 
793 A doctrinal exploration of administrative law principles as applied to the habeas corpus 
review of unlawful combatant detentions is beyond the scope of this work, which remains 
concemed with the larger separation ofpowers issues involved. For an excellent discussion of 
how administrative law principles might apply to the judicial review of unlawful combatant 
detentions, see Masur, supra note 715. 
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its authorization of citizen detentions. In regard to non-citizens detained at 
Guantanamo Bay, however, judges of the D.C. District Court split radically as 
to the scope of the President's lawful authority to detain, basing their decisions 
upon whether those detainees possessed any constitutional rights. In applying 
Hamdi to the cases before them, all cases nevertheless proceeded along a 
similar line of analysis that respected the Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown 
paradigm thus depending upon whether the President exercised his war powers 
in a way having primary domestic or foreign impact. 
Padilla, whose original habeas petition the Supreme Court had found to 
be filed in the wrong venue,794 re-filed in the District Court for the District of 
South Carolina, where the Government held him in a Charleston naval brig. 
Judge Floyd, at the very beginning of his opinion, made it clear that the "sole 
question" was whether the President was authorized to detain a citizen as an 
unlawful combatant "under the unique circumstances presented here.,,795 This 
opening statement indicated that a court should not look only at the broader 
question of whether the President was congressionally authorized to detain 
unlawful combatants, but must examine the facts and substantive issues of any 
particular case to determine if detention was lawful. The South Carolina 
District Court therefore proceeded on the assumption that habeas review for 
the legality of a detention required judicial scrutiny of predicate facts and 
independent assessment of substantive matters. 
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court found that the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), requiring clear congressional 
authorization for the detention of a citizen, so as to allow the detention of 
citizens as unlawful combatants, per Quirin. However, upon Padilla's habeas 
petition, Judge Floyd interpreted such authorization as narrowly as possible. 
Pointing to the factual difference between the Quirin petitioners and Padilla, 
and noting Milligan 's distinction between combatants and civilians, the 
District Court judge found that Padilla's detention was not legally authorized 
794 542 U.S. 426. 
795 Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 679 (D. s.e. 2005). 
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under the Military Force Authorization. Quoting Ex parte Endo,196 a World 
War II Japanese detention case, Judge Floyd assumed, "'when asked to find 
implied powers in a grant of legislative or executive authority, that the law 
makers intended to place no greater restraint on the citizen than was clearly 
and unmistakably indicated by the language used. ",797 The Judge read the 
Military Force Authorization, which authorized the President to use only 
"necessary and appropriate" force, in conjunction with the factual context of 
the case and 18 U.S.c. § 4001(a). Consequently, the detention of Padilla was 
unlawful, as it was not necessary and appropriate within the provisions of the 
Military Force Authorization. Citing to Quirin, Judge Floyd pointed to several 
factual differences between the earlier case and that ofPadilla. Notably, Judge 
Floyd recognized that Padilla had not been tried by a military commission, 
nevertheless suffered detention that was meant to be preventative but was not 
so in fact, and faced potentially indefinite detention.798 Furthermore, upon his 
designation as an unlawful combatant, Padilla was no longer a threat due to his 
prior arrest in Chicago's O'Rare airport upon a material witness warrant. 
Judge Floyd thus found that: 
To be more specific, whereas it may be a necessary and appropriate use 
of force to detain a United State citizen who is captured on the 
battlefield, this Court cannot find, in narrow circumstances presented in 
796 323 V.S. 283, 300 (1944) (Continued detention of an admittedly loyal citizen was unlawful 
pursuant to regulations intended to prevent espionage and sabotage). Compare with 
Korematsu, 323 V.S. 214 (upholding executive internment of Japanese-Americans as a 
security measure during World War Two). See supra note 611; Judge Floyd's quotation of 
Endo, a decision made in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu, seerns to 
validate an observation of Burt Neubome, "The Role of Courts in Time of War" (2005) 29 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. and Soc. Change 555 at 568: "[C]onfronted with a massive national crisis, the 
Court dec1ined to interfere with a constitutionally doubtful rnilitary program (military 
Reconstruction in McCardle; Japanese-American internment in Korematsu; indefinite military 
detention of suspected terrorists in Rasul and Hamdi). Once the military program was in 
place, however, the Court in aIl three eras acted quickly and decisively to place significant 
limits on the military program in order to de fend core constitutional values." Such an 
apparently consistent approach by the Supreme Court reflects a long-standing sensitivity to 
deliberative processes, recognizing the competencies of Congress and the President to make 
decisions regarding war-making, while asserting their own power to adjudicate the right of 
individuals and restrain executive power in specifie cases. 
797 389 F. Supp. 2d at 689, quoting Endo, 323 U.S. at 300. 
798 Ibid. at 687, n. 10. 
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this case, that the same is true when a United States citizen is arrested in 
a civilian setting such as an United States airport. 799 
The facts of Padilla's detention therefore differed considerably from both the 
Quirin petitioners and Hamdi,800 meaning that Congress' Military Force 
Authorization, narrowly construed in light of Padilla's situation, did not 
authorize his detention under the circumstances. 
Judge Floyd's decision respected Hamdi, but his interpretation of the 
Military Force Authorization meant that he could find Padilla's detention 
unlawful without applying the Mathews test.801 Nevertheless, Judge Floyd's 
799 Ibid. at 689. 
800 Judge Floyd specifically drew attention to the fact that "Justice O'Connor noted at least 
nine times that the Court's holding that Mr. Hamdi's detention as an enemy combatant was 
constitutionally permissible was limited to the facts of that case." Ibid. at 685, n. 8, citing 
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635,2639-42,2642, n.1, and 2643. 
801 In relying upon the phrase "necessary and appropriate," Judge Floyd also was able to avoid 
the question as to whether Congress' Military Force Authorization limite d, as well as 
empowered, the President to detain unlawful combatants under international laws of war. 
Bradley and Goldsmith, in contrast, suggest that the Military Force Authorization acted only 
as an instrument to enable but not restrict executive war powers. They write, "Congressional 
Authorization," supra note 701 at 2097, that "[a]lthough the laws of war inform the 
boundaries of what the [Force Authorization] authorizes, that simply means that as a general 
matter the [Force Authorization] authorizes no more than what the laws ofwar permit, not that 
it incorporates law-of-war prohibitions." However, such an approach is puzzling, as in 
determining what the laws of war permit necessarily requires a delineation of their boundaries, 
beyond which the President could not act without violating international law. If the Military 
Force Authorization authorizes the President to act as far as the laws of war permit, it would 
by necessary implication establish limits to his authority. This question becomes especially 
relevant in terms of unlawful combatant detentions. Should the Military Force Authorization 
permit unlawful combatant detentions pursuant to the laws of war, then the executive 
detention power extends to and is limited by the relevant international law. While a 
declaration of war or other form of congressional authorization for hostilities are usually broad 
authorizations for the President to use military force as he sees fit, his detention of unlawful 
combatants is by contrast dependent upon the legal criteria for such status, set out in the laws 
if war. Quirin itself made this clear in relying upon the Hague Convention (later incorporated 
by the Third Geneva Convention) for establishing the definition ofunlawful combatancy. For 
a response to Bradley and Goldsmith, see Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, "International 
Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism" (2005) 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2653. In 
any case, Judge Floyd did not answer these questions, instead applying interpretational canons 
that narrowed the applicability of the Military Force Authorization so as flatly to prohibit the 
detention of a citizen in Padilla's circumstances, as not "necessary and appropriate." This is, 
ultimately, the approach also sanctioned by Bradley and Goldsmith, ibid. at 2106, when they 
suggest that "in construing the [Force Authorization], a c1ear statement requirement is 
appropriate when the President acts against non-combatants in the United States, but not when 
he engages in traditional military functions against combatants." Without a clear statement for 
such executive action, courts must then de termine who qualifies as a combatant under the 
congressional authorization, whether such authorization permits domestic exercise of the 
detention power, what the time limits for detention are, and which procedural protections are 
appropriate in making a detention decision. Courts can draw upon the laws of war for 
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decision on the legality of Padilla's detention proceeded from his scrutiny of 
the factual context of the case and a substantive assessment about what was 
"necessary and appropriate." Because Padilla was a citizen with a tenuous 
belligerent status, was captured far from a battlefield, and was already in 
federal custody as a material witness, the President was exercising the war 
powers in a way that unnecessarily and inappropriately impacted upon 
individu al rights and interfered with the operation of the domestic legal 
system. Thus, Judge Floyd ostensibly interpreted the Military Force 
Authorization sa as ta render Padilla's detention illegal, and prec1ude any 
direct analysis of the process due. Neverthe1ess, even the Judge's finding of 
illegality indirectly raised considerations behind the Mathews balancing test, 
as the Govemment's substantive interests were found not to outweigh PadiUa's 
right to personal liberty. Indeed, in interpreting the Military Force 
Authorization, Judge Floyd implied what decision-making procedures the 
Constitution required for the Govemment to detain Padilla on account of his 
allegedly unlawful conduct. Those procedures were strictly criminal ones, as 
Padilla's case was "a law enforcement matter, not a military matter."g02 The 
executive branch therefore had no jurisdiction to hold Padilla as an unlawful 
combatant under the war powers, regardless of the process it afforded him, and 
the case was more appropriately dealt with by adjudication in the courts. Such 
narrow statut ory interpretation of the Force Authorization followed in the line 
of Youngstown, meaning that the court's habeas review also reflected a 
deliberative separation of powers analysis, where executive authority to 
infringe individual rights or impact upon domestic affairs waned as the 
President redirected the war powers inward. 
Substantive issues similar to those in Padilla, above, arose in cases 
arising from the habeas petitions of non-citizen Guantanamo detainees. The 
preliminary issue in these cases was whether non-citizens had any substantive 
principled even if non-binding guidance, delegation principles, the right to habeas corpus, and 
due process considerations, among other things, when interpreting congressional force 
authorizations for purposes of unlawful combatant detentions. See generally ibid. at 2103-24, 
and "Rejoinder," supra note 523 at 2685-93. 
802 389 F. Supp. 2d at 691. 
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constitutional rights cognizable in federal courtS.803 Although the Supreme 
Court held in Rasul that federal district courts had jurisdiction over habeas 
petitions brought by the Guantanamo detainees, the Court did not decide 
whether the right to habeas corpus carried with it concomitant and substantive 
constitutional rights to be considered in the Mathews analysis. Rasul extended 
federal court jurisdiction over Guantanamo because it was under the exclusive 
control of the United States, despite being de jure sovereign territory of Cuba. 
The peculiar status of Guantanamo Bay for purposes of habeas review, as 
decided in Rasul, therefore brought into doubt the conventional assumption 
that non-citizens abroad possessed no constitutional rights upon which a 
habeas petition could rest. Judges for the D.C. District Court disagreed as to 
whether the special status of Guantanamo entitled detainees there to 
substantive constitutional rights, in addition to a right to petition for habeas. 
Courts therefore had to determine on what side of the Curtiss-
Wright/Youngstown line petitioners fell, due to the territorial status of Cuba. 
This determination would not only affect judicial interpretation of 
congressional authorization for detentions, but would affect the substantive 
balancing between the rights of detainees, if any, against those of the 
Government in determining the constitutional sufficiency of the due process 
afforded them. 
In In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,804 D.C. District Court Judge Green 
issued a memorandum opinion on eleven coordinated habeas cases, dispensing 
with the common issues of law without ruling on their individual merits. In 
her opinion, Judge Green found that non-citizens he Id in Guantanamo had 
Fifth Amendment rights, entitling them under Hamdi to the same due process 
as either a citizen, or non-citizen in sovereign United States territory, alleged 
to be an unlawful combatant. The District Court noticed that the detainees 
were subject to the "same fate as those convicted of war crimes," that being 
803 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (The Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a non-
resident alien and located in a foreign country) and Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (Constitution 
does not confer a right of personal security or an irnmunity from rnilitary trial and punishment 
upon an alien engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States). 
804 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D. D.C. 2005). 
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indefinite, potentially life imprisonment but without significant procedural 
rights.805 She thus took notice of the actual rather than formaI detention 
conditions and purposes, and found that non-citizens held in Guantanamo 
were, under the logic of Youngstown, domestic targets of the war powers. 
Their cases were therefore within the adjudicative competency of the courts, 
just like the cases of citizens. Extrapolating from Rasul 's jurisdictional 
holding, Judge Green found that "fundamental constitutional rights cannot be 
denied in terri tories under the control of the American government, even 
where the United States technically is not considered 'sovereign .... ",806 The 
Government's de facto control of Guantanamo Bay therefore placed the 
detainees there in the same legal situation as al-Marri, for example, or any 
other non-citizen he Id within the United States. 
In applying Rasul as she did, Judge Green substantively weighed the 
Government's interest against that of the petitioners, in finding that they had a 
basic right to due process. The Judge remarked, that "[r]ecognizing the 
existence of that right [to due process] at the Naval Base would not cause the 
United States government any more hardship than would recognizing the 
existence of constitutional rights of the detainees had they been he Id within the 
continental United States.,,807 Though not explicitly saying so, Judge Green's 
finding that substantive rights attached to Guantanamo habeas petitions also 
questioned the reasonableness of the Government's argument that non-citizens 
there had no substantive rights that could withstand the Government's national 
security interests. She noticed that non-citizens detained in Guantanamo were 
in no different position from that of a citizen who might be held there, while 
they potentially faced a worse situation than other non-citizens there who 
might be imprisoned for a fixed sentence following trial by a military 
commission. Unlawful combatants also faced the possibility of such a trial at 
aU times, at the executive's discretion, even though they might dispute their 
status. As such, there was no rationally justifiable reason for why the 
805 Ibid. 
806 Ibid. at 457, and 461,464. 
807 Ibid. at 463. 
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Government should deny to certain non-citizens the same procedural rights 
that similarly situated citizens, or military commission defendants, might 
enjoy in Guantanamo Bay. Because the executive functionally adjudicated the 
rights of both non-citizen and citizen detainees in Guantanamo, courts were 
institutionally competent equally to review the executive's decisions over 
either group of individuals. Detention of non-citizens was congressionally 
authorized, but the de facto domestic status of Guantanamo Bay meant that 
Hamdi and the Mathews test applied for determining just what due process 
was constitutionally required for lawful detention. 
Judge Green's decision contrasted sharply with that of Judge Leon in 
Khalid v. Bush,808 another Guantanamo habeas case to come before the D.C. 
District Court. Judge Leon drew attention to Youngstown, but found that the 
President's authorization to detain unlawful combatants must have expansive 
interpretation.809 He thereby rejected a narrow application of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hamdi, the particular facts of which might limit an 
unlawful combatant detention to battlefield captures, and so forec1osed a 
restrictive interpretation of the Authorization for Use of Military Force like 
that given to it by the South Carolina District Court in Padilla.810 While 
willing to find broad congressional authorization for detention, Judge Leon 
also found that non-citizens in Guantanamo Bay had no constitutional rights 
upon which to base their habeas c1aims. As such, the District Court refused to 
extend Rasul 's ruling on the courts' habeas jurisdiction to grant to non-citizens 
there other substantive rights. According to Judge Leon, "the Supreme Court 
[in Rasul] chose to only answer the question of jurisdiction, and not the 
question of whether these same individuals possess any substantive rights on 
the merits of their c1aims.,,811 The peculiar status of Guantanamo therefore 
meant that non-citizens detained there had a procedural right to file a habeas 
808 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. D.C. 2005). 
809 Ibid. at 318. 
810 Ibid. at 320. 
811 Ibid. at323. 
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petition, but one that did not affect the generally applicable rule that non-
citizens held abroad had no judicially cognizable constitutional rightS.812 
Judge Leon's decision meant that, while the Guantanamo petitioners 
could challenge the lawfulness of their detention in the courts, habeas review 
would be limited only to the questions of whether Congress had generally 
authorized such detentions, or the Constitution directly conferred inherent 
detention powers on the President. Such review did not permit judicial inquiry 
in the substantive merits of petitioners' claims, as "[i]n the final analysis, the 
Court's role in reviewing the military's decision to capture and detain a non-
resident alien is, and must be, highly circumscribed.,,813 This thin concept of 
legality would mean, for example, that a court should not only refuse to 
examine the merits of a non-citizen detainee's c1aim, but that it also could not 
grant the writ where habeas petitioners could prove that "the conditions of 
their custody might violate existing United States law .... ,,814 Under this 
approach to habeas review, the legality of the decision to detain was a different 
issue from the legality of the conditions of that detention. Pursuant to Rasul, 
courts could only look to see if the custody decision al one was either 
congressionally authorized or supported by inherent executive power directly 
conferred by the Constitution. Any substantive judicial inquiry into the facts 
of capture or conditions of detention "during a time of armed conflict, would, 
of course, require that Court to inject itself into sensitive matters of foreign 
affairs, military poliey, and other national seeurity areas.,,815 Judge Leon's 
812 But see Yin, supra note 452 at 1067-69, suggesting that due process rights are, 
altematively, limitations upon executive power that exist even in the absence of anyone have a 
right to seek enforcement. Thus, while non-citizens detained abroad might not have any 
substantive rights, due process would be an inherent limitation upon executive power, 
enforceable independently by the courts whenever they had habeas jurisdiction. Due process 
"rights," strictly speaking, would therefore not run with the writ, but due process "limitations" 
upon executive power would. Yin's position is interesting, as it implies a close relationship 
between due process and the separation ofpowers - a relationship, in light of Mathews, fixed 
upon the fluctuating and overlapping deliberative competencies of the branches. 
813 355 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
814 Ibid. at 324 [emphasis original], and 329. 
815 Ibid. at 326; "Moreover, the absence of federal court review of the conditions of the 
detention of a non-resident alien is also consistent with the text of the Constitution and other 
Supreme Court precedent. The Founders allocated the war powers among Congress and the 
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approach to habeas review and the separation of powers had a strong flavor of 
formalism. Contrasted with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Khalid placed 
petitioners in an intermediate territorial status under the Curtiss-Wright and 
Youngstown paradigm. Individuals could petition for habeas review under 
Rasul, but were still subject to a greater executive discretion to detain by virtue 
of their lack of citizenship and their presence in de jure foreign territory. 
Regarding the executive's use of the war powers to detain foreigners abroad, 
Judge Leon's decision gave to the President an almost absolute discretion, 
even while preserving a weak habeas review. Khalid therefore seemed to take 
the Fourth Circuit's approach to habeas review in Hamdi, since overruled by 
the Supreme Court in regard to citizen detentions, and apply it in the different 
context of the Guantanamo cases. 
Despite their different holdings on whether non-citizens held in 
Guantanamo had substantive rights, Guantanamo Detainee and Khalid rested 
on the same analytical framework established by Hamdi and Rasul. That is, 
they addressed the question of just where to draw a hne between domestically 
and foreign oriented exercises of the war powers, according to the Curtiss-
Wright/Youngstown paradigm. It just happened that Guantanamo Bay, 
because of its peculiar territorial status, fell right along that line. Depending 
upon how the D.C. District judges resolved the preliminary issue of 
Guantanamo's status, the executive's lawful authority to detain non-citizens 
there would be either nearly absolute or considerably limited by due process 
requirements, subject to judicial review inquiring into substantive issues 
behind the detention decision. Thus, while Judge Leon in Khalid cast this 
foreign and domestic divide in a formalistic light, his decision nevertheless fit 
with that of Judge Green into a deliberative separation of powers analysis, in 
which the executive and judicial branches' relative decision-making 
competencies overlapped and rested upon contextual factors. For Judge 
Green, the de facto status of Guantanamo as United States territory meant that 
detentions there had a domestic impact, which courts were institutionally 
Executive, not the Judiciary. As a general rule, therefore, the judiciary should not insinuate 
itself into foreign affairs and national security issues." Ibid. at 329. 
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competent to review to the same extent as the Supreme Court set out in 
Hamdi. To Judge Leon, on the other hand, the foreign status of Guantanamo 
engaged the broad discretion of the executive branch under what might be 
considered a Lockean "federative" power. In accordance with this narrow 
interpretation of Rasul, therefore, judicial competence did not go beyond a 
general inquiry as to whether congressional authorization for the detention 
power existed. 
The separation of powers analysis behind the decisions in Guantanamo 
Detainee and Khalid, as well as with the South Carolina District Court 
decision in Padilla, reconciled with one another in light of Hamdi and Rasul. 
That is, the President's discretion to detain non-citizens abroad remained 
exceptionally wide due to the executive branch's competence in Lockean 
"federative" affairs, matters which were resistant to adjudication in the courts. 
When the President redirected his war powers inward to detain citizens or non-
citizens within the United States as unlawful combatants, however, the 
justifications for judicial review increased. These executive unI aw fuI 
combatant detentions were functionally judicial in nature, and so subject to 
resolution by adjudication in the courts. Moreover, judicial review over 
domestic exercises of the war powers was necessary to check potential abuses 
of executive authority, thereby preserving the separation of powers' structural 
protections for individual rights. Habeas review for legality of a detention 
would therefore depend upon separation of powers concems in interpreting 
congressional authorization and applying the Mathews due process analysis 
mandated by Hamdi. Both Guantanamo Detainee and Khalid differed only as 
to their findings about the peculiar territorial status of Guantanamo Bay, and 
did not otherwise challenge the applicability of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Hamdi to the case of a citizen or non-citizen located on sovereign U.S. 
territory. 
Procedural Fairness and Reasonableness as Groundsfor Habeas Review 
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Notwithstanding its formalistic approach, Khalid still showed that 
contextual considerations shaped the courts' analysis of both executive and 
judicial authority under the separation of powers. "Having conc1uded that 
Congress, through the [Military Force Authorization], has conferred authority 
on the President to detain the petitioners," Judge Leon believed that "it would 
be impermissible ... under our constitutional system of separation of powers 
for the judiciary to engage in a substantive evaluation of the conditions of their 
detention.,,816 However, this is exactly what Judge Green did in Guantanamo 
Detainee in applying Hamdi and using the Mathews balancing test to 
determine the process due to non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay. 
Accordingly, as of August 2005, Guantanamo Detainee was one of only two 
federal court decisions exploring the scope of habeas review under the due 
process requirements of Hamdi. The other decision from the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,817 decided in summer 2005, explored 
the connection between constitutionally mandated procedures for unlawful 
combatant status determinations and the jurisdiction of military commissions 
trying them for their alleged violations of the laws of war. Both of these 
decisions, along with Padilla, Khalid, and other habeas cases to come, would 
doubtlessly work their way up to the Supreme Court for clarification of its 
ruling in Hamdi. However, a brief explanation of Judge Green's due process 
analysis in Guantanamo Detainee and the D.C. Circuit opinion in Hamdan 
sheds sorne light on the interrelationship between legality, procedural faimess 
and the reasonableness of a detention decision. 
Judge Green, finding that non-citizens he Id in Guantanamo possessed 
substantive constitutional rights, proceeded to review the procedures used in 
designating individuals to be unlawful combatants. Shortly after the Supreme 
Court' s decision in Hamdi, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz 
ordered that a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, comprised of three military 
officers, review the combatant status of each Guantanamo detainee. 818 The 
816 Ibid. at 328. 
817 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
818 Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, supra note 518. 
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Review Tribunal was to determine whether detainees were "enemy 
combatants," defined as "an individu al who was part of or supporting Taliban 
or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who had 
committed a belligerent act or had directly supported hostilities in aid of 
enemy armed forces.,,819 This definition reflected the criteria which the 
President's Military Order set forth for subjecting individuals to trial by 
military commissions,820 and was considerably broader than the definition of 
unlawful combatants in the Third Geneva Convention and used by the 
Supreme Court in Quirin. As summarized by Judge Green,821 the Tribunal 
procedures allowed detainees to hear the factual basis for their detentions, 
excepting that information which the Govemment deemed classified. 
Detainees could testify before the Tribunal, and submit exculpatory evidence 
where the Tribunal found it relevant and "reasonably available," although the 
Govemment's initial status determination was entitled to a presumption. 
Detainees had a right ta a have a military officer as a "Personal 
Representative," but not access to legal counsel. 
Judge Green found that the Review Tribunal was constitutionally 
defective, pursuant to the decision in Hamdi, for two main reasons. Pirst, the 
tribunals suffered from basic procedural defects. The Tribunals denied 
petitioners due process by disallowing their access to material evidence 
supporting their status determination, which the Govemment had deemed 
c1assified. Accordingly, in light of the petitioners' lack of access to material 
evidence, the unavailability of legal counsel to assist petitioners in their 
Tribunal hearing was impermissible. The Govemment had denied to each 
petitioner "sufficient notice of the factual basis for which he is being detained 
and a fair opportunity to rebut the govemment's evidence supporting the 
determination that he is an 'enemy combatant. ",822 As such, the Tribunal 
819 Ibid. 
820 See 194, above. 
821 355 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
822 Ibid. at 468. 
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procedures violated the due process guaranteed by Hamdi. However, Judge 
Green recognized the flexibility of procedures in how she linked the 
availability of material evidence to petitioners with their access to legal 
counsel. Therefore, due process would allow the withholding of material 
evidence from direct release to the petitioners, as long as legal counsel could 
review it on petitioners' behalf so as to "investigate and ensure the accuracy, 
reliability and relevance of that evidence. Thus, the governmental and private 
interests have been fairly balanced in a manner that satisfied constitutional due 
process requirements."S23 In so determining the precise contours of Hamdi 's 
procedural requirements, under the Mathews test, Judge Green balanced the 
competing substantive interests of the parties. 
Second, Judge Green found that the Tribunal had denied petitioners their 
due process in making its decisions on the merits. In responding to 
petitioners' c1aims that the Government had obtained incriminating statements 
and evidence through involuntary means possibly amounting to torture, she 
found that the Tribunal had not sufficiently considered such evidence as due 
process violations. Finding that due process prohibited the use of evidence 
obtained through coercion, she stated that due process therefore required "a 
thorough inquiry into the accuracy and reliability of statements alleged to have 
been obtained through torture.,,824 Without ruling on the merits of the 
petitioners' c1aims of torture, Judge Green nevertheless made it c1ear that 
courts would review how the Tribunal had weighed and considered the 
evidence before it. Not only did the use of coerced evidence violate due 
process, but potentially any detention decision not reasonably supported by the 
evidence would also be unlawful. As for the Government's definition of 
"enemy combatant," relied upon by the Tribunal, it was vague, overly broad, 
and went beyond that used in Hamdi. Judge Green noted that the 
Government's definition could support the indefinite detention of individuals 
823 Ibid. at 471; For criticism of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal procedures, and a 
generally favorable view of Judge Green's decision, see Kent Roach and Gary Trotter, 
"Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror" (2005) 109 Penn. St. L. Rev. 967 at 1015-
31. 
824 355 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73. 
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who had never actually committed a belligerent act or directly supported 
hostilities against the United States.825 Finding that the Third Geneva 
Convention applied, its Article four criteria for lawful combatancy controlled 
and required an individualized assessment of conduct, thereby prohibiting the 
Government's detention of individuals based upon associations with broad 
group categories, such as the Taliban.826 Thus, not only did the executive's 
jurisdiction to detain unlawful combatants depend upon a narrow definition of 
such status, but due process permitted courts to review how the Tribunal 
would assess the evidence in making its decisions. Judge Green's decision 
suggested, then, that courts could review whether the Tribunal's decisions as 
to facts and the competing interests of the parties were reasonable in light of 
the evidence.827 
Decided sorne months after Guantanamo Detainee, in the summer 2005, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld828 was the first Appeals Court case to look at the 
jurisdiction of military commissions over Guantanamo Bay detainees. Salim 
Ahmned Hamdan, alleged to be inter alia a driver and bodyguard to Osama 
bin Laden, filed his petition alleging that his detention at Guantanamo Bay 
was unlawful. Hamdan's petition arose before the Hamdi decision and the 
creation of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, although the Tribunal 
subsequently affirmed his status as an "enemy combatant" under the 
Government's own definition. Upon hearing Hamdan's petition, Judge 
Robertson of the D.C. District Court829 found that the Third Geneva 
825 Ibid. at 475. 
826 Ibid. at 478-80; Yin, supra note 452 at 1084-85. 
827 Judge Rens Green's decision reflects what Cass Sunstein has characterized as a minimalist 
approach to conflicts between civil liberties and national security interests, that strives for a 
middle ground between opposite extrernes of, as he terms it, liberty maximalisrn and national 
security rnaxirnalisrn. Minirnalisrn, by contrast, represents "due process writ large." Sunstein, 
"Minimalism at War" (2004) Sup. Ct. Rev. 47 at 109, describes it so: "First, Congress should 
be required to provide clear authorization for executive intrusions on interests that have a 
strong claim to constitutional protection. Second, sorne kind of hearing should be required 
before the executive deprives people of their freedorn. Third, courts should discipline 
thernselves through narrow, incornpletely theorized rulings." 
828 415 F.3d 33. 
829 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D. D.C. 2004), overruled by 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
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Convention was a self-executing treaty. Therefore, Article five required that 
Hamdan receive a hearing before a competent tribunal to deterrnine whether 
he was entitled to POW status, before he could be tried before a military 
commission. Absent such a hearing, the District Court had decided, Hamdan 
was to receive POW protection, prohibiting his trial before a military 
commission and allowing only a court martial under the U. C.MJ In any case, 
Judge Robertson found that the rules of procedure for military commissions, 
allowing exclusion of an accused from a hearing and reliance upon secret 
evidence, violated controlling provisions of the u.c.MJ 830 For these reasons, 
Judge Robertson concluded, Hamdan's trial by military commission was 
unlawful. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had little trouble reversing Judge 
Roberston's ruling, first finding that the Third Geneva Convention was not 
self-executing. Particularly, the Circuit Court noted that Rasul's extension of 
district court habeas jurisdiction over non-citizens in Guantanarno did nothing 
to "render the Geneva Convention judicially enforceable.,,831 The court's 
decision on this point echoed that of Judge Leon in Khalid, finding that Rasul 
was a jurisdictional decision that did not confer substantive constitutional 
rights on the non-citizens held in Guantanamo. However, the D.C. Circuit did 
not go this far, limiting its analysis to treaty rights only. Nevertheless, the 
court went on to find that even if the Third Geneva Convention was judicially 
enforceable, it did not apply in Hamdan's case for other reasons.832 As to any 
830 UCM.J., art. 36, at 10 U.S.C. § 836(a), provides: "Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, 
including modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military 
commissions and other rnilitary tribunals. .. may be prescribed by the President by 
regulations which shaH, so far as he considers practicable, apply the princip les of law and the 
mIe of evidence generally recognizable in the trial of criminal cases in the United States 
district courts, but which may not be contrary to or consistent with this chapter." Judge 
Robertson re1ied on Article 36, to find that UCM.J., art. 39(b), at 10 U.S.C. § 839(b) applied 
to military commissions: "When the members of a court-martial deliberate or vote, only the 
members may be present. AH other proceedings, inc1uding any other consultation of the 
members of the court with counsel or the military judge, shaH be made part of the record and 
shaH be in the presence of the accused, the defense counse1, the trial counsel, and, in cases in 
which a military judge has been detailed to the court, the military judge." 
831 415 F.3d at 40. 
832 The Circuit Court opined that the Third Geneva Convention did not apply because Hamdan 
did not meet its Article four criteria for POWs. AdditionaHy, the Court found that al-Qaeda 
was not a High Contracting Party whose members were entitled to Convention protection, 
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ambiguities about the application of the Convention 's provisions, "the 
President's reasonable view of the provision must therefore prevail.,,833 As for 
the applicability of the U CMJ., the Court found that it "imposes only 
minimal restrictions upon the form and function of military commissions. . . 
. ,,834 Nothing in its provisions or any other military regulations required a 
special status hearing before an individual stood trial as an alleged unlawful 
combatant before a military commission.835 The D.C. Circuit's decision on the 
applicability of the Convention thus only went to the issue of enforceable 
treaty rights, and the Court did not go further and consider whether Hamdan 
was constitutionally entitled to due process. Similarly, the court's refusaI to 
apply the UCMJ. was an act of statutory interpretation, and not a ruling on 
the whether other rights existed. Like the District Court below, the Court of 
Appeals did not review the sufficiency of military commission procedures 
under an independent due process analysis, preferring instead to rely upon 
claims under the Geneva Convention and the U CMJ. 
It is therefore unclear as to whether the D.C. Circuit considered the 
military commission procedures to be sufficient as a matter of legally-required 
due process, or simply expressions of executive grace established at the 
President's discretion under his war powers. The court offered only one hint 
to this important question, stating that "[t]he issue thus raised is not whether 
the commission may try [Hamdan], but rather how the commission may try 
him. That is by no stretch a jurisdictional argument." The court therefore 
deferred to the ongoing military proceedings, while reserving the possibility 
that the petitioner could later "contest his conviction in federal court after he 
exhausted his military remedies.,,836 The Circuit Court thus seemed to limit its 
habeas review to a bare examination of whether legal authorization existed for 
while the international character of the "war against terrorism" meant that the Convention did 
not apply to the action in Afghanistan as an internaI armed conflict. 415 F.3d at 40-42. 
833 Ibid. at 42. 
834 Ibid. at 43. 
835 Ibid. 
836 Ibid. at 42. 
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the executive detention of unlawful combatants. That is, upon a habeas 
petition, it would only look to see whether Congress or the Constitutional 
directly had generally authorized the trial of unlawful combatants by military 
commission, while leaving procedural questions for later appeal. Hamdan 
might accordingly proceed upon the same reasoning as Khalid, that non-
citizens abroad had no substantive due process rights on which to base a 
habeas claim. If so, Hamdan would seem, like Khalid, to rest upon an 
assumption about the territorial status of Guantanamo, in terms of the Curtiss-
Wright/Youngstown paradigm. Yet, the Circuit Court did not go this far, 
instead limiting its inquiry into substantive rights to the question of whether 
the Third Geneva Convention was self-executing and its protections therefore 
available to an alleged unlawful combatant. If taking a position like that in 
Khalid, then the Circuit Court's suggestion that petitioners might later appeal a 
military commission decision upon procedural grounds became meaningless, 
as they would have no rights upon which to ground their claims. 
Altematively, if the case is understood to presume that non-citizens in 
Guantanamo did indeed possess substantive rights, then Hamdan 
complemented Hamdi and Guantanamo Detainee by sketching out the military 
commission procedures constitutionally due to an alleged unlawful combatant 
who is a citizen or non-citizen with comparable rights. Under the latter 
interpretation, however, the court's division between the jurisdictional and 
procedural issues becomes even more puzzling. Severance of legality from 
procedural faimess and reasonableness cut against Hamdi's thrust that due 
process itself circumscribed the executive's jurisdiction to detain, allowing 
courts to balance the parties' interests and review executive decisions. 
Because it speculated upon the procedures of a military commission trial that 
had not yet taken place, however, the D.C. Circuit Court could not delve into 
the substantive rights or reasonableness of the commission's decisions. 
As the above cases show, Hamdi has opened up the prospect that courts 
can scrutinize unlawful combatant detentions based upon substantive 
considerations, in reviewing them for legality, procedural faimess, and 
reasonableness. Although courts might still extend deference to executive 
fact-findings or national security judgments, especially when acting abroad 
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against non-citizens, such deference is neither absolute nor automatic. Gone is 
a formalistic sphere of war powers, in which the actions categorized within it 
are immune from judicial review. While the President might continue to 
possess exceptional discretion when exercising his war powers abroad, the 
courts will exercise increasingly vigorous judicial review as he redirects those 
war powers inward to infringe liberties of the citizen or impact domestic 
affairs. Just how intensely courts will wish to inquire into the substantive 
issues behind an unlawful combatant detention, or other inherently justiciable 
exercise of the war powers, might vary depending upon factual circumstances, 
themselves determinative of the relative deliberative competencies of the 
executive and judicial branches. Still, the prospect of review itself should 
serve to caution the executive branch from abusing its war powers, as it might 
do when designating, detaining, and trying individuals as unlawful 
combatants. After Hamdi, judicial consideration of the deliberative processes 
involved in an unlawful combatant determination puts review of the war 
powers on a common principled footing, where the lawful exercise of 
executive power depends upon legality, procedural faimess, and 
reasonableness. This principled footing, and the judicial review of the war 
powers, rests upon the same foundations as those upon which the Constitution 
always has rested. These foundations are Lockean ones, demanding that 
govemment institutions exercise power in trust - checking and balancing one 
another - to preserve liberty and promote the public good. 
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